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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this research study is to examine the present state of
Insurance law in Cameroon with particular reference to motor insurance,
bringing out the fact that with the exception of certain areas, there exist
two systems of insurance law in Cameroon; one in the English-speaking part
and the other in the French-speaking part. This work proposes that this
distinction ought not to continue and advocates the unification of insurance
laws. For reason of space not all the fundamental principles of insurance
law and regulation will be attempted: hence some valuable material cannot be
included in this thesis.
Motor vehicle insurance was chosen for these reasons. First, it is the
most common form of insurance in both English and French-speaking Cameroon.
Second, it is, in practical terms, the most important type of liability
insurance. It is therefore, of greatest interest and relevance to the
Cameroonian public comprising insurance companies, policyholders, victims of
accidents and the dependants of victims. This has led the state to
intervene in regulating motor vehicle insurance a great deal more than in
other branches of insurance.
The approach adopted throughout is a comparative one, involving
English, French and Cameroonian law.
, In order to provide the reader with a background to the existence of
the two legal systems in Cameroon, the introductory chapter traces the
evolution of law with particular reference to the colonial era. The Reason
for Government Regulation of certain aspects of insurance law in the
countries involved is then examined (Chapter One). This intervention has
been exercised through Government Control of Insurance Concerns (Chapter
Two), Compulsory Motor and other Insurances (Chapter Three), the provision
of a .Motor Insurance Fund (Chapter Four) and Regulation of Insurance
Intermediaries (parts of Chapter Six). In the above areas where the
government has intervened there now exists considerable uniformity in
insurance law' and practice throughout the Republic of Cameroon. However,
there are still other aspects of the insurance transaction in which there
1
are no uniform laws (see parts of Chapter Three dealing with the conceptual
basis of liability and parts of Chapter Six dealing with Insurance
Intermediaries and Disclosure. Further, see Chapters Five, Seven and Eight
dealing with the Formation of the Insurance Contract, the Construction of
the Insurance Contract and the Settlement Process respectively.
Finally, this work concludes with proposals for reforming the present
laws based on the material discussed, and in particular, a proposal for a
Uniform Insurance Code for Cameroon.
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applicable to motor vehicles.
Order No. 750-MINFI-DCE5 of 7 August 1985 fixing the amount
of contribution by the Insurance Companies to the Motor
Insurance Fund for the period of 1st January to 31st December
1985.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this general introduction is to present the essential
characteristic features of the Cameroonian legal system. The approach to the
subject adopted here is historical as the present legal structure reflects
Cameroon's colonial past.
I HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CAMEROONIAN LEGAL SYSTEM
After its discovery by European explorers and merchants, Cameroon '
underwent	 a triple colonial experience - German, English and French
domination.
2
1 At the' end of the fifteenth century, Portuguese explorers bapti,sed
the Wouri River on whose estuary stands the coastal territory around
the modern city of Douala, 'Rio dos Cameroes' after the large pink
prawns found there; from this came the country's present name:
Cameroon. The appellation Cameroon was spelt differently throughout
the country's colonial history: Kamerun by the Germans; Cameroun by
the French and Cameroons by the English. In this study all these
forms of the name will be found according to whether mention is made
of the territory under German, French or British Colonial rule. For
the period since unification (that is, 1961 and beyond), .t* le form
Cameroon will be used.
• 2 See Monie J.N., The Development of the Laws and constitution of 
Cameroon, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, July 1970.
Further details on Cameroon in the colonial era can be found in the
following works:- H.R. Rudin, Germans in the Cameroon 1884-1914,
New Haven, 1938; David E. Gardiner, Cameroon: United Nations 
Challenge to French Policy, London, Oxford Univer§ity Press, 1963;
Victor T. Le Vine, The Cameroon Federal Republic, Cornell, 1971;
Harold D. Nelson, Area Handbook for the United Republic of Cameroon,
Washington D.C., 1974; Mveng Englebert, Histoire du Cameroun, Paris,
1963; W.R. Johnson, The Cameroon Federation: Political Integration
in a Fragmentary Society, Princeton, 1970.
2GERMAN ANNEXATION OF CAMEROON
The Germans were the first European power to establish a protectorate
over Kamerun.	 On 12 July 1884 Gustav Nactigal, Bismarck's envoy, signed a
treaty with two Cameroonian Kings in Douala on behalf of the German
Government. Two days later on 14 July 1884 the German protectorate of
Kamerun was officially proclaimed.	 At the Berlin Conference Britain and
France agreed to abandon any further claims on Cameroon and recognised
Germany's annexation of Kamerun 3 .	 Germany then proceeded to demarcate the
western boundary with French Equatorial Africa. By 1887, German sovereignty
over the Kamerun was firmly established.
	 For some thirty two years
thereafter until March 1916, Kamerun was a German colony subject to Imperial
German Law
4
.
During German rule civil
	 administration
	 was closely allied to
jurisdiction in the courts. The head of the German administration in Kamerun
was the Governor who was initially responsible to the Chancellor but later to
the Colonial Office. The Governor was empowered to legislate for the country
and to administer the courts. The English-supervised Douala Court of Equity
which had been set up in 1856 by the European Mercantile Community to resolve
trade disputes continued to operate. Such a vestige of British influence was
irksome to the Germans. Consequently this court was abolished in 1885.
Governor Soden set up a temporary court (similar to the consular courts in
British territories) in Douala with himself as President.
Two basic Acts were passed declaring German law applicable to Europeans
In German colonies. The first was the law regarding Consular Jurisdiction
3	 See: Cameroon - Handbook prepared under direction of the Historical
section of the Foreign Office - No.118 February 1919, pp.15-25:
4	 See generally, Victor T. Le Vine, op.	 cit., pp.22-31; N. Rubin,
Cameroon: An African Federation, London, 1971 pp.23-43.
• dated 7 April 1900 and the second was the Colonial Law dated 10 September,
1900.	 In terms of these instruments the administration of justice with
regard to Europeans in the territory was to be governed by the laws of the
German civil and criminal codes which became applicable in Kamerun. The
administration of justice with regard to Cameroonians was governed by
ordinances. Section 4 of the Colonial Law of 1900 vested in the Kaiser the
right to legislate for the colonies by virtue of his royal prerogative.
Generally, the exercise of his powers was delegated to the Imperial
Chancellor and the Governor. There was no codification of the substantive
law and procedure. In practice, the civil code, tempered by such customary
laws as could be ascertained, applied.
The system of courts also followed a dual pattern: two sets of courts
were established, one for Europeans and another for Africans. An evaluation
of German colonial justice would
	 portray	 a	 discriminatory
	 policy.
Paradoxically, this was beneficial for the well-being of the indigenes as it
maintained, encouraged and fostered native law and custom, which today is the
only law truly Cameroonian in origin.
THE BRITISH AND FRENCH IN CAMEROON
The Germans were defeated in the First World War by the British and
French forces in Cameroon in 1916. In 1915 Britain and France agreed to
maintain a- condominium until the collapse of German resistance in the
territory. An agreement was reached on 4 March,. 1916 which ended the
condominium and delineated the zones of influence of France and Britain.
France obtained the bulk of Cameroon land area and population and Britain
acquired two non-contiguous strips of Cameroon territory bordering Nigeria.
•••
A • I
4Britain's primary concern was to secure what she regarded as better
boundaries for her vast territory of Nigeria 5
 . By the treaty of Versailles,
Germany renounced all rights over her overseas possessions including Cameroon
in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers 6 .
Britain and France jointly recommended to the Council of the League of
Nations the conferment upon themselves of mandates to administer the
territory of Cameroon in accordance with article 22 of the Covenant of the
League of Nations. Great Britain administered the portion of the territory
lying to the west and France that lying to the east of the frontier line
fixed by a joint declaration signed in .London on 10 July, 1919 7 . The
recommended mandates were confirmed by the League of Nations, the terms of
which were defined by Acts done at London on 20 July 1922. The terms of the
mandates agreement were identical. Article 9 stipulated that:
"The Mandatory shall have full powers of administration and legislation
in the area subject to the mandate. This area shall be administered in
accordance with the laws of the Mandatory as an integral part of his
territory 	
It further provided that:
"The Mandatory shall therefore be at liberty to apply his laws to the
territory subject to the mandate, with such modifications as may be
required by local conditions 	
5	 See N. Rubin, op cit., pp.71-79; Victor T. Le Vine, op. cit., p.32.
6	 Article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles, 28 June 1919.
7 For the Franco-British declaration of 1919 fix jTg the frontier line
between the two Cameroons, see, Annexes 374f and 374g to the Minutes
of the Nineteenth Sessions of the Council of the League of Nations,
Appendices: League of Nations Official Journal, August 1922, 872 and
877.
This article provides the basis, and officially marks the beginning, of the
duality of Western legal systems which the people of Cameroon have since
experienced and to which they remain subject to this day. 	 Consequently, it
is of crucial importance in the legal history of Cameroon.
After the second World War, events took a different turn and new
elements were introduced in the process of international supervision - the
trusteeship system was created by the United Nations. Pursuant to articles
75 and 77 of the United Nations Charter of 26 June, 1945 France and Britain
indicated their desire to place their respective portions of Cameroon under
the new international trusteeship system
8
.	 The General Assembly of the
United Nations converted the existing mandates into trusteeships and defined
their terms by virtue of article 85 of the U.N. Charter
9
. Article 5(a) of
the Trusteeship Agreement with Great Britain and Article 4(1) with France re-
enacted Article 9 of the League of Nations Mandate, the terms of which have
been,mentioned previously.
10
Clearly then, with effect at least from 29 July
1922, Cameroon was divided into two parts
10A
; one, administered by
8 See the preamble to the respective Trusteeship Agreements for
British Administration in Cameroon and French Administration in
Cameroon; the United Nations General Assembly 'Official Records,
1946, Supplement No.513 December 1946, New York 1946.
9 These terms are set out in the  United Nations General Assembly
Official Records, 1946, op. cit., pp.21-22 ip respect of British
Cameroons and pp.27-28 in respect of French Cameroon.
10 Supra, at p.4.
10A At present the Republic of Cameroon comprises the territory formerly
under French mandate and the southern portion of Cameroon formerly
under British administration.
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Great Britain and subject to the English system of law and justice and the
other administered by France and subject to French law and justice. Both
Britain and France were to lead Cameroon to independence 11 .
,	 t
Great Britain further divided her portion of Cameroon into two
territories - Northern and Southern Cameroons, both of which she administered
as integral parts of her neighbouring colony of Nigeria through which the
institutions and practices of English justice were transplanted into British
Cameroon. It is in this connection that it will be seen 11A
 how English law
was received into Cameroon.
The main facet of British colonial administration was indirect rule.
Indirect rule implies the slow and gradual development of customary law and
institutions along traditional lines but it also necessitates the existence
4
of a native court system side by side with a system of British established
courts which applied English law to cases involving non-natives or concerning
non-customary disputes.
	 The whole arrangement resulted in a kind of legal
dualism with respect to both the two bodies of law and the two sets of
courts. There was the British established system of courts applying mainly
English law subject to local adaptations and modifications and the indigenous
system of traditional courts applying mainly customary law or such part of it
as was not considered to be repugnant to the principles of 'natural justice,
equity and good conscience'. One of the inevitable consequences of British
rule over dependent territories was the introduction into them of English law
and legal system alongside the existing local laws.
11 See Victor T. Le Vine, The Cameroon from Mandate to Independence,
University of California Press, 1964, pp.88-104 and 211 et seg.
11A Infra, pp.11-12.
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France administered her portion of Cameroon together with her colonies
in French Equatorial Africa 12
 .	 French policy did not aim at fitting the
inhabitants of her colonies for eventual and complete self-government.
	 Its
colonial policy oscillated between the two poles of Assimilation and
.	 13
Association . The system of dual legal status found further expression in
the courts and the legal system.
	 Separate legal systems existed to
distinguish those Africans assimilated to European law (Citoyens) from those
,
N
12 It should be noted that Cameroon was technically not a colony of
France. The head of the colonialadministration in French Cameroon
was the Commissioner of the republic - Commissaire de la R‘publique 
appointed by, and representing the government in Paris. His
functions were similar to those of the Governor-General and regional
Governors of the colonies in French Equatorial Africa. As will be
seen later, this technical difference in international legal status
made some difference to the way France administered the territory.
The laws in France and French Equatorial Africa were not directly
applicable in Cameroon unless rendered as such by subordinate
legislation. For a detailed account of French administration of
Cameroon see: Jean Suret-Canale, French Colonialism in Tropical 
Africa: 1900-1945, PICA Press, New York 1971, pp.37-42; .J.H.
Godfrey, French Equatorial Africa and Cameroons, Geographical
Handbook Series, Naval Intelligence Division, Oxford 1942, pp.242-
299.
13 For details on French colonial policy see generally, David E.
Gardiner, Cameroon: United Nations Challenge to French Policy,
London, Oxford University Press 1963; Victor T. Le Vine, op. cit.,
,
pp.88-105.
8subject to native custom (Su'ets) 14 .	 For 'citoyens'	 in Cameroun (as in
French Equatorial Africa) the full set of Metropolitan Codes (Civil,
Commercial and Penal, to mention a few) were applicable.
The system of 'Justice indiale' was created in Cameroun by a decree of
23 April 1921 and was administered by tribunals. 	 These tribunals had
jurisdiction over all Cameroonian 'suJets' and followed the procedure
prescribed by local custom and applied customary laws so long as they did not
conflict with the principles of French civilisation.
International surveillance of Cameroon under the British and French
administrations was of considerable significance throughout the period of the
mandate	 and trusteeship system.	 Colonial administration of Cameroon
bequeathed a considerable legacy of development not only in the legal sphere
but also in respect of economic, social and political advancement. This was
in consonance with article 76 of the United Nations Charter which provided
that the trusteeship existed in order to:
":..promote	 the	 political,	 economic,	 social,	 and educational
advancement	 of	 the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their
progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be
appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples
and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned ..."
The spirit"of this article was carried through when Britain and France
granted independence to their dependencies.
14 A 'citoyen . was a Frenchman or native who had attained French
culture and had the civil and political rights of persons of French
origin (also known as assimi16s or evolurs). A 'sujet' was a native
who had not been assimilated.
-9 -
From Independence to Present Day 
On 1 January 1960, the Eastern Cameroun which had been administered by
the French gained independence from France and later that year on 1 October
1960, Nigeria became independent. The Northern Cameroons voted in a United
Nations .
 supervised plebiscite held on 11 February 1961 in favour of accession
to independence by joining the neighbouring Federation of Nigeria and duly
became part of the latter. The then Southern Cameroons opted to unite with
East Cameroon instead of staying with Nigeria through which it had been
administered by the British.
	 Consequently, on 1 October 1961 the Federal
Republic of Cameroon was born with two states having different languages,
laws and legal systems. Within the Federation the former British territory
(Southern Cameroons) became the state of West Cameroon and the former French
territory, the state of East Cameroon. The Federation was transitional and
ultimately by a referendum on 20 May 1972 the Federal Republic of Cameroon
was abolished and the United Republic of Cameroon came into being 15 .
It will be seen
15A
 in our discussion on the sources of law in Cameroon
that the colonial history was not without its impact on the legal system of
Cameroon. At independence it inherited all the existing laws in both
federated states. This dual system accounts for the common and civil law
flavour in the Cameroonian legal system.
15 By a constitutional amendment of January 1984, t6e epithet "United"
was dropped out of the name of the country which henceforth is to be
known simply as the Republic of Cameroon.
15A Infra., pp.10-24.
I
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II	 THE SOURCES OF LAW IN CAMEROON
Before the arrival of	 the European colonisers indigenous legal
institutions - (customary courts) were found everywhere. Nevertheless their
arrival had far-reaching effects on the Cameroonian legal system.	 Professor
Allott has observed that:
"The arrival of European	 colonial powers wrought a fundamental
revolution in African legal arrangements, the results of which are with
us to this day. The nature of the revolution varied somewhat with the
different colonial powers, but in general each power first introduced
its own legal system or some variant of it as the fundamental and
general law of territories, and second, permitted the regulated
continuance of traditional African law and judicial institutions except
where they ran counter to the demands of colonial administration or
were thought
	
repugnant' to 'civilised' ideas	 of	 justice	 and
humanity"
16
.
In this respect the sources of law in Cameroon can be traced to the
foreign received laws and the indigenous sources. Cameroon's legal heritage
is derived basically from two extraneous legal systems.	 Mention could be
made of the influence of German law but since that law had no material
influence on the insurance law of Cameroon, the present discussion will be
substantially devoted to the reception of common and civil law into Cameroon.
A. FOREIGN SOURCES OF LAW
1. German Law 
As has already been pointed. out
16A
, German rule in Cameroon lasted for
only thirty years from 1884 to 1914. This is a short period by any standard
16 See A.N. Allott, New Essays in African Law, London, Butterworths,
1970 at p.11.
16A Supra, at p.2.
but the German administration established some basis in the economic and
.	 social fields.	 Its main concern was economic.
	 In this connection it
concentrated in the establishment of plantations. The Germans left little
imprint by way of legal development. Much of what is left is in the field of
land law. The present land law, Ordinance No.74-1 of 6 July 1974 in Cameroon
establishing rules governing land tenure is a reflection of German colonial
land policy - Schutzgebiet Von Kamerun.
2. The reception of English law in Cameroon via Nigeria 
It was earlier observed 16B that under the mandate and trusteeship
systems Britain administered CamerooA integrally with her colony of Nigeria.
It was in this connection that English law was received into Cameroon,
namely, through Nigeria.
The British Cameroons Administration Order in Council No.3 of 1923
provided that those parts of the Cameroon under British Mandate adjoining the
northern and southern provinces of the protectorate of Nigeria should be
administered as integral parts
	 of	 Northern
	 and	 Southern	 Nigeria,
respectively. By virtue of Ordinance No.5 of 1924, all Ordinances enacted in
Nigeria after February 1924 were applicable to the Cameroons under British
Mandate.	 This ordinance is thus the enabling legislation which makes the
application of Nigerian and English law possible in Cameroon.
In conformity with the political wishes of the Southern Cameroonians,
the Southern Cameroons achieved in 1954 quasi-regional status within the
colonial Federation of Nigeria and was endowed with its .own Legislative House
and Executive Counci1 17 . The Nigerian (Constitution) Order in Council, 1954
188 Supra . , at p.6.
17 See Report of the Conference on the Nigerian Constitution held in
London in July and August 1953. Cmnd.8934, London, H.M.S.O. 1953
Annex VI at p.22.
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provided for the 'regionalisation' of the judiciary. 	 It provided for High
Courts for each of the regions, a High Court for Lagos and a High Court for
the Southern Cameroons and established a Federal Supreme Court as a Court of
Appeal from the High Courts.	 The responsibility of administering the law
thus received was that of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in Lagos.
Section 11 of the Southern Cameroons High Court Law of 1955 provided
that:
"Subject to the provisions of this Law or any other written law, the
common law, the doctrines of equity, and the statutes of general
application which were in force in England on the first day of
January, 1900, shall be, in so far as they relate to any matter with
respect to which the Legislature of the Southern Cameroons is for the
time being competent to make laws, be in force within the
jurisdiction of the courts constituted by this law".
This triple formula by which English law was generally transplanted into
British Cameroons and other British territories has given rise to academic
controversy as to whether the cut-off date of 1 January 1900 applies to all
.., three sources of law - common law, equity and statute - or only tp . statute
18
.
Whatever the outcome of this controversy, courts in the former British
Cameroons continue to this day to cite English cases decided long after
18 See A. Allott, New Essays in African Law, London 1970, pp.28-69.
For other views on the subject, see A.E.W. Park, The Sources of 
Nigerian Law, London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1963, pp.19-21; 0.8.
Nwabueze, The Machinery of Justice in Nigeria, London, Butterworths,
1963 pp.19-22; T.O. Elias, The British Colonial Law, London, Stevens
and Sons Ltd., 1963 pp.35-36.
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1900 as authority for their decisions 19 .	 The significance of the general
reception of English law is that it provides the residual law of English-
speaking Cameroon, to which reference is made in the absence of any express
rule deriving from specific local law.
3: The reception of French Law 
The French-speaking portion of Cameroun as mentioned earlier 19A
 was not
a colony under the League of Nations Mandate 20 .	 In any case, the French
Parliament did not legislate directly for the colonies; and an Act of
Parliament did not apply to the colonies unless it was specifically extended
to them by an additional instrument 21 .	 Generally, legislation for the
19 See, for example, cases in the English Speaking Cameroon: Emmanuel 
Aqu Ukpai and S.O.R.A.R.A.F. Compagnie Gen6ral d'Assurances v. 
Regina Azonqfack Fonqkwe and 7 others, Civil Appeal No.CAS WP/16/75
of 12 January 1976, Buea, (Unreported). In this case Justice 0.M.
Inglis cited and considered the judgment of Greer L.J. in Flint V. 
Lovell [1935] 1 K.B. 354 at 360; see further judgments: Samuel 
Jenqob Gizanq v. Onuoha John, John Nqassa and Guardian Royal 
Exchange Assurance (Cameroon) Ltd., Suit No.HCSW/6/75 of 4 August
1976, Buea (Unreported) in which justice 0.M. Inglis relied on the
judgment of Lord Morris in West v. Shephard [1964] A.C. 326 at 346;
In eases of Henry Che v. Charles N. Tayim and Mutuelle Aqricole 
d'Assurances, Suit No.HCB/18/1976 of 18 February 1977, Bamenda
(Unreported) and Boniface Fuh v. Simon Nfonkwa Philimone Nsah and 
Mutuelle Aqricole d'Assurances, Suit No.HCB/1976 of 5 July 1977,
Bamenda, (Unreported) Justice T.E. Mbuagbaw relied on three post
1900 English decisions in establishing negligence - two of which
are: National Coal Board v. England [1954] A.C. 403; and Kemp and 
Dougal v. Darnqavil Coal Co. Ltd. (1909) S.C. 1314 at 1319. See
further, A.N. Allott, "The Authority of English Decisions in
Colonial Courts", (1957), J.A.L. 23. A justification for references
to common law judgments after 1900 may be based on the fact that
common law is a fluid concept and cannot be determined with
reference to any particular period. Common law and the doctrines of
equity are ambulatory in their application and therefore cannot be
stultified at any particular . date.
19A Supra, note 12.
20 The signatories to the Franco-British declaration of 1919 fixing the
frontier boundaries were not foreign Ministry Officials - 'or Great
Britain the responsible official was the Secretary of State for the
Colonies and for France, the Minister of the Colonies.
21 For a discussion of the application of. French law in French African
countries, see Jeswald W. Salacuse, An Introduction to Law in 
French-speakinq Africa, Vol.I: Africa South of the Sahara, 1969,
pp.11-12.
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colonies was enacted by decree of the President. Before coming into force in
any colony the presidential decree had to be promulgated locally by order of
the Governor.	 The laws in force in the colonies of French West Africa and
French Equatorial Africa did not apply ipso facto in Cameroun. In 1924 all
laws so far applicable in French Equatorial Africa were renderetV,applicable
en bloc to the mandated territory of Cameroun by decree of 22 May 1924 22 .
The laws in force in French Equatorial Africa embraced French Acts of
Parliament, Presidential Decrees, Orders in Council of the Governor General,
French Codes, Administrative law and Native customary law. Clearly then, the
decree of 22 May, 1924 is the enabling statute which renders the application
of French law possible in Cameroun. The effect of this was to introduce,
among others, the French Civil Code (Code Civil or Code Napoleon) and the
French Commercial Code (Code de Commerce) which continue to serve as the
primary source of civil law in the French-speaking Cameroun 23 . Further laws
were rendered applicable by order of the Governor of French Cameroun. In
1930, the Insurance Law of 13 July, 1930 24
 was passed by the legislator in
France. Seven years later the 1930 law was rendered applicable to Cameroun
by Decree of 19 March 1937.
	 Furthermore, an Ordinance of 29 September 1945
rendered applicable in Cameroun all basic French insurance legislation
22 See ITapport Annuel du Gouvernement Franais sur l'Administration 
sous mandat des territoires du Cameroun pour l'ann6e 1924, Paris,
1925 at p.31.
23 See Gaston-Jean Bouvenet and Rena Bourdin, Codes et Lois du Cameroun 
Vol.II 1956, see pp.9-160 for provisions of • the Civil Code and
pp.331-509 for the provisions of the Commercial Code.
24 This law is hereinafter referred to and cited as 'the Law of 13 July
1930'.
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thereby importing the French
	 law	 of	 June 1938 regulating insurance
companies
25
.
To give effect to the exportation of French laws, the court structure was
organised for complete reception. By a Presidential decree of 30 June 1935, a
Court of Appeal at Brazzaville was constituted. This court dealt with appeals
from Cameroun and from its decision there lay a further appeal to the 'Cour de 
cassation' 26 at Paris. The local tribunals of the 'Justice Franvise' in the
Cameroun followed the model of that in French Equatorial Africa. These were a
criminal court sitting normally at Douala, a tribunal of first instance at
Douala, a Justice of the Peace Court with ordinary jurisdiction in other
regions. Thus French law was also received through the judicial system by the
courts applying French law.
B. INDIGENOUS SOURCES OF LAW
1. Customary law 
Customary law was kept alive by the British and French who applied it to
the natives'. There is no single, uniform set of customs prevailing throughout
the country due to the numerous ethnic groupings, each with its own traditions
and institutions.	 Customary law is a blanket description covering many
different systems largely tribal in origin and usually operated within the
area occupied by the tribe. One feature of customary law which transcends the
whole structure is that it is unwritten, and a "mirror of accepted usage" 27 .
Native law is the legal aspect of tribal life, established by evidence and by
25 For the text of the French insurance legislation reproduced in whole
in French-speaking Cameroon see: Gaston-Jean Bouvenet and Rene
Bourdin, op. cit., pp.161-219.
26 See note 34, below, for authority of the decisions of the Cour de 
cessation. This court is the highest judicial tribunal in France.
27 Owoniiin v. Omotosho (1961) 1 All N.L.R. 304 at 309.
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judicial notice in customary courts. These courts have original jurisdiction
in civil matters especially in respect of family, land and property matters
but no criminal jurisdiction.
In the English-speaking provinces of Cameroon, customary law is
recognised by section 27 of the Southern Cameroon High Court Law of 1955. It
provides that:
"The High Court shall observe and enforce the observance of every
native law and custom which is applicable and is not repugnant to
natural justice, equity and good conscience, not incompatible either
directly or by implication with any law for the time being in force,
and nothing in this Act shall deprive any person of the benefit of any
such native law and custom."
Customary laws are subject to certain general tests of validity before they
29
can be enforced
28
. In this respect T. Olawale Elias noted that 	 •
"Whenever English law was introduced into a colony the traditional
British policy has been to give recognition to such aspects of
customary law as are found to be well established and not contrary to
morality or justice.	 Sometimes, recognition is clear and prompt, as
when the local community has at the time of British advent reached a
comparatively advanced stage of civilization and its customary law is
fairly firm and ascertainable, at least in essentials".
28 See T. Olawale Elias, British Colonial Law - A Comparative Study of
the Interaction between English and Local Laws in British 
Dependencies, London, Stevens & Sons, 1962 pp.101-110.
29 Ibid., at 101; Customary laws were recognised if they were purged of
all primitive ideas and origins, that is, not barbarous, see further
discussion at pp.106-110.
- 17 -
Similarly, in English law Sir William Blackstone commented that 
30
:
"When a custom is actually proved to exist, the next enquiry is into
the legality of it; for if it is not a good custom it ought to be no
longer used. "Malus usus abolendus est is an established maxim of the
law. To make a particular custom good, the following are necessary
requisites ... That it have been used so long, that the memory of man
runneth not to the contrary ...",
He went on to list other tests of validity such as that the custom must have
been continued, peaceably enjoyed, reasonable, certain, compulsory and,
finally, consistent with other customs.
In the French-speaking provinces of Cameroon customary courts were
integrated into the judicial system in 1959 by Ordinance No.59/86 of December
1959. At present, Customary courts are included in the hierarchy of courts
under the Ministry of Justice
30A
.
Article 46 of the 1961 Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Cameroon, now Article 38 of the Constitution of (United) Republic of
Cameroon, maintains the observance of "native law and custom" as a source of
Cameroonian law.
2.	 Local Legislation 
At the present day legislation is the principal agency of law reform
and with the tendency towards codification, it is becoming the most important
source of Cameroonian law. Local statutes take precedence over all the other
30 See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: A 
Facsimile of the First Edition of 1756-1769, Vol.I - 'Of the Rights 
' of Persons', Univ. of Chicago Press, 1979 p.76 and pp.77-78.
30A Ordinance No.72/21 of 19 October 1972, organising the structure of
the courts in the (United) Republic of Cameroon.
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sources of law. Local legislation may abolish, alter, supersede or maintain
In force any foreign received laws. Foreign laws are abrogated if local
legislation is enacted whose content makes it clear that it is intended to
cover ground previously covered by English or French law.
A fur.ther characteristic feature of Cameroonian legislation that
enhances its importance among the other sources of law is its unlimited
territorial application, that is, it is the only source of law whose rules
prima facie apply to the entire country. Since 1961 the aim has been to
harmpnise the laws in both the English and French-speaking provinces. By
1967, the process of harmonisation and integration of laws had really
progressed. Federal Law No.67 - LF - 1 of 12 June 1967 introduced Book II of
the Penal Code which came into force on October 1, 1967.
,
Before that, Book I was introduced in 1965 and entered into force on 1
October ' 1966.	 The Cameroon penal code applies equally and uniformly
throughout the country. It is the result of a detailed study of both systems
of criminal law by a commission comprising judges and lawyers both in private
practice and in government service and of Cameroonian, French and English
nationality. Following this, Labour Law was codified by Law No.67 - LF - 6
of 12 June 1967.
	
These are examples of legal integration by way of
codification of laws to eradicate Cameroon's legal hydra (dualism). 	 In the
specific domain of insurance law, although there is as yet no general
uniformity," isolated instances increasingly exist of legislation which is
intended' to apply uniformly throughout Cameroon 31 .
,
31 See infra pp.43-297 on the uniform legislation applicable to the
Republic .
 of Cameroon in Chapters One to Four an.d parts of Chapter
Six of this study. See further legislation in Lgqislation 
Camerounaise de l'Assurance, Imprimerie Nationale, Yaoundg.
And also see S.A. Fonkam, "Insurance Law and Practice in Cameroon",
(1985) 19, No.2 Journal of World Trade Law 136.
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There is a mass of statute law, much of it enacted only since the
Federation.	 The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Cameroon, in its
article 46 maintained in force all existing laws in both federated states
which were not in contradiction with the Constitution itself. Upon the
demise of the Federation, a similar provision of the unitary Constitution of
2 June 1972, article 43, carried over:
"The legislation resulting from the laws and regulations applicable in
the Federated State • • • in all of their dispositions which are not
contrary to the stipulations of this Constitution ...".
One result has been the perpetuation of two systems of law in Cameroon.
4
The 'existing laws' in the French-speaking provinces (former East
Cameroon) comprise local legislation and such French laws and instruments as
wereexpressly applied before independence. A broad categorisation of these
comprises: (a) Legislation of the various legislatures of French Cameroon
until 1960; (b) Legislation of the Republic of Cameroon between 1 January
1960 • and 1 October 1961; (c) Legislation of the East Cameroon House of
Assembly and of the Federal Assembly between 1961 and 1972 and (d)
Legislation of the National Assembly of the (United) Republic of Cameroon
since June 1972.
The 'existing laws' in the English-speaking provinces (former West
Cameroon) comprise basically: (a) the laws applicable in Nigeria, that is,
the general principles of English law and equity together with English
statute law before 1 January 1900; (b) Any instrument such as an Order in
Council emanating directly from the United Kingdom .
 government; (c) the
Legislation of the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly from 1954 to 1961;
(d) Legislation of the West Cameroon House of Assembly and of the Federal
Assembly between 1961 and 1972 and (e) Legislation of the National Assembly
of the (United) Republic of Cameroon since 1972.
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Article 43 of the Constitution of the (United) Republic of Cameroon
preserves all legislation passed before June 1972, which has not been amended
or repealed by subsequent enactments. From time to time the President of the
Republic exercises the power to legislate over certain matters by way of
decrees and ordinances
32
 and to issue statutory rules and orders
33
.
3. Case Law'
A body of Cameroon case law is growing up around the local legislation
and foreign received laws of Britain, France and Nigeria. The hierarchy of
the courts ensures the respectability of decisions of higher courts in the
stratum with the Supreme Court as an overriding authority of the law of the
land.
The organisation of the courts and the doctrine of precedent 
The quest for the unification 	 of	 laws found favour with the
organisation of the courts.	 The hierarchy of the courts converged and
culminated in the organisation of the court structure of the (United)
. Republic of Cameroon in 1972. Article 1 of Ordinance No.72-21 of 19 October
.1972 provides that:
, w44 .w
"Justice shall be administered by
(a) The Courts of First Instance (Tribunaux de Premnres Instances);
(b) The High Courts (Tribunaux de Grande Instance);
(c) The Military Courts;
(d) The COurts of Appeal (Cour d'appel); and
(e) The Supreme Court (Cour supreme)."
32 Article 21 of the Constitution of the (United) Republic of Cameroon.
33 Article 9(9) and 22, ibid.
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The Ordinance on judicial organisation of the Supreme Court, No.72-6 of
26 August 1972, as amended, introduced an essentially uniform system of
courts throughout (United) Republic of Cameroon, replacing the two systems
hitherto in existence on either side of the legal divide.
33A
Article 18(2) of Ordinance No.72-6 of 26 August 1972 raises an
interesting point.	 It provides that, until such time as a proper procedure
is enacted to be followed in the Supreme Court, in deciding an appeal, this
court is to adopt the procedure applicable in the court against whose
'decision the appeal has been brought. In essence, therefore, this requires
that the procedure applicable in the English-speaking provinces is to be
followed if the appeal is from a decision of one of the Courts of Appeal in
the two English-speaking provinces, and that of the French-speaking provinces
If the appeal is from a decision of the Court of Appeal in a French-speaking
province. It is worth noting that the Ordinance does not go further to
specify the composition of the court according to whether it is considering a
case from the French-speaking or English-speaking province 33B
	One may
question thë competence of a court comprising mainly or wholly judges trained
in the procedure of one system to decide an appeal in application Of the
other system's procedural rules. In practice, however, this situation has
been resolved to some extent.
	 There exists at the Supreme Court level, an
English-speaking division bench and a French-speaking division bench of
33A On the judicial system in French-speaking Cameroon before 1972
reform, see Michel Guermann, "L'Organisation Judiciaire au Cameroun
Oriental", (1973) 3 Rev. Cam. de Droit 24, esp. pp.29-30; A.
Marticou Riou, "L'Organisation Judiciaire du Cameroun", Penant 1969
Doctr. 33, esp. pp. 52-53. On the system iti English-speaking
Cameroon before 1972, see J.A. O'Brien Quinn, "The Organisation and
Structure of the Courts in West Cameroon", (1973) 3 Cam. L. Rev. 17
esp. pp.18-19.
33B See Article 2(2) and (3) of Ordinance No.72-6 of 26 August 1972.
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judges 33C with each division hearing appeals from their respective provinces.
- • Article 8 of Ordinance No.72-21 of 19 October 1972 provides that
judicial decisions and orders shall be enforceable throughout the territory
of the Republic.
The judges and practitioners of the English-speaking provinces imbued
in the dynamic and developing common law tradition encourage the citation of
cases. In courts of both English and French-speaking Cameroon, decided cases
are often cited. But in English and French-speaking Cameroon, there is, in
• theory, no doctrine	 of	 binding	 precedent	 as	 known in England
34
.
Nevertheless, in practice the lower courts in those provinces hardly
disregard previous decisions of higher courts, notably the Cour d'appel and
33C Field investigation - interview with Justice Ekema, Judge at the
Supreme Court, Yaounde, July 1983.
34 As to the significance and practical effects of the decisions
rendered by the Cour de cassation, tout-chambres ilunies, see: the
law of 1 April 1837 now the law of 3 July, 1967. In view of this
law, binding effect is given to the decision rendered after a second
renvoi, in solemn session by the Cour de cassation, the highest
tribunal in France and the lower courts must decide a case according
to the . indication of the Cour de cassation. For a discussion of the
authority of decided cases in France, see: Amos and Walton,
Introduction to French Law, 3rd. ed., by F.H. Lawson, A.E. Anton and
L. Neville Brown, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967, pp.7-12; Rene David
and John E. Brierly, Major Legal Systems in the World Today, 2nd.
ed. ) London, Stevens & Sons, 1978 pp. 121-132 esp. pp.123-4 and
p.131: O. Kahn-Freund, Claudine L gvy and Bernard Rudden, A Source-
book on French Law: Systems - Methods - Outlines of Contract, 2nd.
ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979 p. 284; see especially the
authority or weight of interpretation given to article 1384 by the
Cour de cassation, infra pp.153 and in Rent David, English Law and 
French Law - A Comparison in substance, Tagore Law Lectures, London,
Stevens & Sons 1980, p.23.
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A
the Cour supreme 35 .	 In English-speaking Cameroon the doctrine of binding
precedent applies in theory: courts of first instance and high courts within
an English-speaking province are bound by the decisions of the Court of
Appeal of that province and, ultimately, by decisions of the supreme Court.
. Nevertheless, the proper functioning of the doctrine of binding precedent in
English-speaking Cameroon is subject to two major difficulties. First, there
is' the absence of a sustained system of law reporting since the West Cameroon
Law Report of 1965, 1966, and 1967, compiled and annotated by O'Brien Quinn
on 'behalf of the	 West	 Cameroon	 Bar Association, was discontinued.
Nevertheless, throughout the country court files are available to the judges,
practitioners and the public whose constant recourse to them reveals the
leading cases of the land. At a seminar in February 1979, for judicial and
legal officers in English-speaking Cameroon, the participants expressed
concern about the lack of effective law reporting of judgments of Cameroonian
courts.
	
This deficiency, it was said, had resulted in a tendency among
practitioners of English-speaking Cameroon to cite Nigerian and English
decisions wliereas there are adequate Cameroon cases that could be cited 36 .
The only surviving system of case reporting is the Bulletin d'arrets de la 
Cour supreme which started in 1960.
35 Articles 1 and 16 of Ordinance No.72/6 of 26 August 1972 on the
organiSation of the supreme court and subsequently modified by law
No.76128 of 14 December, 1976 organising the supreme cdurt states
that:
"The judgments of the supreme court shall be binding on the
lower courts".
The supreme court is the unifying body of case law in the (United)
Republic of Cameroon. Its function has been to see about the
unification of case law in the (United) Republic of Cameroon. Thus,
It is only at the Supreme Court level that the doctrine of binding
	 .
precedent is conceivable.
	 See also, the Constitution of •the
(United) Republic of Cameroon of 2 June 1972, art. 32.
36 See the Minutes of the 1979 Seminar for Judicial and Legal Officers 
Held in the Court of Appeal in Buea on Tuesday 27 February 1979,
p.19.
- 24 -
Second, the existence of a Court Appeal for each of the two English-
speaking provinces and of several High Courts, one for each division of a
province, has tended to undermine the effectiveness of stare decisis in
English-speaking Cameroon. 	 Whereas in England the effectiveness of the
doctrine of binding precedent is enhanced by the existence throughout that
country of only one High Court, one Court of Appeal, and one House of Lords,
in English-speaking Cameroon the simultaneous existence of two Courts of
Appeal and nine High Courts has had a deleterious effect on the vitality of
the doctrine of binding precedent.
III PROBLEMS OF INTERNAL CONFLICT OF LAWS IN A BI-JURAL COUNTRY
The present discussion will be confined to the subject of
insurance, though similar problems may arise in other areas of law.
Prior to 1962, as has already been observed36A , there was no insurance
legislation uniformly applicable throughout the national territory comprising
both English and French-speaking Cameroons. After re-unification there was
increasing business and commercial interaction between the two 'Cameroons'
and it became necessary to harmonise and standardise certain aspects of
insurance law and practice. In 1962, therefore, the decree of the Federal
Government mentioned above introduced measures which purported to unify
certain aspects of insurance law.
	 Aspects of insurance law and practice
which were not treated by any national legislation continued to obey the
insurance law specifically applicable to French-speaking Cameroon on the one
hand and English-speaking Cameroon on the other. In those areas of law which
are still governed by the two respective systems of lal, internal conflict of
laws problems may arise.
36A Supra, at pp.11-15 and p.20.
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The conflicts in this area are but one manifestation of a more general
situation.	 In all branches of civil law, the laws in the English-speaking
Cameroon differ from those in the French-speaking Cameroon. In the last few
years since unification there has been increasing interaction between the
'inhabitants	 of English-speaking Cameroon and those of French-speaking
Cameroon. In particular, there has been interaction between business-men
within the framework of commercial transactions, between suppliers of goods
and services who tend to be based in French-speaking Cameroon and consumers
who are to be found or based all over the country including English-speaking
Cameroon. The effect of this is that, quite often, a consumer in English-
speaking Cameroon who is otherwise subject to English-derived laws finds
himself entering into a contract for consumer services, for example,
electricity, water and, what is most pertinent here, insurance, with a
supplier whose headquarters are based in French-speaking Cameroon and whose
business, although carried out throughout the country including English-
speaking Cameroon, may be governed by French-derived laws. When the customer
In English-speaking Cameroon enters into a commercial contract with a
supplier based in French-speaking Cameroon, is the contract governed by the
internal law of English-speaking Cameroon . which relates to the subject matter
of the contract or is that contract governed by the internal law of French-
speaking Cameroon relating to the subject matter of the contract? 37
4 37 For a discussion of the proper law of contract . and the autonomy
under which the parties are free to choose the governing law, see
Cheshire and North, Private 'International Law, 10th. ed., 1979,
London, Butterworths pp.195-202; R.H. Graveson, Conflict of Laws: 
Private International Law, 7th. ed., 1974, Londoh, Sweet & Maxwell
pp.400-404.; Kelly, "Reference, Choice, Restriction and
Prohibition"' (1977) 26 I.C.L.Q. 857 esp. p.871; Ole Lando, "The
Proper Law of the Contract", (1964) 8 Scandinavian Studies in Law
105, 109-147. The answer to this question in Cameroon, is provided
by inquiries in the course of field research work carried out during
the months of June to September 1983, see below, pp.26-30.
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The attitude of the courts in both English-speaking and French-speaking
Cameroon has been to ignore the existence of this conflict of laws problem.
The courts on both sides of the country when confronted with an issue which
raises a putative conflict of laws issue have tended to decide that issue by
automatically adopting the lex fori as the lex causae. The courts seem to
work on the principle that when parties submit their dispute before them they
thereby intend that the law of the forum should govern the issue. The courts
thus show a regrettable lack of awareness of the conflict of laws situation
involved in the dispute submitted before them. They appear to confuse choice
of jurisdiction with choice of the proper law.
Insurance companies specifically mention at the top of their policies
that the contract will be governed by the law of 13 July 1930. This is, in
effect, a proposal of a choice of law clause to the prospective policyholder.
If the prospective policyholder then completes and signs this proposal form
and accepts the policy in total awareness of the clause he must be deemed to -
have accepted the choice of law clause proposal which was made to him by the
insurance company. In that case, in the event of a dispute the law of 1930
ought to apply even where the dispute is submitted before a court in English-
speaking Cameroon, a territory in which the law of 1930 ordinarily has no
application, in view of the fact that, that law has never been extended to
English-speaking Cameroon by any legislation passed since its coming into
force.
The basic principle of the law of contract is that parties are free to
agree not only on the terms of their contract but alo on the choice of a
t system of law to govern any dispute that may arise between them in connection
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with that contract
38
.
	
However, divergent views 39
 obtain on the question
whether their freedom is completely unfettered or is restricted to the choice
of law with which the contract is factually connected. This raises questions
such as whether the parties directed their minds to the matter and in fact
reached an agreed conclusion. Furthermore, does the 'intention' (whether
subjective or objective) signify the common intention that the parties would
have held had they considered the matter, or does it merely mean the
intention which as reasonable persons, they ought to have formed, having
regard to all the relevant facts? In order to answer these questions, in the
light of our particular study, the intention of the parties may have to be
ascertained. Insurance contracts are standard form contracts or contracts of
adhesion in which the element of actual consent may be either negligible or
completely absent. Where is the intention of parties?
	 Is it mutual or
unilateral? Clearly, without a deeper analysis it is scarcely possible to be
content with the aphorism that the proper law is the law intended by the
parties.	 The only justification one may advance for the express choice of
38 Vita Food Products Inc., v. Unus Shipping Co., [1939] A.C. 277 per
Lord Wright at 289-290; For the view that the intention of the
parties must prevail see: R. v. International Trustee [1937] A.C.
500 at 529; British Controlled Oilfields v. Stagg (1922), 127 L.T.
209; For a contrary view see, Lord Denning in Boissevain v. Weil 
[1949] 1 K.B. 482, at 491 cf L. Denning in Tzortzis v. Monark Line 
A/B, [1968] 1 W.L.R. 406, at 411.
However, this freedom of the parties to choose the applicable law
may - be	 expressly	 restricted	 and perhaps even excluded by
legislation. If there is legislation to this effect, (which
unfortunately is absent on the point in Cameroon), that prevails
over any chosen system of law of the parties.
39 See Cheshire and North, op. cit., pp.195-202; David F. Cavers, "A
Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem", (1933) 47 Marv. L. Rev. 173-
208; F.A. Mann, "The Proper Law of Contract", (1950) 3 I.L.Q. 60
esp. at 61; R.N. Graveson, "Philosophical Aspects of the English
Conflict of Laws", (1962) 78 L.Q.R. 337-370; Albert A. Ehrenzweig,
"A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws", (1963) 79 L.Q.R. 441-445; D.
St. L. Kelly,	 "Reference, Choice, Restriction and Prohibition"
(1977) 26 I.C.L.Q. 857-883 esp. at 871.
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the proper law of the
	 contract	 is the certainty which it provides
which,therefore, puts the proper law beyond doubt and thus saves delay and
cost of disputed litigation.
In the absence of legislation restricting the freedom of the parties to
choose the proper law of their contract, it will be curious if the courts do
not consider what the parties intended to be the proper law of the contract.
It is therefore astonishing that in English-speaking Cameroon courts have
been inclined to apply that territory's insurance law to settle disputes
submitte&to them by parties to an insurance policy which the parties had
earlier agreed would be governed by the French-speaking law of 13 July 1930.
Thus in Aquh Thomas v. Societe NationaleNation le d'Assurance Cameroun (SNAC) 40 , the
policy provided by SNAC whose headquarters is situated in Douala, stipulated
that the contract will be governed by the law of 13 July, 1930 and the policy
incorporated the provisions of the 1930 law in its general conditions: the
insurance company in pleading as a defence the breach of the general
conditions consequently invoked the provisions of the 1930 law. 	 The judge,
in considering the issues between the parties, applied English law as to the
breach of a warranty in the contract and upheld the repudiation of the
contract. In fact, a generalised objection could be made in respect of all
the insurance cases brought before the English-speaking provinces as all the
five insurance company's policy documents have a similar headed wording with
the incorporation of the provisions of the 1930 law 41 .
Furthermore, the point of jurisdiction was raised in the Bamenda Court of
Appeal in David Che Johny v. Total Afrique Ouest and Socier Co. 
40 (1980) Reference No.3455/81 Buea (Unreported).
Al See later, Chapters Five to Seven, pp.299-439.	 t
- 29 -
Assurance
42
. The counsel for the defendant contended that article 13 of the
agreement duly signed on 30 April 1968 in Douala conferred jurisdiction on
the Douala Commercial court in the case of a dispute arising under the
contract. Here, Justice H. Ekor Tarh said:
"The dichotomy of civil law in the legal system of the (United)
Republic of Cameroon at present is a notoriety. Therefore apart
from the formal validity of a contract, its essential validity,
interpretation, the effect and obligations of the parties to it are
governed by the law which the parties have agreed or intended or
which they presume to have been intended to govern them. That is
the proper law of the contract.
Ip so facto, where the parties to a contract stipulate expressly
that the contract shall be governed by a particular law that law
will be the proper law of the contract, provided the selection is
bona fide and there is no objection on grounds of public policy.
Accordingly, if contracting parties freely and expressly stipulate
the 'lex loci contractus' as the proper law of the contract between'
them, then the courts have no reasons to interfere in such a
choice. The relevant case in issue is "Vita Food Products Inc., v. 
Unus Shipping Co. Ltd.", [1939] A.C. 277, House of Lords at page
292.“
On this basis the judge was persuaded to uphold the gbjection raised by the
defence and ruled that the jurisdiction of the court was expressly excluded
42 Suit No. H.C./14/71 of 11 December 1972, Bamenda (Unreported) a town
in the English-speaking province of Cameroon.
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and the suit could not be entertained in the Bamenda Court. This approach by
the judge in this case to dismiss the case is not desirable. According to
conflict of laws principles, although parties to a contract may agree to
submit their differences to the courts of their choice, they cannot by doing
so oust the jurisdiction of another court 43 .	 The validity of such a clause
Is a matter for the proper law of the contract in particular whether it
provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of its court. If in that law there
is a prohibition against ousting the jurisdiction of the court in a
particular context, no jurisdiction clause can prevail against') it. In
'i
English domestic law there is one such statutory prohibition. This is
section 141 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974, which provides that the county
court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any action by the
creditor or owner to enforce a consumer credit agreement, and that such an
action shall not be brought in any other court. By analogy, in the absence
of any stipulation in the 1930 law itself, in Cameroon, parties ought not to
oust the jurisdiction of another court and such objections as in the above
case should not be entertained by judges. The judge ought to consider the
• country with whose law a dispute has the closest connection (the proper law)
and the country with whose courts a dispute arising thereunder has the
closest connection (the proper court).
IV ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF INSURANCE IN CAMEROON
In every society there exist various arrangements for spreading amongst
members the effects of a loss which falls directly upon one or a few of them.
43 The Fehmarn [1958] 1 W.L.R. 159. Cf. The Eleftheria [1969] 2 W.L.R.
1073. For further explanation see: E.I. Sykes and P.C. Pryles,
International and Interstate Conflict 4 of Laws: Cases and Materials,
1975, London, Butterworths pp.128-153 and pp.440-457.
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In small communities which are homogeneous in character all members of the
community usually participate in these arrangements. For example, in some
' areas of Cameroon where a member's home is destroyed by fire the entire
community considers it its responsibility to contribute a general effort in
time, money and other resources to build that member a new home. This form
of loss participation which constitutes a mutual assistance association (in a
sense collective responsibility) is at present widespread in various parts of
Cameroon especially outside the urban areas.
However, where society has attained a certain stage of evolution in
which, due to the conditions of living (economic, social and otherwise) and
the diversity of peoples forced to live together, homogeneity is lost,
communal loss sharing becomes less practicable. This creates a necessity for
the establishment of professional organisations whose business is to assume
the obligation to repair a loss which has befallen an individual in return
for that individual's obligation to pay the professional body 'a P certain
amount of money in consideration of the organisation undertaking to redress
the future loss.
	
This is the substance of insurance. MacGillivray and
Parkington said
44
:
"A contract of insurance is one whereby one party (the "insurer")
promises in return for a money consideration (the "premium") to pay to
the other party (the "assured") a sum of money or provide him with some
corresponding benefit, upon the occurrence of one or more specified
events."
Insurance in the modern sense described by MacGillivray and Parkington has
44 MacGillivray and Parkington, On Insurance Law - relating to all 
risks other than marine, 7th ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell 1981 at
p.3. A useful working definition can be derived from that given by
Channell, J. in Prudential Insurance Company v. Inland Revenue 
Commissioners [1904] 2 K.B. 658 at 663.
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long been a feature of the economic and social life of the people of
Cameroon.
However, differences may be conceived between traditional systems of
insurance and modern insurance. 	 In respect of the latter premiums are
collected on an annual basis. Furthermore, the insured forfeits the premium
or any benefits deriving therefrom if no misfortune or fortuity occurs and no
claims are made.	 Insurance, therefore, is an aleatory contract, with a
certain payment on one side equated to a much larger but uncertain payment on
the other. By contrast with the traditional system, insurance operates more
like a banking institution as at one time or the other the contributors must
benefit from the monies collected.
Traditional forms of 'insurance' 45
 schemes
The 'extended family' system was the earliest form of social insurance.
Under this system, which is based on humanitarian African philosophy,
everybody is expected to be "his brother's keeper". The progressive and
well-to-do members of each family, that is, of both the immediate and
extended family (in some cases this may extend to the whole village or clan)
are expected to cater for the interests of the less successful members of the
family.	 The family structure is based on mutual solidarity. Individual
security stems from belonging to a large family. Thus in traditional African
society the extended family system was a very useful and effective method of
providing security.
45 The use of the word "insurance" here should not lead the reader to
extrapolate its meaning from "insurance" properly so called in
Western legal systems because since legal concepts are in fact
defined in relation to a complete legal system, it is highly
unlikely that "insurance" in the modern sense should fit into a very
different legal system like that of Cameroon, if one intends to be
precise and specific. The purpose, therefore, of employing the word
"insurance" in this context is aimed more at drawing the reader's
attention to the existence of this concept in some form (presumably
still in its puberty form) in the Cameroonian context.
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Furthermore, echoes of insurance practices in Cameroon can be found in
the 14arious ethnic and tribal groupings. Practices such as the 'Essusu'
'Nianqe s , •especially in the Bameleke tribe, are a sort of contribution scheme
for occasions such as marriage, death and birth celebrations or unforeseen
contingencies such as fire disasters, poor crop yields due to drought, famine
or flood. In Cameroon today, there still exist unions formed by members of
the same village or clan living in urban areas who arrange to meet
periodically, usually on a monthly basis to discuss matters relating to the
welfare of their members and the improvement of their village community. One
such group in existence is the Pinyin Development Organisation formed by
Pinyin • inhabitants living in urban centres such as Yaounde and Bamenda 46 .
The organisation contributes every month some money to meet the needs of its
individual members. At the end of the year, usually at Christmas time, and
New Year, they organise some festivities. 	 Among other contribution schemes
organised, the members of these unions make regular contributions into 	 a
fund - the 'sobriquet' - the trouble bank. This fund, as its name suggests,
operates on a lending basis to members in times of calamities or unforeseen
expenditure and sometimes assists members in times of crisis.
Allied to the village or clan unions is the 'age grade association'.
This institution acts as a mutual insurance society to members on a basis
similar to the English ancient guilds. 	 The association maintains funds
,•
contributed by individual members.	 These monies are collected periodically
almost in the same manner as industrial life assurance premiums are
collected.	 The expenses for weddings and funeral expenses of the deceased
member's family are incurred from the funds thus accumulated. 	 In addition,
46 See A.S. Fonkam, "Insurance Law and Practice in Cameroon", (19W
.	 •19, No.2 Journal of World Trade Law, p.136.
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the funds serve to 'tidy over' the deceased's debts. In cases of unexpected
deaths (especially accidental deaths) in which case the deceased might not
have made provisions for his dependents, the "age grade association" takes
over the responsibility of sustaining and maintaining the deceased member's
dependents until they can provide for themselves.
Similarly, in more advanced cultures, functionally similar phenomena
,exist. Thus, in medieval society the reciprocal rights and duties which made
up the feudal relationship provided both a feeling of security and a
reasonable measure of actual security against many of 	 the	 pressing
vicissitudes of life, for Lord and man alike.
	 When the Lord-vassal
relationship did not provide the security, the church or specially developed
institutions like the medieval guild did. The presence everywhere in pre-
capitalist societies of insurance-like institutions led William Graham Sumner
to describe
47
 religion as a species of the genus "insurance" which was, he
thought:
"...a generic conception covering the methods of attaining security, of
which the modern devices are but specific, highI4 elaborated, and
scientifically tested examples ...
Insurance is a grand device and is now a highly technical process;
but its roots go further back than one would think, offhand. Man on
earth, having always had an eye to the avoidance of ill luck, has tried
in all ages somehow to insure himself, to take out a "policy" of some
sort on which he has paid regular premiums in some form of self denial
or sacrifice."
47 Sumner and Keller, The Science of Society, 1927, 749, passim. in
Spencer L. Kimball, "The purpose of Insurance Regulation: A
Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law", (1961) 45.Minn.
L. Rev. 471 at 479-480.
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The needs for security and for a feeling of security seem universal,
but the particular forms they take and the institutions that satisfy them are
extremely varied and are culturally determined. In pre-capitalist forms of
social organisation and traditional societies, man achieved security, both
economic and psychic, through a variety of interpersonal relationships which
were central to the society and were highly institutionalised. Thus in many
primitive societies kinship was the basis of social organisation, and one of
the chief purposes of the network of rights and duties making up the kinship
pattern was the provision of mutual aid to distressed individuals48.
In Western Europe, when the capitalist revolution swept away feudal
sociCy,	 it	 destroyed	 the structure that provided security through
Interpersonal relationships. 	 Men no longer had personal relationships
comprehensive enough, or dependable enough, to provide the security and the
feeling of security that are the final goals of much of the human struggle.
Those goals had to be sought through new institutions. 	 One ultimate
consequence was the development of a ubiquitous system of insurance, in the
modern sense of a scientifically organised technique for the distribution of
risks through an institution that has no other purpose.	 This institution
provides security through commercial companies operating in tht market and
through governmental organisations operating in an analogous manner. In
these ways modern man secures for himself all the tangible security and a
large part of the feeling of security that were lost when the old order was
48 See White, The Science of Culture, 1949, 347, 355 and Hoebel, Man in 
the Primitive World, 1958 2nd ed., 347, 355 in Spencer L. Kimball,
op. cit., p.479; Also see Kenneth S. Carlston, Social Theory and 
African Tribal Organisation: The development of socio-legal theory, 
1968 Univ. of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago, London pp.98-108. 
Laura Nader, Law in Culture and Society 1969, Chicago.
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swept away.
	 Insurance is a central institution in contemporary society,
having replaced prior basic institutions as the way of providing for the
pervasive security demands of the human being.
	 It is the contemporary
manifestation of man's search for security, which demands the extension of
insurance to protect the society at large in the way that the primitive
kinship system did. The contemporary drive, as will be seen later, 48A to
extend social seourity to provide for victims of accidents, especially road
traffic accidents, is only one illustration.
There were in existence in Cameroon as in most parts of Africa49 , some
organised forms of insurance arrangements entirely indigenous to Africa. The
existence of these structures hampered the desire for technically structured
forms of insurance as is known today. Moreover, the economy was basically
agricultural and farming, which was the main pre-occupation of the people,
was at subsistence level, the accompanying catastrophies of which were
sufficiently redressed by the self-reliant organisations.	 As a corollary,
the absence of great commercial activity, industrialisation and a vibrant
economy with inherent and attendant risks and speculation did not awaken the
need for more sophisticated and modern structures of insurance institutions.
The introduction of great commercial ventures by the European traders
in the nineteenth century necessitated the construction of roads, bridges,
building complexes which involved heavy capital expenditure. These ventures
were fraught with great risks which ordinary prudence and common sense
required to be insured against. Thus, industrialisation and urbanisation of
modern life, with the attendant deterioration of such social institutions as
48A Infra, pp.195-239.
49 See J.O. Irukwu, Insurance Management in Africa, 1981, Caxton Press,
(West Africa) Ltd., Ibadan, pp.6-10; E. Mensah, "Insurance Policy
Conditions in Africa", (1975), in Conference Papers of the Insurance 
Institute of Nigeria, Vol.IV, p.100.
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the extended family, which were of vital importance in generations gone by,
have brought pressing social problems which demand further solutions.
The development of modern insurance 
Insurance in its modern form was not known in most of black Africa
until early nineteenth century. 	 The early European colonisers brought to
their various territories the idea of modern insurance. 	 In the English-
. speaking Countries, the idea was introduced by the early British merchants
and today insurance law and practices in these areas are almost entirely
patterned along British lines. Similarly, in the French-speaking countries
of Africa that came under French influence, insurance principles and
practices adopted are that of Metropolitan France.
Until the 1950's there were no indigenous insurance companies operating
In Cameroon. Contracts of insurance were effected with established iMsurance
companies in France and Britain.	 Later on, these insurers appointed local
agents to represent them and maintained their headquarters in the mother
country.. These agents were principally expatriate banks and traders who were
given powers of attorney to effect insurance business, issue cover notes and
service claims.	 In the case of the Royal Exchange Assurance Limited,
Barclays Bank DCO was their principal agent. Subsequently, branch offices of
the main companies with sub-branches in urban centres of the country were
opened. One of the first insurance companies to have branch offices in
-
Nigeria and thereafter in English-speaking Cameroon was the Royal Exchange
Assurance in 1921
50
.	 British insurance companies operating in Nigeria
extended their activities to the then Southern Cameroons through their
Nigerian headquarters.	 Similarly, in French-speaking Cameroon, the first
v
4‘
50 See generally, Barry Supple, The Royal Exchange Assurance: a history 
of British insurance 1720 - 1970, 1970, Cambridge University Press;
Harold E. Raynes, A History of British Insurance, London 1964;
/ Charles Wright and C. Ernest Fayle, A History of Lloyd's, 1928.
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French insurance agencies operating	 in 1953 were Grouoement Fransais 
d'Assurances	 now	 Assureurs Conseils Camerounais; Agence  de Compaqnie 
Franvise now Socifter Camerounaise Assurance et 116-assurance and Assurance 
G6ndrale de France now Chanag et Privet d'Assurance.
With independence	 and	 the	 consequent	 economic involvement of
Cameroonians and the government in all spheres of the economic life of the
country legislation was passed to organise insurance companies in Cameroon.
This may have been inspired by the desire to consolidate the national
insurance market and further to restrict the free flow of foreign exchange
from the country. The first of these legislation were Ordinance No.62 - OF -
36 of 31 March 1962 fixing the legislation applicable to the operation and
organisation of insurance and Decree No.62 - OF - 437 of 18 December 1962
stipulating regulations relating to investments of insurance organisations in
the Federal Republic of Cameroon51 . Foreign insurance companies were merged
to form domestic insurance concerns, but they maintained very close ties with
the parent company in France and Britain. 	 The first national insurance
company Was Assurances Mutuelles Aqricoles du Cameroun (AMACAM) which was
established in 1965. Originally, it took the form of a mutual (Mutuelle) or
cooperative society (coop g rative d'assurance) having been created by the
Chamber of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery, thus emphasising the main
••
51 These laws have been subsequently abrogated and replaced by
Ordinance No.73 - 14 of 10 May 1973 fixing regulations applicable to
Insurance concerns and Decree No.73-237 of 10 May 1973 abrogating
Decree No.62 - OF - 437 of 18 December 1962 mentioned above.
However, now see Ordinance No. 85-3 of 31 August 1985 modifying
these laws. For a discussion of this later Ordinance, see infra. 
Chapter Two relating to Government Control of Insurance Concerns,
pp.57-111.
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economic activity which was agricultural.	 It has, however, lost the
character of a mutual society and now operates more like a joint stock
company or limited liability company (socigtg anonyme) 52 .
At present there are six national or domestic insurance companies:
Assurances Mutuelles Agricoles du Cameroun (AMACAM), Soci gt g Camerounaise
d'Assurances et de Rgassurances (SOCAR), Soci gt g Nouvelle d'Assurances du
Cameroun (SNAC), Compagnie Camerounaise d'Assurances et de Riassurances
(CCAR), Guardian Royal Exchange Cameroon Ltd. (0EACAM), and Cameroon
American Insurance Company S.A. (CAMICO). The government participates in at
.	 53
	
least 50 per cent of the registered capital of these companies . 	 The
government does not promote the mushroom growth of petty insurance companies.
The above mentioned companies now underwrite a substantial-volume of the
total insurance business in the Cameroon market.
52 Mutual companies are generally not constituted for commercial
purposes but in order to serve some well-defined and explicit
interests of their members. In insurance, mutual companies could be
recommended for a large number of classes where many small
homogeneous risks for a specific and limited group of persons were
to be covered.	 On the other hand a joint stock company is a
business enterprise with a separate legal existence, having
share.holders whose liability is limited. Its main disadvantages are
that, it tends to put profit-making over and above all other
considerations which is detrimental to the interests of the insured.
Furthermore, a joint stock company could fall into the hands of
small groups, for example, families and lose its true anonymous
character. For further details see: UNCTAD, Insurance Legislation 
and Supervision in developing countries, 1972, U.N. Publications
Sales No. E 72 11 D at p.9.
53 See: in the case of SOCAR, Decree No.73-349 of 10 July 1973 to
publish a Protocol Agreement between the (United) Republic of
Cameroon and Les Mutuelles du Mans. In this company Cameroon
interest is 55% and 45% belongs to a consortium of foreign
companies.
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Foreign insurance companies operate through the medium of branch offices,
agencies and delegations. Premium income of insurance companies operating in
Cameroon is increasing at a very substantial rate
54
.
TABLE 1:
	
Premium Income of Insurance Companies in Cameroon 
(in billions of Francs CFA)
YEAR 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Motor
Insurance 2,907.05 3,420.79 4,479.36 5,764.47 5,819.1 6,850.8
Other
Insurance
Businesses 3,321.57 4,151.22 5,268.24 6,235.27 6,977.2 8,084.3
TOTAL 6,228.62 7,572.01 9,747.60 11,999.74 12,796.30 14,935.10
SOURCE: Cameroon National Re-insurance Fund, Yaounde
54 See statistics provided by Cameroon National Re-insurance Fund
(CNR), above. For notable types of insurance business underwritten
in Cameroon, see S.A. Fonkam, State Regulation of Private Insurance 
in Cameroon, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, London 1980, p.60.
See also	 Institut	 International	 des	 Assurance,	 Le Marche
Camerounaise des assurances No.4, January 1977 pp.5-7.
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After reunification and the unitary state attention was directed
towards the coordination and unification of insurance legislation in both
English and French-speaking Cameroon. 55 The motivation generally has been
clearly towards harmonisation, unification and integration of laws. These
are amongst the most pressing needs in Cameroon today. The present legal
duality causes serious repercussions such as differential treatment of
citizens within the same country.	 The observations made previously lend
support to the view that the end of the colonial period did not bring an end
to imported law. One can rightly say that throughout independent Africa
•
there is no question of abandoning 	 the Western Law which prior to
Independence had become their 'droit commun' 56 .	 These laws were mainly
copies of laws made for the parent country. At independence some of these
laws were retained and others have since been modified.
The legal system in Cameroon is in the process of development, This
development is necessary so as to harmonise her laws which are based on two
distinct legal systems - the common law and civil law of England and France
respectively. The existence of a dual legal system means that the same issue
may be governed by two different concepts depending on the jurisdiction of
the court.	 On issues where there is no uniform legislation, the applicable
law will be either the common law or civil law, depending on whether the
55 See, for example, A. Fonkam, op. cit., pp.50-52. For further
discussion see infra Chapters One, Two and Three in which the
legislation discussed apply to the Republic of Cameroon.
56 See, N.N. Rubin and E. Cotran, Annual Survey of African Law, 1967,
Vol.I pp.335-347; "Unification of laws in Africa", (1968) 15 Am. J.
of Comp. Law, p.84; also see, Jean Foyer, "Les Jestin ges du droit
franiais en Afrique"", (1962) 72 Recueil Penant pp.1-6; E. Loi
Langoul, "Problemes particuliers de Codifications du Cameroun",
(1960) 20 Rev. Jur. Pol. Ind. Coop. 106 at 108-110. Salfo Albert
Balima, "Les Assurances en Afrique Francophone - Leur role dans une
perspective de d gveloppement (s gminaire (cole internationale de
Bordeaux)", 1978 32, Rev. Jur. Pol. Ind. Coop. 709-720; Andr( Tune,
"La Vie du droit en Afrique",	 (1978) 32, Rev. Jur. Pol. Ind. Coop.
21 et seq. SH L
Y
LIBRARY
- 42 -
court is in the former French or English territory. 	 This thesis is an
inquiry', into the insurance laws of Cameroon and, in the final analysis, a
quest for uniform laws.
It may be recalled that this legal duality found further expression in
the languages adopted in the English and French-speaking Camer6on. This has
resulted in translation of legal terms and concepts from one language into
another, the dangers of which are well recognised. This study avoids most of
them by refraining from translation as much as possible. However, as the
profile of each chapter is drawn, the opportunity will be taken to substitute
and explain foreign terms, expressions and concepts in order not to render
the text unintelligible. This, it is hoped, will facilitate understanding.
In addition, in this thesis no attempts have been made to convert the
value of Cameroon Francs in relation to the Pound Sterling as fluctuations in
the value of currency may be experienced. However, at the time of submission
e the exchange rate of Francs CFA to Sterling was 595 Frs. CFA. to El.
A few comments seem appropriate here about the proposals advanced with
respect ' to Chapter Three of this study in particular. On very close and
deeper analysis, the issues raised and discussed are, or become too complex
and multifaceted to admit of simple or even practical solutions .  An attempt
has been made to present, to some extent, a reasonably balanced discussion of
the assigned issues rather than to advance a view in support of a given
measure. iHowever, in some respect the discussion reflects some persuasion as
to how the issues ought to be resolved. Consequently, no official "school
solutions" are proferred as being uniquely acceptable. 	 In addition, the
discussion is not so much to resolve issues as to raise and explore them;
rather it is designed to provoke and stimulate academic thought and
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discussion on the subject. It would not therefore be surprising to find that
alternative views may be expressed.
It is hoped that the following account is up-to-date to November 1985,
' though it has been possible to incorporate some later English developments.
if
1
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CHAP TER	 1
, THE REASON FOR GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF INSURANCE CONCERNS
I INTRODUCTION
Governmental control of insurance concerns has been variously described
as official supervision of insurance companies, governmental intervention or
interference in insurance concerns.
1
There is hardly any state in the world today in which the old policy of
laissez-faire still commands general adherence. 	 The right of governments to
interfere in the affairs of their peoples is universally recognised. The
only question is as to how far their interference should go. There are many
different views on this fundamental issue but so far as insurance is
concerned,	 the weight of opinion appears to be that at least some
intervention is necessary.
••
During the past hundred years governments throughout the world have
considered it necessary to place the insurance industry under official
supervision. On December 8, 1904 the President of the United States of
America in his annual message to Congress said.
2
I V. Lijadu, "Government Control of the operations of Insurance
Companies", Conference Papers of the Insurance Institute of Nigeria,
1972, Vol. 1 at p.77,
2	 Kailin Tuan, Modern Insurance Theory and Education, 1972, Vol. 1 at
p.165
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"The business of insurance vitally affects the great mass of the
people of the United States and is national and not local in its
, application.	 It involves a multitude of transactions among the
people of different states and between American companies and
foreign governments. I urge that Congress carefully consider
whether the power of the Bureau of Corporations cannot constit-
utionally be extended to cover interstate transactions in
insurance."
Similarly, in Cameroon, the Minister of Finance, speaking of insurance
business said: 3
"The rapid development of the insurance business, its extent, the
enormous amount of money and diversity of interests involved and
the present business methods suggest that under existing
conditions insurance is commerce and should be subjected to
government regulation."
In the United Kingdom the official supervision of the insurance
industry is a subject of significant concern to both the providers of
insurance cover and the buyers of insurance. It is generally accepted that
any industry which solicits large sums of money from the public in exchange
for a promise of a future benefit must be subject to an adequate system of -
official supervision in order to protect its customers against the
3
	
	
See: Minutes of a Conference held at Douala by the Association of
Insurance Companies and representatives of the Government Department
of Insurance on May 5, 1972. Recently, the President of the
Republic of Cameroon, S.E. Paul Biya, expressed concern on the value
of insurance to the national economy and for the people of Cameroon;
see for example, "Le nouveau visage du march e des assurances",
Cameroon Tribune, No.3406, 24 October 1985 at p. 1. Subsequently,
this led to some modifications in the Cameroonian insurance
legislation, see for example Ordinance No. 85-3 of 31 August 1985
relating to insurance business; hereinafter referred to as "the 1985
Ordinance". See also, Le ministre d glegue	 a Presidence, charge
de	 l'Informatique,	 "Actes	 du	 chef	 de	 l'itat",	 Cameroon
Tribune,No.3448,	 12	 December	 1985.	 The intention of this
legislation is without doubt to strengthen the hand of 	 the
government in the regulation and practice of insurance business in
Cameroon. However, the legislation itself is only the tip of the
ice-berg; much remains to be done through supplemental regulations
which have not yet been devised. Other parts of it are mainly a re-
enactment of the 1973 Ordinance.
- 46 -
possibility of loss through dishonest and incompetent management.
3A
However,
in the United Kingdom the principle which has applied was once described as
"freedom with publicity". 4 This consisted essentially in letting the
insurance industry operate with minimum state intervention provided adequate
information was furnished to enable the public to know if tht companies were
. financially sound. 	 The concept of freedom with publicity, though still at
the heart of British insurance regulation, is a little frayed at the edges
more recently, legislation governing insurance companies has been thoroughly
revised and more stringent controls have been introduced with a considerable
and growing body of insurance supervisory legislation governing the industry
in the United Kingdom. Two basic factors account for these develorments in
legislation, namely, the serious failures of insurance companies between
1966-1974 and an external influence with wide ranging effects.	 We will
briefly examine these.	 In July 1966, the Fire Auto and Marine Insurance
Company went into liquidation.	 The immediate consequence was the enactment
3A In 'fact a look at the history of legislation on governmental
regulation of insurance in Britain reveals that legislation in this
field is invariably influenced by the need to protect the policyholders
and third-party claimants against the risk of insolvency after some
insurance concerns have collapsed. Thus the collapse of the Albert Life
Assurance Society in 1868 led to the passing of the Life Assurance
Companies Act 1870. For further accounts of the 1870 Act see: Raynes, A
History of British Insurance (1964) 2nd ed. pp.345-365; M. Pickering,
"The' bontrol of Insurance Business in Great Britain", (1969) Wis. L.
Rev. 1141 et seg. This Act was the fore-runner of legislation in
Britain d6aling with the regulation of the insurance industry. Even the
most casual reading of this Act will reveal the resolve of the
9overnment of the day to avoid future insolvencies.. Further measures
have been passed between 1870 and 1982 with the object of protecting the
public from the effects of OS mushroom growth of insurance companies.
lacking the financial resources necessary to carry or business. Present
legislation regulating the insurance industry consists of the
Policyholders Protection Act 1975 and the Insurance Companies Act 1982,
and subordinate regulations passed under these Acts. For up to.date
details and analysis see: Ellis, T.H. and Wiltshire, J.A. Regulation of 
Insurance in the United Kingdom and Ireland, 1983, Kluwer Publishing Co.
4
	
	
Cockerell, H.A.L. and Dickinson, G.M., Motor Insurance and the 
Consumer, 1980 at p.8.
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of Part 11 of the Companies Act 1967 which extended the powers of
intervention of the then Board of Trade and introduced the requirement that
an insurance company could not transact business without prior authorisation
of the Board. Later in 1971, the failure of the Vehicle and General brought
a further strengthening of the legislation, with the Insurance Companies
(Amendment)	 Act 1973, which introduced the requirement for insurance
companies to be managed and controlled by fit and proper persons and extended
the range of interventionary powers available to the Department of Trade. 5
Finally, the failure of Nation Life in 1974 resulted in the consolidation of
the 1967 and 1973 Acts into the Insurance Companies Act 1974, which extended
the powers of the Department of Trade to make regulations and further, the
Policyholders Protection Act 1975 6 was introduced.
The external factor is the entry of the United Kingdom into the
European Economic Community (E.E.C.). This is currently the most significant _
influence in the development of regulatory powers and supervisory laws in the
United . gngdom.	 As part of the harmonisation process in 1973 and 1979,
respectively, the Non-Life Establishment Directive 7 and the Life
5 See: Report of the Tribunal appointed to inquire into certain issues
in relation to the circumstances leading up to the cessation of
trading by the Vehicle and General Insurance Companyitimited.
(Chairman: Hon. Mr. Justice James) (H.L. 80, H.C. 133) 1972 London:
H.M.S.O.
6	 For further details on the Policyholders Protection Act 1975, see
infra at pp.125-138.
7 73/239/EEC: First Council Directive of 24 July 1973 on the
coordination of Laws, Regulations and administrative provisions
relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of direct
insurance other than life assurance (0.J. 1973, L228/3); and
73/240/EEC: Council Directive of 24 July 1973 abolishing
restrictions on freedom of establishment in the business of direct
insurance other than life assurance (0.J. 1973, L228/20).
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Establishment Directive 8
 were adopted.	 A series of regulations were issued
by the Department of Trade in 1977, 1978, 1979 and later consolidated into
the Insurance Companies Regulations 1981 and in 1982 a consolidating
legislation was passed bringing together the provisions of the 1974 and 1981
Insurance Companies Acts. These regulations and legislation implemented the
above mentioned Directives.
There has since been a considerable and growing body of insurance
supervisory legislation governing the industry in the United Kingdom and
dealing with such matters as authorisation to commence business, the
maintenance of an adequate financial base, the pursuit of a prudent
investment policy, and the observance of certain ethical principles in the
conduct of insurance business.	 This body of legislation will be considered
in Chapter Two of this study. 9
The motivation for the enactment of regulatory legislation and the
establishment of controlling department of government have depended very much
on the political philosophy of the government concerned and the social
framework of the state. One consideration appears to be the desire to
protect the insuring public 10 against the possibility of loss through the
operations of dishonest or badly managed insurers. Another is the desire to
•	 •
8
9
79/267/EEC:	 First Council	 Directive
ordination	 of	 Laws,	 Regulations
relating to the taking-up and pursuit
assurance	 (0.3.	 1979,	 L63/1).
Infra,	 pp.57-124.
of
and
of
5	 March	 1979	 on the co-
administrative	 provisions
the business of direct life
10 The position is precarious in a country such as Cameroon where there
is no national social welfare comparable to that of England which
could assist persons in desperate situations: It has been pointed
out in the introduction to this work that the 'extended family'
system helps a lot in Cameroon; but the system whereby relations
help other less fortunate ones in the family or clan appears to be
gradually thinning out. Thus, there is a strong need for the
government to provide measures for the protection of the insuring
public by ensuring that insurance companies are properly managed.
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contrOl and direct the investments of institutions owning a substantial
proportion . of the industries of a country. These considerations are allied
to two factors which call for government control of the insurance industry,
namely, the inequality of the parties to an insurance contract and the need
to maintain the solvency of insurance companies.
II THE INEQUALITY OF PARTIES TO AN INSURANCE CONTRACT.
In a free society, it is generally accepted that if parties having the
tapacity to act enter into an agreement, the agreement, in the absence of
some vitiating factor such as fraud, misrepresentation, duress, undue
influence or mistake becomes law between the parties which 
	 of law
ought to enforce. As Kessler has pointed out, "rational behavior within the
context of our culture is only possible if agreements will be respected. It
requires that reasonable expectations created by promises receive the
protection of the law".
11
The contract mechanism in fact is an indispensable
tool within a free enterprise system. Its proper functioning, however, rests
very firmly on the ability of the parties to bargain freely, and reach an
understanding or meeting of minds.
An ideal contract is one in which the parties who are brought together
by the play of market forces meet each other on a footing of approximate
social and economic equality and are free to bargain. It was perhaps with
such an ideal situation in mind that Sir George Jessel, M.R. made his famous
dictum:
	  if there is one thing which more than another public
policy requires it is that men of full ege and competent
understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and
that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily
11 F. Kessler, "Contracts of Adhesion: Some thoughts about freedom of
contract", (1943) 43 Columb. L. Rev. 629.
- 50 -
shall be 12held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of
justice."
The Master of the Rolls was here enunciating the doctrines of freedom and
sanctity of contract. The role of the court was limited to interpreting the
instrument which embodied the parties' agreement. The court was, and is, not
expected to make a contract for the parties.
The development of large scale enterprise with its mass production and
mass distribution appeared to have made the introduction of a new type of
contract inevitable. This new type of contract destroyed most of the basis
on which the contract mechanism was built, namely, the possibility for
parties of approximate economic standing freely to discuss the terms on which
they intended to contract.	 Seemingly, this new phenomenon, a natural
consequence of industrialisation, is variously described as standard form
contract
13
, contract of adhesion
14
 or block contract.
15
An insurer carries on business by issuing proposal forms and policies.
These are standard form contracts consisting of standardised terms in printed
form.	 The proposer therefore has no opportunity of changing anything in the
contract. Notionally, the party invited to accept such a contract is free to
choose whether or not to do so, but the choice is usually one of "take it or
12 Printing and Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson (1875) 19 L.R.
Eq.462 at 465.
13 Note that certain types of insurance contracts have long existed in
standard forms, for example, marine insurance.
14 The phrase "contract of	 adhesion" was introduced into legal
vocabulary by Professor Patterson, "The Delivery of a Life Insurance
Policy", (1919) 33 Marv. L. Rev. 198 at p.222; For more literature
on the subject see: R Powell, "Good Faith in Contracts", (1917) Cur.
Leg. Prob. 16 at p.27; Nathan Isaacs, "The Standardizing of
Contracts", (1917) 27 Yale L.J. 34; Llewellyn, "What Price Contract
- An Essay in Perspective",	 (1931) 40 Yale L.J. 704; R.F. Hallman,
"Insurance as a Contract of Adhesion", (1978) Ins. L.J. pp.274-283.
15 The term "block-contract" is used by Professor Llewellyn in a book
review (1939) 52 Marv. L. Rev. 700 at 701.
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leave it." A person who exercises his right of refusal does so at the
expense of foregoing services which can be secured in no other way. As
Professor Dennis Lloyd said: 16
"This is a way in which the commercial community is able to
impose its own practices and requirements in a quasi-legislative
fashion. Some of these- standard form contracts are devised
rather to consolidate and confirm rules and usages which are
best fitted to protect the interests of the particular sellers,
rather than to strike a balance between the needs and practices
of all concerned, including the humble consumer".
Any protection for a purchaser in these circumstances ought to be statutory.
Protective legislation would seem particularly appropriate in the case of
compulsory insurance contracts, for example, under the Road Traffic Acts.
16A
An insurance contract is a contract of adhesion par excellence.
17
The
policy and other essential documents are mass-produced in advance and the
buyer of insurance merely has to complete details without the possibility of
changing any terms in such documents. One cannot therefore talk of bargain
within the framework of the relationship between seller and buyer of
insurance since bargain in usual business activities assumes that the buyer
is able to negotiate with the seller the terms on which the article is sold
and bought.
In Cameroon, the position is perhaps rendered worse by the fact that in
some urban centres only one insurance company operates, making it impossible
for the prospective buyer who would not wish to accept that company's terms
to seek another insurer. Given this obvious imbalance between the buyer and
16 Lord Lloyd, The Idea of Law, 1964 at p.249.
16A See later discussion in Chapter Three of this stutiy, pp.204-226.
17 Yvonne Lambert-Faivre, Droit des Assurances, 2e ddn., Pr6cis Dalloz,
1977 at p.99: "Le contrat d'assurance est dlabor(, rddigd, imprime
par l'assureur, et l'assurd qui adhere a un contrat prd- gtabli dont
il n'a pas discutd les conditions se contente souvent de remplir les
blancs de l'imprimg."
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seller of insurance it became necessary for the state to intervene and
protect the interests of the buyer. The recent intervention by the state in
Cameroon was prompted because of the upsurge of fire and road traffic
accidents and in particular, the recognition that insurance companies are
prompt to collect or accept premiums but are slow to settle claims made
against them by the insured and his claimants who are less well-informed of
the mechanism of insurance.
17A
In England, France and the United States of America, courts of law were
the first to intervene in an attempt to do justice to the buyer of insdrance.
Such techniques as construction contra proferentem and the doctrines of
waiver and estoppel were called in aid to protect the insured.
18
 The rules
of construction of policies will be discussed in Chapter Seven of this
work.
19
	The above techniques devised by the courts, however, proved
inadequate given the plethora of weapons the seller has in his armoury for
insuring that the contract of insurance is invariably to his advantage.
20
In France, the legislator intervened much earlier in regulating the
insurance contract and insurance companies. Here, insurance supervision in
the sense in which it is now understood may be said to have come into being
17A This imbalance becomes especially more apparent in a country where
there are poor, if at all, informal settlement procedures. In
respect of this, see Chapter Eight, pp.464-465 and the proposals
advanced in Chapter Nine, pp.504-505, to ameliorate this situation.
18 For a typical example of a case where an English court used the
contra proferentem rule see: English v. Western [1940] 2 K.B. 156.
19 Infra pp.415-439.
20 For a useful discussion of some defences used by insurers to defeat
the claims of policyholders, see: Hasson, "The Basis of the Contract
Clause in Insurance Law", (1971) 34 M.L.R. 29; J.R. Birds,
"Warranties in Insurance Proposal Forms", [1977] J Bus. L. pp.231-
246.
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in 1930.
21
The law of July 13, 1930
22
 comprised two main bodies of rules:
rules applying to the conduct of insurance concerns
23
 and rules applying to
the contract of insurance.
24
The 1930 law lays down specific details on the
form of the insurance contract, rules relating to the terms of the contract,
rules relating to the modification of the contract, rules for assessing
claims, duties of the insurer, and so on. This French law is the main piece
of legislation governing the insurance contract in Cameroon today.
In England, on the other hand, legislative interference in the
insurance industry has never included control of the terms of the insurance
contract.
	 This is undoubtedly explained by the philosophy underlying
governmental control of the insurance industry, namely, "freedom with
publicity".
25
More recently, recommendations were, however, made by the Law
Commission
26
 in 1980 for some measure of legislative control of the terms of
Insurance policies and other similar documents.
III THE NEED TO MAINTAIN THE SOLVENCY OF INSURANCE COMPANIES
One of the fundamental	 and	 most	 widely accepted reasons for
21 M. Picard and A. Besson Les Assurances Terrestres en Droit Franvis 
- Les Entreprises d'Assurances, Vol. II, 4 gdn., Paris 1977.
22 Hereinafter referred to as "the 1930 Law".
23 This aspect is principally governed by the decree of 14 June, 1938.
24 0.E.C.D., Supervision of Private Insurance in Europe, 1963, Country
Reports prepared by the Insurance Supervisory Service in France.
25 This has already been explained above, see p.46.
26 Law Commission, Insurance Law - Non-Disclosure and Breach of
Warranty, (Law Corn. No.104) Cmnd. 8068, London H„.M.S.O. 1980. The
existence of certain deficiencies in the law as noted by the Fifth
Report of the Law Reform Committee, "Conditions and Exceptions in
Insurance Policies", 1957, Cmnd. 62 and more recently in 1980 the
Law Commission made recommendations highlighted by the Fifth Report
in a more general way. However, it is unlikely that the Law
Commissions proposals will be enacted. See later p.339 note 125.
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governmental regulation of the insurance industry is the need to protect
policyholders and other third party beneficiaries against the risk of the
insurer's insolvency. 27 This overriding need is recognised in Cameroon. 28
The function of insurance which Wendell Berge describes as "a mechanism
of minimising the fortuitous risks of life so that man's energies will be
free to assume other risks in adventurous grappling with those problems which
he has a chance to solve"
29
 can only be fulfilled if the finances of the
insurance company are sound. Similarly, Spencer L. Kimball said:
30
"The importance of insurance in meeting some of the most basic
needs of the human being leads inevitably to the central goal of
insurance regulation. If insurance is to do its job, that is,
if it is to insure, then the insurance enterprise must be
solvent. Solvency is the most important goal of all insurance
law and regulation ...".
He further went on to say:
“ ... there must be a degree and type of solvency that ensures
that the policyholder will be protected in any reasonably
27 M. Picard and A. Besson, op. cit., at p.156; 0.E.C.D., Supervision
of Private Insurance in Europe, 1963, para. 3; G.A. Olawayin,
"Government Control of Insurance in Nigeria", (1974) Nig. L.J. 81.
28 Article 55(1) of the 1985 Ordinance. This piece of legislation
reiterates the essential aim of supervision as defined in article 1
of the French Decree of 14 June 1938.
It is possible to discern that, while the underlying purpose is
similarly the protection of the policyholder, other considerations
may also be apparent. The 1985 Ordinance is designed to enable
close control to be exercised over the investment of an insurer's
funds. Moreover, the more traditional concept of consumer
protection which is concerned with solvency is not neglected in the
new legislation.
29 See: "Insurance as a system of free enterprise", an address before
the New England Association of Insurance Agents, Poland Springs,
Me., June 28, 1946, reprinted in C.G. Center and R.M. Heins,
Insurance and Government, McGraw Hill Books Co. Ipc. 1962, at p16.
30 Spencer L. Kimball, "Insurance Regulation at the Crossroads: where
do we go from here ?", reprinted in Modern Insurance Theory and 
Education edited by Kailin Tuan, Vol. 2, 1972, at p.335; See
generally, Kimball, "The Goals of Insurance Law: means versus ends",
(1962) 29 J. of Ins. pp.19-29, reprinted in "Essays in Insurance
Regulation, Readings selected from published writings of Spencer L.
Kimball", 1966, pp.20-24.
4
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foreseeable situation. The enterprise must be more than solvent,
it must be solid. The Swedes speak of I Soliditet' as a main aim
of insurance regulation. Their term expresses 4T main goal of
insurance law much more adequately than solvency."
The peculiar nature of the insurance transaction requires the insured
to repose some confidence and have faith in the insurers. The insured in an
insurance transaction is buying an invisible product and cannot determine its
quality until he puts it to the test and makes his claim, by which time it
may be too late to take remedial action if the company is insolvent; the
insured at the time he pays the premium obtains nothing really concrete or
tangible as such from the insurer except the latter's promise to honour his
own obligations at a future date on the happening of the specified event
insured against. The buyer of insurance should therefore be protected by the
taking of steps to ensure that the insurance concern is likely to be in a
position to honour its promise if and when the fortuitous event insured
against occurs. For this purpose, insurance needs strict consumer protection
measures to ensure that the financial position of the insurer is such that he
will always be able to meet his engagements.
The need to ensure the continued solvency of the insurance company is
even more necessary in the case of long-term insurance where premiums are
paid many years before the company is called upon to make good any claims.32
31 Spencer L. Kimball, Modern Insurance Theory and Education, op. cit.,
at p.335.
32 Maugham J., puts this succinctly in the English case of Re North and 
South  Insurance, (1933) 47 Li. L.R. 357 at 357-358.
"An insurance company differs in its nature from almost every
other trading concern. It starts, in the first instance,
without liabilities. It obtains premiums sometimes in very
large amounts, .... Inasmuch as the claims come in every case
after the premiums have been secured, there is always a risk
that an insurance company may, by offering what look like very
advantageous terms to the public, obtain a very large premium
income which, as a result of the practical working of the
company, proves to be insufficient income for the purpose of
meeting claims".
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In most states nowadays legislation makes it compulsory for every
motorist to ensure with an approved insurance company. The emergence of the
motor car and, subsequently, compulsory motor insurance
321
meant that many
people became involved in claims for damage, injury and death caused by motor
accidents and that motor insurance acquire greater importance.
33
The
innocent victim of a road accident clearly could not be allowed to suffer
because an insurance company was unable to meet its obligations. If one of
the approved insurers were to be found incapable of paying its claims the
resultant public outcry might be very embarrassing politically to the
government. These developments meant that governments became compelled to
act with a view to ensuring the solvency of insurance companies operating
within their territorial jurisdiction. 	 The result is the legislation
mentioned earlier in this chapter and described in detail in the next,
namely, the Insurance Companies Act 1982 and the Policyholders' Protection
Act 1975 and regulations made thereunder.
-=<>=-
32A See infra, pp.195, 198 and 204.
33 This statement should be taken with caution as before motor
insurance was widely used there had been in existence fire, life and
marine insurance business.
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CHAP TER	 2
GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF INSURANCE CONCERNS
I INTRODUCTION
Government supervisory authorities have laid down elaborate legal,
financial and technical requirements which must be complied with before an
Insurance concern commences business. 	 These requirements ensure that
Insurance concerns commence business on a sound basis. As we have already
observed
1
, the state regulates the insurance industry because of the need to
protect policyholders and beneficiaties of insurance policies. 	 These
interests are not transient but of a continuing nature given the nature of
the insurance contract itself. A system set up to regulate the insurance
industry as a means of safeguarding the interests of policyholders and other
third parties must consequently be organised in such a way that supervision
is carried out on a more or less continuous basis. State regulation of the
Insurance industry ought therefore to be concerned with its financial
situation before it commences business as it is with the continual solvency
of an insurance concern. If this were otherwise insurance regulation will
lose most, if not all of its significance.	 It is for this reason that
England and Cameroon which regulate the insurance industry have in addition
to laying down conditions which have to be fulfilled before a licence is
granted to commence business, also take steps to ensure that throughout its
existence, the insurance concerns continue to abide by the existing legislat-
ion.	 Regulation of insurance therefore precedes and accompanies the under-
taking's transaction.
1
	
See: Chapter One of this study pp.44-56.
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II THE CONDITIONS FOR FORMING AN INSURANCE CONCERN
In this section we will examine the legal, financial and technical
requirements for the formation of and the carrying on of an insurance
business in Cameroon and England.
The Legal Requirements for the Formation of an Insurance Company.
The legal requirements are mainly concerned with the form of the
concerns and the documents on which contracts are to be based and which
determine the contractual relationship with policyholders.
Form of the concerns.
At the very threshold of insurance activity, statutes exhibit the
state's interest in solidity by control of the form of the company through
which insurance business should be carried on. In Cameroon and England the
supervisory authority requires insurance concerns to assume a particular
legal form.	 In Cameroon only incorporated associations are allowed to
transact insurance business.	 The acceptable forms of incorporation are
limited liability companies, limited partnerships, mutual companies and
mutual societies.
2
	Most concerns transacting insurance business take the
form of limited liability companies. Originally, the only mutual insurance
company was the Assurances	 Mutuelles Aqricoles du Cameroun (AMACAM).
Presently it is a mutual company only in name. Limited Partnerships and
mutual societies are not common forms of insurance concerns. Article 11 does
not include individuals or unincorporated associations among those who may be
authorised to carry on insurance business. The reason for this probably lies
in what was pointed out in the UNCTAD Report on Insurance Legislation and
Supervision in Developing Countries thus:
2	 Article 11 of the 1985 Ordinance.
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"Regarding the legal form of insurance concerns, the experts
agreed that both joint stock companies with limited liability
and mutual concerns should be considered, in principle, as
having adequate legal forms because both were apt to warrant, in
addition to financial resources adapted to the business
requirements, the permanence which is a qualification of great
importance in insurance in view of its long term nature.
Individuals were to be 
3
rejected as insurers, as they did not
offer these guarantees.
It may be noted, however, that although individuals are not allowed to be
Insurers in Cameroon, Lloyd's of London insures some risks notably aviation
and marine risks.
4
In England, insurance business can be carried out both by natural and
legal persons.	 The persons and bodies authorised to carry out insurance
business are: a member of Lloyd's; a body registered under the enactment
relating to friendly societies; Or a trade union or employers' association
where the insurance business carried on by the union or association is
limited to the provision for its members of provident benefits or strike
benefits.
5
Further, section	 4	 permits existing insurance companies
authorised under sections 3 and 4 of the Insurance Companies Act 1981 to
carry on insurance business. It may be noted that in England, individuals
3 UNCTAD, Insurance Legislation and Supervision in Developing 
Countries, 1972, United Nations Publications, New York, para. 19 at
p.9
4 Decree No.67-DF-332 of 4 August 1967 laying down conditions for
applying Ordinance No.62-DF-36 of 31 March 1962 to Lloyd's of
London.
5	 Section 2 of the Insurance Companies Act 1982.
6 The Association of Lloyd's underwriters of London are an example of
Individuals who act as insurers in Britain - they are individual
underwriters authorised by Lloyd's; the statutory corporation called
Lloyd's does not insure as such, see: Scrutton L.J. in Rozanes V. 
Bowen (1928) 32 Li. L.R. 98 at 101. "Lloyd's as such never insures;
the corporation never insures.
	
It requires from the members who
join	 it	 that they give security with which to meet their
engagements, and deposits are made with the Society by	 the
individual members; but Lloyd's	 insures nobody and takes no
liability except to the extent of the deposit for claims made on its
individual members; its individual members underwrite 	
6
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may underwrite insurance but only 	 as	 members of an association of
underwriters, and in accordance with the provision of a trust deed approved
by the Department of Trade and Industry.
7
 The conditions of membership of
Lloyd's call for the provision of strict financial guarantees equivalent to
the minimum capital requirements applied to registered companies.
8
The Cameroonian legislation	 requires	 insurance companies to be
registered or incorporated under Cameroonian law.
9
	Notwithstanding the
provisions herein stated, some foreign underwriters may be authorised to
carry out insurance transactions in Cameroon under conditions which will be
7	 The members of Lloyd's Association act or participate personally for
the corporation. See: Dew Gibb, Lloyd's of London, A Study in 
Individualism, 1957 MacMillan & Co. For the course of business at
Lloyd's see: E.R.H. Ivamy, General Principles of Insurance, 4th ed.,
1979, London, Butterworths, pp.596-602.
8 R.S. Ferguson, "Self-Regulation at Lloyd's: The Lloyd's Act 1982",
(1983) 46 M.L.R. 57-63. See also sections 83-86 of the Insurance
Companies Act 1982; MacGillivray and Parkington, On Insurance Law 
relating to all risks other than marine insurance, 7th ed., 1981
London, Sweet & Maxwell, pp.913-927
Any person who wishes to continue to trade as an underwriter at
Lloyd's must pass the Lloyd's solvency test. Under Lloyd's rules
the principle of unlimited liability in the marketc in which
underwriting members are responsible to meet the full extent of
their losses from their own resources applies in so far as it
relates to losses sustained in the normal course of business at
Lloyd's. Lloyd's has studied various ways to assist underwriting
without compromising the market principle of unlimited liability.
At no time do underwriting members (Names) contest this principle
but they do object to applying that principle in the case of losses
arising from fraud or professional negligence. The recent troubles
at Lloyd's which resulted in losses of £130m falling on 1,525
underwriting members of Lloyd's sparked off debates of whether the
underwriters should be helped out of their predicament but this
would seem to be compromising or departing from the principle of
unlimited liability: See, The Financial Times, June - July 1985.
9	 Article 3(1) of the 1985 Ordinance
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made by a special instrument.
10
	Since this Order has not been promulgated,
it is not clear in what form foreign companies may be authorised to carry out
business in Cameroon.
Nevertheless, these provisions seem to be aimed at consolidating the
Cameroonian insurance market.	 Before the 1973 Ordinance there were twenty
eight insurance companies, all of which except for Assurances Mutuelles 
Aciricoles du Cameroun (formed in 1965), were foreign companies or branches of
foreign companies.
Presently, there are six 	 domestic concerns.	 Foreign insurance
companies operate only through the medium of agencies and branch offices. It
Is apparent that the government are being empowered to restrict the
development of foreign companies and increase Cameroon private and public
sector participation in insurance business. 10 Whilst such measures may be
justifiable in the national interest, it is hoped that considerations of
protection for the public will not unduly interfere with the free play of
market forces and competition. Regard ought to be given to a second plan of
action in terms of sensible targets for expansion at reasonable costs,
capital resources, and expertise should match freedom as it is obvious that
progress of insurance companies rests very substantially on the financial
expertise of its management.
Furthermore, individuals are not allowed to transact insurance business
in Cameroon. 11
10 The registered capital of limited liability insurance companies, the
minimum of which will be fixed by decree, must comprise private or
public Cameroonian shares at least equal to one third of its amount:
article 3(2) ibid.; See also, Waffo Mongo, "L'6tat des assurances au
Cameroun: Vers la suppression des socift gs gtranOres et une plus
grande Camerounisation des cadres", Cameroon Tribune, No. 3406,
October 1985
11 However, Lloyd's of London has been transacting insurance business
for a long time in Cameroon and their representation is under
process at the moment: Waffo Mongo, op. cit. 
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'	 In England, a foreign insurance concern may underwrite insurance
contracts in any of the classes specified in the Insurance Companies Act 1982
whether by means of a branch office or permanent agent.
12
There are
different requirements for a company having its head office in the United
Kingdom or in a member state of the European Community and that whose head
office is not within the community. 13 Where the body's head office is in the
United Kingdom, the applicant must be a company defined in section 735 of the
Companies Act 1985 or section 399 of the Companies Act (Northern Ireland)
1960; or a registered society; or a body corporate established by Royal
Charter or Act of Parliament and already authorised under section 3 or 4 of
the Insurance Companies Act 1982 to carry on Insurance business.
14
In
respect of companies whose head office is in a member state of the EEC other
than the United Kingdom the company must have a representative who is
resident in the United Kingdom 15
 and authorised to act generally and accept
service of any document.
16
If the representative is not an individual, it
must be a company as defined in section 735 of the Companies Act 1985 or
section 399 of the Companies Act (Northern Ireland) 1960 with its head office
in the United Kingdom and must itself have an individual representative
resident in the United Kingdom who is authorised to act generally, and to
accept service of any document on behalf of the company in its capacity as
representative of the applicant.
17
12 Sections 8 & 9 of the Insurance Companies Act 1982.
13 Sections 7-9 of the Insurance Companies Act 1982.
14 Section 7(1) of the Insurance Companies Act 1982.
15 Section 8(1) ibid.
16 Section 10(1) ibid.
17 Section 10(5) ibid.
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In the case of a company from another member-state restricted to reinsurance
business, the applicant must be a body corporate entitled under the law of
that state to carry on insurance business.
18
Finally, companies whose head office is not within the Community must
satisfy the following additional requirements: first, the applicant must be a
body corporate entitled under the law of the place where its head office is
situated to carry on long-term or general business there; second, the
applicant must have assets in the United Kingdom of at least one-half of the
minimum guarantee fund; and third, the applicant must have made a deposit in
accordance with section 9 (1) (c) of the 1982 Act. 19
A significant requirement concerning all these companies is that, the
company's director, controller, manager, representative OT main agent20 must
be a "fit and proper person" to hold such office.
21
This phrase is not
defined in the Act.	 Clearly the requirement would exclude a person with a
bad record, a conviction for a relevant offence, a history of bankruptcy or
misconduct or malfeasance.	 Further, it may relate to competence, for
example, lack of knowledge, ability or experience for the responsibility.
18 Section 8(3) ibid.
19 Section 9(1) ibid.
20 Main agents are persons with authority to commit a company and who
write an account of unlimited size or the amount of business written
is over 10% of a company's gross annual income. The raison d'hre 
for this step is that prudent supervision should extend to a
company's principal business producers if its operation is such that
a significant proportion of its portfolio comes from one or, at best
only a small number of underwriting agents.
21 Sections 7(3) and 8(2) of the 1982 Act. The information which has
to be supplied about directors, controllers, mangers representatives
and others is prescribed in schedule 6, forms A, 13 and C of the
Insurance Companies Regulations 1981 S.I. 1981, No.1654.
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Most difficult of all are cases where the issue is one of irresponsibility or
lack of good faith. 22 The fitness provisions of the Insurance Companies Act
1982 may entitle the Secretary of State to exercise statutory powers of
intervention in relation to that company if the director, controller or
manager appears to him "not a fit and proper person" to be a director,
controller or manager. The use of this power has been most controversial and
on occasion has been criticised by the Ombudsman and on occasion has led to
proceedings before the European Commission of Human Rights.
22
Similarly, in Cameroon, managers of insurance companies must produce
documents evidencing that they are of honourable character and have the
appropriate training and experience required to manage and control insurance
companies. 23 Furthermore, administrators and managers of insurance companies
are prohibited from taking or having a direct or indirect interest in an
Insurance company, contract, agreement or business or financial transaction
made with the company or on its behalf, unless they are duly authorised by
the General Assembly.
23A
Similar to the broad interpretation of the "fit and
proper person" provision under English law, this latter requirement in the
Cameroonian legislation seems to be aimed at ensuring that managers of
Insurance companies exercise good faith in their dealings with the company.
22 See infra pp.116-119.
23 Article 45 of the 1985 Ordinance. Article 47 ibid. lists a number
of offences for which if a manager has been convicted, he will be
precluded from running an insurance company.
23A Article 46(1) ibid. Article 46(2) provides for the disclosure of
any commitments, agreements and business or financial transactions
authorised by the General Assembly in accordance with article 46(1)
above in a report. For an example of the exercise of this power see
Infra p.111.
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The Documents on which Contracts are to be Based.
Basically, insurance law is concerned with regulating two broad fields:
the functioning of insurance concerns and the contractual relationship
between insurance concerns and policyholders. In Cameroon,
24
 article 59(1)
of the 1985 Ordinance requires insurance concerns to send their policies,
general policy conditions, proposal forms and other documents intended for
the public or to be distributed or supplied to policyholders to the Minister
of Finance who may recommend any necessary corrections or modifications
before business is commenced.	 The approval of these documents is a pre-
requisite for the grant of a licence to operate. 	 The object of this
inspection of documents by the supervisory authority is to ensure that the
contractual relationship is founded upon a legal basis which is not
prejudicial to the interests of the insured. 25	Similarly, in England,
insurance companies are required by regulation 29, schedule 5 (12) of the
Insurance Companies Regulations 1981 to submit to the Secretary of State
before an authorisation is given, the nature of the commitments which the
company proposes to take on and the general and special policy or treaty
conditions which it proposes to use. 26 However, by contrast to England, in
Cameroon the law of 13 July 1930 stipulated the form, content, terms and
conditions of insurance policies. The supervisory authority is required to
24 A similar provision is afforded in article R.310.6 of the Insurance
Code 1976 in France. See: M. Picard and A. Besson, op. cit.,
pp.197-198.
25 Insurance contracts in Cameroon and France are made subject to the
law of 13 July 1930 and the French Insurance Code of 1976,
respectively. The reason for the submission of these documents may
be classed as consumer protection, or perhaps more aptly, in the
case of insurance, purchaser protection, see: M. Picard and A.
Besson, op. cit., pp.197-198.
26 Schedules 4 and 5 of the Insurance Companies Regulations 1981, S.I.
1981, No. 1654.
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scrutinise the clauses and actual policy wordings to ensure that none of the
clauses of the contract which the concern proposes to use conflicts with the
requirements of the law on insurance contracts. In England, on the other
hand, the submission of the general and policy conditions to the supervisory
authority is concerned with the determination of whether or not the insurance
concern is financially able to undertake its commitments.
The Financial Requirements for Carrying on an Insurance Business 
Once the form of the company is chosen, the concern of the law to
implement the solidity principle becomes more profound and significant
demands are made to ensure adequate capitalisation of the new enterprise. In
the early days of an insurance company, capital plays a crucial role as this
enables the company to operate with assurance as merely a risk distributor.
It is not surprising therefore, that fairly substantial sums of paid-up
capital are requisite to the formation of an insurance company.
In Cameroon, the legislation relating to the financial requirements
before an authorisation is granted makes provision for the setting up of
initial share capital and of initial guarantees. Limited liability insurance
companies are required, prior to the final incorporation of the company to
pay up not less than one-third of their holdings in cash.
27
However, with
respect to mutual insurance companies an initial capital of not less than the
amount to be provided for by decree must be paid up.
28
On the other hand,
27 Article 13(2) of the 1985 Ordinance. Contributions in kind must be
fully and immediately paid up and must appear on the assets side of
the balance sheet of the company under a separate heading: Article
13(3) ibid. Article 14 requires the disclosure pf the amount of the
registered capital of the company concerned in documents, such as
prospectuses, notices, advertisements and other documents generally
intended for third parties.
28 Article 17 ibid. As in respect of limited liability companies, the
amount of the initial share capital must be disclosed in their
articles of association: article 18 ibid.
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insurance companies undertaking life insurance business and capital accumul-
ation transactions are required to set up guarantee reserves. 281' These
guarantees are intended to guard against any financial difficulties such as,
any deficiency in the technical and actuarial provisions which a newly
incorporated company might face.
28B
The establishment of guarantee reserves
exempts companies subject to these provisions from establishing the initial
share capital generally required of limited liability companies.
28C
In addition, it is interesting to realise that the Cameroonian legisla-
tion has imported the margin of solvency concept and requires insurance
companies to maintain a guarantee fund.
28D
However, the legislation does not
appear to lay down a formal or minimum margin of solvency. Moreover, it does
not specify the valuation bases for purposes of solvency such as the admiss-
ibility of assets and liabilities, the way in which assets should be valued
and tested for certain purposes including that of establishing the margin of
solvency.	 Nevertheless, it is to be expected that much of the detailed
regulation and control proferred will be provided for in the Orders still to
be made.
In the United Kingdom, section 5 of the Insurance Companies Act 1982
confers on the Secretary of State the power not to issue an authorisation
under section 3 of the Act unless the applicant has submitted to him such
proposals as to the manner in which it proposes to carry on business, such
financial forecasts and such other information as may be required by or in
accordance with regulations under the Act, and he is satisfied on the basis
28A Article 8(1) ibid.
288 Article 8(2) ibid.
28C Article 8(3) ibid.
28D Article 8(4) ibid.
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Technical Requirements.
A factor on which the control authorities in both the United Kingdom
and Cameroon have to be satisfied before granting authorisation is the
adequacy of a company's reinsurance arrangements
32
 and premium rates.	 These
provisions are to ensure that the company does not undertake risks of a
character or of an amount likely to result in undue strain on its financial
resources without there being some evidence that adequate reinsurance
arrangements have been made.	 Knowledge of the reinsurance arrangements
would, in theory at least, enable the control authorities to intervene
whenever they consider it necessary to prevent the insurer from over-
burdening itself financially. In Cameroon, the provisions as to reinsurance
arrangements are stipulated in article 2 of Decree No. 68-DF-153 of 8 April
1968.	 This article requires all insurance concerns operating in Cameroon to
re-insure 10 per cent of their technical reserves as from December 31, every
year, with the National Re-Insurance Fund. 	 Insurance companies may further
reinsure their risks with foreign companies. In this regard, article 36(2)
of the 1985 Ordinance provides that all re-insurance agreements or contracts
with foreign companies under which over 50 per cent of the premiums paid in
Cameroon are to be retroceded, must be approved by the Minister of Finance
before they are put into effect.
32A
In the United Kingdom, similar requirements are provided by regulation
29 of the Insurance Companies Regulations 1981.
33
This regulation provides
32 For the role of reinsurance see: R.L. Carter. Reinsurance 2nd ed.,
1983 London, pp.1-10.
32A However, article 36(3) prohibits all reinsurance agreements with
foreign companies which involve the transfer of more than 50% of
their premium.
33 Schedules 4 and 5 of regulation 29 of the Insurance Companies
Regulations 1981 S.I. 1981, No.1654.
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of that and any other information received by him that the application ought
to be granted.	 In accordance with this requirement, regulation 29 and
schedules 4 and 5
29 in respect of long-term business and general business
respectively require first, the submission to the Secretary of State of a
statement showing the amount by which the assets are expected to exceed
liabilities at the date of authorisation (after application of valuation
regulations) 30 and how it is calculated; second, the date on which the
company's financial year will end; third, the name and addresses of the
auditors of the company; fourth, names and addresses of the company's
principal bankers; fifth, the assets which represent or will represent the
minimum guarantee fund being assets admissible under and valued in accordance
with the Assets Valuation Regulations;
31
sixth, the estimated costs of
installing the administrative services and organisation 	 for	 securing
business, and the financial resources intended to cover those costs and
finally, projections for each of the first three financial years following
authorisation; a forecast balance sheet (on both optimistic and pessimistic
bases), a plan (on both optimistic and pessimistic bases) setting out
detailed estimates of income and expenditure in respect of direct business,
reinsurance acceptances and reinsurance cessions and estimates relating to
the financial resources intended to cover underwriting liabilities and the
margin of solvency.
29 Insurance Companies Regulations 1981 S.I. 1981, No.1654.
30 Parts V & VI of the Insurance Companies Regulations 1981 S.I. 1981,
No. 1654.
31 Regulations 37-49 ibid. These regulations seek to strengthen
insurance companies assets. They are designed to ensure that assets
are widely spread so that the solvency of a company is not
vulnerable to the failure of, or to its inability to dispose of, one
or two individual investments.
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that all insurance companies must submit to the Secretary of State,
Information concerning the guiding principles relating to re-insurance of
business written in the United Kingdom including the company's maximum
retention per risk or event after all reinsurance ceded. 	 Furthermore, the
companies must submit as aforementioned, copies and drafts of any separate
reinsurance treaties covering business in the United Kingdom. The Department
of Trade and Industry will not normally allow more than 20 per cent of the
liabilities of an applicant company to be reinsured with its holding company,
more than 10 per cent of liabilities to be reinsured with any other company
or more than 25 per cent of liabilities to be reinsured within any one
country other than the country in which the applicant company has its head
office.
34 As in Cameroon, extensive use is made in the United Kingdom of the
capacity provided by foreign reinsurers. This is essential as it ensures a
satisfactory spread of cover 	 by	 domestic companies and so avoids a
concentration of United Kingdom risks in the London market.Regulations
further require in respect of long-term business the submission of the
technical bases which the actuary who will be appointed for the purposes of
section 19 of the 1982 Act proposes to employ for each class of business
including the bases needed for calculating premium rates and technical
reserves, including mathematical reserves and schedule 5 requires the
submission of the tariffs which the company proposes to apply for each
category of business in respect of general business. The latter requirement
is more specific. Finally, a certificate by the actuary that he considers
the premium rates to be suitable must be obtained. The submission of the
tariffs to the supervisory authority is more concernedk with the solvency of
34 See: Department of Trade and Industry, Guidance Notes on Insurance
Legislation, para. 6.013, Release 3: 13-11-85.
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insurance companies.	 In contrast in Cameroon, article 81 of the 1985
Ordinance requires insurance concerns to submit the premium rates of all
types of business they propose to undertake to the Minister of Finance for
approval before they are put into effect. 	 This article is silent as to what
requirements premium rates must satisfy before they are approved. One would
assume that before any rates are approved, the supervisory authority must be
satisfied that they are not inadequate, excessive or unfairly discriminatory.
However, these criteria, considered in isolation do not provide very much
guidance.	 For instance, an excessive rate is one which is too high or too
low in relation to the risk to which it applies. 	 There is very little
guidance to be derived from the definition.	 In the last resort, the
supervisory authority has to take a decision in the light of all the
circumstances that exist in the country such as the market structure and
performance, including changes	 in	 market	 share, entries and exits,
profitability, price, availability and adequacy of consumer information.
These considerations require that officials of the supervisory service be
educated and experienced in taking well reasoned decisions. This is an area
where discretion alone will not suffice.
III LEGISLATION GOVERNING THE OPERATION OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY.
In almost all the developing countries as in the developed countries
insurance companies may carry on insurance business only if they have
obtained prior authorisation from the state. 	 The grant of authorisation
takes the form of an administrative act. 	 Prior authorisation is commonly
called f aqrgment s in French administrative practice, and 'licence' in the
United Kingdom practice. The licence is evidence of state approval that the
insurance undertaking has fulfilled all the legal, financial and technical
requirements prescribed by law and deemed necessary for the protection of the
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interest of the policyholders and the general interest of the states'
economy.
The necessity of licensing insurance concerns was stressed by the
UNCTAD experts in their Report on Insurance Legislation and Supervision in
developing countries. They said that:
35
"mere formal registration was not sufficient, but should be
preceded by a comprehensive pre-licence examination of the
technical and economic conditions of the concern, of its plan of
business to be transacted in the coming few years, of the
technical skill and integrity of its managers and its
reinsurance arrangements".
In this respect, it was pointed out that only a thorough analysis carried out
by the supervisory authorities could lead to valid conclusions and that ample
discretionary powers should be given to the authorities in approving all
these factors as this would prevent to a large extent untrustworthy concerns
from entering into the business.
In the United Kingdom, the Insurance Companies Act 1982 requires an
insurance company to apply for and receive an authorisation from the
Secretary of State in respect of the class or classes of business it wishes
to transact.
36
By virtue of section 3 (1) of the 1982 Act, the Secretary of
State may authorise a body to carry on in the United Kingdom such of the
classes of insurance business specified in schedule 1 or 2 to the Act, Or
such part of those classes, as may be specified in the authorisation.
Section 3 (3) further enacts that: "an authorisation under this section may
identify classes or parts of classes of general business by referring to the
35 UNCTAD, Insurance Legislation and Supervision in Developing 
Countries, 1972, United Nations Publications, New York, para. 13 at
p.8
36 The consequences of the failure to obtain an authorisation in the
United Kingdom and Cameroon will be discussed later on in this
chapter pp.138-145.
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appropriate groups specified in Part 11 of Schedule 2 to this Act". 37 An
authorisation is, thus, not a blanket approval to insurance concerns to
engage in all classes of insurance business.
In Cameroon, the licence is granted by the Minister of Finance in the
form of a ministerial order, known in French as "arrgt6", which is published
in the Official Gazette.38 As in the United Kingdom, it is not granted for
all insurance operations, but is restricted to the conduct of a specified
number of classes of business which the applicant concern must identify in
its application. If the concern decides in the course of its business to
engage in other classes of insurance operations, it must make the appropriate
application to the competent authority.	 Article 35(1) of the 1985 Ordinance
provides that approval must be requested separately for each category of
insurance business enumerated in that article.	 The applicant insurance
concern must therefore specify in its application which of the nineteen
classes of insurance business it intends to engage in. As we have already
observed, 39 the financial guarantees required by the supervisory authority
differ with the number and type of classes of insurance business which the
concern wishes to transact.
In addition to restricting the classes of insurance business which an
insurance company may undertake in England, section 16 of the Insurance
Companies Act 198240 provides that authorised insurance companies are
prohibited from carrying on in the United Kingdom or elsewhere any activities
37 This section implements article 7 of the EEC Non-Life Establishment
Directive No.73/239/EEC, (0.3. 1973, L228/3). op. cit. 
38 Article 35 of Ordinance No.85-3 of 31 August 1985 relating to
insurance business.
39 Supra., pp.66-68.
40 See also article 8 of Directive No. 79/267/EEC of 13 March 1979,
(0.3. of European Communities, 1979 L63/5) op. cit. 
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which are not in connection with or for the purposes of their insurance
business. 41	A corresponding restriction may be found under Cameroonian
law. 42
In some countries, notably, India, the Republic of Viet-Nam and some
African countries, namely Tunisia, Benin Republic and Malagasy Republic, in
order to safeguard the interests of holders of long term policies, primarily
life assurance, there are legal provisions prohibiting insurance concerns
conducting this class of business from engaging in other types of general
business. This is called the principle of specialisation. 	 In the United
Kingdom, the principle of specialisation used not to be formally embodied in
any instrument though regulations do stipulate that concerns must keep
separate accounts (capital and reserves) for life insurance and any other
classes of business they undertake.
43
	However, section 6 of the Insurance
Companies Act 1982 (implementing article 13 of Directive No. 79/267/EEC)44
prohibits the issue of authorisation to carry on both long-term and general
insurance business in the United Kingdom. In practice however, the Secretary
of State may allow new insurers to conduct the two types of business in
separate companies. 45	One may assert that this practice would render the
principle of specialisation unnecessary since the two companies may be
41 For the interpretation of insurance business see: Section 95 of the
Insurance Companies Act 1982.
42 By virtue of article 33(1) of the 1985 Ordinance, insurance compan-
ies may not carry out any other business other than the transactions
listed in article 32 of this Ordinance. This provision is also
applicable in France, see: M. Picard and A. Besson op. cit., at pp.
156 et seq. and article R.322.2 of the Insurance Code 1976.
43 See, for example, section 16 of the English Insurance Companies Act
1974.
44 0.3., of the European Communities, L63/5 of 13 March 1979, op. cit. 	 .
45 Department of Trade and Industry, Guidance Notes on Insurance
Legislation, para. 6-008 on composite insurers, Release 3: 13-ii-85.
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subsidiary companies of the same holding company. It is therefore, sensible
that separate accounts should be maintained in respect of long-term and
general business.
In Cameroon, apart from the American Life Assurance Company which has
so far confined its insurance operations to life assurance, all insurance
companies engage in more than one of the categories of transactions referred
to in article 32 of the 1985 Ordinance.	 However, article 33(3) requires
insurance companies to establish special management and keep separate
accounts for each category of transactions.
As we noted earlier
46
in this chapter the UNCTAD experts recommended
that the supervisory authorities should possess wide discretionary powers in
admitting new industries into the insurance market. This recommendation is
followed by Scandinavian and some developing countries.	 In Sweden as a
result of deliberate government policy Swedish law gives the government
supervisory authorities power to restrict the entry of new companies into the
market place. A new Swedish insurance company or a foreign concern seeking
admission into the market is obligated to show to the satisfaction of the
insurance department that it is needed in the market and is likely to promote
sound insurance practice.
47
The Swedish authorities encourage a trend
towards the merger of existing firms in order to reduce the supposed adverse
effects of excessive competition such as an increase in the cost of marketing
resulting from too many companies. The result of the Swedish "need test" has
been to keep the market organisation of the insurance business well within
the comprehension of the regulator and subject to his effective control.
46 ,Supra, p.72.
47 Spencer L. Kimball, "The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A
Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law", (1961) 45 Minn.
L. Rev. 471 at pp.514-517.
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This view is held by Lijadu who says that: 48
"The superintendent of insurance should have discretionary powers
in the granting of licences, so that he may exercise these
powers when the economic and social conditions make it desirable
to do so, thus, when it is feared that too many concerns will be
established in relation to the local market causing its
saturation or throwing it out of balance, the superintendent may
either withhold further licences or apply new criteria stricter
than those required by the existing laws, in order to exclude
the less qualified applicants".
Cameroon unlike Britain, subjects the granting of a licence to the
economic conditions prevailing on the domestic market at the time of the
application. The Minister of Finance is empowered by virtue of article 63 of
the 1985 Ordinance to suspend or restrict grants of approval for all or any
categories	 or	 sub-categories	 of	 insurance	 transactions	 where the
circumstances of the market so require. 	 This does not seem to be the
position in the United Kingdom. By virtue of the European Economic Community
directive No. 73/239/EEC of July 24, 1973, 49 a member of the E.E.C. cannot
refuse a licence to an insurance concern of one of the member states because
of the unfavourable economic circumstances of the national insurance market.
The introduction of a common market means implementation of the "economic"
freedoms set out in the Treaty of Rome. Articles 52-58 of the Treaty of Rome
1957 provide for the gradual abolition of restrictions on the right of
establishment	 and	 for the right of insurance companies bearing the
nationality of one state to cross into another state and establish an agency,
branch or subsidiary in that state.
48 Y. Lijadu, "Government Control of Operations of Insurance
Companies", Conference Papers of the Insurance Institute of Nigeria,
Vol.1, 1972, at p.87.
49 0.3., of the European Communities, L228/20, 1973, op. cit. 
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IV. THE ORGANS IN CHARGE OF INSURANCE REGULATION AND THE SUPERVISION OF THE
INDUSTRY.
The effectiveness of insurance regulation depends on the bodies
responsible for insurance regulation and supervision.
The Organs in Charge of Insurance Regulation.
In England the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry has very wide
powers of intervention under the Insurance Companies Act 1982. 50 The
Secretary of State is assisted in the exercise of these powers by a number of
insurance advisers within the Insurance Division of the Department of Trade
and Industry. 51 Each insurer authorised under the Insurance Companies Act
1982 is required to comply with all the requirements of the Act and its
compliance is monitored by the Insurance Division.
Professional associations also play a valuable role in the supervisory
process as the practice of the Insurance Division is to consult widely with
interested bodies before recommending new legislation to the Secretary of
State for submission to Parliament. 	 The bodies consulted are notably the
British Insurance Association, 52 the Life Offices Association, the Associated
Scottish Life Offices, the Industrial Life Offices Association, the linked
Life Assurance Group, the Institute of London Underwriters, the Corporation
of Lloyd's and the British Insurance Brokers Association.
50 Sections 37-48 of the Insurance Companies Act 1982.
51 At 31 December 1983, the staff of the Insurance Division of the
Department of Trade and Industry numbered 88. The bivision has the
assistance of the Department's Solicitor, Accountancy Services
Division, Companies Investigation Branch and Government Actuary.
See: Department of Trade and Industry, Insurance Annual Report 1983,
London, H.M.S.O. para. 19 p.3 and Appendix 6.
52 Very recently this organisation has become the Association of
British Insurance (A.B.I.)
Because the English approach to insurance regulation is to keep
governmental intervention to a minimum, the professional association play a
role in self-regulation. An example of regulation of the insurance industry
by the British Insurance Association is afforded by Statements of Insurance
Practice
53
which these associations issue from time to time on behalf of
their members. We will in Chapter Five discuss the contribution of these
Statements to the law of non-disclosure, misrepresentation and breach of
warranty.
54
The	 professional	 associations	 also	 submit	 evidence	 on a
representational basis to Royal Commissions, Committees of Inquiry and
Tribunals. Notable examples of this role are evidence submitted before the
Monopolies Commission Into the Supply of Fire Insurance, the Hilary Scott
Committee on Property Bonds and Equity-Linked Life Assurance, the Tribunal
which investigated the collapse of the Vehicle and General Insurance Company.
Regulation of the insurance industry in Cameroon as in Britain is the
joint responsibility of a government body and professional organisations. In
Cameroon the government department in charge of regulation is the Sub-
Department of Insurance (Sous-Direction des Assurances) of the Ministry ar
Finance.
55
Insurance regulation in Cameroon is thus carried out, as in
France and many French-speaking African countries, under the authority of the
Minister of Finance.	 The present organisation of the Sub-Department of
Insurance is governed by Decree No.84-1105 of 25 August 1984 	 which
53 These Statements are reproduced in Appendix A of the Law Commission
Working Paper No.73 - Insurance Law: Non-Disclosure and Breach of
Warranty, 1979, London H.M.S.O.
54 Infra, pp.316, 323 and 339.
55 See: article 57(1) of the 1985 Ordinance which provides that state
control of the insurance industry shall be exercised under the
authority of the Minister of Finance.
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reorganised the Ministry of Finance. 	 Article 36(1) of the decree provides
that the Sub-Department of Insurance shall be placed under the authority of
the Sub-Director and shall be responsible for the formation, supervision and
enforcement of legislation on insurance.
The Sub-Department of Insurance comprises of two services and a Corps
of Insurance Inspectors. The two services are:
(a) the Studies and Approvals Services, (services des gtudes et des 
apr .ements); and
(b) the Insurance Companies Control Service, (le service du contrtle 
des entreprises d'assurances).
The service in charge of studies and authorisation is responsible for
examining applications made by concerns intending to do insurance business in
Cameroon.	 It studies the documents which must be submitted by all
prospective insurance concerns, and makes recommendations to the Minister of
Finance who decides either to grant or refuse an authorisation on the
strength of the recommendations. 56	This service is responsible for the
examination of premium rates, policy forms and other documents issued by
insurance concerns operating in Cameroon. Thus, to a considerable extent, it
is this service which determines the level of premium rates and the contents,
length and print of insurance policies and proposal forms.
Insurance inspectors come under the auspices of the Insurance Companies
Control Service. 56A	They are	 the	 principal officers in charge of
implementing insurance legislation in Cameroon.
56 Article 36(2) of Decree No.84-1105 of August 1984. See also, Order
No. 212-MINFI-CE! of 29/6/1973 for a list of documents to be
submitted by all concerns intending to do business in Cameroon.
56A Article 36(3) of Decree No.84-1105 of August 1984.
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Another government body which is indirectly responsible for regulating
the insurance industry in Cameroon is the National Re-Insurance Fund (Caisse 
Nationale de Rg-assurance).
It ensures that all insurance companies compulsorily reinsure ten per cent of
their premium income 57 and keep up to date statistics which are published and
submitted to the control authorities.
The Conference Internationale des Contr6les d'Assurances des gtats 
Africains et Malgache (C.I.C.A.) also play an important part in insurance
regulation in Cameroon, especially within the framework of regional co-
operation in this field. 58 This body acts as a co-ordinator and advisory
body to all the French-speaking West African countries. 	 It organises
conferences and seminars for the discussion of problems facing the states
grouped under it. It plays a supervisory role over the training and educat-
ion of insurance experts. The only professional association in Cameroon is
the Association des Socigtgs d'Assurances du Cameroun (A.S.A.C.) which acts
as an intermediary	 between	 insurance	 concerns	 and the supervisory
authority. 59
Furthermore article 76 of the	 1985 Ordinance provides for the
establishment of an advisory body called the National Insurance Board. This
57 Supra p.69.
58 CICA is a regional insurance organisation grouping the following
French-speaking West African countries: Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Congo, Togo, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Upper Volta, Mali, Niger,
Senegal, Chad, Dahomey, Mauritania and Malagasy Republic.
59 Article 78(1) of the 1985 Ordinance. All insurance companies
approved in accordance with article 31 ibid must become members of
the Professional Association of Insurance Companies: article 77
ibid. See articles 79 and 80 ibid for the functions and competence
of the Association of Insurance Companies. For a detailed account
of the role of C.I.C.A. and A.S.A.C. see: S.A. Fonkam, State 
Regulation of Private Insurance in Cameroon, unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, University of London, 1980, pp.244-245.
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body is required to give opinions on matters submitted to it by the supervis-
ory authority relating to insurance contracts, the functioning of insurance
companies, the practice of the professional association and the withdrawal of
approvals.	 In this capacity, it is expected that this body will formulate
proposals on the prevention of risks, conditions for the compensation of
accidents, general conditions of insurance contracts, rules on tariff regula-
tion and guiding principles relating to reinsurance. 	 By virtue of article
76(4) a decree will regulate the duties, composition and functioning of the
National Insurance Board. This decree has not yet been passed. However, it
is hoped that the members of this body would involve the government, insur-
ance companies and the Association of Insurance Companies. In this regard,
this provision could be seen as a unique and edifying experience recognising
the value of sensible co-operation between the legislators and those for whom
the legislators are legislating.
The Supervision of the Insurance Industry by these Organs.
The control and supervision of insurance companies is a continuing
exercise; hence apart from the pre-registration regulations which must be
complied with by every insurance company which desires to start an insurance
business, there are post-registration regulations to ensure that throughout
its existence, the insurance concern continues to abide by existing legislat-
ion.	 It is to the consideration of these regulations and requirements that
we will now turn.
In both England and Cameroon supervision of the business of licensed
insurance concern involves:
(i) the examination of returns and other documents which must be
submitted to the supervisory authorities;
(ii) inspection at the place of business to verify that the information
given in the returns and other documents corresponds with the actual state of
the concern's business affairs.
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I. The Examination of Returns and other Documents.
The examination of returns and other insurance documents is concerned
with legal, financial and technical controls.
A.	 Legal Controls.
In England, the legal control is in connection with constitution of an
insurance company.
	
Changes relating to the constitution of an insurance
company must be notified to the Registrar of Companies.
60
	Further, the
Secretary of State is empowered by virtue of section 37 of the insurance
Companies Act 1982 to exercise certain powers of intervention. He has the
power to obtain information and require production of documents at such time
and place as he may specify.
61
	The information to be submitted pursuant to
section 5 (1) of the Insurance Companies Act 1982 is listed in regulation 29,
Schedules 4 and 5 of the Insurance Companies Regulations.
62
Amongst others,
this information relates to the date and place of incorporation, the
registered number of the company, a brief summary of the objects of the
company, the names of the persons who will be directors, controllers or
managers of the company (changes of which have to be notified to the
Secretary of State), and the particulars of any association which exists or
which is proposed to exist between the directors or controllers of the
company and any person who acts or will act as an insurance broker, agent,
loss adjuster or reinsurer for the company. Within his powers the Secretary
of State may require documents relating to insurance contracts such as
general and special policy conditions to be submitted to him.
60 Section 380 of the Companies Act 1985.
61 Section 44 of the Insurance Companies Act 1982.
62 Section 29 of the Insurance Companies Regulations 1981, S.I.
1981No.1654, pp.53-61.
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With regard to Cameroon, the two areas where continuing legal controls
are exercised are concerned with the articles of association of insurance
companies and the documents intended for the public.
(i) Articles of association 
In Cameroon, insurance companies, both limited liability companies and mutual
insurance companies, must submit proposed amendments of their articles of
association to the Minister of Finance before they become effective.
63
By
requiring the insurance companies to notify any changes in their articles of
association to the Minister of Finance, the supervisory authority ensures the
due observance of existing laws.
(ii) Documents intended for the public 
As we observed earlier,
64
the 1985 Ordinance provides that policies,
prospectuses, proposal forms and any other printed matter intended for the
public or to be distributed or supplied to policyholders must be sent to the
Minister of Finance who may recommend any necessary corrections or modific-
ations before they are put to use.	 Thus any subsequent modifications which
affect the document must be approved by the supervisory authority.
B. Financial Controls 
To secure the financial stability of the insurance concern, financial
controls are exercised on a continuing basis.
In England, legislation has always relied for the protection of the
policyholders largely on regular publication of the financial affairs of
insurance enterprises. Thus, the supervisory authority is concerned essent-
ially with the following;
63 Article 58(1) of the 1985 Ordinance. In the case of limited
liability companies see: articles 13 and 14 of the 1985 Ordinance in
respect of mutual insurance companies see: articles 18 and 20 of the
1985 Ordinance.
64 Supra at p.65.
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(1) the collection of material relating to the financial condition of
the insurer which it is required to publish;
(2) the verification of the maintenance of the prescribed degree of
solvency;
(3) the maintenance of assets in the United Kingdom; and
(4) requirements on investments.
We will be concerned with these four aspects, particularly with the examin-
ation of legislation dealing with each of them.
I. The collection of material relating to the financial condition of the 
company for publication.
Companies registered in the United Kingdom and carrying on any "Act"
65
class of insurance must make returns covering the whole of their insurance
business including "non Act" classes, throughout the world; they are required
to distinguish the United Kingdom part of their business only in the case of
life assurance. Companies not registered in the United Kingdom underwriting
insurance business of any "Act" class in the United Kingdom must make similar
returns.
These returns include a revenue account for the year, a balance sheet
at the end of the year and a profit and loss account for the year or in the
case of a company not trading for profit, an income and expenditure account
for the year.
66
Furthermore, section 20 of the 1982 Act requires insurance
companies to prepare annually statements of the prescribed class of insurance
65 An "Act" class of insurance business means any class of insurance
business specified in schedules 1 and 2 of the Insurance Companies
Act 1982 and "non Act" class of business refers to any business not
specified in the Act.
66 Section 17 of the Insurance Companies Act 1982.
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business they are undertaking. The accounts must be audited by such persons
as may be prescribed.
67
	The form and content of these accounts are pre-
scribed by regulations.
68
In addition, companies carrying on "long-term" business for example,
life	 assurance, must cause periodic actuarial investigation of their
financial condition at intervals not exceeding twelve months, including a
valuation of their liabilities.
69
	New insurance companies are required to
submit quarterly returns.
Section 22 of the Insurance Companies Act 1982 requires the deposit of
every account, balance sheet, abstract or statement required by sections 17,
18 and 20 of the Act and any report of the auditor of the company made in
pursuance of section 21 to be printed and five copies deposited with the
Secretary of State within six months after the close of the period to which
the account, balance sheet, abstract or report relates.
70
The whole of the
material contained in the returns is held available for public inspection and
is published either in full or in summary in annual reports issued by the
Department of Trade and Industry. Insurance companies are also required to
supply copies of their accounts and actuarial abstracts on demand to any
policyholder. 71 These stringent requirements assist the Department of Trade
and Industry in its task of monitoring the solvency of insurance companies.
67 Section 21 ibid.
68 Insurance Companies (Accounts and Statements) Regulations 1983, S.I.
1983, No.1811.
69 Section 18 of the Insurance Companies Act 1982.
70 The Secretary of State may use his powers of intervention by virtue
of section 42 to make actuarial investigations into a company's
financial position and by Section 43 accelerate the production of
information required by accounting provisions.
71 Section 23 of the 1982 Act.
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2. The verification of the maintenance of the prescribed degree of  solvency
The Department of Trade and Industry must be satisfied that the requisite
margin or margins of solvency
72
 (or the minimum guarantee fund if greater)
needed at the beginning of the fourth year following authorisation is
maintained.
73
 New undertakings must have margins of solvency at least equal
to the appropriate minimum guarantee fund. 74
	The amount of an insurer's
solvency margin requirement for general business depends on its corporate
status:
75
 the size of the company's account; which of two calculations,
applied to its premium income and claims payments, produces the higher
result;
76
 the extent to which the company reinsurers its account; and in the
case of companies with a small account, the classes of business for which the
company is authorised.
77
 Having established the solvency requirement, an
insurer then has to test its assets to make sure that it possesses sufficient
assets of an acceptable nature to meet the requirements. 78 An insurance
72 The concept of a minimum solvency margin - a minimum amount by which
the assets of an insurer must exceed its liabilities was included
for the first time in the Assurance Companies Act 1946. In 1977,
regulations were made to implement the provisions of the Non-Life
Establishment Directive with effect from July 1978. These
regulations have been repealed and incorporated into the Insurance
Companies Act 1982 and Insurance Companies Regulations 1981, S.I.
1981, No.1654.
73 Department of Trade and Industry, Guidance Notes op. cit., para. 10
p. 3.
74 Ibid., especially paras. 11 and 12.
75 For United Kingdom companies and pure reinsurers - section 32(1);
external direct companies - section 32(2); and Community companies -
section 34 of the Insurance Companies Act 1982.
76 Regulation 4, schedule 2 of the Insurance Companies Regulations
1981, S.I. 1981, No.1654.
77 Regulations 4 and 9 of, and Schedules 1, 2 and 3 to the Insurance
Companies Regulations 1981, S.I. 1981, No.1654.
78 Regulations 37-49 together with schedules 7 and 8 ibid. set down
rules for valuing the assets of an insurance company for solvency
purposes.
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company which fails to maintain the margin of solvency must at the request of
the Secretary of State submit a short-term financial scheme for the restorat-
ion of its financial position, propose modifications to the scheme if the
Secretary of State considers it inadequate and give effect to any scheme
accepted by him as adequate.
79
 The scheme must include measures not only for
short term support but also the general improvement of the capital base.
3.  The Maintenance of Assets in the United Kingdom. 
The Secretary of State may require that assets of a company of a value which
at any time is equal to the whole or a specified proportion of the amount of
Its domestic liabilities must be maintained in the United Kingdom.
80
 He may
direct that for the purposes of any such requirement assets of a specified
class or description must or must not be treated as assets maintained in the
United Kingdom.
81
 He may also direct that the domestic liabilities of any
class or description must be taken to be the net liabilities after deducting
any part of them which is reinsured. 82
	In computing the amount or any
liabilities all contingent and prospective liabilities must be taken into
account but not liability in respect of share capital. 83
In addition to the Secretary of State's power to impose a requirement
on a company to maintain assets of a value equal to the amount of its
domestic liabilities, he may impose an additional requirement that the whole
or a specified proportion of the assets must be held by a person approved by
him as trustee for the company.
84
79 Sections 32(4) and 33 of the Insurance Companies Act 1982.
80 Section 39(1) of the 1982 Act.
81 Section 39(2) ibid.
82 Section 39(3) ibid.
83 Section 39(6) ibid.
84 Section 40 ibid.
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Further protection of the assets of the company is provided by section
28 which requires insurance companies to maintain the separation of assets
and liabilities attributable to long-term business and section 29 requires
the application of assets of the company with long-term business only for the
purpose of that business.
Where there is an established surplus in which long-term policyholders
are eligible to participate and an amount has been allocated to policyholders
of that category in respect of a previously established surplus, section 30
requires the company not to apply assets representing any part of that
surplus but to make allocations to policyholders of that surplus.
4.	 Requirements on Investments.
The Secretary of State is given the power to require a company not to
make investments of a specified class or description and to realise, before
the expiration of a specified period, the whole or a specified proportion of
investments of a specified class or description held by the company.
85
Part
5 of the Insurance Companies Regulation 1981 sets out the valuation of assets
of the company and listed investments which a company ought to undertake.
86
In Cameroon, legislation on the financial controls exercisable by the
supervisory authorities as a measure of safeguarding the insurance company's
continued solvency in the interest of policyholders and beneficiaries deals
with the following: first, the share capital; second, the keeping of accounts
and balance sheets; third, guarantee reserves, guarantee fund and margin of
solvency, fourth, technical reserves; and fifth the investment of these
reserves.
85 Section 38 ibid.
86 Regulations 37-49 of Insurance Companies Regulations 1981 S.I. 1981,
No.1654.
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1.	 Share Capital.
Although the initial share capital provides security to policyholders
and beneficiaries at the early stages of its existence, in a going insurance
business, capital plays a relatively subordinate role. The business operates
on an essentially mutual basis distributing risks among all participants,
with capital serving merely as an added buffer against unpredictably high
losses.
In cases where a share capital or initial fund or a particular amount
is required for each different class of insurance business, there must be a
re-adjustment whenever the concern proposes to carry on any additional class
of business.
The share capital may be reduced to offset a loss in the balance sheet,
but where the reduction brings the share capital below the statutory minimum
the company must either increase it to the prescribed minimum or confine
itself to those classes of business for which the capital is still adequate.
Article 15 of Ordinance No.85-3 of 31 August 1985 provides that in the
event of loss of half of the registered share capital, the Board of Directors
must convene an Extraordinary General Meeting of all shareholders for the
purpose of resolving to wind up the company; and that should it be impossible
to convene such a General Meeting, the company may be wound up by a court of
law in the area where the company has its head office, on the application of
the Minister of Finance. Thus to continue in existence, a company must not
reduce its actual share capital to less than half of the registered share
capital.
2.	 The keeping of accounts and balance sheets.
In Cameroon, the keeping of accounts and balance sheets is dealt with
by article 58 of the 1985 Ordinance. This provides that insurance concerns
operating in Cameroon must forward or produce to the Minister of Finance all
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documents likely to facilitate the supervisory authority in the checking of
their financial situation and operations in a manner and at intervals to be
prescribed by an Order of the Minister of Finance. This Order has not been
passed hence reliance is placed on the provisions of articles 33(3) and 54 of
the 1985 Ordinance which require the keeping of separate accounts for each
class of business carried out by insurance companies. These articles require
insurance concerns to draw up and submit annually to the supervisory
authority revenue and expenditure accounts. The 1985 Ordinance does not seem
to provide adequately for the type of accounting documents that must be kept
by insurance companies. However, in respect of the items to be included in
the balance sheet articles 49, 50 and 51 lists certain items and assets that
must be earmarked for the liabilities and assets side of the balance sheet.
Insurance companies nevertheless remain subject to the ordinary rules of
company law in this respect.
87
	It is hoped that the intended Orders
implementing the 1985 Ordinance will clearly make provisions which will
closely supervise newly authorised companies by requiring them to make
frequent and detailed returns, accounts and statements. On the other hand,
In respect of already established companies, the supervisory authority ought
to exercise interventionary measures such as restricting the taking up of new
business, maintaining and realising certain assets for solvency purposes and
restricting the company's ability to make certain loans where there is
reasonable suspicion of insolvency or rather reason to believe or know that
the legislation is not being complied with. These measures seem desirable if
the spirit of the legislation reflects the spirit in which the legislation
was conceived.
87 Article 54 of the 1985 Ordinance.
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3.	 Guarantee Reserves, Guarantee Fund and Margin of Solvency.
As a further safeguard, in case an insurance company runs into
financial difficulties, the legislation provides for the constitution of
guarantee reserves to meet any deficiency in the actuarial and technical
provisions.
88
	Furthermore, insurance companies are required to maintain
throughout the life of the concern, a margin of solvency and a guarantee
fund.
88A These provisions have not been elaborated upon and article 8(4)
provides that the conditions for the constitution of the reserves and the
statutory amounts of the guarantee reserves, the solvency margin and the
guarantee fund will be fixed by decree. It is unnecessary to add that the
efficacy of these provisions will depend to a large extent on the actual and
continuous exercise of tighter controls and supervision by the supervisory
authority in the interest of policyholders and beneficiaries without unduly
impairing the service and enterprise which insurance companies ought to
demonstrate.	 As will be seen, in the United Kingdom, the law has protected
not only the policyholders and claimants, but also those who provide
insurance services.
4.	 Technical Reserves.
The company's commitments in respect of claims towards policyholders,
beneficiaries and third parties are covered by the technical reserves. The
nature of the insurance transaction shows the importance attached to the
technical reserves. There may be a considerable length of time between the
conclusion of an insurance contract and the settlement of a claim, during
which the insurer collects and accumulates premiums which technically
speaking do not belong to the company, but indicate the extent to which the
88 Article 8(1) ibid.
88A Article 8(3) ibid.
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company is committed to settle claims which 	 may arise. Moreover, in motor
insurance business,	 for example, claims which arise in the current year may
be settled or paid for five years or even longer. In practice, the largest
and therefore most difficult claims take a long time to settle.
89
 It is
therefore necessary that some of the assets of an insurance company be
available immediately to pay those claims which are quickly settled and other
assets must remain available until some unspecified future date in order to
pay those outstanding claims which are slow to mature and which involve
uncertainties as to liability and quantum. 	 A major cause of financial
instability is the insurer's tendency to underestimate the amount of its
outstanding claims. This danger is greatest with liability insurance as the
total amount of outstanding liability claims is difficult to estimate. The
reasons for this include the effect of inflation on awards and the changes in
the attitude of judges. 90
In order that the insurance company may be in a position to honour its
promise if and when a claim is made, the insurer must set aside the premiums
collected from the policyholders in the form of technical reserves.	 Thus
article 48 of the 1985 Ordinance sets out different types of technical
reserves according to the main classes of insurance business undertaken
namely: Technical reserves for life, marriage and birth insurance; Technical
reserves for annuities for which the insurer is liable and Technical reserves
to be constituted by all concerns doing insurance business.In the case of
non-life
	 insurance, premiums are normally payable for annual periods
beginning at any point in the financial year. Consequently the insurer may
not have earned all the	 premiums	 by	 the end of that year and a
89 See later, Chapter Three, pp.166-167.
90 See later, in Chapter Three on the discussion on the award of
damages, p.172, 177-183.
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reserve must therefore be set up to cover the part of the premiums for the
period during which the insurer is still liable for any claims which may be
made. This is the reserve for "unexpired risks" or "premium reserve", and
represents the premiums paid in advance for the period subsequent to the date
of drawing up the balance sheet. A second type of reserve known as "reserves
for outstanding claims" is established by the insurer but still outstanding
at the date on which the balance is drawn up.
Article 48(3)(b) of the 1985 Ordinance provides that the Minister of
Finance may by Order publish in the Official Gazette prescribe other
technical reserves which must be constituted by insurance companies operating
in Cameroon.
In maintaining the financial equilibrium of an insurance concern,
accurate calculation of the technical reserves and a sound choice of
investments to cover these reserves are of cardinal importance. 	 Therefore,
as the role of the supervisory authority is essentially to see that the
concern remains solvent throughout its existence, legislative and supervisory
powers are exercised in Cameroon to ensure that technical reserves are
calculated
91
 and invested properly to cover the contractual commitments to
policyholders and third party beneficiaries.
5.	 The investment of reserves.
The Cameroonian insurance 	 legislation	 makes	 provision for the
investment of reserves in order to secure the financial stability of
insurance concerns. Article 52 of the 1985 Ordinance merely provides that
when the provisions concerning the formation of the liabilities referred to
91 For detailed account of the manner in which the technical reserves
are calculated in developing countries, especially in C.I.C.A.
Countries, see: the UNCTAD Secretariat Report, Insurance Legislation 
and Supervision in developing countries, op. cit., pp.49-59. In the
particular case of Cameroon see: Order No.1110-MINFI-DCE of 26
October 1971 relating to the calculation of technical reserves of
insurance companies.
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in articles 49 to 51 have been complied with, the remaining funds are
entirely at the disposal of insurance companies. These may be invested in
accordance with the memorandum and articles of association of the company and
with the rules of the ordinary law. However, in the absence of any express
provisions, it seems sensible to rely on Decree No.73-237 of 10 May 1973
repealing Decree No.62-DF-437 of 18 December 1962 regulating the investments
of insurance concerns in Cameroon. Here, the control of investments include
the drawing up of lists of approved investments and rules on the maximum
proportion of assets that may be invested in any one type or in any single
investment.
Article 1 of the decree provides that technical and mathematical
reserves of insurance concerns operating in Cameroon will be represented on
the assets side of the balance sheet either by cash in hand or cash deposits
in banks, premiums due within three months or, with respect solely to
mathematical reserves, advances on policies om investments. Article 2 (1)
enacts that cash in hand or in banks or premiums due within three months must
not exceed 30 per cent of the total amount of technical reserves.
Article 2 (2) further stipulates that premiums due within three months
and earmarked to cover technical and mathematical reserves must within the
above mentioned percentage not exceed 40 per cent of liquid assets.
Article 3 (1) provides a catalogue of acceptable investments as follows:-
(1) Government bonds	 and	 other	 government	 guaranteed securities
especially treasury bonds and other treasury securities.
(2) Stocks, shares or debentures of public or semi-public corporations
and local councils guaranteed by the government,.
(3) Deposits made with such bodies.
(4) Post Office bonds.
(5) Immovable	 property
	 situated	 in	 Cameroon	 with	 the special
authorisation of the Minister of Finance.
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(6) Stocks and shares of low rental real estate companies provided the
authorisation of the Minister of Finance is granted and
(7) Funds deposited as security in a Treasury account.
Article 3 (1) states that an Order of the Minister of Finance will determine
the conditions for the return of securities and the withdrawal of funds
deposited with the Cameroon Development Bank and the National Investment
Corporation which are set aside for covering technical and actuarial provis-
ions and the conditions under which the evaluation of investment will be
carried out. The following may, however, not exceed 20 per cent of overall
investments:-
- first mortgage loans on buildings in Cameroon, if the whole of the
primary mortgage in respect of any one building does not exceed 40 per
cent of its estimated value;
- securities officially quoted on a stock exchange within the franc zone,
provided that:
(1) the securities issued or the loans obtained by any one borrower do
not exceed 5 per cent of investment in that category and;
(2) the total investments of this nature entered on the balance sheet
do not exceed 25 per cent of the reserves.
Any other investments under conditions laid down by Order of the Minister
of Finance.
92
Undoubtedly, insurance concerns are the repository of very large funds.
The control of investments is perhaps more understandable in developing
92 Article 3(3) of Decree No73-237 of 10 May 1973 regulating the
investments of insurance concerns in Cameroon. The provisions of
this decree are very similar to those which obtain in other C.I.C.A.
Countries. See the UNCTAD Secretariat Report cm. cit., at pp. 60-
61. Regrettably, in the guidance officially given to developing
nations by the UNCTAD, their recommendations for the establishment
of national insurance markets for the ostensible reason of keeping
Insurance funds within the country, ignore this basic insurance
principle.
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countries such as Cameroon where the funds of insurance companies are an
obvious source on which to draw for use in projects which will develop the
country's economy. Therefore to permit insurance premiums to be invested
outside the country represents a loss of vital capital resources. On the
other hand, such measures seem to overlook the fact that insurance companies'
first duty is to look after the interests of their policyholders and in this,
it appears to be much more important for the concern investing large sums of
money to be certain that their resources can produce the compensatory cash
promptly in the event of catastrophes.	 If a country of limited economic
resources chooses to restrict insurance business to its own domestic
companies and further insists that the companies invest all or most of its
insurance funds in local assets, the consequences of a natural disaster are
fairly obvious. It would be an easy assumption to make in the light of the
geographical position of Cameroon and in particular,the occurrence of an
earthquake in Cameroon in the sixties, that Cameroon is not prone to natural
catastrophes.	 Consequently, one ought not to ignore the fundamental
necessity that insurance funds should be invested in assets not themselves
subjected to the same peril as the property insured. Thus, where government
Intervention in insurance virtually prevents this elementary provision, it
would be somewhat difficult for insurers to raise the funds necessary to
rebuild the properties destroyed.
(c)	 Technical controls 
Technical controls are, as in the case of pre-licence technical
requirements concerned essentially with the requirement of reinsurance
arrangements and the regulation of premium rates.
(i) Reinsurance 
Reinsurance is a vital tool for the distribution or sharing of risks
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and also an important method of risk control.
93
This wide sharing of risks
ensures that losses are spread over a number of insurers and reinsurers
sometimes on an international basis. Thus the primary object of reinsurance
is to protect the primary insurer or the ceding company from being crippled
by large losses beyond the financial capacity of the insurer concerned.
It is desirable that developing countries, especially Cameroon, should
find a suitable balance between retention of premium funds and maximum
protection against catastrophes which might impair the insurance industry's
ability to provide good services and broaden their scope for innovation. It
is obviously necessary to set some limits on a subject of potentially wide
ranging ramifications.	 This fundamental need to spread risk has been
recognised by the Cameroonian 	 legislation but there are nevertheless
restrictions placed on insurers. These restrictions however seem reasonable.
As we have already observed
94
 government intervention and involvement in the
business of insurance extends to reinsurance.
95
In the case of Cameroon a
state-owned reinsurance institution which is empowered to operate in every
aspect as a professional reinsurer with special privileges as far as domestic
business is concerned was created on 22 May 1965 by law No. 65/LF/10.
Called the National Re-Insurance	 Fund (Caisse Nationale de R6- 
Assurance), this body is responsible for the compulsory re-insurance of all
93 For a classic description of the purpose and function of
reinsurance, see R.L. Carter, Reinsurance, 2nd ed., London 1983,
pp.3-21; K. Cannar, Motor Insurance Theory and Practice, 1st. ed.,
1979 London, Witherby & Co Ltd., p.211; See also, 3.0. Irukwu,
Reinsurance in the Third World, 1982, London, Witherby	 Co. Ltd.,
pp.1-6.
94 Supra, p.69.
95 For the advantages of	 national reinsurance institutions in a
developing country see: 3.0. Irukwu, op. cit., p.10.
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insurance concerns operating in Cameroon.
96
	Decree No. 68-DF-153 of 8 April
1968 provides in article 2 that insurance concerns operating in Cameroon must
reinsure every year 10 per cent of their premium income to the Fund. The
insurance concerns are required to submit to the Fund every year documents to
enable it to ensure that the right sums are paid over to it by all insurance
concerns. The Fund is then able to compile statistics which are submitted to
the Sub-Department of Insurance. 	 The supervisory authority monitors that
these arrangements remain adequate throughout the life of the insurance
concern.
Compulsory session of a fixed percentage of premium income to a state-
owned reinsurance corporation is a feature common to developing countries.
In Brazil for instance, 100 per cent of reinsurance must be placed with the
Institute of Brazil which is the country's only reinsurance company.
97
Most
other countries in the third world such as Nigeria, Kenya, Iran require the
insurers in the local market to cede business compulsorily between 20 per
cent to 30 per cent to their state-owned reinsurance company. In the case of
Nigeria, section 3 (3) of the Nigerian Reinsurance Corporation Decree No.49
of 1977 provides that the Nigerian Reinsurance Corporation must have the
right of first refusal of any reinsurance business from Nigeria before such
business is placed in the international reinsurance market.
In contrast to Cameroon and other developing countries, in the United
Kingdom, there is no compulsory cession of a specified percentage of the
business underwritten by insurance companies. In the United Kingdom, as we
mentioned earlier,
98 
one of the conditions for granting a licence by the
96 Article 3 of Law No.65/LF/10 of May 1965.
97 3.0. Irukwu, op. cit., p.10.
98 Supra at p.70.
- 99 -
Secretary of State is the requirement that adequate reinsurance arrangements
have been made. Thus section 37 (1) (d) of the Insurance Companies Act 1982
gives the Secretary of State power to intervene in relation to any insurance
company if he is not satisfied that adequate arrangements are in force for
the reinsurance of risks insured by the company in the course of carrying on
business.
99
In order to monitor compliance with this requirement insurance
companies must reveal the name and address of any reinsurer accepting a
significant amount of its general reinsurance business, a note of any
connection between the company and the reinsurer and the amount 	 of
reinsurance premium payable to the reinsurer in the year.
100
 The fact that
regulations enable any major reinsurer to be identified would mean that
inquiries could be made into such arrangements including those with overseas
reinsurance companies. Further, insurance companies must state amounts due
to them from major treaty reinsurers. This provision is principally designed
to deal with the problem of unpaid claims. Where a company relies unduly on
one particular reinsurer with whose financial status the Department of Trade
and Industry is dissatisfied, the Secretary of State has the power to reduce
the amount of business written by that company or to stop the company writing
business altogether.
(ii) Premium rates.
In the case of Cameroon as we mentioned earlier,
101
 article 81 of the
1985	 Ordinance requires the prior approval of premium rates by the
supervisory authority before they are put to use. In practice the tariffs
99 For the powers of intervention exercised by the Secretary of State
see infra pp.112-114.
100 Insurance Companies (Accounts and Statements) (Amendments) (General
Business Reinsurance) Regulations 1983, S.I. 1983 No.469, regulation
5.
101 Supra at p.71.
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for most of the classes of insurance business are drawn up by the Sub-
Department of insurance.
101A This State Department computes and promulgates
premium rates and all insurers are required by law to adhere to the uniform
state-promulgated rates. This system of regulation is applied in Cameroon in
the case of motor vehicle insurance. 	 Rates are fixed periodically, usually,
by a Ministerial Order which lays down the maximum and minimum rates that can
be charged for any given category of motor vehicles.
102
Insurance companies
then, fix the rates within these limits. 	 Competition in the sense of
favourable tariffs operates in motor insurance business where some insurance
companies grant rebates to policyholders,
103
 and through the operation of
'bonus malus clause' (no-claim bonus discount). Under the latter clause, the
insurance companies grant a certain percentage discount for 'good drivers'
while 'bad risks' drivers may incur higher premiums. The percentage discount
101A The 1985 Ordinance further provides that a National Insurance Board
which is an advisory body will be set up and placed under the
authority of the Minister in charge of insurance. This body will
be required to give opinions on matters submitted to it by the
supervisory authority and formulate proposals on the rules of
tariff regulation and the guiding principles in matters of
reinsurance. It seems that this body would work in liaison with
the Sub-Department of insurance in this respect: article 76 of the
1985 Ordinance.
102 Article 1 of Order No.000618/MINFI/DCE/A of 2 February 1985 fixing
premium rates for motor vehicle insurance. Note that subsequent
orders are passed every year to this effect. See also Order
No.44/MINFI/CE/A of 2 September 1982 fixing the tariffs applicable
to motor vehicles. This minimum and maximum rate regulation is a
feature also common in France, see: Article L.310-7 of the
Insurance Code 1976 in Guy Courtieu and Gilbert Croquez, Code des
Assurances, 4 dn., 1983 L'Argus Paris, p.95; M. Picard and A.
Besson op. cit., at p.200. Through the requirement of prior rate
regulation the state has been able to hold down the rates in the
motor vehicle class which has been reputed for 'doing bad business
over the years, much against the wishes of the insurers who think
they ought to charge higher premiums to make good the losses they
incur.
103 For example, Assurances Mutuelles Agricoles du Cameroun gives 20%
discount to university teachers.
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and willingness to provide the discount differ from company to company.
In contrast, in the United Kingdom, there is open rating in the field
of premiums.	 Each insurance concern is free to fix its level of tariffs.
However, the Secretary of State has the power by virtue of section 41 of the
Insurance Companies Act 1982 to limit the premium income of insurance
companies.
104
Furthermore, regulation 29, schedules 4 and 5 require the
submission of information concerning the technical bases	 needed	 for
calculating premium rates and the insurance companies are required to obtain
a certificate from the actuary that he considers the premium rates to be
suitable. So far, we have seen
105
 in respect of Cameroon two types of rate
regulation, namely, state made rates
106
where a state agency computes and
promulgates premium rates and all insurers are required by law to adhere to
the uniform state promulgated rates and prior approval of rates by a state
104 Because of the Secretary of State's responsibility under the
Insurance Companies Act for overseeing the solvency of insurance
companies, section 9 of the Counter Inflation Act 1973 gave the
Secretary of State the responsibility for applying price control to
insurance premiums. The provision was given permanent effect by
section 14 of the Price Commission Act 1977. Of necessity, control
of premium increases was applied only to those kinds of general
insurance business for which insurers have scheduled rates. In
effect this limited control chiefly applies to motor and property
insurance. The insurance companies were required to seek prior
approval for premium increases and keep records in justification of
increases and make them available to the Department of Trade and
Industry on request. See: Department of Trade Insurance Business: 
Annual Report, 1978, London, H.M.S.O., p.13 para. 52-53. However,
the Competition Act 1980 has abolished the Price Commission and
repealed associated legislation, including the power in the Counter
Inflation Act 1973 to control insurance premiums. In consequence
the special arrangements made by the Department, mentioned in
paragraph 53 of the 1978 Report; with the British Insurance
Association and with Lloyd's for notification of certain premiums
have lapsed. See: Department of Trade Insurance Business: Annual 
Report, 1978, London, H.M.S.O., p.9 para. 54.
105 Supra pp.71 and 99-100.
106 This represents an extreme form of government regulation of premium
rates.
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agency.
107
A question which one might ask at this point is whether state
regulation of premium rates is necessary. Would it not be better to have a
system of free competition as practised in the United Kingdom wherein the
forces of supply and demand control premium levels on the insurance market?
We will briefly look at the arguments advanced in favour of rate regulation
and open rating. 108 The main arguments advanced in favour of a system of
rate regulation are that consumers of insurance are protected from excessive
rates; rate regulation ensures that rates are not unjustifiably discrim
inatory; it ensures that insurers do not make excessive profits thereby
ensuring the adequacy of premiums and the availability of insurance; and
finally rate regulation avoids rate wars and insolvencies. However, there
are also some merit to open rating. Under a system of open competition,
price responsiveness to cost keeps premium rates at a reasonable level,
encourages availability of insurance and fair treatment of claimants and
policyholders. Further, competition spurs research and innovation within
107 A majority of the states in the United States of America and most
continental countries have adopted this system which requires
insurance companies to file rates and supporting data with the
commissioner for his approval thereof, before they become effective.
Other types of rate regulation practised in the United States
include, bureau promulgation of mandatory rates under which rating
organisations to which members are affiliated fix rate which members
of the bureau are required to use; and the use and filing system
which permits insurers to promulgate a revised rate first and file
the necessary rate information	 with the regulatory authority
subsequently. For other types of regulation being practised in the
United States of America see: Aaron Trupin, M.A., "Open Rating in
Insurance': in Issues in Insurance, 1st ed., Vol.I, edited by John
D. Long, 1978 at p.251. (Note that this monograph has been deleted
in the 2nd. ed. 1981 of this work, see preface by Edwin S. Overmann.
However, it is nevertheless up to date but not very much a topical
issue in comparison to the monographs which have been retained.
108 For a fuller account of the arguments in favour of rate regulation
and open rating see: Aaron Trupin, ibid, pp.283-289. See also,
Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law: Basic Text, 1971 at pp.557-567 for
persuasive arguments in favour of rate regulation.
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the industry.	 It permits better use of public funds saved from rate
regulation which is very costly. 	 And finally, open rating does not make
insolvencies more likely. These arguments were summed up by William 0.
Bailey that rating freedom and competition will benefit the consumer by
promoting "innovation in coverages, classifications, services, and other
areas... greater availability of insurance protection, improved response to
changing markets and individual preferences and free choices for informed
consumers".
109
 Whatever the merits of these arguments, it is clear that none
of the systems is perfect. It has been assumed that is ail siyan rattivg system
insolvencies are more frequent because unscrupulous insurers may indulge in
cut-throat competition by charging very low premiums in order to attract
business and accumulate adequate reserves	 to meet the settlement of
claims.
110	
There is no evidence to show that insolvencies have been
substantially reduced or eliminated in countries where premium rates are
regulated.
111
Thus in spite of all that might be said in favour of rate
regulation, it certainly is not a panacea for all the problems facing the
insurance industry. The manner in which either of the two systems works in
practice is very much dependent on the conditions prevailing in each country.
In the United Kingdom, for instance, open competition in the field of premium
rates has worked reasonably well. This has been due largely to the fact that
the British Insurance market is well established, with a long tradition
behind it.	 The existence on the market of insurance companies with a long
109 US correspondent, "The future of rate making", Post Magazine and
Insurance Monitor, Vol. CXLI, No.30, 24 July 1980, p.1696.
110 The example of the Vehicle and General Insurance Company collapse,
being a case in point in Britain, see Ronald Beale, After the V & G 
Crash, The City Press, 1972.
111 Robert E. Keeton, op. cit., p.557 et seq. 
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and honourable record, and in general, the English sense of fair play and
justice are all factors which have worked in favour of open-rating. These
factors do not exist to the same extent in Cameroon and in most developing
Countries.	 Insurance, a Product of colonialism is relatively new in
Cameroon
112
and most of Africa. There are also fewer insurance companies.
Most crucial perhaps, is the unavailability of insurance in many parts of the
country.
113 If one considers the fact that "the theoretical model of pure
competition assumes that any given market has numerous buyers and sellers
acting independently, and that each buyer is free to select any seller and,
conversely, each seller, any buyer" and also that "in such a market, no
individual or group of buyers or sellers is large enough to exert any
appreciable influence on the demand, the supply, or the price of the
product", 114 then of course, one realises that the conditions do not exist
for such open competition on the Cameroonian insurance market. In order to
avoid a situation where an insurance company finding itself in a monopoly
situation is tempted to charge premiums, it is therefore necessary for the
state to intervene in regulating the level of premium rates. Rate regulation
by the supervisory authority in Cameroon is commendable and ought to be
encouraged until such a time that the conditions in the market place make it
feasible for open competition to thrive without prejudicing the interests of
consumers of insurance.
II Inspection at place of Business
The supervisory authorities in the United Kingdom and Cameroon are
112 Suara, pp.10, 30-39.
113 In Kumbo for instance, there is only a branch of the Mutuelles
Agricoles while in Nkambe there is none at all.
114 See Aaron Trupin, op. cit., at pp.220-221.
Insurance matters. There is evidence of lack of probity on the part of
117
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empowered by law to carry out inspection at the place of business of the
insurance concerns. As in the case of examination of returns, the inspection
is concerned with legal, financial and technical aspects of the concerns
activities. The aim of such an inspection being either verification of
information given in the return or a 'spot check' of the whole of the
insurer's affairs.
With respect to Cameroon the legislation provides for compulsory
inspections at the place of business at least twice a year and the inspectors
may at any time make a "spot" check
115
 - that is, one without giving the
company prior notice. This inspection procedure has been criticised as being
costly and time consuming as the area of supervision extends widely.
116
 This
criticism is hardly justified as most of the insurance companies lack
sufficient, competent and qualified personnel conversant and experienced in
directors and managers of the companies and lack of understanding of the
115 Article 36(3) of Decree No.84-1105 of 25 August 1984 re-organising
the Ministry of Finance. As in France, there are two inspection
procedures - at the place of business (inspection sur place) and the
insurance companies are required to send their documents to the
supervisory authority annually (inspection sur piece) see :M. Picard
and A. Besson, op. cit., 164-166.
116 Remarks by the Director of the Sub-Department of Insurance in an
interview with him on 10 June 1983. It is probable that the reason
for the heavy cost and time involved in inspection may be due to the
fact that there are only three insurance inspectors: article 37 of
Decree No. 84-1105 of 25 August 1984 op.cit. Undoubtedly, the
present insurance inspectors are to a large extent qualified for
this responsibility as they possess a postgraduate diploma - Dip1Sme
du Cycle Sup6rieur from the International Institute of Insurance in
Yaounde, after which they participated in seminars on insurance and
pursued three months' training in the Department or Insurance of the
Ministry of Economy and Finance in Paris (France) - Reply to inquiry
from the Sub-Department of Insurance of the Ministry of Finance,
letter dated 28 October 1985.
117 See Institut International des Assurances, "La formation du
Personnel en matiere d'assurance" in Le March 6 Camerounais  des
Assurances No.4, January 1977 at p.21.
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nature of the insurance business and of the caution with which the business
should be conducted.
118
In Cameroon, the principal constraint on development
is shortage of executive capacity - there is not enough skilled manpower to
go around and this affects the quality of service available.
	
However,
progress is expected in the future as the International Institute of
Insurance embarks on the training of professional insurance executives.
In Cameroon where the institution of qualified public auditors is not
developed, inspection constitute an integral part of state control of
insurers. By virtue of articles 57(1) of the 1985 ordinance state control is
exercised under the authority of the Minister of Finance by a corps of sworn
civil servants called insurance inspectors. They are attached to the control
service of the Sub-Department of Insurance. 	 Inspectors are empowered, upon
presentation of their identification papers, to demand full details and all
documents relating to the undertaking's business.	 In particular they can
inspect the undertaking's books (for example, registers of contracts,
investments, claims, reserves, reinsurance arrangements and accounts and
balance sheets). 119 Inspectors are bound to observe official secrecy. 120
If it appears from an inspection at the place of business that:
(a) there has been a breach of the conditions under which the concern has a
legal right to carry on business, whether under its articles of
association, the term of its licence or the statutory regulations, or
(b) the general trend of the concern's financial affairs is likely to
imperil its solvency, the insurance inspectors may prepare a report on
their findings and observations and forward it to the Minister of
118 Ibid.
119 Article 36(3) of Decree No.84-1105 of 25 August 1984.
120 Ibid. Article 60(1).
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Finance who determines the	 necessary	 remedial action.	 The
supervisory authority may request that a recovery programme comprising
all necessary measures to restore the balance of the company be
forwarded to him within one month for approval. 	 He may appoint an
insurance controller to carry out permanent surveillance of the company
in difficulty.
121A
	In the event of failure to draw up a recovery
programme, or the proposed programme not being approved by the
supervisory authority, or if approved, the programme not being carried
out under the prescribed conditions and time limit, the supervisory
authority	 may	 take	 any	 measures to protect the interest of
policyholders and beneficiaries.
121B
He may:
121C
(a) restrict or forbid the company's freedom of access to its assets;
(b) order any issuing person or body to refrain from carrying out any
transaction on securities belonging to the company in question and
from paying interest and dividends on the said securities;
(c) register a mortgage on the property of the company;
(d) demand that the first authentic copies of mortgage loans granted by
the company be deposited at the Deposits and Consignment Fund and
that all the funds, titles and shares held or owned by the company
be deposited in a frozen account at the Central Bank for a given
period and under conditions to be fixed by the supervisory
authority;
(e) order that the account is not debited by order of its owner except
on special authorisation from the supervisory authority and for
121 Ibid. Article 64(1).
121A Ibid. Article 64(2).
121B Ibid. Article 64(3).
121C Ibid. Article 64(4).
121
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a given amount.
Further conditions for the recovery of insurance companies concerning
solvency requirements will be fixed by decree. 1210 This decree has not yet
been promulgated.
It seems that additional powers to control the financial activities of
insurance companies are necessary if the government department responsible
for the granting and continuance of insurance licences is to take effective
action when the solvency of a company and in consequence the security of its
policyholders and claimants is in jeopardy. However, it is hoped that the
legislation envisaged in the present decree will be designed to facilitate
close control over companies in financial difficulties similar to the
stringent requirements in respect of the maintenance of the solvency margin
under English law.
In addition, article 70(1) of the 1985 Ordinance empowers the Minister
of Finance to withdraw or suspend all or some of the classes of business the
concern is licenced to undertake in two circumstances:
(a) where the financial standing of the company is such that it cannot
provide adequate financial guarantees to meet the commitments towards
policyholders and other creditors. This might arise where the
technical and guarantee reserves are not adequately constituted.
(b) where the company is not complying with insurance legislation.
According to article 70 (2), suspension Or withdrawal of a licence
becomes effective three months after the supervisory authority has formally
notified the insurance company of its decision to suspend or withdraw its
licence. In the situation where a concern's licence has been suspended in
accordance with the above provisions no new contracts may be concluded or old
1210 Ibid. Article 64(5). Article 65 provides penalties on directors of
a company subject to the recovery measures, who fails to comply
with these measures.
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contracts renewed in those classes affected by the suspension order.
121E
Contracts still valid in the categories or sub-categories affected by the
suspension order will be supervised by the company concerned under conditions
provided for by the policies until their termination or expiry.
122
	Failing
an amicable transfer approved in accordance with the provisions of article 68
of the 1985 Ordinance in respect of a voluntary cessation of activity, the
supervisory authority may order the company * concerned to automatically
transfer all or part of its portfolio to one or more other approved and
consenting companies.
123
In respect of a licence being withdrawn of all the classes of insurance
business, the concern must be wound up and dissolved.
124
	In which case
articles 74(2) and 86(5) of the 1985 Ordinance calls for the appointment of a
liquidator who will be responsible for the winding up operation. French
insurance and general commercial law seems to have very substantially
influenced insurance legislation and regulation in Cameroon as to the meeting
of a company's liabilities on winding up on the fate of current contracts in
the event of the total withdrawal of a licence.
With respect to general insurance business, article 73(1) of the 1985
Ordinance, following article 26 of the French Decree of June 14, 1938, now
embodied in Article L. 326.12 of the Insurance Code 1976, provides that all
contracts must terminate at mid-day on the 40th day following the publication
121E Article 71(1) of the 1985 Ordinance.
122 Article 71(2) of the 1985 Ordinance.
123 Ibid. Article 72.
124 Ibid. Article 74(1).
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of the withdrawal order in the Official Gazette.
125
Premiums paid or due are
only retainable or claimable pro-rata to the period of insurance, up to the
date of termination.	 By virtue of article 73(2) provision is made for the
continuation of long-term insurance business. This article stipulates that
the liquidator must provisionally carry on the long-term business of the
company pending a decision by the responsible Minister who may by Order do
one of the following:
(1) call for the cancellation of all contracts by a given date,
(2) extend the expiry date of contracts,
(3) transfer the business either partially or wholly to another company.
In this way the policyholder is protected by another insurer assuming the
commitments of his present insurer who had encountered financial
difficulties.
Special provision is made for securing the interests of policyholders
during the process of winding up. In accordance with article 53 of the 1985
Ordinance which has exactly followed article L.327.2 of the French Insurance
Code, a preferential line is created in favour of policyholders and third-
party beneficiaries over the movable assets of the insurance company.
It is interesting to note	 that no insurance company has been
compulsorily wound up by the supervisory authority in Cameroon.
125A
However,
Mutuelle Camerounaise d'Assurance went into voluntary liquidation in 1975.
125 We will recommend later that the provision of a policyholders
protection legislation in Cameroon similar to that in the U.K. will
assist policyholders in the event of withdrawal or cancellation of
a licence, see pp.135-136. It is possible that the National
Insurance Board provided for by article 76(1) of the 19135 Ordinance
would be a competent body to undertake this responsibility though
as envisaged by the legislation, it seems that it will be a mere
advisory body: See supra, p.100, note 101A.
125A Field investigation concluded in Cameroon July 1983, Sub-Department
of Insurance, Yaounde. Further confirmed by a reply to inquiry
letter dated 28 October 1985 from M. Bile Ebenezer, Sub-Director of
the Sub-Department of Insurance, Cameroon.
In addition, Sun Alliance Insurance Company (an English company) withdrew
from business in Cameroon in 1980.	 This was confirmed by Mr. D. Klean,
Superintendent, Overseas Division who commented
1258
that the voluntary
withdrawal of their group company concerned from Cameroon was dictated purely
by commercial considerations (which of course remains confidential to the
company).
Nevertheless, the supervisory authority has exercised its power of
intervention in respect of a broker.
125C
The companies concerned in this
case were Assureurs Conseils Franco-Africains	 (ACFRA)	 and	 Compaonie 
Camerounaise d'Assurances et de R6assurances (CCAR). The manager of CCAR was
alleged to have been passing on business to ACFRA, a company in which, the
said manager had a substantial interest and thereby in breach of article
46(1) of the 1985 Ordinance. This was found out by the managers of Soci6t4
Camerounaise d'Assurances et de Rgassurances (SOCAR) (the most affected
insurance company) which reported to the Minister of Finance. After due
investigations, it was revealed that there was no substantial evidence to
show that the insurance broker, (ACFRA) and the insurance company, (CCAR)
exchanged business in bad faith and the case was dismissed. Presently, ACFRA 
is still in business.
In contrast to Cameroon, there is no compulsory inspection at the place
of business by the control authorities in the United Kingdom. However, if it
appears to the supervisory authorities that a business is being so conducted
that there is a risk of the company becoming insolvent, the Secretary of
State may impose on the company all or any of the following requirements:-
125B	 Reply to inquiry, letter dated 18 December 1985.
125C	 Reply to inquiry, letter dated 28 October 1985 from M. Bile
Ebenezer, Sub-Director of the Sub-Department of Insurance,
Cameroon.	 Note that insurance agents and	 brokers	 are
supervised through insurance companies whom they represent.
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(a) a mandatory request that the company must make investments of a
specified class or description and must realise the whole or a
specified proportion of investments of that class or description
held by it immediately before the requirement is imposed,
126
(b) that assets of the company of a value which at any time is equal to
the whole or a specified proportion of the amount of its domestic
liabilities be maintained in the United Kingdom,
127
(c) an additional requirement that the whole or a specified proportion
of its assets be held in the custody of a person approved by the
appropriate authority as trustee for the company,
128
(d) that the company take all such steps as are requisite to secure
that the aggregate of the premiums to be received by it in
consideration of the undertaking by it of liabilities in the course
of carrying on business of a specified class must not exceed a
specified amount,
129
(e) that the company furnish him or the appropriate authority at
special times or intervals, with information about specified
matters.
130
Where, however, the information so obtained does not remove the doubt as
to the solvency of the company the Department of Trade and Industry may
appoint an inspector to make a more detailed investigation. This is rarely
126 Section 38 of the Insurance Companies Act 1982.
127 Ibid., section 39(1).
128 Ibid., section 40(1).
129 Ibid., section 41(1).
130 Ibid., section 44. See further sections 42, 43 and 45 of the
Insurance Companies Act 1982 for other powers of intervention in
table 2 below at p.114.
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necessary as the examination of the statutory returns most often suffices.
The returns and documents submitted to the supervisory authority in the
United Kingdom contain sufficient information to enable the Department of
Trade and Industry to monitor the progress of each company and if necessary
to exercise the powers of intervention granted to the Secretary of State.
Section 37 of the Insurance Companies Act 1982 states the grounds upon which
the Secretary of State may exercise the considerable powers of intervention
which he enjoys under the Act. The powers conferred by sections 38 and 41 to
45 are exercisable by the Secretary of State if he considers it desirable for
protecting policyholders or potential policyholders of the company against
the risk that the company may be unable to meet its liabilities or, in the
case of long-term business, to fulfill the reasonable expectation of policy-
holders or potential policyholders.
131
	Furthermore, he may exercise his
powers under the Act if it appears to him that the company or a company of
which it is a subsidiary or a subordinate company has failed to satisfy its
obligations under the legislation;
132
 if it appears to him that the company
has furnished misleading or inaccurate information under and for the purposes
of any provision of the Act;
133 
and if it appears that there has been a
substantial departure from any proposal or forecast submitted to him by the
company in accordance with section 5.
134
These powers were exercised in respect of newly authorised companies, on
change of control and on other occasions during 1983 as shown in the table
overleaf. In addition 16 companies were required to take non-statutory
remedial action.
131 Ibid., section 37(2)(a).
132 Ibid., section 37(2)(b).
133 Ibid., section 37(2)(c).
134 Ibid., section 37(3)(f).	 See also section 37(2)(2)(d)(e) arid (g).
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TABLE 2 :	 The Exercise of the Powers of Intervention by the Secretary of
State in the United Kingdom.
Section	 Power	 Number of times used
On or within	 On or within	 In other cases
five years of	 five years of	 under s37(2),
authorisation	 change of control (3),(4) & (6)
under s37(5)(a) of company under
s37(5)(b)
38	 Requirements about	 15	 1
	
-
investments
39	 Maintenance of assets	 -	 -	 1
in UK
40	 Custody of assets	 -	 -	 1
41	 Limitation of premium	 15	 -	 2
income
42	 Actuarial	 6	 -	 2
investigations
43	 Acceleration of infor-	 -	 -	 1
mation required by
accounting provisions
44(1) Obtaining information 	 18
	
1	 3
(at specified times or
intervals)
44(2) Obtaining information (by	 -	 1	 2
production of specified
books or papers)
45	 Residual power to impose	 15	 -	 2
requirements for protect-
ion of policyholders
SOURCE:	 DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
INSURANCE ANNUAL REPORT 1983
LONDON H.M.S.O.
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The number of times the powers of intervention was exercised as shown in the
above table, reveal that, in a great majority of cases, these powers are
exercised in respect- of newly authorised companies which are still getting
used to the British Insurance market.	 An example of this can be afforded by
the Department of Trade and Industry's intervention in the affairs of Castle
Life Assurance Company in 1974. This company was authorised to commence
business on September 4, 1973 after it had submitted its "business plan" and
approval had been obtained from the Department of Trade and Industry. On
September 14, 1973, under the normal request, to notify any changes in its
policies within seven days of any such occurrence arising, the company
informed the Department of Trade and Industry that It was Nanning to issue
two policies, namely, a renewable term assurance and a guarantee income bond.
The Government Actuary's Department took the view that this altered the
company's "business plan" basis as originally submitted. As the new policies
were being put on sale only ten days after authorisation had been granted,
the Department of Trade and Industry expressed doubts as to whether the
company had not got these policies already in mind, in which case they should
have been submitted before authorisation. 	 Inquiries were begun by the
Department of Trade to find whether "misleading or inaccurate information"
had been supplied for the purpose of authorisation. On April 9, 1974, the
Department finally imposed restrictions on the company, not to carry on any
new contracts of insurance.
135
135 These restrictions were made under section It of the Insurance
Companies Amendment Act 1973. A corresponding restriction could be
made under section 11 of the Insurance Companies Act 1982.
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In addition to placing varying restrictions
136
 on the company, the Department
found Mr. X,
137 
chairman and managing director of the company "not to be a
fit and proper person" to be a controller of the company. The Department of
Trade and Industry had taken this action on the ground that he had permitted
or caused the company to furnish misleading information in connection with an
application for authorisation. 	 The director in question complained to the
Ombudsman that the Department's action in finding him to be not a "fit and
proper" person was unjustified and excessive. He also complained that after
having taken the statutory opportunity to make both written and oral
representations he had subsequently been refused a further hearing. Under
the stringent requirements to protect the public, the Department is given
extensive statutory powers under which there is no appeal to the courts
except possibly under the concept of "natural justice", and so this complaint
to the Ombudsman was the first time they have ever been challenged in such a
way.
138
This case brought out some of the difficulties the Department faces
in implementing such legislation with its far-reaching powers. They have to
136 Other restrictions under sections 14-16 of the 1973 Act such as
limitation on premium income, maintenance of assets in the UK and
preventing the company from keeping investments which were
unsuitable were made.
137 The identity of Mr. X is not revealed in the anonymised report of
the Ombudsman, See: Second Report of the Parliamentary Commissioner
for Administration, Session 1976-77 Annual Report for 1976, House of
Commons Paper 116, H.M.S.O. London, Appendix B. Case No. C.618/V -
Action taken under the Insurance Companies Amendment Act 1973 at 26.
138 Although the Department of Trade has complete discretion to decide
on the fitness of a person under the regulations, its exercise of
such power must be free from arbitrariness.
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protect the public as a whole, as far as possible, from the unscrupulous.
139
At the same time the individual must be protected from arbitrary actions on
the part of the Executive. The Department takes the view that it must have
full confidence in the good faith of controllers of insurance companies. In
this case, it felt apparently, that because Mr. X was experienced as an
actuary in insurance company authorisations he had been involved either in
deliberate deception over the "Business Plan" as far as the guaranteed bond
scheme was concerned or inadvertent deception through incompetent control and
so in either case it could not have confidence in the way the company was
run. Its concern over "misleading information" was not concealed from Mr. X,
who was no stranger to getting authorisation. It was not surprising that the
Department felt that something was being held back from it. But its failure
to give Mr. X a clearer indication of matters at issue on some occasions
needlessly deprived him of an earlier opportunity of expanding his explanat-
ions. The Department was criticised for acting unfairly against Mr. X.
140
In accordance with the Ombudsman recommendations the Department reviewed the
case through officials unconnected with its previous inquiries. As a result
of the review, the Secretary of State concluded that the director concerned
139 During the passage of the Bill which became the Insurance Companies
Amendment Act 1973, disquiet was expressed in Parliament over the
"fit and proper"powers. It was thought that there were inadequate
safeguards against the arbitrary use of power, with insufficient
opportunity for a person to defend himself against such charges as
no appeal machinery was introduced against such a finding. The Bill
was amended to incorporate a provision that particulars of the
grounds must be given in a notice served on the company. See: 857
Hansard, (5th series) H.C. Cols. 118-178 (21 May 1973). It is clear
from a reading of Hansard that there was recognition in both Houses
of Parliament that the central purpose of the Bill was to give
powers to enable the Department to protect the public, so far as
possible, from the unscrupulous.
140 Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration op. cit., pp.46-48.
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(and one of the other directors who had similarly been found "not to be a fit
and proper person") should no longer be regarded in that light. 141
The control of the Castle Life, renamed Igal, passed to Mr. Joseph
Kaplan, managing director of Indemnity Guarantee Assurance Ltd. On November
4, 1975, the Secretary of State gave notice to the company that he was
considering exercising his powers under section 29 of the 1974 Insurance
Companies Act on the ground that Mr. Joseph Kaplan, was not 'a fit and proper
person'. The reasons concerned the valuation attached to a freehold property
(at Clifton Street London EC2) and an insurance on that property. This was
based on the proposition that Mr. Kaplan had signed the accounts to 31st.
December 1974 knowing or having reason to believe that the valuation assigned
therein to Clifton Street was misleading and inaccurate and because Mr.
Kaplan knew or had reason to believe that the insurance effected to protect
against any reduction in value of Clifton Street was for the purpose of
representing that the value of the premises was higher than its true value.
On February 1976 the Secretary of State served a notice on the company under
section 29 of the Act imposing restrictions on its ability to enter into or
vary insurance contracts. Mr. Kaplan maintained that the matters in issue
should, under article 6(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1948, have been decided by a court. 	 He
submitted that the civil rights and obligations of himself and the company
were determined without a public hearing before a court and also maintained
that the allegations against him amounted in substance to a criminal charge.
He alleged that article 6 was thus applicable and was breached. On 23
141 See: Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, Second Report
(Session 1978-1979). Annual Report for 1978, House of Commons paper
205, London, H.M.S.O. para. 71.
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January 1981, the Committee of Ministers' Deputies of the Council of Europe
resolved that there had been no violation of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 142
We mentioned earlier that the underlying philosophy of the supervisory
legislation in the United Kingdom has been described as "Freedom with
publicity", 143 whereby the supervisory function has been exercised by a
government department largely on the basis of annual returns designed to
provide sufficient information to enable the department ta monitor the
overall financial position of an insurer. However, in the light of recent
legislation one would question the appropriateness of this phrase. In the
past twenty years the volume of supervisory regulation has expanded at a
tremendous rate in response to changing circumstances within the industry and
a changing external environment in which self-regulation is perceived as
somewhat anachronistic. The Department of Trade and Industry has come to
possess over the years a steadily enhanced supervisory role over the
insurance industry.
	
It is thought that the only realistic method of
controlling insurance companies is by government regulation although Lloyds
in the United Kingdom must be mentioned as a unique exception.
The legislation introduced may 	 not have changed the underlying
philosophy but the degree of supervision is clearly intended to result in the
closest possible scrutiny of the affairs of an insurer; extremely detailed
returns are required at more frequent intervals than - previously.	 These
returns enable the Department of Trade and Industry to monitor the progress
142 Joseph Kaplan v. United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 64, Application
No.7598/76; Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights 
1981, Martinus Nijhoff, Publishers, a member of the Kluwer Academic
Publishers Group, Hague, Boston, Lancaster.
143 Supra, Chapter One, p.46.
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of each company and therefore facilitate the detection of any cloud as soon
as it appears on the horizon and, if necessary, the supervisory authority
exercises the powers of intervention granted to the Secretary of State.
Perhaps the most significant is the power of the Secretary of State to
intervene directly in the affairs of an insurer where there is evidence of
potential insolvency and consequent risk of financial loss to policyholders.
The effect of these legislative provisions, though still falling short of
outright control has resulted in an increase in the intervention and
direction of an insurer's affairs. The justification of these powers was the
need to protect policyholder's interests by speedy departmental action to
prevent interim depletion of assets and the power to impose requirements on
newly authorised companies were intended to stop less desirable characters
getting control of a company which was already authorised. 	 Supervision has
been based on an early warning system to detect adverse trends in order that
remedial measures may be instituted in good time. These measures have
included devices to avoid insolvency by attempting to improve the position of
ailing insurance companies. Improvement may result from efforts to obtain
additional funds, reduce premium writings, improve operational profitability,
acquire appropriate reinsurance arrangements and upturn in investments.
These powers of intervention in the interest of policyholders follow from
scrutiny of insurers financial condition and has been the acid test of the
effectiveness of the legislation and of the Department of Trade and
Industry's stewardship under the Act. 	 Stricter supervision of insurance
companies by the Department of Trade and Industry is acceptable as inevitable
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in the light of earlier weaknesses which it has been argued
144
 stemmed from
the department's limited powers. The Department of Trade and Industry has
been criticised
145
 in the past for the error of allowing a company to
continue in business longer than it should. Clearly, the Department of Trade
and Industry's powers of intervention are sufficient to enable them to handle
any conceivable situation effectively.	 The hope must therefore be that the
Department of Trade and Industry should not indulge in overkill by imposing
too stringent requirements which will stifle insurance companies initiative.
Further, action should be taken preferably in as quiet a manner as possible
as loss of public confidence may bring about the collapse of any institution
particularly an insurance company that relies for its existence upon acting
as a trustee for other people's money.
The principal measure of consumer protection inherent in the Insurance
Companies Act 1982 is the constant monitoring of the solvency of insurance
companies to ensure that they are able to meet their ultimate liabilities.
One of the ways of measuring the effectiveness of supervision is by studying
the presence or absence of insurance companies insolvencies. Another is by
analysing the extent to which policyholders have suffered in numerical or
monetary terms. This latter method is difficult to determine. During the
period 1969-1974 some thirty-two companies failed
146
 affecting millions of
policyholders of which more than 55 per cent were insured with three
companies only; the Fire Auto and Marine, the Vehicle and General and Nation
144 Ronald Beale, After the V & G Crash - An inquest into Motor 
Insurance, City Press, London 1972, pp.104-128.
145 Ibid.
146 Department of Trade, Insurance business; Annual Reports, 1969-1974,
London, H.M.S.O.
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Life Assurance Company. Whereas in the nine years from 1974 to the end of
1983 only nineteen insurance companies have been wound up 147 giving a lower
annual failure rate. The comparatively small number of failures during the
latter period are indicative of the fact that the stringent and increased
powers of supervision by the Department of Trade and Industry are effective
in avoiding or reducing failure of insurance companies. 	 The objective and
significant consequence of the Insurance Companies Act 1982 has been to
ensure that companies did not fail. Nevertheless, no system of supervision,
however, tight, can provide a complete guarantee against failure, as
insurance is the business of taking risks. The protection scheme which will
be considered below 148 is, therefore complementary to the new supervision
arrangements.
As we have observed in both countries, 149 the supervisory authorities
may enforce special requirements to redress the insurance concern's position.
They may even oblige the concern to suspend all or part of its business
before resorting to one of the two ultimate sanctions - withdrawal of the
licence or compulsory winding up. 149A
An insurance company may be wound up in the United Kingdom on one of
three grounds: first, on the order of a court in accordance with the
150
provisions of the Companies' Act 1985; 	 second, on the petition of ten
147 Department of Trade, Insurance business; Annual Reports, 1975-1983,
London, H.M.S.O.
148 Infra, pp.125-138.
149 Supra, pp.107-115.
149A For rules on winding up, see in England, the Insurance Companies
(Winding Up) Rules (S.I. No.1985/95) made under section 59 of the
Insurance Companies Act 1982 and bringing into force sections
54(3), 55 and 56 of that Act. In respect of Cameroon, see articles
74 and 75 of the 1985 Ordinance.
150 Section 53 of the Insurance Companies Act 1982.
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or more policyholders owning policies of an aggregate value of not less than
£10,000, provided that such a petition is presented with leave of the
court
151
 and third, the Secretary of State may also present a petition for
winding up an insurance company on the grounds that; the company is unable to
pay its debts within the meaning of sections 517 and 518 or section 572 of
the Companies Act 1985; the company has failed to satisfy an obligation to
which it is or was subject by virtue of the 1982 Act or any enactment
repealed by the Act or by the Insurance Companies Act 1981; or the company
has failed in its obligation imposed by section 221 of the Companies Act 1985
to keep proper accounting records or produce records kept in satisfaction of
that obligation and the Secretary of State is unable to ascertain its
financial position.
152
In the event of winding up, section 55(3) of the Insurance Companies
Act 1982 provides that the assets representing the fund or funds maintained
by the company in respect of its long-term business must be available only
for meeting the liabilities of the company attributable to that business and
the other assets of the company must be available only for meeting the
liabilities of the company attributable to its other business.
Furthermore, section 56 of	 the	 1982	 makes provision for the
continuation of long-term business of the company being wound up. Thus the
liquidator must, unless the court otherwise orders, carry on the long-term
business of the company being wound up, with a view to its being transferred
as a going concern to another insurance company, whether as an existing
company or a company formed for that purpose; and, in carrying on that
business as aforesaid, the liquidator may agree to variation of any contracts
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid, section 54.
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of insurance in existence when the winding up order is made, but must not
effect any new contracts of insurance. The Insurance Companies Act 1982
contains adequate measures for the handling of assets on the winding up of an
insurance company.
153
We have noted that where an insurance company is unable to meet its
liabilities	 the eventual consequence is winding up of the concern's
business.
154
Where this happens the interests of policyholders and other
beneficiaries are at stake.
	 The extent to which these interests will be
prejudiced will of course vary with each individual case. We have briefly
looked at the procedure laid down in the United Kingdom and Cameroon for
safeguarding the interests of policyholders in the event of winding up.
155
It is however, evident that where the cause of winding up is the inability of
the insurance concern to meet its liabilities the measures we have been
examining in the above systems can only go some of the way to minimise the
extent of the loss suffered by policyholders and third party claimants. The
question one might ask at this point is whether the supervisory authority,
having failed to prevent insolvencies should allow the policyholders to
suffer the brunt of the very thing that it set out to avoid? This could
hardly be seen to be the best course to adopt from the point of view of
policyholders. It can be argued, rightly it is submitted that the best
course to adopt is to ensure that policyholders receive full or some
compensation.	 This is especially necessary in the cases where the state has
rendered insurance compulsory. It is in this light that the United Kingdom
Policyholders Protection Act 1975 is of particular relevance.
153 Ibid, section 59.
154 Supra, p.109 and p.122.
155 Supra, pp.109-110 and pp.123-124.
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V. THE UNITED KINGDOM POLICYHOLDERS PROTECTION ACT 1975.
This Act came into force on November 13, 1975. 	 Section 1 of the
Policyholders Protection Act 1975 established the Policyholders Protection
Board which is empowered to take the measures provided in the Act for
indemnifying in whole or in part, or otherwise assisting or protecting
Policyholders and others who may be prejudiced in consequence of the
inability of insurance companies carrying on business in the United Kingdom
to meet their liabilities under policies issued or securities given by them.
The Policyholders Protection Board was set up in the wake of the collapse of
Nation Life Insurance Company.
156
1  The Policyholders Protection Board 
Section 1 of the 1975 Act provides for the establishment of a statutory
body the Policyholders Protection Board, to administer the protection scheme.
Schedule 1 to the Act provides that the Board shall consist of five members
appointed by the Secretary of State from the management of insurance
companies, and at least one must be qualified to represent the interests of
Policyholders.
157 Members of the Board hold office for not more than two
156 It is somewhat ironic that Nation Life Policyholders were not able
to benefit from the scheme since the protection scheme only applied
to policyholders of insurance companies which went into liquidation
after 29 October 1974. Nation Life went into liquidation in July
1974.
157 The Secretary of State may also appoint in respect of each member of
the Board, an alternate member to perform his duties as a member in
his absence. See: Schedule 1 and articles 1-5 for a fuller account
of the nature and scope of Member's duties.
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years.
158
The Secretary of State appoints one of the Board Members to be the
Chairman thereof. The Chairman holds office only for as long as he remains a
Member of the Board. 159 Members are remunerated whenever the Board meets.
For the year ending March 31, 1977, the rate of remuneration was £45 per day
for the Chairman and £30 per day for other Members or alternate Members. 160
2 Duties of the Board. 
The duties of the Board arise when an insurance company goes into
liquidation or is in provisional liquidation. The main duty of the Board as
we have indicated above
161
 is to indemnify or otherwise assist or protect
policyholders and others who have been or may be prejudiced by the inability
of an authorised insurance company to meet its liabilities under policies
issued or securities given by them.
162
For this purpose, in the case of
compulsory insurance, the Board shall secure the payment of a sum equal to
the full amount of any liability of the company in liquidation towards any
policyholder or security holder under the terms of any policy or security, as
soon as reasonably practicable after the beginning of the liquidation.
163
In
the exercise of this duty, the Board has settled ten cases totaling some
£12.000 arising out of unexpected claims made against the Cotton Trade
158 Para. 2(1) and (2) of schedule 1 to the 1975 Act.
159 Schedule 1 of the 1975 Act.
160 Half of these rates were payable for periods of half a day or less.
See: Policyholders Protection Board, Reports and Accounts for the
year ended 31 March 1976, p.l. See also schedule 1 paras. 5 and 6.
161 Supra, p.125.
162 Section 1(2) of the 1975 Act.
163 Section 6(4) ibid.
- .127 -
Insurance Association Limited which transacted employers liability insurance
business.
164
In the case of non-compulsory insurance, the Board shall ensure that a
sum equal to 90 per cent of the amount of any liability of a company in
liquidation towards a private policyholder under the terms of any policy
which is a U.K. policy at the beginning of the liquidation is paid to the
policyholder as soon as reasonably practicable after the beginning of the
liquidation.
165
In the exercise of this duty, the Board is given certain
powers. It is to the consideration of these powers that we will now turn.
3 Powers of the Board.
The Board is empowered by the 1975 Act to assist policyholders of
insurance companies in liquidation or in provisional liquidation, by making
interim payments
166
 so that policyholders do not suffer hardship during the
interval which is bound to elapse between the time when an insurance company
gets into financial difficulties and the time when some appropriate rescue
operation is organised by the Board. Under section 28 of the 1975 Act the
Secretary of State is required when an insurance company is in liquidation or
financial difficulties to make a report to Parliament giving details of the
exercise of his powers under the Insurance Companies Act 1982 in relation to
the company. In 1975 the Secretary of State reported on Fidelity Life
164 See Policyholders Protection Board, Reports and Accounts for the
year ended 31 March 1984 p.5. Note that employer's liability is a
compulsory class of general business and policyholders are entitled
to the protection of the Board under section 6(l of the 1975 Act.
165 Section 8(1) and (2) of the 1975 Act. Section 8(4) excludes marine,
aviation, transport insurance business and contracts of reinsurance
from the provisions of this Act.
166 Section 15 ibid.
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Assurance Limited and Capital Annuities Limited that there was no reasonable
prospect of their being able to meet their liabilities to their policyholders
and other creditors.
167
These two cases were the first to be handled by the
Policyholders Protection Board.
168
They illustrate the different ways in
which interim payments may be made. 	 For Fidelity Life Assurance Company
interim payments were made out of the company's funds under an indemnity
given to the provisional liquidator by the Board. The issue arose whether
the Board's power under section 15 (3) (b) was confined to affording a
liquidator or provisional liquidator indemnity against any personal liability
resulting from interim payments or whether the Board was authorised to give
to the company itself an undertaking to make good any shortfall of assets
resulting from interim payments. 	 In interpreting section 15 (3)(b) of the
1975 Act the court held in the case of Policyholders Protection Board v. 
Official Receiver
169
 that not only is the Board able to indemnify the
provisional liquidator in his personal capacity; it is also empowered to give
the company an undertaking to make good any shortfall of assets which may
result from making the interim payments. Brightman J., made a declaration
that the Policyholders Protection Board has the power under section 15 (3)(b)
of the 1975 Act to enter into a three-party deed of indemnity between the
167 These reports were made on 26 July 1976 and 21 December 1976
respectively. The company needed an increase in its assets by at
lest £750,000 without a corresponding increase in its liabilities.
The Department of Trade and Industry had not been satisfied that the
value of Fidelity Life's assets exceeded its liabilities and on 14
January 1975, the company had undertaken not to issue new policies.
See: Department of Trade, Insurance business: Annual Fleport, 1976,
London H.M.S.O., 1976, paras.5 and 6 at p.l.
168 Policyholders Protection Board, Report of activities for the period
12 November 1975 (date established) to 30 September 1976, p.l.
169 [1976] 1 W.L.R. 447 Ibid, at p.450.
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Board, Fidelity Life Assurance Ltd., in provisional liquidation and the
provisional liquidator whereby the provisional liquidator should make interim
payments until a winding up order was made or a scheme approved by the Board
was operating, and the Board would indemnify the provisional liquidator
against any personal liability arising from the fact that he permitted such
payments to be made and would indemnify him for the benefit of the company
with the object of protecting the company against loss. The court took the
view that to confine the indemnity to any personal liability of the liquid-
ator would largely stultify the intention of the paragraph, so that the true
construction was the wider one.
170
This ruling by the court is favourable to
policyholders.
In making interim payments to policyholders of Fidelity Life Assurance,
the Board leaned heavily on Fidelity's United States parent company, Fidelity
corporation of Richmond, Virginia.	 The Board managed to avoid any expense
itself whilst safeguarding the policyholders. The Board's efforts on behalf
of policyholders of Fidelity Life Assurance appear to have paid off.	 The
second case, that of Capital Annuities Limited, differs from the first in
that there was no parent company available to provide additional funds.
There was thus no possibility of a 100 per cent rescue and policyholders
could only be protected at the 90 per cent level, subject to any scaling-down
for excessive benefits. It was necessary in this case to raise a levy from
the industry to finance the interim payments.
171
It is clear that without
the Board's intervention policyholders of Capital Annuities would still be
waiting for payments from the company, 	 for at the time it went into
170 Ibid., at p.453.
171 See later discussion on the financial resources of the Board at
pp.133-135.
	 '
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provisional liquidation, the company was totally illiquid.
172
Another power of the Board is to protect policyholders of companies in
financial difficulties by taking any measures appearing to them to be
appropriate for securing or facilitating the transfer of all or part of the
insurance business carried on by a company in financial difficulties to
another authorised insurance company on terms appearing to the Board to be
appropriate in any case or description of case.
173
	In 1978, the Board
established a scheme by which under the Board's guarantee Capital Annuities
Limited would be managed by Commercial Union Assurance Group.
174
And in
accordance with section 11(3) of the 1975 Act, arrangements were made with
Commercial Union Assurance Group whereby 1,200 policyholders were offered
continuation or substitute policies with that company at the level of 90 per
cent of non-excessive benefits. A similar arrangement was made in respect of
450 policyholders of Underwriters National Assurance Company who were offered
substitute policies by Guardian Assurance PLC. 175
Upon liquidation of a company in the field of non-compulsory general
insurance, the Board must secure 90 per cent of the liability to each private
policyholder and for long-term policies must additionally secure continuity
of insurance to the level of 90 per cent of the future benefits under the
policy (but excluding any policy bonus not declared before the beginning of
172 This company has been in	 liquidation since 1978 and until 1984
continued assistance was given to some policyholders. See
Policyholders Protection Board, Report and Accounts for the year
ended 31 March, 1984, p.4.
173 Section 16(4) of the Policyholders Protection Act 1975.
174 Policyholders Protection Board, Report and Accounts for the year
ended 31 March, 1978, p.4.
175 Policyholders Protection Board, Report and Accounts for the year
ended 31 March, 1982, p.5.
- 131 -
the liquidation) or if this proves not to be practicable, to pay the policy-
holder a sum equal to 90 per cent of the value of his policy.
176
In the
exercise of this power by section 17(4), the Board may reduce or disregard
any disproportionate or excessive benefits under long-term policies provided
that an independent actuary reports to the Board that the benefits in
question are excessive. This power was used, following a report to that
effect, in respect of Capital Annuities Limited.
177
The Board, the Institute
of Actuaries and Faculty of Actuaries all suggested that the duties of the
independent actuary to whom the Board would refer long-term policies which
provided benefits which might be regarded as excessive needed clarific-
ation.
178
The duties under sections 12(1) and 17(4) might be interpreted as
restricting the actuary in his determination of excessive benefits to a
comparison with the 'premium paid or payable and to any other terms of the
policy.' They suggested that the actuary should be free to take into account
all the factors which he considers relevant.
179
The Board may also assist a company in financial difficulties by giving
such assistance as may enable it to continue to carry on insurance
business.
180
In the case of Underwriters National Assurance Company, the
Board attempted to arrange for the company's business to be continued but in
the light of legal and actuarial advice, it concluded that such arrangements
176 Section 10 of the 1975 Act.
177 See: Policyholders Protection Board, Report and Accounts for the
year ended 31 March, 1979, p.4.
178 See infra, pp.134-135. See also Report on the Policyholders
Protection Act 1975, 1981 (1980-1981, H.C. 363) London H.M.S.O.,
para. 18 at pp.8-9.
179 Ibid
180 Section 11(3) of the 1975 Act.
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were not practicable.
181
The duties and powers of the Board are only exercisable in relation to
authorised insurance companies, an authorised insurance company being one
which is permitted to carry on business in the United Kingdom by virtue of
the Insurance Companies Act 1982 or of the Insurance Companies Act (Northern
Ireland) 1968. 182 Cavalier Insurance Company had been authorised to transact
insurance classes 7, 8 and 9 (Goods in Transit, Fire and Natural Forces and
Damage to Property). This company was put into liquidation in February 1984
after it was discovered that it had written more than 100,000 extended
warranties without authorisation.
	 Under the terms of section 8 (2) of the
1975 Act, the Board is protecting the interests of private policyholders to
the extent of 90 per cent of claims under the authorised policies.
183
The
Policyholders Protection Board is uncertain whether claims on extended
warranties underwritten by Cavalier Insurance Company should be met from its
funds.
184
Since the insurance cover was not valid, it has been argued that
policyholders would not be protected by the Board as it was only empowered to
act where policies were legal, the problem has been compounded by two
181 Policyholders Protection Board, Report and Acpounts for the year
ended 31 March, 1983, p.5.
182 Section 3 of the 1975 Act.
183 See Policyholders Protection Board, Report and Accounts for the year
ended 31 March, 1984, p.5
184 Ibid., at p.5.
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conflicting court decisions as to the validity of unauthorised policies.
185
The Policyholders Protection Board is seeking legal advise to clarify its
rights and duties.
186
A policyholder is eligible for the assistance or protection of the
Board only in respect of a policy of insurance which was a United Kingdom
policy for the purpose of the Act at the material time, namely, when the
performance by the insurer of any of his obligations under the contract
evidenced by the policy would constitute the carrying on by the insurer of
insurance business of any class in the United Kingdom.
187
4 Financial Resources of the Board. 
The Policyholders Protection Act authorises the Board to impose levies
on the insurance industry for the purpose of financing the performance of its
activities.
188
	Sections 19 and 20 provide for levies on intermediaries who
185 See later discussion on pp.138-142. In the case of the Bedford 
Insurance Company Ltd. v. Institut° de Resseouros do Brazil and 
others [1984] 3 W.L.R. 726, it was held that contracts written by an
insurance company outside the scope of its authorisation were void.
The indication was that the Board had no rights or duties in
relation to the extended warranty business. In April 1984, the
judgment in the Bedford case was contradicted in the case of Stewart 
v. Oriental Fire and Marine Insurance Co. [1984] 3 W.L.R. 741.
186 Policyholders Protection Board, Report and Accounts for the year
ended 31 March, 1984 p.5.
187 Section 4 of the 1975 Act. By analogy to a broad construction given
' in Stewart's Case [1984] 3 W.L.R. 741-749, the phrase "effecting and
carrying on of insurance business" in the Insurance Companies Act
1974, means that the insurer has a reasonable presence in the United
Kingdom. Furthermore, it has been emphasised that both "the
effecting and carrying out" or "the decision either to effect or to
carry out" must be taken in the United Kingdom: See, Department of
Trade and Industry Press Notice, "Carrying on Tnsurance Business -
Alex Fletcher Statement", Ref:470, 25 July 1985.
188 Section 21(1) and (2) empowers the Board from time to time for the
purpose of financing general insurance business expenditure, to
impose a levy on authorised insurance companies carrying on general .
business in the UK and a separate levy on authorised insurance
companies carrying on long-term business within the UK for the
purpose of financing long-term expenditure.
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have earned substantial commission in respect of insurance business from a
failed company.
189
 The amount each company may be required to pay under any
levy in respect of either class of insurance business shall be calculated by
reference to the net premium income of the company for the year ending last
before the beginning of that financial year in respect of general and long-
term U.K. policies held at the relevant time.
190
 Such levies for any one
financial year shall not exceed one per cent of any income of the company for
the year ending last before the beginning of that financial year which is
income liable either to the general business or long-term business.
191
 The
levy imposed on long-term business in 1976 to which we have made reference
was at the rate of 0.25 per cent.
192 	 The amount raised was £2.5a122Yon,
The Board may not impose any levy for the purpose of financing expenditure of
any description unless the expenditure has already been incurred by the Board
or it appears to the Board that the expenditure will be incurred within
twelve months of the imposition of the levy.
193
The sharing of the burden of the levy may give rise to inequity between
Life offices. For example, in the early years of the operation of the Act,
Life Offices specialising in single - premium contracts will bear a greater
proportion of the levy than they will after many years of operation, when the
premium income from periodical premium policies effected after 31 December
189 See also Schedule 11 of the 1975 Act for detailed provisions on
intermediaries.
190 Section 21(3) and (4) of the 1975 Act. For details on the
calculation of the companies income see sectioh 21(5) - (9) of the
1975 Act.
191 Schedule 111 para.4 of the 1975 Act.
192 Policyholders Protection Board, Report and Accounts for the year
ended 31 March, 1977 p.5
193 Schedule 111 of the 1975 Act.
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1974 will have built up and account for a greater proportion of leviable
premium income.
	 In this respect two suggestions were made. 194 The Life
Offices Association suggested that it would be more equitable if the
calculation of the levy were to be based on the average of the net premium
income for each of the three financial years preceding the financial year in
question rather than on the net premium income for only one year. The Linked
Life Assurance Group further suggested that, in the case of single premium
policies, only a fraction of the premium income for example, one-fifth,
should be regarded as income for any one year in arriving at the basis for
assessing the levy. 195 These proposals were acceptable in principle and may
be taken into consideration when amendments
	 are to be made tq the
policyholders Protection Act.196
To assist the Board in the performance of its duties every authorised
insurance company is required to send to the Secretary of State before March
1, every year, a statement of any income of the company for the previous year
which is income liable to the long-term business or general business levy. 197
The Board also has powers to borrow money up to £10 million and is
empowered to invest any funds which are not required from time to time. 198
The United Kingdom Policyholders Protection Act 1975 is an outstanding
example of the state's desire to carry out to its logical conclusion the main
function of insurance regulation, namely, the protection of policyholders and
third party beneficiaries.
	 The Act will continue to form the basis of the
194 Report on the Policyholders Protection Act 1975, op. cit., para.20
at p.9.
195 Ibid at p.9.
196 Ibid at p.9.
197 Schedule 111 para.4(1) and (2) of the 1975 Act.
198 Section 1(3) of the 1975 Act.
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security which policyholders desire.
	
Regrettably, there is no piece of
legislation	 in	 Cameroon similar to the United Kingdom Policyholders
Protection Act. Although there are no recorded cases of insurance company
collapses in Cameroon, there is a real need for some provision to be made for
protecting policyholders and other beneficiaries of insurance policies from
any such collapse.
So far only six cases have been referred to the Board and policyholders
have received protection which otherwise would not have been available if
such a body was not set up. It has been an effective arrangement for the
protection of policyholders in the event of insurance companies going into
liquidation. In 1981 the Secretary of State presented a report in pursuance
of section 30 of the Policyholders Protection Act 1975 on the operation of
the Act and its effectiveness as a method of protecting policyholders of
authorised insurance companies carrying on business in the U.K. 	 The
consensus expressed in the review
199
 was that on the basis of the three cases
reported to the Policyholders Protection Board, the Act has been shown to be
capable of achieving its objectives. It is satisfactory from the standpoint
of the policyholders, of the insurance companies and the general public
interest, that the Act has so far been little used. It is desirable that the
need to invoke the Act's safeguards should not arise. The effectiveness of
the protection offered by the Policyholders Protection Act 1975 may be
associated with the effectiveness of the Department of Trade and Industry's
supervision	 of	 the	 activities of insurance companies. 	 The report
concluded
200
 that the 1975 Act should be retained, substantially in its
199 Report on the Policyholders Protection Act 1975, 1981 (1980-1981,
H.C. 363) London H.M.S.O. at p.5; See also, 985 Hansard (5th series)
H.C. Cols.206-207 (21 May 1980); 7 Hansard (6th series) H.C. Co1.136
(25 June 1981).
200 Ibid., p.10
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present form, there being no present case for changes in the scope of the
Act, the levels of protection or the composition of the Board and that the
level of protection should remain at 90 per cent. The Department of Trade
and Industry considered
201
 that the limit should not be altered for the
policyholder, should continue to have incentive to prudence when deciding
with which institution he should take out insurance. 	 Certain proposals
mentioned above
202
 would however be given further consideration when a
suitable opportunity occurs for insurance legislation.
Representatives of the insurance industry indicated
203
 their opposition
in principle to a statutory scheme for safeguarding policyholders interests
on the grounds that this would encourage irresponsibility among some
insurance companies.
	
While this may be true, it is already in the power of
the Department of Trade and Industry, possibly nudged by the market, to
preclude "unfit persons" from transacting insurance business. A more general
argument against the scheme is that, it is unfair on the policyholders of
prudent companies, who have to contribute to the protection of the less
prudent.
204
 This argument rests on assumptions that are difficult to
sustain. It is assumed that an ordinary person can distinguish between a
prudent and an imprudent company. It should be noted that few people have
the information to make this judgment. 	 The fact is that not all, nor
probably most policyholders of imprudent companies are themselves imprudent.
Moreover, an impeccably prudent company may in the course of time, before a
201 Ibid., p.10.
202 Supra., p.135.
203 Report on the Policyholders Protection Act 1975, op. cit., at p.7;
See further, 360 Hansard (5th series) H.C. cols.202-289 (6 May
1975); cols.1191-1275 (20th May 1975) and cols. 1413-1507 (22 May
1975); 891 Hansard (5th series) H.C. cols.993-996 (5 May 1975).
204 Ibid.
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policy matures, have changes in management, and competence of management can
vary over a period of years. There is unfortunately no guarantee that a
company, however prudent, may not find itself in difficulties in the future.
The principle behind the Act is that all policyholders of all companies are
deserving of protection; and equally that, all companies should contribute to
that protection. The scheme is meant to support supervisory legislation and
it is therefore desirable that the existence of such funds should not result
in any relaxation of the regulatory controls available, or the vigilance with
which these controls are exercised, for otherwise the fear that the more
stable	 insurers	 might find themselves subsidising their less stable
competitors would be well founded.
VI SANCTIONS AND ENFORCEMENT OF INSURANCE REGULATIONS
#
We have already explained
204A
that there are both pre- and post-
registration regulations which must be complied with by every company
desiring not only to start an insurance business but also to stay in
business. However, comprehensive any set of regulations to control the
operation of insurance business may be, the real test lies in how far they
are really made to work, and this, in itself will largely be determined by
the way the regulations are enforced.
Consequences of lack of authorisation 
The authorisation of a company to commence insurance business is a
necessary pre-requisite to the granting of a licence as an insurer. In both
England and Cameroon failure to obtain such a licence before commencement of
insurance business is an offence contrary to the insurance regulations. It
is clear that the criminal offence could only be committed by the insurance
company and not by the insured, unless he knowingly aids and abets the
204A	 See supra, pp.58-124.
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commission. In this respect, section 14(3) of the Insurance Companies Act
1982 in England, provides that any person found guilty of such an offence
will be liable to a fine not exceeding £1000 or imprisoned for a term not
exceeding two years.
205
	Similarly, in Cameroon, article 86 of the 1985
Ordinance provides penalties for breach of article 31 thereof, of a fine
ranging from 1,000,000 CFA francs to 5,000,000 CFA francs and imprisonment
ranging from twelve months to two years or alternatively, either of the two
penalties only.
In England, the Insurance Companies Act 1982, did not render the
performance of the insurance contract per se objectionable or illegal; it
merely prohibited the insurer from transacting a class or classes of
insurance business for which it had not obtained the requisite authorisation.
The offending section of the 1982 Act is the act of "effecting or carrying
out of insurance contracts" by an insurance company by way of business. 206
Evidently, this can only be done by an insurance company. The enforcement of
this regulation was brought to the test in Bedford Insurance Co. Ltd. v. 
Instituto de Ressequros do Brazil and others.
207
	In this case, the court
decided that a policy of an insurance company unauthorised for the class of
business concerned was so tainted with illegality that even an innocent
assured could not enforce it against the insurance company. It was further
held that the original contracts were not only illegal and void ab initio but
also that the plaintiffs would be unable to recover under the reinsurance
contract as the Insurance Companies Act of 1974 and 1981 prohibited both
contract and performance. However, in Stewart v. Oriental Fire and Marine 
205 In England, see section 14(1) of the Insurance Companies Act 1982.
206 For an elaboration of this phrase, see the Department of Trade and
Industry Press Notice, supra, p.133, note 187.
207 [1984] 3 W.L.R. 726. Note that it was a reinsurance transaction.
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Insurance Co. Ltd. 208
 on very similar facts, a contrary decision was held as
regards the consequences of contracts performed by an illegally established
insurance company. Here, the plaintiff was a representative member of
Lloyd's Syndicate. The syndicate wished to reinsure against a risk written
by the syndicate as primary insurers. The reinsurers were defendants whose
registered office was in South Korea and another foreign corporation.
Neither the defendants nor their agents had any authority from the Department
of Trade and Industry to conduct in Great Britain any relevant class of
insurance	 business	 and	 the
	 plaintiffs,	 the	 syndicate	 and their
representatives were at all material times, unaware whether any authority had
been obtained.	 The plaintiff wished to recover under the reinsurance
contract. The plaintiff submitted that the conduct which the Act prohibited
was the carrying on without authorisation of certain classes of business
identified in the Act. The court in holding in favour of the plaintiff said
the 1974 Act did not invalidate expressly each transaction made in the course
of carrying on insurance business without authorisation. 209 Furthermore, the
Act did not regulate rights and liabilities of insurer and insured inter se:
it was principally designed to ensure the financial soundness of insurers.
Therefore, the contracts made in the course of carrying on insurance business
of an unauthorised class were enforceable at the suit of the insured.
Evidently, the purpose of the Insurance Companies Act 1974 and 1981 was
to provide for regulation by the Department of Trade and Industry of insurers
carrying on business in Great Britain in order to ensure that they were able
to honour their commitments to their insureds. They were and are no direct
208 [1984] 3 W.L.R. 741.
209 Ibid., at pp.755-757.
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references to contracts of insurance in the 1974, 1981 and now 1982 Insurance
Companies Acts.	 The essential difference between carrying on insurance
business and effecting or carrying out contracts of insurance appear to be
that whereas the business may be carried on only by insurers, the contracts
may be made between insurer and insured.	 What is aimed at and therefore
prohibited by the regulations is the conduct of insurance business without
authorisation. It does not seem to be the intention of the statute to leave
a person uninsured who has entered into an apparently valid contract of
Insurance of a relevant class with an insurer who turned out, unbeknown to
the person seeking insurance, to have effected it without authorisation. 	 As
a matter of commercial practicality and public policy contracts of insurance
ought not to be rendered unenforceable by an innocent insured who has paid
all the premiums. The immediate effect of rendering contracts of insurance
illegal would be the wholly undesirable one of allowing insurers to keep
premiums paid while releasing them from their obligation to pay claims. The
decision in the latter case therefore, seems to be a better and sensible
result, and presumably will be preferred and followed in later decisions.
209A
However, this case left open a number of questions. Firstly, the right of an
unauthorised company to enforce against a reinsurer reinsurance of its
unauthorised contracts and secondly, the right of an insured who is not
'Innocent' but knows that the insurance company is unauthorised.
	 The first
question seems to have been decided by the case of Phoenix General Insurance 
Co. of Greece S.A. v. Halvanon Insurance Ltd. 210 Here, Phoenix General,
Inadvertently, effected and carried out insurance business for which it had
not obtained authorisation and further reinsured those risks with a Greek
209A This view is also held by J. Birds "Illegality and Insurance",
[1984] 3.8.L.298 at 300.
210 [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep.599
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company based in London. 	 With respect to the original insurance contract,
the court held that Phoenix was liable to the original assureds as the
contracts were not void but became merely unenforceable - the innocent
assured could enforce the contract as the ultimate intention of the statute
was clearly to protect potential assureds.
211 On the other hand, Phoenix was
precluded from recovering against the reinsurers in respect of business
written in contravention of the 1974 Act as amended by regulation 6 of the
Insurance Companies (Classes of General Business) Regulations 1977,
212
 since
it sought to rely on its own illegal conduct. This decision seems to be
favourable to insured persons as opposed to insurance companies. The reason
for this may be that the Insurance Companies Act 1974 and 1982 subjected
insurance companies to supervision and regulation if they carried out
unauthorised business.
Rather timely, perhaps, the Financial Services Bill [51] of 18 December
1985 implementing the proposals of the government White Paper
213
 makes
reference to insurance contracts effected in breach of section 2 of the
Insurance Companies Act 1982. 	 Clause 113(3) may allow a contract of
insurance to be enforced or money or property transferred under it to be
retained by an unauthorised insurer under certain circumstances. In the
light of this the decisions in Bedford and Phoenix cases would no longer be
good law. In addition, Clause 113(1) of the Financial Services Bill 1985
211 This reasoning is similar to that adopted in Stewart's Case, op. 
cit.
212 S.I. 1977 No.1552, Sched. 3.
213 Financial Services in the United Kingdom: A New Framework for
Investor Protection, Cmnd 9432, January 1985, London H.M.S.O. para.
15.18. See also L.C.B . Gower, Review of Investor Protection,
Report, Part I, Cmnd. 9125, January 1984, London, H.M.S.O., para.91.
And in respect of the Bedford and Stewart cases see, Report: Part
II, London, H.M.S.O., para.5.07.
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provides that a contract of insurance entered into by an unauthorised insurer
is unenforceable against the insured.	 However, the insured will be entitled
to recover any money or other property paid or transferred by him under the
contract, together with tnterest on any such money. It appears that clause
113 of the 1985 Bill will render the secondary obligation to pay or recover
damages in the absence of performance valid but not the primary obligation of
performance.	 Furthermore it expressly provides in Clause 113(6) that any
breach of section 2 of the 1982 Act will not make a contract of insurance
illegal or invalid and a breach of that section in respect of a contract of
insurance will not affect the validity of any reinsurance contract entered
into in respect of that contract. This clearly touches on the point made in
the Phoenix case.
In contrast, in Cameroon,	 the position concerning contracts of
insurance made by unauthorised insurers is clearly stated by the 1985
Ordinance itself. Article 5(3) provides that "Contracts concluded in breach
of the provisions of this Ordinance shall be null and void: Provided that
such nullity shall not be applicable to 	 bona fide insured persons,
underwriters
213A
 and beneficiaries". In contrast to the Insurance Companies
Act 1982 of England, the Cameroonian Ordinance of 1985 makes a direct
reference	 to contracts concluded by unauthorised insurance companies.
Clearly, an innocent insured can recover any claim brought under such
contracts. The question may, however, arise as to where the resources would
be provided for the satisfaction of such claims, bearing in mind that a
fraudulent company may be without sufficient funds to meet its commitments.
In this respect, article 29(1) of the 1985 Ordinance provides that "where a
company is declared null, the founders to whom the nullity is ascribable and
213A Added emphasis.
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the directors in office at the time the nullity was incurred shall be jointly
and severally liable towards third parties for any damage resulting from this
annulment."
It is interesting to note that, the Cameroonian legislation makes
reference to bona fide underwriters.
The existence of sanctions is meaningless without mechanism for their
effective vindication. 	 The enforcement or procedural protection is merely
another side of the context of the regulation. It has become common-place to
observe that affirmative action by the state is necessary to ensure that the
regulations are enforced.	 Accordingly those involved in the enforcement
machinery and therefore empowered to make periodical checks on insurance
companies ought to be more vigilant and active in the discharge of their
duties. Furthermore, the Insurance Division of the Ministry of Finance must
ensure that only qualified persons with a proven record of honesty and
integrity are allowed to operate as insurance supervisors.	 One would
question of what use are government regulations if they are not enforced
against insurance companies. 	 Surprise checks and raids are much more
effective than complete reliance on mere regulations. 	 This is likely to
prove a useful and effective deterrent to stealthily operated and unlicensed
business. However, it should be noteworthy that this involves an extensive
task on the supervisory authorities especially in a country like England
where the population is dense and there are back streets where possibly
unscrupulous business could be undertaken without the supervisory authority
knowing of its existence. Despite the supervision and control carried out in
England, Cavalier Insurance Company carried out extended warranty insurance
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for sometime before they were detected. 214
The control and supervision of insurance companies is a continuing
exercise; hence apart from the immediate pre-incorporation requirements to be
observed by a company which proposes to do insurance business there are
documents which must be filed annually with the supervisory authorities. The
failure of an insurance company to comply with post-registration requirements
could lead to the cancellation and withdrawal of its licence.	 Furthermore,
in both England and Cameroon the legislation provide for heavy fines and
penalties in the case where insurance companies supply misleading information
to the authorities.
215
-=<>=-
214 Supra, pp.132-133. For another recent example, see Department of
Trade and Industry Press Notice, "DTI Petition to Wind up Bloomside
Ltd.", Ref:128, 1 March 1985.
215 In England, see further sections 14(42); 71(2), 81,91 and 92 of the
Insurance Companies Act 1982. In Cameroon, see article 86 of the
1985 Ordinance.
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CHAPTER	 3
THE REASON FOR AND SCOPE OF COMPULSORY INSURANCEI
I INTRODUCTION
This study, as we have already indicated, 2
 is concerned principally
with the law of insurance with respect to motor vehicles. The purpose of
this chapter therefore, is to examine the scope of compulsory insurance which
underlies the basis of motor insurance in England, France and Cameroon.
However, a better understanding of the law requires an examination of the
raison d'ttre of compulsory insurance. 	 Compulsory insurance is a benign
attempt to provide an insured person and his victims with a semblance of
'blanket' cover
3
 in circumstances where he is legally liable to pay for
1	 Note that this Chapter is not limited to motor vehicle insurance
only. A brief discussion of other types of compulsory insurance
will be attempted. They are not particularly relevant to this work
but show the need felt by governments to regulate aspects of
insurance in respect of personal injuries to persons generally to
ensure compensation of victims.
2	 See the abstract of this study, supra, p. v.
3 This phraseology is employed here to emphasise the point that
although compulsory insurance seeks to provide adequate compensation
to an insured person and his victims, it is still subject to
liability being found and certain vitiating factors in the contract
of insurance. As to the statutory restrictions on contractual
rights in respect of this cover, which relate to these latter
factors, see infra, pp. 211-213. For further discussion of misrep-
resentation and basis of the contract clause, see Chapter Five
pp.323-356 and with respect to conditions in policies of insurance,
see Chapter Seven, pp.434-439. However, in this Chapter, our
discussion would be concerned with the law of civil liability and
the provisions of compulsory insurance laws.
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injury caused to such victims.	 This guarantee, that is, liability insurance
monies, is linked to the institution of adversarial legal proceedings - the
law on civil liability. We will briefly, therefore, deal with an acute
problem of our present day life, namely, the problem created in the law of
liability with respect to the use of motor vehicles; the result of which may
be settlement in court or settlement out of court.
4
It cannot be seriously doubted	 that, the enormous increase in
litigation in this branch of our study is the result of the upsurge of
accidents on our roads.
5
 Each year about 7,600 people are killed and some
400,000 are injured in road accidents in the United Kingdom. Almost all the
deaths and 85 per cent of the injuries occur in accidents invol4ing a motom
vehicle.
6
 The statistics overleaf provide an indication of the situation.
4	 For a discussion of the latter, see Chapter Eight of this work,
pp. 444-476.
5	 This is more grimly described by one writer in an article, albeit
somewhat outdated now: see, Kenneth Cannar, "The statistics of
sorrow : road accident casualties, 1976", Post Magazine 	 and
Insurance Monitor, 9 June, 1977 Vol.CXXXVIII, No.23 at 1442.
6	 Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation
for Personal Injury,	 (Chairman: Lord Pearson) Vol.1, Cmnd.7054-1,
1978, para. 958 at p.205. Hereinafter cited as 'Pearson'.
Road in Britain Northern Ireland) 1977 1981Accidents (excluding -TABLE 3 :
Vehicles on the Road	 No.	 of	 Killed	 Seriously	 Slightly
(1975	 .	 100)	 Casualties	 injured	 injured
1977	 108	 348,061	 6,614	 81,681	 259,766
1978	 112	 349,795
	
6,831	 82,518	 260,446
1979	 112	 333,799
	 6,350	 80,274	 247,175
1980	 116	 328,600
	 6,010	 79,400	 243,190
1981
	 116	 324,840	 5,846	 78,259	 240,735
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Source:	 British Insurance Association
Facts and Figures 1981 London.
In Cameroon 10 per cent of untimely deaths are caused by accidents on the
road.
7
The absence of global statistics covering the entire country renders
a complete view of the accident situation hard to determine. 	 The table
overleaf reveals the accident statistics for the commercial town of Douala.
8
7	 Shey Mabu, "Death On Our Roads: Any Way Out ?". Cameroon Tribune,
No.472 July 6, 1983, p.l. 	 .
8 Statistics compiled from the accident register of the Central Police
Station at Douala during the course of field work carried out in
July 1983.
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TABLE 4 : Road Accidents in Cameroon (Douala only) 1978 - 1982. 
Year Number of
Accidents
Number of	 Number involving
Mortal Accidents	 Bodily	 Injuries
Number involving
Property Damage
1978 3,824 624 1,568 2,329
1979 3,768 635 1,597 2,393
1980 3,646 502 1,463 2,397
1981 3,707 715 1,701 2,436
1982 3,981 807 2,435 2,450
Source: Commissariat Central Douala 1983.
The causes of this increase in the number of accidents are many.
The number of accidents and injuries caused by motor vehicles in England,
Cameroon as well as in Europe and the United States has increased in
proportion to the increase in the number of automobiles. 9 The plurality of
causes of traffic accidents, namely the condition of the road, the number of
cars on the road, the mechanisms and structures of the vehicles involved, the
speed and efficiency of the drivers and the availability of traffic signs all
contribute to produce and increase road accidents.
10
9 In Cameroon the Department of Transport Report of 1978/79 activities
disclosed that there were over 22,000 registered vehicles: See,
Minutes of the Meeting held at the Ministry of Transport on 16 July,
1979 under the Chairmanship of Mr Ndum Amadou, Director of the
Ministry of Transport.
10 For causes of road accidents in Cameroon see: Radio Broadcast, two
week information campaign on the prevention of road accidents, 2 -
16 July 1983.
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Furthermore, the increase in 	 the	 volume	 of road traffic and
industrialisation resulted in a phenomenal rise in the rate of personal
injuries and fatal accidents with disruptive effects on the victims and their
dependents. While efforts and adequate action ought to be made to reduce the
number of casualties on the highway, it is equally important to focus
attention on the unavoidable problem of compensating victims of such
accidents. What follows then, is a study of the methods by which the laws of
England, France and Cameroon have endeavoured to solve the problems of
determining liability for injury and damage caused by the use of motor
vehicles and consideration of the process through which these methods were
devised, pointing out the changes which have resulted.
II THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF LIABILITY
English and Cameroonian law subscribe to the principle of fault in
determining the civil liability of the person responsible for road traffic
accidents: a person injured by a motor vehicle will recover tort compensation
only if the defendant was at fault.
In England and the English-speaking part of Cameroon, the tort of
negligence is largely concerned with three essential elements: first, a duty
to take care; second, a breach of that duty; and third, damage to the
plaintiff caused by that breach of duty.11
For a classic statement of the principles behind the tort of
negligence, see the speech of Lord Atkin in Donoghue V. Stevenson
[1932] A.C. 562 at p.580.
For an elaborate discussion of these principles, see the text books
on the law of Tort: Winfield and Jolowicz, On Tort, 12th ed., by
W.V.H. Rogers, 1984 London pp.69-116; Salmond and Heuston, The Law
of Torts, 18th ed., by R.F.V. Heuston and R S. Chambers, 1981,
London, pp.181-226; Street, The Law of Torts, 7th ed., 1983, London,
pp.93-173; John G. Fleming, The Law of Torts, 6th ed., 1983, London,
pp.97-299; Hepple and Matthews, Tort : Cases and Materials, 2nd ed.,
1980, London, pp.64-372; and Tony Weir, A Casebook on Tort, 5th ed.,
1983, London, pp.15-218.
11
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In the French-speaking part of Cameroon the law of tort is governed by
five articles of the Civil Code: article s 1382 to 1386.
12
 The chief domain
of subject liability in which the idea of fault retains its traditional
character and role is that of liability for direct personal acts, (responsab-
ilite du fait personnel). This is based on articles 1382 and 1383 of the
Civil Code. Article 1382 provides that: "Any act whatever of man which causes
damage	 to	 another obliges him by whose fault it occurred to make
reparation" 13 And article 1383 lays down that: "Each one is liable for the
damage which he causes not by his own act but also by his negligence or
imprudence" 14	These articles are app/Lcable wtti	 the gamage has been
12 For the provisions of the articles of the Civil Code in Cameroon,
see G.J. Bouvenet and R. Bourdin, Codes et Lois du Cameroun, Vol. II
1956, pp.102-103. These texts are notable for their brevity being
drawn up in 1804, an age when the problems of civil liability were
very much fewer and very much less important than at the present
time. On the French law of torts, see:
(a) in French: Genevi4ve Viney,
	 Trait( de Droit Civil: Les 
Obligations, La Responsabilit(: conditions, 1982, Paris, L.G.O.J.
pp.304 et seq.; Alex Weill et Fransoise Terre, Droit Civil: Les 
Obligations 36 edn., Dalloz, Paris, 1980. H.L. Mazeaud, J. Mazeaud, 
et Fransois Chabas, Trait Theorique et Pratique de la Responsab-
ilit6 Civile : Dilictuelle et Contractuelle, III, 66 dn. 1983,
Paris; A Tunc, La Responsabilite Civile, 1981, Paris; Phillippe Le
Tourneau, La Responsabilite Civile, 36 dn. 1982; H.L. Mazeaud et J.
Mazeaud, Lesons de Droit Civil; Obligations: Theorie Gfterale, 66
(dn., par F. Chabas, 1978, Paris, pp.340 et seq.; Michel de Juglart,
Cours de Droit Civil, 96 dn., 1978, Paris, pp.211-299; J. Charbonn-
ier, Droit Civil : Les Obligations, lie (dn., Paris, pp.351-481; M.
Planiol et G. Ripert, Trait e Pratique de Droit Civil Fransais: 
Obligations, Vol. VI, 26 (dn. 1952, Paris, pp.639-776.
(b) in English: Amos and Walton, Introduction to French Law, 3rd
ed., by F.H. Lawson, A.E. Anton and L.N. Brown 1967, Oxford
Clarendon Press, pp.200-238; Von Mehren, The Civil Law System - 
Cases and Materials for the Comparative Study of Law, F.H. Lawson,
Negligence in the Civil Law, 1950, Oxford Clarendon Press; M.D.
Chorlton, "The Basis of the French Law of Torts", (1977) N.L.J. 465;
P. Esmein, "Liability in French Law for Damages Caused by Motor
Vehicle Accidents", (1953) 2 Am. J. Comp. L. 156; P. Catala and J.A.
Weir, "Delict and Torts: A Study in Parallel", (1963) 37 Tul. L. R.
572-620.
13 Translation by John H. Crabb, The French Civil Code (as amended to
July 1, 1976), New Jersey, at p.253.
14 J.H. Crabb, op. cit. at p.253.
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directly caused by the defendant without the intervention of a °thing' or the
agency of another person.
The action in negligence under English and the English-speaking
Cameroonian law is akin to an action under articles 1382 and 1383 of the
Civil Code.	 The element of fault is denoted by the requirement of a breach
of the duty of care, while in French-speaking Cameroon it is expressly
mentioned in articles 1382 and 1383, in a rather general way.
Side by side with this traditional liability, there have been developed
in France forms of liability where the part played by fault has been
considerably diminished. 	 Such are liability for the act of another person,
(resPonsabilit6 du fait d'autrui) and the liability for damage caused by
things (responsabilit‘ du fait des choses).
	
These are based on articles
1384, 1385 and 1386 of the Civil Code. 15 Article 1384 provides that:
"He is liable not only for the damage which he caused by his
own act, but also for that which is caused by the act of
persons for whom he is responsible, or by things which has in
his keeping." 16
A plain reading of this article indicates that fault is not a necessary
requirement for liability to be found. The article thus comes into operation
when one person is held liable for damage caused by another person for whom
15 Articles 1385 and 1386 are outside the scope of this study and
therefore call for no comment or discussion. See P. Esmein, op. 
cit., pp.256-266; Mvogo Dieudonn g-C61estin, Application des Articles 
1382 et 1384 du Code Civil en Matitre d'Accidents de Circulation,
(etude de Jurisprudence de la Cour Suprtme et de la Cour d'Appel de
Yaoundd, 1961 - 1973), Memoire de Licence, Yaounde, May 1973.
16 J.H. Crabb, op. cit., at p.253; The pronoun 'he' in the text should
be properly read as 'a person' or 'any person' and 'in his keeping'
denotes in a person's care and control.
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the first is vicariously responsible or for damage caused by a °thing' in the
defendant's control.
17
The decisive element of liability under articles 1382 and 1383 of the
Civil Code is undoubtedly, the traditional principle of "no liability without
fault". However, it should be observed that no express condition of fault is
required by article 1384.	 This article seems to carry implications of
liability arising without fault, a concept reinforced by articles 1385 and
1386. For our purposes therefore, a discussion of the disparity produced by
these three articles, and a consideration of the process through which
changes have been effected by the courts
18
to affect the law regarding
liability, will be the main theme.
Originally, the word "things" was understood to denote only animals and
buildings.
19
Gradually however, through a complex and tortuous process of
judicial interpretation, the provision was declared applicable to motor
17 See Francis Desk, "Automobile Accidents: A Comparative Study of the
Law of Liability in Europe", (1931) 79. Univ. Pa. L.R. 271 at p.274
for a suggestion that article 1384 should be read in the light of
the two preceding articles (1382 and 1383) which were drafted and
enacted at the same time and by implication include the element of
fault. Since a thing cannot act either negligently or otherwise,
should not liability attached to "acts of things" be held dependent
on the fault, negligence or imprudence of the person in control.
Also arguable is the fact that, since the text omitted the word
fault, should it not be considered intentional by the legislature in
imposing a liability regardless of fault with respect to either or
both of these situations dealt with in article 1384, namely,
liability for damages caused by the acts of' persons' for whom one
is responsible and damages caused by things' which are under one's
control ?
18 One remark ought to be made at this point. The interpretation and
elaboration of atticle 1384 of the Civil Code were made by the
French courts. These cases are applicable in French-speaking
Cameroon, see, the introduction to this work, pp.13-15. For this
reason the discussions that follow on the interpretation by the
French courts seems appropriate.
	
For discussion of subsequent
changes in the law in France, see infra, pp.185-194.
19 See, P. Esmein, op. cit., 156 at p.157
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vehicles. 20 In the test case of Jand'heur c. Les Galeries belfortaises,
21
the Cour de cassation sitting tout-chambres r6unies finally pronounced the
applicability of article 1384 to all automobile accidents. Article 1384 has
been construed to impose upon the "custodian", usually the owner of a
"thing", a presumption of liability for the damage caused by the "thing". 22
The Cour de cassation declared that the presumption of liability established
by article 1384 as to one who has under his control an inanimate object that
caused harm to another can be rebutted only by proving a cas fortuit, force 
maJeure or cause 6trangre that cannot be imputed to him.
23
Two observations seem to be appropriate with respect to the Jand'heur 
decision.	 First, the owner or "custodian" 24 (quardien) of a thing is
subjected to what has been regarded successively as a "presumption of
20 Ibid. at pp.157-159; See also, J. Bedour, "Le Risque Juridique de
L'Assurance Automobile: RSflexions sur son Pass‘ et son Avenir", in
ftudes Offertes 1 Monsieur le Professeur A. Besson, 1976, Paris,
p.27 et seq.; F. Desk, op. cit., at pp.275-294; Starting from a very
narrow legal base French judges (like the English judges developing
common law) have built up a theory which the legislator had not
foreseen. They have done this while both respecting the fundamental
principle of the written law and displaying much ingenuity in
adapting the law to new situations: a typical example of how the
courts, even under a code system respond to social change in the
absence of, or delay in, legislative intervention.
21 Cour de cassation, Ch. run., 13 February 1930. D. 1930. 1. 57 (note
Ripert), S. 1930. 1. 121 (note Esmein).
This decision rendered by the highest judicial court in France, in
solemn session of all the chambers sitting en banc became for all
practical purposes, law which in all likelihood will be followed by
the lower courts.
22 Ibid. at p.57.
23 See in French-speaking Cameroon, the decision of the Supreme Court:
Henreiki Michel C. La SociStS Internationale de Transports (S.I.T.)
Arrat No.6 of 6 November 1966, Bulletin des Arr gts de la Cour
Supreme No.15, 1966, 1536 Yaounde.
24 The "custodian" may be the "thing's" owner or another person who has
been entrusted with it and granted broad freedom in its use.
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liability" (pr‘somption de responsabilit(), a presumption of fault (pre 'sompt-
ion de faute) and a "prima facie liability". The expression presently used
by the Cour de Cassation is "responsabilit‘ de plein droit." 25 This suggests
an evolution towards a stricter liability. 26 Second, the "custodian" is
discharged from liability if he can prove that the accident was caused not by
the "thing", for example, a motor vehicle, but by a "foreign cause", which
could neither be foreseen nor avoided. 27 This is usually an act of nature or
of a third person or - as in most cases in which a defence (contributory
negligence) is available - an act of the victim himself. 28 The custodian may
be only partially relieved of liability if the "foreign cause" was not the
25 For example see: Jouffre c. Dame Bouesco et autres, Cour de
cassation (2 Ch. civ.), 16 June, 1965 D.S. 1965. 1. 662.
26 See: Andri Tunc, "Analysis of the French Auto Accident Compensation
System", in Department of Transportation: Automobile Insurance and
Compensation Study, Comparative Studies in Automobile Accident 
Compensation, April 1970 at p.3; A Tunc,	 "Traffic	 Accident
Compensation in France: The	 present law and a Controversial
Proposal", (1966) 79 Marv. L. Rev. 1409 esp. at pp.1412-1413.
27 H. Mazeaud, L. Mazeaud et A. Tunc, op. cit., pp.635-650
28 For further details of this trilogy of causes or concepts, see
F.H.L. Lawson and B.S. Markesinis, Tortious Liability for 
unintentional harm in the Common law and the Civil law, 1982, Vol.I,
Cambridge University Press, pp.126-134.
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sole cause of the damage. 29	In the case of Fetqo Hilaire c. Caillerez 
Franiois 30
 in the French-speaking Cameroon, the fault of the victim (contrib-
utory negligence) was not an unavoidable and unforeseeable act constituting
force maleure to exonerate all responsibility of the other party to the
accident and an apportionment of responsibility was made. But in Egouanq 
Benoit C.	 M.P.	 et Sinon Celli., 31 the court held that the owner of the
vehicle was exonerated from responsibility under article 1384 since there was
proof of a cas fortuit or force majeure which made the accident unforeseeable
and unavoidable.
	
Moreover the accident was caused exclusively by the
victim's gross negligence in suddenly and unexpectedly emerging into the
highway in front of the oncoming vehicle. The court found that the driver
did all that was humanly possible to avoid the accident.
29 Professor Tunc's view is that, after the decision in Jand'heur, the
French courts began to accept that the fault of the victim -
contributory negligence in English law - which did not amount to
force maleure operated to reduce the damage to which the plaintiff
(victim) is entitled under article 1384(1) and hence the respective
and comparative fault of the parties was recognised; See: Mazeaud et
Tunc, op. cit., esp. at pp.642-644. This apportionment of the
damage has been applied to acts of nature, see in France, (1)
Transports maritimes de P(tat c. Veuve Brossette et Bastard es 
qual. (The Lamoriciere decision), Cour de cassation, Ch. civ., sect.
corn., 19 June 1951, (2 arr g ts), D. 1951. 1. 717. (note Ripert) and
also to acts of third persons, see Larribe c. tpoux Saulle et 
demoiselle Boutin, Cour de cassation Ch. civ., 2e sect. civ., 15
January 1960. D. 1961. 1. 681 (note Radouant); Berthier et Caisse 
rgq. de l'Est central c. Veuve Lamende, Cour de cassation, Ch. civ.,
2e sect civ., 17 December 1963. D. 1964. 1. 569 (note Tunc).
30 Arr gt No.9 of 12 October 1965, Bulletin des arrtts de la Cour
Supreme No.13, 1965 Yaounde 1154.
31 Arr gt No.416 of 13 March 1962, Bulletin des arr gts de la Cour
Supreme No.6, 1962 at p.270.
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Since the decision of Jand'heur, article 1384(1) has been applied in
traffic accident cases.
32
	The requirement of proof of fault has been
displaced in many cases by the presumption of liability established by
article 1384(1). This construction by the French courts of the Civil Code
provisions relating to tort liability has been sufficiently favourable to
victims of traffic accidents who have been compensated irrespective of the
fact that there may not have been any negligence whatsoever. The increase in
traffic accidents and advances in technology have influenced the law; and
changes made, indicate that the law is very much a living law in this field.
However, one must not lose sight of Friedmann's comment
33
 that,
"the transformation of a law through judicial lawmaking so as to
adapt	 it to social change, while immensely important, has
inevitably proved inadequate. 	 This is due to a variety of
factors: the chanciness of cases coming up for decision; the ad
hoc character of judicial decisions; the vast differences of
judicial philosophy - varying from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,
from court to court and
	 between the different judges and
altogether the increasing need for a specific regulation of the
legal responsibilities, particularly of industrial enterprises and
motorists towards employees and the public.	 This can be done
effectively only by Statutory and Administrative regulation."
32 Articles 1382 and 1383 apply in traffic accident suits when the
damage results in a penal action as well, for example, breach of
articles 319 and 320 of the Penal Code (the same articles and
provisions are found in the Cameroon Penal Code) which results in
homicide and bodily injuries to the victim. 	 (Interview with
Professors A. Tunc and Besson, Paris, February 1984). In criminal
proceedings the civil remedy of reparation provided by articles 1382
and 1383 is awarded, conforming to article 2 of the Criminal
Procedure Code.
33 W. Friedmann, Law in a changing Society 2nd ed., New York, 1972 at
p.168.
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This comment expresses disenchantment for reform through the courts but
advocates legislative intervention. It is also worth noting that the change
brought about by the French court in interpreting article 1384 of the Civil
Code was a result of a slow evolution which created disparity in judicial
decisions in the same courts and in the various jurisdictions, in line with
Freidmann's comment. 34
As far as English law is concerned, problems such as to whom the driver
owes a duty of care are rarely relevant. 35 The important questions concern
contributory negligence.	 The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945
introduced the principle of apportionment of damages between the plaintiff
and defendant, where the plaintiff has failed to take reasonable precautions
for his own safety in respect of the particular danger which in fact
occurred, so that he thereby contributed to his own injury. 36	In the
English-speaking Eameroon, the 1945 Act is not applicable37 (since it is an
34 See F. Deak, op. cit., pp.271-295.
35 See later discussion on pp.162-166.
36 Froom v. Butcher [1976] Q.B. 286. See: Salmond and Heuston, The Law 
of Torts 18th ed., 1981, London, pp.479-487.
37 Justice Gwamesia in Valenti Domas and others v. Nil Stephen Mbandi,
(1980) Civil suit No. CASWP/25/80 of 20 November 1980, Buea
(Unreported) at p.7, said that "There is no doubt that the question
of contributory negligence does not apply on this side of the
Republic until the laws are harmonised."
this duty is that of a reasonable man. In France and French-speaking39
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enactment after the limiting date of 1900). 	 The 'last opportunity rule'
38
has always been considered and caused the court not to apportion responsibil-
ity.	 In practice, however, insurance companies do seem to arrange to
apportion the liability among themselves.
In England, France as well as in Cameroon, various norms are set up as
an attempt to provide a convenient legal standard for measuring fault. In
England and the English-speaking Cameroon, the standard of care required by
Cameroon, the present tendency is to adopt a comparative standard. In order
to discover whether or not there has been fault, the conduct of the author of
the damage must be measured against an ideal standard, Pased upon the
theoretical conduct of an ordinary person or a bonus pater familias,
411 from
which he ought not to have deviated. This type of ideal individual is called
the bon Ore de famille. L. and H. Mazeaud and Tunc say
41
 fault consists of
"an error of conduct which would not have been committed by a prudent person
placed in the same external circumstances as the person responsible for the
38 The doctrine invented by Salmond in 1912 has also been called, the
"last clear opportunity" or the "last clear chance". He says "Ex
hypothesi in all cases of contributory negligence the defendant has
been guilty of negligence which caused the accident: therefore in
all cases he could by the exercise of reasonable care have avoided
the accident; and therefore ... he is liable notwithstanding the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff. Clearly, therefore,
something more than a mere opportunity of avoiding the accident by
reasonable care is required in order to bring the rule in Davies v. 
Mann into operation .... Subject to certain qualifications it would
seem that the true test is the existence of the last opportunity of
avoiding the accident...." See Salmond and Heuston op. cit., at
p.481.
39 See Anderson B. in Ellvth v. Birmingham Water Works Co., (1856) 11
Ex. 781 at 784.
40 F. Desk, op. cit., at p.271.
41 Trait Th gorique et Pratique de la Responsabilit g Civile, 1970 at
p.434.
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damage." The test thus applied corresponds to the "reasonable man test" of
English law. The judge in deciding if there has been fault asks himself what
would have been the attitude or reaction of the bon Ore de famille. If he
considers the bon Ore de famille would have acted in the same way, he will
decide that the tortfeaser was not at fault and should not incur legal
liability.	 Similarly, as in English law, the existence of a breach of duty
is tested by an objective standard; a defendant is not relieved by proof that
his behaviour did not deviate from his own norm. The context of the standard
common law duty is invariable - the actor must behave as a reasonable man in
the objective behaviourial context.
In England and Cameroon the burden of proving fault rests with the
plaintiff.	 In England and the English-speaking Cameroon there are in the
practice of the courts certain principles which assist the plaintiff to
discharge this burden. The plaintiff may plead res ipsa loquitur (the facts
speak for themselves). It must be remembered that 'the res' can only speak
so as to throw the inference of fault on the defendant in cases where the
exact cause of the accident is unexplained.
42
However, if the facts of an
accident are sufficiently known to enable the issue of negligence to be
determined, then it ceases to be a case of res ipsa loquitur
43
and the
solution must be found whether, on the facts as established, negligence is to
42 Where this maxim applies the plaintiff is entitled to rely upon the
mere happening of the accident as evidence of negligence.
43 For a case in the English-speaking Cameroon in which res ipsa 
loquitur was not applicable, see William and others v. Nlie and La 
FoncAre Assurance, (1975) Appeal No. CASWP/21/75, Buea (Unreported)
1975. See further discussion of this principle in T. Ellis Lewis,
"A Ramble with Res Ipsa Lopuitur", (1951) 11 C.L.J. 74; D.P.
O'Connell, "Res Ipsa Loquitur: The Australian Experience", (1954)
C.L.J. 118-132.
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be inferred or not. The scope of application of the maxim in English law was
laid down by Erle C.J. in Scott v. London and St. Katherine Docks Co., 44
"There must be reasonable evidence of negligence.
But where the thing is shewn to be under the management of
the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose
from want of care."
This wording thus suggests an immediate analogy with the French-speaking
Cameroonian law relating to damage done by a thing under the defendant's
control - a person is presumed liable for damage caused by things under his
'control'. 45 Nevertheless there is no similarity between the common law
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and the French doctrine of presumption of fault
Or presumption of liability. 46 The presumption of fault raised by article
1384 against the owner of a thing causing damage does not mean a true
presumption which can be rebutted by the defendant by proving that he was not
44 (1865) 3 H & C 596 at 601; See also Barkway v. South Wales Transport 
Co., [1948] 2 All E.R. 460 at 471 per Asquith L.J. The Barkway case
was relied on and applied by the courts in the English-speaking
Cameroon in Mbu v. Walla and Royal Exchange Assurance Co., (1973)
Suit No. WC/35/72 of 10 July 1973, Buea (Unreported), even though it
was decided after 1900, the reception date of the reception of
English law, but as we have seen supra, pp.13 and 29-30, the courts
in English-speaking Cameroon constantly cite and rely on English
decisions well after 1900.
45 See in French-speaking Cameroon: Olobo Mathien c. M.P. and Nqoro 
Eboqo Daniel, Arrgt No.287 of July 1975, Bulletin des arrAts de la
Cour Supr gme No.33 1975 Yaounde.
46 See Crabb, "Res Ipsa Loquitur and Article 1384 of the French Civil
Code", (1962)4 Inter. Am. L. Rev. 256; Also see F. Desk, op. cit.,
at p.278.
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negligent (or at fault). In the language of the Cour de cassation in the
Jand'heur 47 case the presumption of liability cannot be rebutted except by
proving force maieure or an unforeseen event (cas fortuit) or a cause not
imputable to the person presumed liable - for example contributory negligence
or the fault of a third party. 	 Consequently, presumption of fault or
liability is a rule of substantive law imposing liability regardless of
fault. This has a much more far reaching effect than res ipsa loquitur. 	 In
contrast, the presumption raised by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a
procedural device which operates to shift the burden of going forward with
the evidence 48 - the defendant would not be liable if the evidence shows that
he was not at fault.
The application of the doctrine to traffic accidents, however, is of
considerable importance. Many accidents occur in a split second, leaving the
facts in doubt. The maxim is commonly applied in three types of case : those
in which damage is caused to a passenger, or to a pedestrian on a pavement,
or to a stationary vehicle. One of the earliest cases in which a motorist
was held to have sufficient control over his vehicle to attract the
application of the maxim was Halliwell v. Venables.
49
The defendant was
driving a sports car along a broad road on a dry night. There was no other
47 It is significant to note that the Cour de Cassation spoke of
presumption of liability (prgsomption de responsabilitd) instead of
the traditional presumption of fault, (prdsomption de faute) based
on the idea of risk created.
48 Bohlen, "The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the
Burden of Proof". (1919) 68 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 307; The presumption
of fault (prgsomption de faute) often referred to by writers in
relation to article 1384 is misleading. The true presumption which
results in shifting the burden of proof (renversement de la charge 
de la preuve) akin to that known to the common law jurisdictions
also exists in French jurisprudence.
49 (1930) 99 L.J.K.B. 353.
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traffic about the road. After a slight bend the car turned over and bounced
along the road. The defendant admitted that his speed was about thirty-five
miles per hour and that he was driving with only one hand on the steering
wheel, as was his usual practice. 	 It was held that in the absence of a
reasonable explanation by the defendant, the widow of a deceased passenger
could rely on the facts as evidence of negligence. In Ellor v. Selfridge and 
Co. Ltd., 50
 the defendant's vehicle mounted a pavement and knocked down the
plaintiff. The defendant offered no evidence and so the plaintiff was
awarded damages.	 There is some controversy amongst jurists as to the
strength of the presumption of negligence raised by the application of the
maxim res ipsa loquitur. 	 Some jurists suggest that the defendant must
positively disprove negligence; others say he need only adduce evidence which
produces a reasonable explanation of how the accident may have occurred
without negligence.
51
The cases do not appear to follow a clear principle
and judicial pronouncements in support of either view may be found. 52 The
tendency exhibited in later traffic accident cases
53
 is to favour the first
view, that is, to require the defendant to satisfy the court that he did not
act negligently. It is submitted that this is fair, for the defendant must
50 (1930) 46 T.L.R. 236; See also McGowan v. Stott (1930) 99 L.J.K.B.
357n.
51 T. Ellis-Lewis, "A Ramble with Res Ipsa Loquitur", (1951) 11 C.L.J.
74; D.P. O'Connell, "Res Ipsa Loquitur", (1954) C.L.J. 118; G.H.L.
Fridman, "The Myth of Res Ipsa Loquitur", (1953-54) 10 Univ. of
Toronto L.J. 233.
52 See, for example, Lord Loreburn L.C. in Angus v. London, Tilbury, 
and Southend Railway Co. (1906) 22 T.L.R. 222 at 223 in favour of
the first view and Lord Dunedin in Ballard v. North British Railway 
Co., (1923) S.C. 43 at 54 in favour of the second view. Although
the latter was dissenting, his view was approved by Willmer J. in
The Aralia (1949) 82 LI.L.R. 884 at 887.
53 Ludgate V. Lovett [1969] 2 All E.R. 1275 at 1277; Henderson v. 
Jenkins (Henry E.) & Sons Ltd. [1969] 3 All E.R. 756.
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be assumed to have exclusive knowledge of the facts bearing on causation as
the vehicle is in his control.
In France and French-speaking Cameroon the action under article 1384
has been developed to ensure that in most cases, the victims of the accidents
have the right to compensation - all that is required is that damage has been
caused by the action of a thing in the control of the defendant. A victim
may avoid the difficulty of proving fault by relying on article 1384(1). The
presumption of liability operates to the benefit of every person who suffers
damage whether in his person or in his property. 	 In the case of damage
caused by automobiles, it operates to the benefit of pedestrians as well as
of persons in another vehicle.
	
In the case of collision between two
vehicles, in the absence of fault shown on the part of the one or the other
of the operators the court 54 maintains the presumption of liability as
regards each of the custodians and holds him liable for the damage suffered
by the other vehicle or its occupants.	 The court may consider the
presumption inversely as annulling its liability or may cumulate the damages
so as to apportion the responsibility between the two custodians. 55
The difference between the French-speaking Cameroonian law of civil
liability and torts known to the common law as found in England and the
English-speaking Cameroonian law is that the former system, unlike the
latter, has a single definition of which the constant features are damage and
causation. A third feature, fault, is more or less necessary according to
54 See, in the French-speaking Cameroon, Sime Fglix, Cooplabam, 
Lartique Roger and A. Michel c. Lartique Roger, A. Michel, Sime
Felix and Cooplabam, Arrgt No.123 of 18 May 4.965, Bulletin des
arrets de la Cour Supreme, No.12, 1965, Yaounde 1001 at p.1002.
55 La Societe S.A.C.A.F.O.M. and Tamo Martin c. Omqba Christophe, Arrgt
No.56 of 13 December 1966, Bulletin des arr gts de la Cour Supr gme, .
No.15, 1966, Yaounde p.1469.
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the different cases and more or less easy to establish in the courts. One
observation that can be drawn from our discussion so far is that the French-
speaking Cameroonian practice stands between a system of liability based on
the behaviour of the parties and a system of liability disregarding behaviour
and would, thus, move from liability based on no liability without fault to
no fault liability, if this process of interpretation continues.
	
	
In
-
contrast, under England and the English-speaking -Cameroonian law, negligence
must be proved in every case.
In Cameroon,
56
 even where the basis of liability is still technically
fault the requirement is easily satisfied, for example by proof of a breach
of one of the regulations laid down in the Highway Code, (Code de la Route).
The courts take the view that negligence is presumed (and even established)
against anyone who violates a traffic statute. In Dame Watine and Watinee
Gonzaque c. Kona Joseph,
57 
a case in the French-speaking Cameroon, the Court
decided that breach of article 40 of the Code de la route demonstrated
negligence and imprudence under article 1382 and 1383 of the Civil Code.
Also in Valentin Domes and others v. N.ii Stephen Mbandi, 58 a decision in the
56 In Cameroon, note that the law applies to both French-speaking and
English-speaking Cameroon.
57 Arr gt No.48 of 6 December, 1966, Bulletin des arr gts de la Cour
Supreme, No.15, 1966, 1467, Yaounde. See also Balep Bissai Molse c. 
Perrussel Pierre, (1966) Arr gt No.54 of 13 December 1966, Bulletin
des arr gts de la Cour Supreme No.15, 1966, 1467, Yaounde.
58 Civil Suit No. CASWP/52/80 of 20 November 1980, Buea (Unreported) at
p.7. For a corresponding decision in French-speaking Cameroon, on
similar facts see S.Y. Henq and others c. M.P. Bonda Joseph, (1969)
Arr gt No.130 of 4 March, 1969, Bulletin des arrets de la Cour
Suprgme No.20, Yaounde, 1969, pp.2360-2362.
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English-speaking Cameroon Justice Gwamesia said that;
"It is a principle of law as laid down by the Highway Code and
Regulations that any driver emerging from a side road has the duty
to stop before entering the major road. Since there was proof
that the first defendant never stopped at the junction next to the
Figara Night Club before swerving towards Bokwango, there is no
doubt that there was a breach of that duty, and she has to bear
its attendant consequences."
A different approach is adopted in England.	 The highway code is not binding
as a statutory regulation; it is only a set of directions for the guidance of
persons using roads made under statutory authority by the Ministry of
Transport and as such a document which may be regarded as information and
advice to drivers. Section 37 of the Road Traffic Act 1972 provides that a
failure to observe any provision of the Highway Code may in any civil
proceedings be relied upon by any party to the proceedings as tending to
establish or negative any liability which is in question in those proceedings
and in Croston v. Vaugham, 59 Greer L.J. said "... it does not follow that, if
they fail to carry out any provision of the Highway Code, they are	 I
necessarily negligent."	 Apart from the Highway Code, there are innumerable
statutory provisions concerning road traffic in England, for example, on the
construction and use of vehicles and traffic infringements. When violations
of statutes of this nature are held tortious in England, this is because
English law recognises a tort quite independent of negligence - the action
for breach of statutory duty.
The shortcomings of the tort system in providing compensation to
victims of road accidents have been due to the role of fault in the
59 [1938] 1.K.B. 540 at 557.
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determination of lia bility.	 The need of the injured person to assert both
that another was at fault in causing the accident and that he himself was
legally blameless Confronts the victim of a traffic accident with severe
problems of proof. 59A Delay is another factor that causes dissatisfaction
with the legal sys tem. 59B
	Often justice delayed is justice denied.
Nevertheless delay can be justifiable, 59C
 but can often aggravate pressure on
the plaintiff to settle prematurely.
	
The problem of delay is also
experienced in Cameroon. In the course of field work,
60
 it was observed that
the Kumba High Court is reputed for delay in accident claims cases. There
was a backlog of automobile personal injury cases going as far back as 1976.
In response to an inquiry as to the reasons for this accumulation of 'running
down' cases, most of the judges and counsel said that the High Court sits
during assizes and priority is given to criminal suits. They further
remarked that, even when the court sits to dispose of the civil suits on road
traffic cases, the trial takes a long period of time to be settled -
sometimes more than three years.
59A For an elaborate discussion of this see, R.E. Keeton and J.
O'Connell, Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim: A Blueprint for 
Reforming Automobile Insurance, 1965, Little, Brown and Co., Boston,
pp.18-19; Pearson, op. cit., at p.210; Conard et. al., Automobile 
Costs and Payments: Studies in the Economics of Injury Reparation,
1964, University of Michigan Press, p.149 Table 4-11. See also the
case of Snelling v. Whitehead, The Times, 31 July 1975.
59B Pearson, op. cit., at p.211.
59C It may be in the plaintiff's own interest that the case should not
be settled before his medical condition has sufficiently stabilised
to allow a proper prognosis; and a quick settlement may well result
in less compensation being paid. However, in England, see section 6
of the Administration of Justice Act 1982, infra., p.172 and note
70.
60 Research carried out from October 1980 - November 1981 and June 1983
- September 1983.
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The operation of the tort system is excessively expensive.
61
 To some
extent costs of administration are part of the inescapable burden which
account for 45 per cent of the total cost of determination of liability and
compensation for road traffic accident injuries. 62
	Because of the role of
fault in the present system, contests over the intricate details of accidents
are routine.	 In cases of relatively modest injury, the expense of the
contest often exceeds the amount claimed as compensation. All this expense
is added to automobile insurance costs and borne by the motoring community
through increases in insurance premiums. Thus it is argued that such moneys
could be devoted to extending the scope of compensation without proof of
fault. The tort system is sometimes difficult for the injured persons to
understand and operate and they usually need the advice of solicitors.
Ignorance accounts for a majority of cases in which civil suits are not
instituted in the courts.
63
This lack of awareness or consciousness of
bringing of suits or redressing a wrong through the courts is prevalent in
Cameroonian society. Here there are still many poorly educated and semi-
illiterate people. Many of these know nothing about legal aid or solicitors
and they think of the law (if at all) as something meted out by magistrates
(that is, the criminal law). 	 Again, in Cameroon, legal aid is very
restricted; it is mainly recognised in criminal actions and not generous as
regards civil actions. Until quite recently in Cameroon, very few personal
injury or death claims were made. In the rural areas there used to be a
strong moral and religious objection to the practice of "making money" out of
61 See Conard et. al., op. cit., esp. chap. 4 pp.137-180.
62 Pearson, op. cit., at p.211.
63 See: Abel-Smith Zander and Brooke, Legal Problems and the Citizen,
London, 1973, pp.169-178 and 183-185.
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an accident. In the early days of motor insurance it might have been consid-
ered immoral and a disservice to the memory of the dead for a person to claim
money from an insurance company in respect of his deceased relation. Anthro-
pologists have shown" that, in the early days religion and ethics provided a
symbolic system of supernatural rewards and reinforced adherence to approved
norms of social behaviour in tribal societies. Religion acted as a mode of
social control. However, with time, societies, through interaction and
learning from other societies' experience, undergo a process of change. Such
change may also be a reflection of the pressure brought upon it by social and
economic conditions. These factors may affect other means of social control
such as custom, mores, convention and religion; which may then cease to be
the primary mode of control. Further as the society acquires wealth and
awareness of living conditions (in this case even the realisation of the
existence of insurance companies) a new type of sanction may be provided for
the infraction of a legal rule, namely, the requirement to make reparation or
payment of compensation to the injured party. The psychological basis of the
desire to make reparation wrought as a consequence of breaking a rule of
conduct is said to be out of a sense of guilt. When a violator of a valued
norm is subjected to a sanctioning process of a retributive or reparational
character, then law and legal institutions emerge as a regulatory machinery.
It may therefore be suggested that religious stands and moral beliefs
loosened their impact and were no longer strongly held. The demands and
64 Kenneth S. Carlston, Social Theory and African Tribal Organisation: 
the development of Socio-legal Theory, 1969, Chicago; Witchcraft may
be said to have played a part in people not bringing unexplained
accidents for trial. In Cameroon, this notion called 'Nvongo' is
often spoken of today in common parlance as reasons for not
instituting suits.	 When someone dies in a sudden and unexpected
accident, others say, his father or uncle has given him up to the .
'gods' as a form of some sacrifice or reward.
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needs of Cameroonian society brought an awareness that people should compens-
ate for their wrongful acts. 	 Thus there was a reaction within Cameroonian
society analogous to the changing attitude of the courts in France towards
the interpretation of article 1384 of the Civil Code (an enactment of 1806
made in the horse and buggy age and subsequently found to be inappropriate to
serve the demands of the public as a result of mechanisation and industrial-
isation).
The textual criticisms of the fault principle - the law and its
administration - has posed and is posing a social problem in this field of
our study and has been recognised by many 65 as unfair, lacking in certainty
and no longer adequate. 	 In an attempt to encapsulate the criticisms which
have so far been levelled against the tort system Professor Keeton and
O'Connell write of the present system
"It provides too little too late, unfairly allocated, at wasteful
cost, and through means that promote dishonesty and disrespect for
law. .66
It seems appropriate to note that delictual actions were more closely linked
with the idea of vengeance than with that of reparation for the damage
65 Leonard M. Ring, "No-Fault Auto Insurance: Hoax or Cure?", (1971) 52
Chicago Bar record, 451-459; In France: A Tunc, "Les Problemes
Contemporains de la Responsabilit g Civile Dglictuelle", (1967) 19
Rev. Int. Dr. Comp. 757-777; Tunc, "The Twentieth Century
Development and Function of the Law of Torts in France", (1965) 14
I.C.L.Q. 1089-1102; In England see: Gray, "Liability for Highway
Accidents", (1964) 17 Cur. Leg. Prob. 127; H. Street, "The Twentieth
Century Development and Function of the Law of Tort in England",
(1965) 14 I.C.L.Q. 862-877.
66 Keeton and O'Connell, op. cit., at p.3.
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suffered - they gave rise to penalties. 67
	However, in all modern societies
these penalties have been abandoned in favour of individual assessment of
damages and it has now been recognised that the function of an award of
damages is compensation and not punishment. 68 The courts in the English and
French-speaking Cameroon acknowledge these principles.
69
It may therefore be
recognised that, the overall aim and objective of tort law is similar in
England and Cameroon.
Traffic accidents all too frequently result in personal injury, death
and damage to property. 	 The position with regard to the assessment of
damages differs in each of these cases which must he tosNsidemeh seriatim.
The differences in the assessment of damages as will be observed are matters
of detail and are due to the methods or approaches adopted in the two
countries under consideration. In this work, for reasons of space as much as
relevance, we will limit our discussion of the assessment of damages only in
so far as it reveals the differences in application of the law and ay
weaknesses that may be found. In the case of personal injury, damages are
67 Salmond and Heuston, The Law of Torts, 18th ed., 1981, pp-1,9-21;
Glanville Williams, "The Aims of the Law of Tort", (1951) 4 Curr.
Leg. Prob. 137 et seq., stating the raison d'gtre of the Law of
Tort; J.A. Jolowicz, "Liability for Accidents" (1968) C.L.J. 50 at
55 et seq. 
68 See, for example, Lord Goddard in British Transport Commission v. 
Gourley A.C. 185 at 208; and also, Lord Denning in Browning v. War 
Office [1963] 1 Q.B. 750 at 758; Viscount Dunedin in Admiralty 
Commissioners v. S.S. Valeria [1922] A.C. 242 at 248.
69 See the case of Emmanuel Aqu Ukpai and S.O.R.A.R.A.F. Compaqnie 
Ggngral d'Assurance v. Regina A. Fonqkwa & 7 others, (1975) Civil
Appeal No. CASWP/16/75, Buea (Unreported) where Justice Inglis cited
Viscount Dunedin in Admiralty Commissioners v. S.S. Valeria [1922]
A.C. 242. In much similar terms, Max Le Roy stated the French
principle of assessing damages: M. Le Roy, "Bases Juridiques de la
reparation du dommage corporel en droit commun", in Le Concours 
M6dical, documentation professionelle permanente (1982) No.7,
February Issue, at p.7. Compare with Viscount Dunedin in Admiralty 
Commissioners v. S.S. Valeria [1922] A.C. 242 at 248.
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awarded for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss. 	 These heads of damages
are common in England and Cameroon but there are variations in the mode of
assessment. The victim is entitled to recover all expenses he is put to as a
result of his injuries. This includes loss of earnings and medical expenses.
The victim's incapacity may not have ceased prior to the trial, in which case
the court will need to estimate its duration from the evidence of medical
experts. In England, section 6 of the Administration of Justice Act 1982 has
vested a new power in the High Court to make declaratory judgments to enable
damages in a personal injuries action to be assessed on the basis that the
plaintiff will not suffer at some future time serious deterioration in his
physical and mental condition, or develop some serious disease. 	 If,
therefore, either eventuality does occur the case can be re-opened and
further compensation may be granted.
70
This approach is similar to that in
the French-speaking part of Cameroon where a provisional payment is made if
the victim has not recovered and started working. In contrast, in the
English-speaking part of Cameroon, only lump sums are awarded after judgment.
The periodic payment seems a desirable form of compensation, as it takes
70 This section stems from the majority recommendation of the Pearson
Royal Commission in 1978 that provision should be made for damages
in the form of periodic payments for claims of 'serious and lasting
injury which affect earning capacity or otherwise cause substantial
pecuniary loss'. See: Pearson, op. cit., Vol.1, para.584. For
further discussion on this see, Kenneth Cannar, "Legal pot-pourri
and law change", Post Magazine and Insurance Monitor, 4 July 1985,
Vol.146 No.27 p.1748; "Judgment for better damages", Post Magazine
and Insurance Monitor, 18 July 1985, Vol.146 No.29 pp.1904-1905;
Richard James and John Molesey, "A second bite at the cherry", Post
Magazine and Insurance Monitor, 24 October 1985, Vol.146 No.43
pp.2951-2952; For an academic discussion see, Winfield and Jolowicz,
On Tort, 12th ed. by W.V.H. Rogers, 1984 London, Sweet & Maxwell,
pp.613, 631-632.
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account of the period of recovery or deterioration of health. 7 ° A
 Furthermore
it is a fle x ible method during periods of inflation.78
In England, the position with regard to death of the victim, is
governed bY the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 as amended by section 3 of the
Administration of Justice Act 1982 and the Law Reform (Miscellaneous)
Provisions Act 1971. In the English-speaking part of Cameroon only the Fatal
Accidents Act of 1846 is applicable.
71
The claim here is for lost dependency
by certain relatives of the deceased.	 In the French-speaking part of
Cameroon, the action for death or fatal accident is founded on article 1382
of the Civil Code. The most important claim here is for prejudice moral 
which is similar to the English award for bereavement. The dependents of the
deceased also have a right to claim for their loss dependency as in English
law.	 The assessment of damages is within the discretion of the judge.
72
It
is not clear what principles actually guide the courts in Cameroon in
determining the sum which has to be paid out. There are no tables to provide
any guidance such as exist in France and England. There are isolated cases
70A Nevertheless, it is to be expected that where periodic payments are
being made, there will be those victims who will not be quite so
anxious to resume their employment, for example, back injuries, and
this might worsen the position of the insurance company.
70B Payments can be inflation-proofed by annual reviews which would keep
them in line with average earnings: see, Pearson op. cit., Vol.1
para.,586.
71 Cathalina Shu and others v. K. Okeke, 	 (1962) W.C. [14] 1962 West
Cameroon Law Report (1962-1964) at p.6.
72 Mbida Thomas c. M.P. et Mbana Beni:ion° Lucas, (1982) Arr gt No.206 of
24 April 1975, Bulletin des arr gts de la Cour Supr gme, No.32 Yaounde
1982, pp.4672-4673.
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in which the judges in the English-speaking part of Cameroon, refer to Kemp
and Kemp, 73
 which has to a great extent created some uniformity in judicial
decisions in England. This table is hardly relevant to the Cameroon courts
as factors such as age, standard of living conditions, wages or salaries
differ greatly from that in England. Moreover, even though the English-
speaking part of Cameroon follows Common Law principles and statutes before
1900, recognition ought to be given to local circumstances 74
 which in this
regard may affect the judges' discretion on awards.
	 For example, in
Cameroon, as a result of the extended family structure, a wide range of
persons has been construed by the courts to de the 'near relatives' of
deceased and invariably are eligible to claim as dependents. Often this
claim could be extensive. 75
	In the English-speaking Cameroon counsel 76
73 Kemp & Kemp, On the quantum of damages in personal injury and fatal 
accident claims, 4th ed., by Derrick Turriff et. al. Vol.2 Law and 
Practices: Personal injury reports, 1975, London, Sweet & Maxwell;
Harvey McGregor, On Damages, (Common Law Library No.9) 14th ed.,
1980, London, Sweet & Maxwell. See the case of Margaret Scott v. 
Jude Osuiu & others and Mutuelle Aqricole Assurance, (1976) Suit No.
H.C.S.W./18/74, of 4 June 1976, Buea (Unreported), in Cameroon. In
England, see comment by Lord Parker of Waddington, "Compensation for
Accidents on the road", (1965) 18 Curr. Leg. Prob. 1 at 4. He
remarked that there is a very substantial degree of uniformity not
merely between the judges themselves, but between the judges and the
Bar and the legal advisers. This may be supported by the fact that
in England, it is not uncommon to find after judgment that the
amount paid into court is only slightly less than that awarded by
the judge.
74 Note, the discussion in the introduction to this work, supra. pp.4,
32-34 and further, see infra, p.482 for Lord Denning's remarks on
this point. Perhaps the task of deciding issues on the award of
damages would have been simplified if there existed a systematic
form of law reporting, see criticisms and proposals discussed in the
introductory and concluding chapters of this study, supra., p.23 and
infra., p.507 respectively.
75 See, for example, a case cited below at p.182.
76 See Gorji Dinka, counsel for the plaintiffs in Regina A. Fonqkwa & -
others v. E.A. Ukpai & S.O.R.A.R.A.F. Compaqnie Ggn6ral d'Assurance,
(1971) Suit No. WC/47/71 Buea 1971 (Unreported).
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often seek to refer to awards in the French-speaking Cameroon, where awards
are normally very high to provide some basis for comparison. This measure
alone cannot create uniformity in judicial decisions. 	 It is desirable to
construct a table such as obtains in France or work out some guiding
principles based on our local conditions for the use of judges and
practitioners to assist them in their pleadings.
In relation to property damage, the 	 role of tort law may be
supplementary to that of private insurance in England and Cameroon. 77 It is
arguable that fault is here a less suitable determinant of liability than in
personal injury cases. Indeed, the insured can normally claim on the policy
even if the property was damaged through his own negligence, but not his own
deliberate act.
78
Loss insurance in both countries under consideration
entitles the insured to claim from his insurer the cost of repairs should his
vehicle be damaged and this is assessed by obtaining garage bills. Where the
vehicle becomes a "write off" a claim is made on the value of the vehicle.
77 This is "loss" or "first party" insurance under which the owner of
property, in the case of motor insurance, the vehicle and its
contents obtains cover against loss or damage to the vehicle for
risks described in the policy such as fire and theft, whether or not
the loss occurs through the fault of any person.
78 Note, however, that policy terms requiring the insured to take
reasonable	 care	 (for	 example,	 see	 Fraser	 v.	 Furman 
(B.N.)(Productions), [1967] 1 W.L.R. 898 a case of liability
insurance) to avoid accidents or to maintain the vehicle in a
roadworthy condition, may have the effect of avoiding the insurer's
liability where the insured has been negligent: see Chapter Seven,
p.428.
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This is normally in England and the English-speaking Cameroon, the market
value or, in French-speaking Cameroon, the valeur vna1e, of the vehicle
before the accident.	 The prevalence, therefore, of loss insurance removes
most vehicle owners' incentives to litigate.
79
	Further, the existence of
"knock for knock" 80 agreements in England and similar agreements in France
and Cameroon renders the pursuit of claims in relation to property damage a
wasteful and expensive exercise, as insurers agree amongst themselves to bear
the loss in respect of the vehicle they insure. The observations made in
this section reveal the disparity in the existing law of Cameroon as between
the English-speaking and French-speaking Cameroon.
81
This, as we have seen,
results in different substantive laws and procedure being applied by the
courts in the two sectors. The requirement to prove fault and the rather
modest mode of assessment of damages in the English-speaking Cameroon,
together with the adversary nature of trial proceedings, result in lower
awards of damages being made to victims in this part of Cameroon than in the
French-speaking Cameroon. It is the purpose of this thesis to reveal such
79 However, it is likely that with the implementation of Article 1 of
E.E.C. Directive No. 84/5/EEC : Second Council Directive of 30
December 1983 on the approximation of the laws of the ' Member States
relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use
of motor vehicles (0.3. 1984), L8/17) requiring compulsory insurance
with respect to property damage, there will be potential heavy
claims. Property damage might be widely defined to include roads,
bridges and consequential loss. 	 See further, Department of
Transport Consultative Document, Giving effect to the Second 
European Community motor insurance Directive, 1984, paras. 4.2 and
4.9 which proposes to deal with damage to roads and bridges by
exclusions in insurance policies. A separate insurance cover is
necessary to cover such losses. Damage caused by impact arising
from the negligence of the driver is covered by the normal motor
insurance policy.
80 See later for a discussion on the methods of accelerating settlement
of claims in relation to property damage pp.464-475.
81 For other areas revealing this disparity in the law, see further,
Chapter Five, pp.309-357 and Chapter Seven, pp.416-439 of this work.
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discrepancies and, in the pursuit of reform, proposals will be made in
Chapter Nine to harmonise the laws. It is hoped that this inspiration will
prompt reform in the law to eliminate the differential treatment of the
citizens of Cameroon presently subject to two systems of laws.
The effect of liability insurance.
The growth of liability insurance and the realisation that losses can
be borne by an anonymous body - an insurance company - have to some extent
changed the nature of liability and affected the assessment of damages.	 The
importance of economic and social factors in shaping and changing some of the
rules on civil liability should not be underestimated.
It has also been suggested
82
that legal rules have been 'invisibly'
affected	 by	 the	 existence	 of	 insurance.	 In England, statutory
modifications
83
 such as the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930
and the provisions of the Road Traffic Act 1972 recognise that the purpose of
liability insurance is to protect the accident victim. Section 149 of the
Road Traffic Act 1972 and the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act
1930 concern the possibility of bankruptcy on the part of the defendant and
therefore, provide a direct right of action by third parties against insurers
which is only applicable on the bankruptcy of the insured. 	 Further,
extensions in the coverage of insurance policies have also influenced the
82 P.S. Atiyah, "Res Ipsa Lowitur in England and Australia", (1972) 35
M.L.R. 337; Accident Compensation and the Law, 3rd ed., 1980,
London, pp.270-285; Fleming James, J.R. "Accident Liability
Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance", (1948) 57 Yale
L.J. 549 at 552; Jaffe, "Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of
Insurance", (1953) 18 Law & Contemp. Prob. 219-212. Henry Ussing,
"The Scandinavian Law of Torts: Impact of Insurance on Tort Law",
(1952) 1 Am. J. Comp. L. 359 et seq., Frank P. Grad, "Recent
Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation", (1950) 50 Columb.
L.R. 300-330.
83 For a discussion of these, see infra., pp.208, 211 and 215.
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effectiveness of present tort liability. Medical payment provisions enure to
the benefit of the victim without regard to fault, and because of conditions
in the policy do not affect the rights of the accident victim.
Similarly, in Cameroon, that is, in both English and French-speaking
Cameroon, this direct right of action against the insurance company was
enacted by article 4(3) of Law N o. 65-LF-9 of 22 May 1965 relating to
compulsory third party motor vehicle insurance. 	 This allows the victim to
sue the tortfeasor's liability insurer directly, sometimes without even
joining the individual tortfeasor. 84 Normally the tortfeasor does not bear
any part of the judgment and has no interest in the litigation, rather the
victim and the insurer alone are interested parties. 85 The resulting benefit
is not solely procedural.	 The victim's right against the insurer is not
defeated by any breach of the insurance contract by the tortfeasor.
86
In effect, the presence of the insurance company shields the actual
defendant - the tortfeasor from bearing any civil liability which result from
.	 87
his acts.	 The word "liability" therefore becomes entirely misleading 	 as
the consequences or liability for the damage are borne directly by the
insurer, and eventually by vehicle owners collectively. Civil liability is
only a screen.	 Liability insurers thus become managers in charge of risks
84 See, for example, in English-speaking Cameroon, the case of Mange W. 
Ndikum and G. Mukonq v. S.O.C.A.R., (1979) Suit No. HCB/4/78 of 24
January 1979, Buea (Unreported), where only the insurance company
was sued. In some cases the insurance company is joined as a party
to the proceedings. See, for example, Fomekonq Jean v. Daniel Mba, 
Atanqa Wanka and Agence G6n6ral Groupement Fran3ais. d'Assurance,
(1976) Suit No. HCB/12/74 of 18 June, 1976, Bamenda (Unreported).
85 See G. Viney, Le D6clin de la Responsabilit6 Individuelle, 1964,
Paris, L.G.D.J.
86 Article 53 of the Law of 13 July 1930.
87 The word applies to someone who is at fault and will have to bear
the consequences.
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created by their clients. 	 In French-speaking Cameroon, together with the
strict liability of article 1384
88
 and the authority of the Code de la 
Route,
89
 the question of 'whose fault was it that the damage occurred' has
perhaps been replaced by 'at whose risk is the damage'.
In England, the principle of no liability without fault still dominates
judicial expressions. However, a subsurface encroachment upon the principle
Is apparent, even though such deviations in practice are largely concealed in
judicial opinions. 90	While, we may concede that the existence of insurance
Is not of itself a reason for imposing liability, one may suggest that it
does add "a little extra tensile strength" to the chain which binds a
tortfeaser to his responsibilities.
91
	The conversion from 'fault' to
negligence without fault through the res ipsa loquitur doctrine
92
 which
reverses the burden of proof for unexplained accidents on those whose
activities cause them, permits some of the benefits of insurance in the case
of many more claims. Judges have denied that any hardship can be done to a
defendant by observing that he (the defendant) could have insured against
liability.	 In 1778, Lord Mansfield
93
 justified the imposition of vicarious
liability on a sheriff for the acts of his officer by observing that it was
88 Supra, pp.152-155.
89 Supra, pp.165-166.
90 See for example, Morgans v. Launchbury [1973] A.C. 127 at 135-
137.611, per Lord Wilberforce; Viscount Simonds in Lister v. Romford 
Ice and Cold Storage Co. Ltd. [1957] A.C. 555 at 577.
91 White v. Blackmore [1972] 2 Q.B. 651 at 668.
92 See Supra., pp.160-161.
93 In the case of Ackworth v. Kempe (1778) 1 Doug K.B. 40; See also
Lord MacNaghten in Lloyd v. Grace Smith & Co. [1912] A.C. 716.
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possible and common for a sheriff to protect himself against such liability
by obtaining an employee's fidelity bond - a species of liability insurance.
The tendency to objectivize the standard of care and to ignore the personal
characteristics of the defendant especially in the case of learner drivers
94
displays an anti-defendant attitude which may also have been influenced by
insurance considerations.	 Furthermore, the fact that more subjective
considerations are taken into account in deciding questionsof contributory
negligence than in deciding questions of negligence suggests that liability
insurance, is exerting some influence on these issues. In addition in cases
In which a trivial act of negligence has resulted fortuitously in serious
personal injury, the courts seem to be 'bending' the law in the direction of
the plaintiff. 95 This can hardly be pure coincidence.
In legal theory in England, the accident victim can only sue the
individual person responsible for the accident or the employer of the
tortfeasor. He does not in law sue the defendant's insurance company.
Traditionally it was considered improper to inform the court that a defendant
was insured.
96
 This is now regarded as an "old fashioned rule".
98
 Such a
recognition is inevitable in the case of motor vehicle insurance where
everyone knows that liability in respect to third parties is rendered
compulsory by the Road Traffic Act 1972. 	 Now that passenger insurance has
been made compulsory there is no reason in law for one member of the family
94 Nettleship v. Weston [1971] 2 Q.B. 691.
95 Robinson v. Post Office [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1176; op. cit. at p.227; See
also, P.S. Atiyah op. cit., at 227.
96 Davie v. New Merton Board Mills Ltd. [1959] A.C. 604, at 627.
97 Morey v. Woodfield [1964] 1 Q.B. 1.
98 Post Office v. Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd. [1967] 2
Q.B. 363 at 368; Morgans v. Launchbury [1973] A.C. 127.
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recovering damages against the other since the damages will eventually have
to be paid by an insurance company. Lord Denning has been particularly prone
to bring the insurance issue into the open in discussing points of law.
99
In Skelton v. Collins,
100 
Windeyer J. said insurance has given "a new
horizon to damages." As Atiyah has observed : 101
"It can hardly be supposed that judges would be habitually awarding
thousands of pounds in damages without a thought for the effect of
such awards on the defendant if they did not appreciate that the
damages would not be paid by the defendants themselves."
Indeed, judges have expressed fears that damages might become excessively
high with the result that insurance premiums would become so exorbitant that
business would become impossible,
102
 and small insurance companies would go
bankrupt.
103
 This speculation, it is submitted, is untenable. Provided that
premiums reflect loss probability
104
 and are effectively managed, 105 it is
99 Sees Morris v. Ford Motor Co. Ltd. [1973] 1 Q.B. 792 at 798.
100 (1966) 39 A.L.J.R. 480 at 494.
101 See P.S. Atiyah, op. cit., at p.273; Lord Denning made a similar
remark in Morris v. Ford Motor Co. Ltd. [1973] 1 Q.B. 792 at 798.
102 Heaps v. Perrite Ltd. [1937] 2 All. E.R. 60 at p.61 per Greer L.J.
103 Fletcher v. Autocar and Transporters Ltd. [1968] 2 Q.B. 322, at 335
per Lord Denning M.R.
104 Premiums ought to be fixed partly by reference to the level of
awards made by the courts and past experience of claims settlement
should be a guide for regulating premium rates for the next
cumulative years.
105 The failures of insurance companies operating in motor insurance
business were attributable to the fact that th,e companies were not
properly conducted, but this is much less likely now given the
controls available in the Insurance Companies Act 1982. See supra,
Chapter Two on Government Control of Insurance Companies, pp.57-124.
Administrative and managerial costs form a greater proportion of the
total costs of insurance companies and this leaves suspect any
arguments about high awards being a primary factor in causing an
insurance company going to ruin.
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clear that the solvency of an insurance company can be maintained. On the
other hand one must admit that volatile changes in the law and inflation may
create some difficulties for insurance companies.
	
In Cameroon, the heavy
burden of court awards in damages because of the large family size and
extended family system is especially felt by insurance companies. The
multiplicity of the various heads of damages in respect of each defendant
renders the size of awards enormous. 	 For example, in the case of SociA 
Camerounaise de Banque and S.O.C.A.R. (Assurance) v. Angela N.Njob,
106 
the
court awarded 216.000 Francs CFA to each of the four wives and 136.000 francs
CFA to each of the eighteen children.
Another case in the French-speaking Cameroon, M.P. and Fotso Kankew 
Jacques c. Meyiwon Appolinius and Mbou Jacques
107 provides a further example.
This was a claim for fatal accident by thirty seven wives and forty nine
children of a deceased chief in Baffousam, in which the court awarded one
hundred and ninety eight million, nine hundred and fifty thousand francs CFA
(198. 950.000 frs CFA).	 This case, amongst others, has had serious
repercussions on the portfolio of insurance companies. It was regarded as a
'scandalous decision' by the Contentieux of Assurance Mutuelle Aqricole du
Cameroun, and in June 1983 a report was made to the Ministry of Justice for
investigation and advice on such cases. 	 In fact one could question the
propriety of such decisions, as it can be argued that the court should have
required strict proof of the fact that these wives and children were actually
dependants of the chief. 107A	It is commonly known that in an African
106 ' Appeal No. BCA/13/77 of 22nd. February 1973, Buea, (Unreported).
It should be noted that this case came on appeal by the insurance
company for a review of the damages awarded by the lower court.
Moreover, the deceased was a low income earner; the result would
have been astronomical if the victim was a well-to-do personality.
107 Judgment No. 576/COR of 22 Dec., 1982, Baffousam (Unreported).
107A For a discussion of similar problems in East Africa, see R.W.
Hodgin, "Claims Under the Fatal Accidents Acts of East Africa",
(1974) 10 East Africah L.J. 165-193.
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chieftancy system, the chiefs depend on their wives, elder children and their
local community for their well-being.	 Moreover, the age of the chief should
be another important consideration in determining the dependency factor of
the defendants.
These observations reveal a fundamental dilemma implicit in many
judicial decisions.	 It seems probable, although incapable of demonstration
by empirical evidence, that the prevalence of liability insurance has had its
impact on the development of the law. We may only suggest that since it is
common knowledge that the defendants are not paying the damages personally,
judges may be consciously or unconsciously more concerned with the hardship
to the victim and less with the tortfeasor and may, therefore, be more
willing to find a tortfeasor negligent. This exhibits a desire to compensate
the unfortunate victim. This, it is suggested, is desirable as the existence
of insurance enables judges to give effect to the desire to compensate a
victim without imposing hardship on the tortfeasor. Insurance thus vitiates
the secondary purpose of damages and incidentally ensures that the primary
purpose is more often achieved.
108
108 See Glanville Williams, "The Aims of the Law of Tort", (1951) 4 Cur.
Leg. Prob. pp.137-176; For an affirmation of punitive or exemplary
damages, see House of Lords decision in Pickett v. British Railway 
E. Ltd. [1980] A.C. 136 and conflicting dicta by Lords Reid and
Wilberforce on the function of compensation in the law of torts see
Cassell & Co. Ltd. v. Broome [1972] A.C. 1027. It could be admitted
that punitive damages in other areas of the law of torts such as
defamation and nuisance are desirable for they can act as deterrents
to future actions as they are premeditated torts.
The punitive aim of tort which is reflected in exemplary damages in
some cases ought to be discouraged in the case of road traffic
accidents. It may be argued that such damages do not serve any
deterrent effect. One can realistically assert that an insured
defendant can hardly be deterred by the prospect of losing a no-
claims bonus, or by an increase in premium for bad risk drivers on
renewal of their policies. We have observed that the causes of most
accidents are due to human frailty, a moments inadvertence can lead
to catastrophic disasters and it is worthwhile realising that the
drivers would not generally, deliberately cause accidents as their
own lives are also at risk.
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If then, the unlimited liability coverage provided by the compulsory
insurance laws of England, France and Cameroon fulfills the main objective of
compensation, it seems desirable that the law be so designed as to keep the
cost of compensating victims as low as possible. A more drastic alternative
may lie in the reappraisal of compensation methods and their replacement by
some form of an extended social security system.
109
The likely cost of this,
however, makes it an unlikely possibility in Cameroon at any rate for the
immediate future.	 From a social point of view, compensation through
collective sources has obvious advantages. 	 Perhaps a better reform would be
to encourage first party insurance.
110
Here, the insurer on the occurrence
of the fortuity pays reparation regardless of fault. 	 Along with this, a
blend of the various systems oT compensation DT some kind 0 compromise
between the tort system based on fault or risk may be appropriate.
111
This
109 In Cameroon, social security as is known in England and France, is
very recent and much more limited in scope. see, Decree No.76-321
of 2 August 1976 to entrust the management of occupational risks to
the National Social Insurance Fund throughout the (United) Republic
Of Cameroon. Only civil servants, employees of nationalised
corporations and employees of private enterprises who pay some
contribution to the National Social Insurance Fund (Caisse Nationale 
de PrGovance Sociale) are entitled to any benefits from the Fund:
Benson, Odia, Ambassade du Nigeria and S.O.C.A.R. c. C. Claude, St(
Hamelle Afrique et autres and Groupement Fransaise d'Assurance,
Judgment No.219 of 27 June 1978, Yaounde (Unreported). For other
citizens, the extended family system, age-grade associations and
tribal or clan groups were and still are, the only sources of self
help.
110 Life, health and accident insurance are much less developed or
common in Cameroon than in England, see for example, Tables 5 and 6,
written premium income of insurance companies, at pp.247 and 248.
In England, the development of insurance, in particular, private and
social insurance have tended to relegate the law of tort to a
secondary role especially in the field of accident compensation as
the legal system is showing symptoms of malaise as criticisms are
made of the fault principle.
111 For a discussion on our proposals on this see, Chapter Nine, pp.492-
495.
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may attract questions such as that, will fault ever go away? and comments -
no fault compensation - a sign of things to come in Cameroon. This is not
far-fetched as we will see below in the case of France.
Limited no fault liability in France 
In France, the interpretational power of the courts was a prelude to
new legislation. 112	The Cour de cassation in particular has been known for
stepping ahead of legislation. 113 The Jand'heur decision in 1930 definitely
112 Loi No.85-677 du 5 juillet 1985 tendant a l'amilioration de la
situation des victimes d'accidents de la circulation et a
l'accO4ration des procedures d'indemnisation, Journal Officiel de
la R4publioue Frangais du 6 juillet 1985, 7584: Hereinafter referred
to as 'the law of July 1985'. Note that the first Chapter of this
new law does not alter the nature of civil responsibility. The law
applicable therefore, is contained in articles 1382 and 1384 of the
Civil Code and in the case of contract, article 1147 thereof
applies.	 For a detailed discussion of this law see: FranFois
Chabas, "Commentaire de la loi du 5 juillet 1985, tendant
l'amgliorisation de la situation des victimes d'accidents de la
circulation et A l'accglgration des proc gdures d'indemnisation"
J.C.P. 1985. /. 3205; Pierre Estoup, "L'indemnisation des victimes
d'accidents de la circulation: L'amalgame de la responsibilitd.
civile et de l'indemnisation automatique", D. 1985 Chr.237; Andre
Tunc, "La r6forme du droit frangais des accidents de la circulation
: tine modeste rdforme est un vue", Le Journal des Procbs, 7
September 1984, p.10.
113 See supra, pp.153-154.
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established the applicability of article 1384(1) to motor vehicle accident
disputes.	 It is paradoxically this decision which initiated the whirl of
judicial thinking in France. 114
 Subsequently, in a remarkable reversal of
114 There have been previous projects drawn up by about ten Commissions
on the reform of the law on accident compensation, most notable
amongst them was that of Andre Tunc: "Sur un projet de loi en
mat:ate d'accidetxt de la circulatiaa", (1967) 65 Rev. Trim. Or. Civ.
82; Paur une Lai sur les accidents de /a circulation, (1981) gdn.
Economica. Here he advocated the initiation of no fault liability
in motor insurance in France. However, the present legislation owes
its origin to the Bellet Commission, see Henri Margeat, "Le projet
de loi Badinter", Journal International des Assurances, l'Argus, 16
November 1984, No,5877, p.2567. Road traffic accident compensation
has provoked so many problems and criticisms and an infinite variety
of solutions have been advanced. Its peculiarities, for example,
the inevitability of accidents; the cost of highway accidents to the
social security funds, the state and insurance companies; the
incidents of accidents and the importance of the insurance factor
prompted tort lawyers to re-think much of their traditional ideas on
civil liability. Undoubtedly, the real explanation behind this, is
the desire to afford the victim of traffic accidents the maximum
possible source of having his harm properly and fully compensated,
which is the primary function of the law of tort.
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case law the Cour de cassation in Arrgt Desmares 115
 held that, in proceedings
founded on article 1384, only the complete defence of force majeure is
available : apportionment of damages would be disregarded. This meant that,
except in the case of acts of God (or nature) the tortfeasor is entirely
responsible for the harm caused. As acts of God are rare, it may be assumed
that the victim will always be compensated: in other words, the tortfeasor
will always be held responsible. 116 This decision it may be rightly said,
115 La Mutualitg industrielle - Louis Paul Desmares c. Pierre Charles - 
S.N.C.F. C.P.S.S., 2e Ch. civ., 21 juillet 1982. D. 1982. 1. 449.
In this case, an elderly couple were knocked down and injured by M.
Desmares' car on a crossing in a small town in the Ardennes. The
couple had admitted that perhaps they had been careless themselves
in venturing on to the crossing when the vehicle was so near to it.
They contended that, on the basis of article 1384(1), the vital
point was not whether or not the motorist was at fault. Rather the
fact that the motorist drove the car which caused the injury fixed
him with civil responsibility. It was held that, apart from
entirely unforeseeable circumstances beyond the control of the
driver, a situation that could not be postulated here, the motorist
was liable under article 1384 since strict liability was imposed
upon persons for any harm caused by others, by the objects within
his control. For a detailed discussion of the implications of this
judgment see: Andre Tunc, "Accident de la circulation: faute ou
risque?", 0.1982, Chr.103; "La rdforme du droit frangaise des
accidents de la circulation", (1983) Rev. drt. intern. et
 drt.
Comp., 180 esp. at 185-190; J.A. Jolowicz, "Traffic Accidents and
Contributory Negligence - Insurance - A New Departure in France",
(9183) 42 C.L.J. 61 at 62. G. Viney, "L'indemnisation des victimes
de dommages causes par le .t.fait d'une chose7apres l'arr gt de la Cour
de cassation (24 Ch.civ.) du 21 juillet 1982", D. 1982. Chr.201; Y.
Lambert-Faivre, "Aspects juridiques moraux et gconomiques de
l'indemnisation des victimes fautives (Civ.26, 21 juillet 1982,
Desmares)", D. 1982 Chr.207; Bigot, "L'Arr gt Desmares: retour au
neolithique", J.C.P. 1982 1. 3090; E. Bloch, "Est-ce le glas du
partage de responsabilite? (arr gt Mutualite industrielle de la
deuxieme chambre civile de la Cour de cassation du 21 juillet
1982)", J.C.P. 1982 1. 3091; J.L. Aubert, "L'arr gt Desmares: une
provocation... quelles reformes?", D. 1983 Chr. 1.; Evelyne
Serverin et Marie-Claire Rondeau-Rivier, "Une essai d' gvaluation du
changement du droit: la mesure des incidences de l'arr gt Desmares",
D. 1985, Chr.227.
116 This consequence is clearly underlined by Charbonnier - the Attorney
General (l'Avocat General) who declared that total compensation for
the victim, even if at fault, has been made possible through
insurance, ibid. at p.420.
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went beyond the strict limits of motor accident victim's compensation. It
produced uncertainty in the law and practically divided the French courts. 117
Indeed, contrary to expectations, the judgment was not beneficial to a victim
who was at fault. It provided for either total compensation or none at all,
and forbids the sharing of responsibility regardless of the behaviour Or
contributory negligence of the victim.
Be that as it may, this decision made necessary the intervention of
legislation.	 The twin objectives of the new law of July 1985 on limited no
fault liability introduced in France are : firstly, to reduce the amount of
litigation and secondly, to guarantee reasonable and speedy compensation for
accident victims. Seemingly, this has been achieved by the legislation.
The following brief discussion seeks to raise the potential problems with the
new law rather than attempting (assuming that this were possible) to provide
any clear answers since it is as yet premature to make any concrete
evaluative judgment.
117 It led to a situation in France which may be poignantly described as
a form of provincial legal territoriality. On the one side, there
were the courts respecting the judgment, see for example, Jean-Marie 
Collery c.	 S.A.R.L. Cooel, Antoine Inn, la M.A.A.F. et C.P.C.A.M. 
des Hauts-de-Seine, Cour d'appel de Versailles (36 Ch.),
	 29	 .
September 1983: Gaz. Pal. 1983, 2, 587; on the other, those
completely ignoring it, for example, Didier Patu c. Didier Le 
Henarf, Compaqnie La Fraternelle et C.P.C.A.M.R.P., Cour d'appel de
Paris (176 Ch.A), 8 December 1982: Gaz. Pal. 1983, 2, 640; whilst
others were able to find distinctions in what may appear to be the
same basic circumstance. It may even be noted that there was
another decision of the Versailles court wbich went against the
Desmares judgment as well. In fact the apprOach in some districts
or tribunals to the Desmares judgment
	 meant	 the	 effective
transformation of third party risks into first party risks without a
corresponding enlargement of
	 premium.	 In consequence, the
government,
	 late in November 1982, realised this result and
authorised insurance companies to increase their premiums by 3%.
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The main thrust of the reform concerns the 'exoneration clauses', that
Is to say, the defences that could be pleaded in particular, the concept of
contributory negligence.
118
 Force majeure and the act of a third party
cannot be set up as a defence to any claim against any victim or
beneficiaries.
119
 The fault of the victim alone is the only reason for
exoneration of the tortfeasor's liability.
120
 In this respect the law makes
a distinction by reference to whom a defence can be raised.	 By virtue of
article 3(1) of the 1985 law, victims of a road traffic accident involving a
motor vehicle, with the exception of drivers, must be compensated for
prejudice resulting from personal injury without the possibility of a defence
on the grounds of their own misdemeanour.
121
	However, there is a 'sole
exception to this strict liability based upon the victim's inexcusable fault,
should this have been the sole or exclusive cause of the accident.
122
Furthermore, unless the victim is under 16, or over 70 years of age or at the
time of the accident is certified as at 80% permanently disabled, his conduct
118 This concept embraces the trilogy of concepts we mentioned earlier,
supra, p.155, that is, force majeure or act of God; act of a third
party; and fault of the victim himself. It may be convenient here
to state that the term 'fault' as used here, should be understood as
negligence and in appropriate circumstances contributory negligence
should be applied.
119 Article 2 of the law of July 1985.
120 Article 3 Ibid.
121 Our translation. See also, Kenneth Cannar, "The Desmares route is
completed", Post Magazine and Insurance Monitor, 3 October 1985,
Vol.146, No.40 p.2705. In respect of proprty damage see article 5
of the law of July 1985. By virtue of article 5, contributory
negligence of the victim will be considered with respect to claims
on property damage. But note that reference to property damage
claims is not made in the law, save only so far as they concern
medical supplies or equipment provided on prescription, when the
same considerations as those applicable to personal injury claims
operate.
122 Added emphasis. Article 3(1) op. cit. 
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can be taken into consideration by the court if he was 'inexcusably' at fault
and in addition his 'inexcusable fault' constitutes the sole cause of the
mishap.
123
We may recognise at this point three categories of victims. First, the
privileged class consisting of young persons under 16, old persons over 70
and handicapped persons.	 To this group a full blooded no fault liability
concept has been applied as their fault is disregarded and therefore not a
barrier to the tortfeasor's compulsory assumption of strict liability. The
second category consists of pedestrians, passengers and cyclists. With
respect to this group, the no fault principle is not absolute: mere
negligence or inadvertence cannot be claimed against them except their
inexcusable fault but this must have been the sole or exclusive cause of the
accident. A third category : drivers are responsible for their negligence of
whatever nature. The fault committed by the driver of motor vehicles will
limit or exclude compensation for damages he personally suffers. He may not
receive any compensation if his negligence was the exclusive cause of the
accident.
124
If the driver or person responsible for the vehicle can no
longer claim force maieure, or act of a third party, it seems that he is
subjected to not an obligation but a guarantee of liability. The underlying
principle of the law envisages a limited possibility of a valid defence in
respect of the behaviour of the victim. The combined effect of articles 2, 3
and 4 seems to go beyond the Desmares decision. The law seems to be based on
the vague idea of creating risk (risque cr66) - an idea imported by the
Jand'heur decision. The drivers are the only persons whose fault of whatever
123 Article 3(2) Ibid.
124 Article 4 Ibid.
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nature is taken into consideration.	 In this light it appears that the law
recognises the secondary aim of tort law - the punitive element. Perhaps,
more importantly, is the realisation that drivers' civil responsibilities
towards third parties are compulsorily covered by insurance. But it is note-
worthy that drivers are not covered by compulsory insurance.
125
Insurance of
civil responsibility will only apply to them if they are victims of injuries
caused by another motor vehicle. 	 This may indicate that the law wishes to
punish those who are called the creators of risk.
126
A better reform would
have been to oblige drivers to take on personal accident insurance.
Furthermore, it seems inevitable that the interpretation of the defence
would lay upon the courts the often and expensive task of having to decide
abstract legal concepts such as 'exclusive clause' and 'inexcusable cause' of
the accident through the medium of contributory negligence. The principle of
inexcusable fault seems difficult to establish.
127 Questions such as what is
inexcusable fault and in what way can the behaviour of a victim be inexcus-
able are bound to arise. This may import or re-import the notion of foreign
125 However, compulsory insurance now covers the civil responsibility of
unpermitted and unauthorised drivers: Article 8 Ibid. It is
probable that this provision was included in the new law as a result
of Article 2(1) of the Second Council Directive 84/5 of 30 December
1983, on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating
to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor
vehicles. (0.3. 1984, L8/17).
126 Querre the creation of risk by pedestrians and cyclists. It appears
that the law is favourable to other victims and beneficiaries except
drivers. Contrast the position of the second and third category of
victims discussed in the text. In this respect, one may contend
that the law seems to be discriminatory.
127 See the recent case of Veuve Guy c. L'hopitea6 et autres, Trib. gr.
Inst. Chateauroux, R6f., 2 August1985, J.C.P. 1985, II. 20476. Here
the contentious issues of 'inexcusable fault' and 'exclusive cause'
have not been argued and decided upon, but a provisional payment has
been made to the widow.
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cause, unavoidable and unforeseeable cause.
128
	Nothing can prevent a judge
from considering that an unforeseeable and unavoidable act constitutes gross
negligence amounting to an inexcusable fault, thus exonerating a defendant
who is sued in a negligence action.	 The law of July 1985 does not state the
basis on which responsibility would be shared if need be. The Civil Code
itself is silent on the rule of apportionment of liability on the basis of
the gravity of the respective faults of litigants. It therefore seems that
reliance would be placed on French judge-made rules which are based on wider
considerations of equity rather than on any particular question of the
doctrine of causation. Moreover, in deciding these issues, it is possible
that consideration will be given to the litigant's particular circumstances
such as his ability to carry the risk and thus create room for judicial
manoeuvre. An expected side effect could be a re-appearance of a lot of
legal disputes on arguments in respect of fault. The hope however, is that
this principle of 'inexcusable fault' or 'exclusive cause' should not be
difficult to establish in order that the first objective set by the
legislation should be achieved.
The second objective relates to the provision of a simplified and
speedy machinery for amicable settlements of disputes.
129
Article 12 of the
law of July 1985 requires the insurer concerned or an insurer who has a
mandate given by the others to present a compensation proposed to any victim
Incurring personal injury within a maximum period of eight months from the
128 It may be worth noting that a number of decisions by the Cour de 
cassation based on the interpretation of these notions have been
made and these gave rise to a lot of arguments in the courts and by
French jurists, see note 29 above.
129 See articles 12-27 of the 1985 law. Note that the limitation period
for claims to be brought has been reduced from thirty years to ten
years counted from the date when the injuries became apparent or the
date when their aggravation occurred: Article 37 Ibid. 
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date of the accident.
130
	In the case where the injuries have not yet
stabilised, as usually will be the case where they are serious, the proposal
may be a provisional one, in which event a final proposal must be made within
a maximum period of five months from the date on which the insurer is
informed that the victim has reached the stage of maximum recovery. 131 In
his initial correspondence, the insurer must, under penalty of rendering the
settlement void, inform the victim of his right to medical and legal
assistance and a copy of the police report. 132 This provision seems to have
been complemented by article 26 of the law which requires the government to
publish an average table of awards granted to victims by court decisions.
This may in appropriate cases provide necessary guidelines to insurers, the
legal and medical profession.
	 However, insurers are subjected to certain
penalties if a proposal by an insurer is not accepted by a victim and
subsequently the claim is adjudicated.
	 If the presiding judge considers the
proposal as 'obviously inadequate', the insurer must pay to the Fonds de 
Garantie Automobile 133 a sum not exceeding 15 per cent of the compensation
130 An insurer who invokes an exception clause in the policy, must
nevertheless make a proposal and carry it out on behalf of the
others: Article 23 Ibid.
131 If these time scales laid down for insurers are not adhered to, a
penalty is imposed in the form of additional interest (currently the
standard rate is 9.5%) at a rate double that of the statutory rate,
and calculated over the period from the date when the proposal
should have been made to the date at which one is made or a final
order made by the court - Article 16 Ibid. Contrast section 6 of
the Administration of Justice Act 1982, in England in respect of
provisional payments, see supra pp.172-173 and Article 12 and 22 of
the law of July 1985.
132 Article 13 Ibid.
133 The organisation is responsible for managing the funds set up to
indemnify road accident victims where no effective insurance exists.
See Articles 7-11 of the law of July 1985. For a similar body in
England and Cameroon, see infra, pp.249-298.
- 194 -
that is awarded plus of course the difference between what the court has
assessed, and the amount originally offered.
134
On the other hand, the victim may within a fortnight of the date of any
amicable settlement repudiate an 	 offer of compensation by registered
letter.
135
	However, if a settlement is agreed, the amount in question must
be paid over within one month of the expiry of the "cooling off" period, that
Is, within six weeks of the date of the agreement to settle.
136
It seems
that these provisions are inspired by consumer protection considerations as
they recognise that the victim requires adequate information and advice and
further some time within which to enter into any commitment in a transaction.
Furthermore, the law in imposing heavy penalties on insurers seems to be
attempting to redress the balance between the 'stronger party' - that is, the
insurer and the 'weaker party' - the victim.
Primarily, the legislation has sought to curtail the defences available
to drivers or rather their insurers and has thus created to some extent a
near absolute form of liability which would only be refuted upon proof of an
inexcusable fault on the part of the victim. This approach coupled with the
provision of some machinery for amicable settlements seems to go some way
towards compensating victims of traffic accidents who previously would have
limited chances of receiving compensation. It is obvious from this schematic
134 Article 17 Ibid. There seems here to be a penalty upon parsimony.
135 Article 19 Ibid.	 This article further prohibits any attempt to
contract out of these provisions.
136 Article 20 Ibid.	 Any failure or delay in payment automatically
gives rise to payment of interest at the statutory rate plus half of
this for the first two months and thereafter, at double the
statutory rate. In the case of a delay in implementing a court
award, even of a provisional nature, the statutory interest is
increased by 50% where payment is not made within two months of
judgment, and 100% after four months from when the judgment has .
expired: Article 21 Ibid.
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treatment of French law on motor accident compensation that the existence of
insurance companies is a prime motivation for the measures adopted.
III BACKGROUND TO COMPULSORY INSURANCE SYSTEM
The legislation of England, France and Cameroon have responded to the
exigencies of our daily life by a search for ways in which law responds to
the pressure brought upon it by changing economic- and social conditions.
In the years preceding 1930, those motorists in England, France and
Cameroon who insured did so voluntarily. Compulsory insurance was contested
in the early twentieth century as an infringement of economic liberalism.
The fear of the progressive intervention by the state in professional
organisations provoked a hostile reaction 137
 from insurers against any idea
of compulsory insurance of any nature.
In England public opinion was in favour of governmental introduction of
legislative measures to combat the tragic consequences of road traffic
accidents.	 The Royal Commission on Transport made an inquiry in 1929. In
its report it recommended
138
 that the Minister of Transport should make the
insurance of motor vehicles compulsory so as to ensure that the victims of
motor accidents obtained adequate compensation. The Minister then consulted
the Association of British Insurers who did not favour this idea of
compulsory motor insurance.
	 British insurers saw in this measure a new
extension of state control over their industry. They expressed the fear of
running undesirable risks which might result in heavy losses to themselves.
137 See below, pp.195-197 : in England, the opposition from the
Association of British Insurers and in France, the failure of
proposals to render motor insurance compulsory.
138 The Royal Commission on Transport: First Report.
	 The Control of
Traffic on Roads. July 1929 Cmnd. 3365 at p.25.
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Such losses might force them to raise the rate of premium which they charged
their policyholders, a situation which might prove not only hard upon the
latter, but detrimental to the insurance companies themselves. In spite of
these objections the legislators thought it necessary to make insurance
against motor liability obligatory.	 The British Road Traffic Act 1930
139
introduced compulsory insurance for the first time. 140 The introduction of
compulsory motor insurance was the first step towards ensuring the protection
of third parties. Compulsory insurance alone could not achieve the desired
aim; hence it has been followed by legislation designed to protect third
parties against the insolvency of the insured
141
or the insurer
142
and
against certain conditions in policies.
143
No system of compulsory insurance
would be complete without some provision being made for the compensation of
victims of uninsured motorists.
144
In 1946 the Motor Insurers' Bureau was
139 The Road Traffic Act of 1930 was followed by the Road Traffic Act
1934. These two enactments were codified in the Road Traffic Act
1960, which has been revised and presently the Road Traffic Act 1972
is the applicable law. For a full account see: M.R. Russell Davies,
The Laws of Road Traffic in Great Britain 5th ed., London 1973.
140 Other countries have followed with similar legislation. In 1932 by
a federal law Switzerland made motor insurance compulsory. Germany
joined the list in 1939. Later on Luxembourg in 1935, Belgium in
1956 and France in 1958 enacted compulsory insurance laws.
141 The Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 1930.
142 See now the Insurance Companies Act 1982 and the Policyholders
Protection Act 1975, discussed supra pp.53-145 in Chapters One and
Two: For greater protection of the insured and beneficiaries of such
insurance policies, the governments of England and Cameroon regulate
the operations of insurance companies whb issue contracts of
insurance.
143 The Road Traffic Act 1972 s.148.
144 See infra, comment on Employers liability insurance pp.232-233
below.
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created to fulfill this function.
145
In France, initial proposals for compulsory motor insurance failed. In
1935 compulsory insurance was introduced for public transport vehicles and
racing drivers. 146	Proposals to extend the scope of the legislation were
bitterly opposed. The main grounds were that it was contrary to the freedom
of the individual to compel a person to insure and insurers would be deprived
of their freedom to select risks.	 The protection of third parties was
developed in a very different manner. Instead the government preferred rirst
of all, to protect the public against insolvent insurers. This was achieved
in the main by legislation in 1938 which regulated the insurance industry. 147
On the other hand opinions were in favour of the creation of a Motor
Guarantee Fund. This was realised in 1951 when the Finance Law No.1508 of 31
December 1951 established the Fonds de Garantie Automobile in its article 15.
Later, however, the financial deficit of the fund rendered the law on
compulsory motor insurance inevitable. Compulsory insurance was introduced
for all motorists in 1958 by Law No.208 of 27 February 1958 and Decree No.135
145 See Chapter Four on Protection of Road Traffic Accident Victims,
pp.253-254. This measure may be regarded as an additional assurance
of protection to remedy the deficiency created by compulsory
insurance laws.
146 For public transport vehicles of passengers: Decree of 25 february
1935; public transport vehicles of goods: Decree of 13 July 1935;
Racing cars and motorcycles: Decree of 25 July 1935.
147 Decree of 30 December 1938; now the provisions of this decree have
been incorporated into the Insurance code 1976; see Collection
d'6cole Nationale d'assurances, l'assurance - th6orie - pratique - 
comptabilit6, 1983, l'Argus, Paris, pp.137-226.
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of 7 January 1959.
148
	Thus in France, compulsory insurance completed the
protection of third parties rather than started it as in England.
The idea of compulsory insurance was recognised quite early in West
Africa.	 The British legislation on the subject was extended to four West
African countries - Nigeria by the Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Act
1945
149 ; Gambia, by the Motor Vehicle (Third Party Insurance) Ordinance 1948;
Ghana, by the Motor Vehicle (Third Party Insurance) Ordinance 1949 as amended
in 1960. Cameroon later introduced compulsory motor insurance by law No.65 -
LF - 9 of 22 May 1965.
150
 As in the Western countries, the main reason for
the introduction of compulsory insurance in all these countries is to ensure
that money is available to compensate the innocent victims injured or killed
in road accidents whatever may be the financial position of the tortfeasor,
that is, the negligent motorist.
IV COMPULSORY INSURANCE AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
The law on compulsory insurance in respect of motor vehicles requires
that before a person can put a vehicle on the road he must obtain the
statutory cover against third party risks. Other compulsory insurances also
require that persons must insure against certain statutory risks before they
undertake their activities.
151
	This obligation to insure defies the
148 For the evolution of compulsory insurance in France see: E. Claeys,
L'assurance obliqatoire de la responsabilit6 des accidents 
d'automobile, 1962, L'Argus, Paris pp.3-56; Lucien Sicot and Joseph
Bienvenu, L'Assurance Automobile Obliqatoire, 1959, Paris.
149 In the former West Cameroon, that is, the English-speaking provinces
of Cameroon, the compulsory insurance law of Nigeria was applicable.
150 It will be seen later that this law also established the Motor
Insurance Fund (Fonds de Garantie Automobile) in its article 7. For
a discussion on this subject see infra, Chapter Four on Protection
of Road traffic Accident Victims at p.253.
151 In the case of other compulsory insurances see, below pp.226-239.
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traditional doctrine of freedom of contract.	 In the nineteenth century the
freedom of contract
152 doctrine entailed that the parties were the best
judges of their own interests. If they freely and voluntarily entered into a
contract the only function of the law was to enforce it. It was immaterial
that one party was economically in a stronger bargaining position than the
other.	 Freedom of contract is of little value when one party has no
alternative between accepting a set of terms proposed by the other or doing
without the goods or services offered. 	 With respect to motor vehicle
insurance, vehicle owners can no longer opt between buying an insurance and
driving without one. Furthermore, proposers for insurance are faced with
standard form contracts, the terms of which have already been prepared by the
other party to the contract; they are faced with the problem of accepting a
policy hedged with conditions and warranties against them.
153
In England, as will be observed,
154
a person may retain his individual
liberty by providing a security instead of taking out an insurance policy.
However, there is no machinery to assist people who cannot provide that
security in obtaining insurance. It is up to each individual to persuade an
insurer to contract with him.
From our interviews with policyholders in Cameroon, we realised that
motor vehicle insurance is recognised as one of those requirements which one
must fulfill before driving a motor vehicle on the highway. 	 However a
majority of people do not see the need to insure and consider it as an
expensive exercise which goes to enrich insurance companies. They fail to
152 Chitty, On Contracts: General Principles, Vol.I, 25th ed., 1983
London, Sweet and Maxwell pp.4-6.
153 Some compulsory insurance statutes have tried to limit the effect of
certain restrictive conditions in compulsory insurance policies.
See infra, pp.208, 211, 215 and 229-230.
154 Infra, at p.219.
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realise that insurance is only expensive before an accident. There are a
good number of drivers who do not comply with the law in their obligation to
insure. Unfortunately, there are no comprehensive statistics on the number
of uninsured motorists in Cameroon.
	 In a limited survey carried out at
Yaounde police station in the month of July 1983, it was revealed that 150
vehicles were impounded for failure to insure.
	 Furthermore, insurance
companies revealed that most policyholders in 
- Cameroon only insure against
their civil liability in respect of third party injury and damage. There are
a few instances of policyholders insuring comprehensively or against theft or
damage to the car by fire. The general limitation of cover strictly to the
requirements of the law is indicative of the general reluctance to insure.
In England, the statistics are not illuminative of the actual situation
of uninsured motorists.	 They show 155
 that the findings of guilt at all
courts for vehicle offences in 1977 was 149,501; in 1978, the figure was
150,010; and in 1979, 158,910. The statistics do not make any distinction
between uninsured motorists and other vehicle offences such as failure to
obtain a road fund licence.
In England, the obligation to insure is imposed on the user of
vehicles.	 The question arises whether there is a corresponding duty on
insurance companies to accept proposals from all persons required by law to
insure. In Cameroon, this question is much debated. 156 Insurers do not seem
155 Home Office Statistics on offences relating to Motor Vehicles in
England and Wales 1977, Cmnd.7349 p.50; 1978, Cmnd.7687 p.58;
Cmnd.8087 p.62. However, the Accident Offices' Association produced
figures suggesting that about one and half million motorists drive
without any insurance cover: The Guardian, 34 August 1983.
156 M. Maurice Nkouendjin Yotnda, "Le refus d'assurer les TPV", October
1977, Argus, 1762-1765; "A propos du refus d'assurer" Cameroon
Tribune No.805, 26 February 1977; "La protection des automobilistes
en justice est assure", Cameroon Tribune No.2688, 1 June 1983 at
p.15.
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to have this contractual freedom as it is considered to be incompatible with
compulsory insurance.
	 In order to deal with the situation where insurance
companies seek to frustrate the scheme of compulsory insurance,
	 the
government has set up an administrative body charged with the duty to deal
with cases of refusals by insurance companies. In Cameroon there is an
established body called the 'Central Bureau of Rates, Supervision and
Conciliation of Disputes.' 157 It is an arbitral body consisting of
representatives of insurers, the public and the government. The Central
Bureau is responsible in the case where a person subjected to compulsory
insurance has been refused insurance cover or proposed conditions exceeding
the normal tariff by an insurance company, (a) to decide on the propriety of
such refusal; (b) where applicable, to lay down the terms on which the
insurance company is bound to insure.
	 Insurance companies who wittingly
refuse to apply the decisions of the Central Bureau may incur a withdrawal of
their licence. There is an express administrative procedure for consultation
In order to avoid arbitrary decisions.
	 Firstly, the Central Bureau must
establish whether there has been a refusal. There is no difficulty in the
case where the insurer expresses his intention not to accept the proposal.
If the proposer is obtaining cover for the first time eight days silence is
taken as an implicit refusal .158 An insurer may instead of refusing cover,
offer a policy extending beyond the scope of compulsory insurance.
	 In the
course of field research in Cameroon, it was observed that most insurance
companies have a policy to persuade proposers and insureds of motor vehicles
157 In Cameroon, see: Article 6(1),(2) and (5) bf Law No.65-LF-9 of 22
May 1965 establishing the Central Bureau of Rates, Supervision and
Conciliation of Disputes and Decree No.65-DF-566 of 29 December 1965
organising the Central Office of Rates, Supervision and Conciliation
of Disputes.
158 Article 2 of Decree No.65-DF-566 of 29 December 1965.
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to insure against individual persons transported or take up personal accident
insurance and in some cases require a life policy and insurance against
responsabilitg civile - chef de famille to cover members of the insured's
family. When asked why they instituted such a practice, one insurance
company said, 159
 "C'est la politique de la compaqnie pour faire l'equilibre 
du	 portefeuille
	 de	 la compaqnie".
	 The legislation has not dealt
satisfactorily with such a situation. This sort of case should be treated as
a refusal to insure the risk proposed by the insured. 160
	Secondly, the
Central Bureau decides whether the proposed risk is abnormally high. The
insurer and proposer are bound to furnish all relevant information concerning
the subject of insurance.
	 If the risk is classed as normal, the Central
Bureau will apply the standard tariff. Where, however, the risk is classed
as abnormally high, the Bureau has one of three alternative courses to apply:
it may fix the premium at a higher level than normal; or apply the normal
tariff and include a franchise clause; or combine the two alternatives. Once
the Central Bureau has adjudicated on the matter the insurer must conclude
the contract.
This system is more favourable to the proposer than the English laissez 
faire. But this raises a question as to what would be the legal basis for
extending the obligation to insure on insurance companies to hire out their
159 Interview with Mr. Charles Alaka, Manager of service contentieux of
Assurances Mutuelles Agricoles du Cameroun, July 1983. In spite of
the high premium income realised in the motor insurance branch, it
is reputed for bad business as the number of claims and settlements
far exceed the revenue collected. See further, Jean Bosco Abogo,
"L'Assurance Automobile: Cl g
 de Voilte de l'Assurance Camerounaise?",
Cameroon Tribune (No.2000) 11 and 12 February 1981, p.13.
160 On the other hand, it seems to be a desirable practice, which ought
to be endorsed by legislation, particularly in respect of drivers.
See further our proposal in Chapter Nine of this work, at p.494 and
note 35.
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services.	 Insurance companies are commercial undertakings. 	 Should the
companies in the face of increasing frequency of accidents and soaring
underwriting losses (especially in the motor field) be required to insure
every driver who has a licence to drive and every vehicle regardless of the
risk run?	 A balance ought to be observed between the legal requirement
incumbent on persons who are compulsorily required to take out insurance and
the special commercial and professional undertaking to provide security.
Insurance companies should be free to select their risks as this would affect
their loss ratio and eventual solvency. It would be undesirable to impose on
insurance companies business which they cannot support, especially in motor
insurance which is notable in Cameroon as the class where bad business is
experienced. Mr. C. Alaka pointed out that the claims and awards by the
courts far exceed their premium income.
161
This is difficult to verify as
regrettably there are no statistics on the payments made on claims and awards
in the motor insurance branch.
	
In 1977-1978 insurance companies in a
concerted action through the Association of Insurance Companies in Cameroon
refused to insure certain makes of vehicles 162 and vehicles of a certain age
especially public transport vehicles even if this would lead to a withdrawal
of their licence. As a result of this action the Ministry of Finance has
proposed to fix a maximum age limit of vehicles that should be insured.
161 The same point was made by Jean Bosco Abogo, op. cit., see note 159
above.
162 See M. Nkouendjin Yotnda, "Probleme de droit Camerounaise - Le refus
d'assurer ].es Transports Publiques de Voyageurs", L'Argus, 1977
pp.1762-1765; "A propos de refus d'assurer", Revue Institut Intern-
ational des Assurances, No.4, 1977 pp.25-27.
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V TYPES OF INSURANCE BUSINESS THAT ARE RENDERED COMPULSORY BY THE STATE
Of the various classes of insurance business carried out in England the
following are rendered compulsory by the state: motor vehicle insurance;
employers' liability insurance; public liability insurance in respect of
riding establishments, contractors in the construction industry, operators of
a nuclear establishment and aircraft operators; and professional indemnity
insurance in respect of insurance brokers. Professional indemnity insurance
may be required not by statute, but by the rules of a profession such as the
Law Society.
In Cameroon, except for the following types of insurances which are
decreed compulsory there is no obligation to insure: 	 motor vehicle
insurance, contractors' all risk insurance and insurance of imports.
One of the most difficult problems in the institution of compulsory
insurance is to decide on the exact scope of the risk to be covered. Persons
are not obliged to insure against, for example, all risks arising out of the
use of a motor vehicle. A compromise has to be reached on the rights of the
third party, the insured and the insurer.
We will study the various categories of compulsory insurance seriatim.
I Motor Vehicle Insurance 
In England, section 143(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1972 provides that
it is not lawful for a person to use or to cause or permit any other person
to use a motor vehicle on a road unless there is in force in relation to the
use of the vehicle by that person or that other person, as the case may be, a
policy of insurance or a security in respect of third party risks as complies
with the requirements of Part VI of the Act. Similarly, in Cameroon, article
1(1) of Law No. 65 - LF - 9 of 22 May 1965 provides that: "No person natural
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or legal, may use Or cause to be used on roads a mechanically propelled
vehicle,	 trailer Or segment of an articulated vehicle unless the owner's
civil liability is covered by a contract of insurance satisfying this law and
any regulation issued under it."
A detailed analysis of these provisions would reveal some similarities
and differences in their application. The important questions for discussion
on the ambit or scope of compulsory insurance would be: first, what risks are
required to be covered by compulsory insurance for example, liabilities in
respect of death and bodily injuries and property damage; second, for whose
benefit is such liability to be incurred; third, the persons on whom the
obligation to insure is imposed and those exempted; 	 and fourth, the
circumstances under which such persons could be found liable.
In contrast to Cameroon, in England it is only in relation to liability
for the death of, or bodily injury to, third parties 163 that the Road Traffic
Act 1972 has given a special character to motor insurance. By virtue of
section 145(3) of the 1972 Act, the policy of insurance (a) must insure such
person, persons, or classes of persons as may be specified in the policy in
respect of any liability which may be incurred by him or them in respect of
the death of or bodily injury to any person caused by, or arising out of, the
use of the vehicle on a road; and (b) must also insure him or them under the
provisions of this part of this Act relating to the payment for emergency
treatment. It should be noted therefore that insurance is not compulsory in
respect of liability concerning damage to the property of a third party.
163 For other types of insurance cover see: R.L. Carter, Handbook of 
Insurance,	 Vol.II, London, 1973-84, 7.1-18; J. Birds, Modern 
Insurance Law, 1982 London, 313; M.R. Russell Davies, The Laws of 
Road Traffic in Great Britain 5th ed., London 1973, Shaw & Sons Ltd, •
p.427.
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One of the steps towards harmonisation in member countries of the
European Economic Community is to extend compulsory third party insurance to
cover damage to property as well as cover against personal injury and
death. 164 In this respect but to a certain extent, as will be seen in the
following discussion, this Directive is the first to produce any significant
effect upon United Kingdom Road Traffic legislation.
165
The Directive 166
allows each member state to decide whether- compulsory insurance cover
obtained by its own nationals will be limited but sets certain minimum
figures. We should however note that United Kingdom legislation requires
cover against personal injury to be unlimited in amount. 167 Generally,
insurance policies provide unlimited cover for damage to property but usually
164 Article 1 of the Second Council Directive of 30 december 1983 on
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance
against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles.
(0.3. 1984, L8/17) (84/5EEC). Any changes to national laws must be
made by December 31, 1987, and be implemented by December 31, 1988:
Article 5(2) Ibid.
165 However, this Directive does not impinge on the law of civil
liability.
166 Article 1(2) Ibid. In the case of personal injury the limit is
350,000 ECU (£200,000) for any one victim or 500,000 ECU for any
combined injuries arising from any one accident. A minimal amount
of damage to property irrespective of the number of victims in any
one accident is 100,000 ECU (£67,000). In the case of personal
injury and damage to property arising out of one event, a minimum
overall amount of 600,000 ECU per claim can be imposed, irrespective
of the number of victims or the nature of the damage. For the
definition of European Currency Unit see Article 3 Ibid. and further
article 1 of Council Regulation (EEC) of 18 December 1978 changing
the value of the unit of account used by the European Monetary
Cooperation Fund (0.3. No.3180/78) 30:12:78 at p.1
167 One of the problems facing the government and the insurance industry
is whether there will be insistence upon the same requirement for
property damage claims. This would require an amendment to the
terms of third party sections of most commercial policies: see
Department of Transport Consultation Document, Giving Effect to the 
Second European Community  Motor Insurance Directive, 1984, paras.
4.2 and 4.3.
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restrict liability for damage caused by commercial vehicles.
168
It appears
that the extension of compulsory insurance to property damage will itself
have only a limited effect on the amount paid out in compensation under
insurance policies. 169
In rendering third party property cover compulsory, it seems necessary
to ensure that the benefits of compulsory property insurance are accorded to
third parties.	 This raises the perennial question of notification of
accidents.
170
It is proposed
171
that the requirements which now apply to
personal injury accidents under section 149 of the Road Traffic Act 1972
should be extended to cover third party property damage. 	 The driver of a
vehicle involved in any accident will be required by law to give details of
his insurance cover to anyone who reasonably requires this information and
168 The restriction for commercial vehicles is however well above the
Directive's figure stated in note 166 above. This figure seems
adequate for property damage likely to be caused by a car, but
commercial vehicles are usually larger and the loads they carry may
well pose an additional threat.
169 However, it seems that there might be higher claims frequency
particularly to the Motor Insurers' Bureau, see infra, p.267. This
may eventually be covered by higher premiums payable by
policyholders.
170 It hardly seems practicable for the police to note all accidents
involving damage to property. Coupled with this situation is the
common problem of motorists not reporting accidents to their
insurers, see Department of Transport comment in the Consultative
Document, op. cit., para. 2.6. Thus, even where liability is fairly
obvious and the guilty motorist's insurance company is ready and
willing to meet a claim, the company is under no obligation to
indemnify the claimant unless the motorist officially notifies his
insurer.
171 See: Department of Transport, Consultative Document, op. cit., para.
2.7.
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failing that at a police station.
172
The arrangements under section 149 of
the	 Road Traffic Act 1972 secure that, except in certain specified
circumstances where insurance policies are cancelled, or where they have been
obtained fraudulently, an insurer is obliged to deal with any third party
claim or meet any court judgment requiring compensation for the victims of an
accident whether or not his policyholder has reported the accident to him.
This in effect gives the third party a direct right against the insurer
analogous to that provided under the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers)
Act 1930.
173
It may be noted that this direct right of action against the
insurer is only exercisable when judgment has been given against the insured.
Linked to this, is the question of direct access to third oat' ir\skytems.
One may question whether complete protection of all third parties in relation
to motor accidents has been provided. Ultimately, there seems to be a need
for the victim or third party to sue the insurer concerned by name in his
original action especially in compulsory motor insurance. Admittedly, in
most cases the real defendant is an insurer, one of whose functions is to
guarantee that if the nominal defendant is found liable the award will be
172 This would require an amendment to section 166 of the Road Traffic
Act 1972. It appears that until the central issue of future police
involvement for reporting property damage accidents is resolved, the
target date of the end of 1986 (intended by the government) for
implementation of the Directive is unlikely to be met: Reply to
inquiry from Mr. M. Ainsworth, Department of Transport, letters
dated 2 October and 21 November 1985 and 31 January 1986. It is not
clear whether the Government will provide any sanction by making it
a criminal offence not to report major damage only accidents.
However, any measure that would force drivers to report accidents
seems favourable to insurers.	 It will enable insurers to keep
tighter checks on their client's driving records. This further
recognises the problem of non-disclosure which is at the root of too
many disputes over motor insurance. For further discussion of this
see, Chapter Five of this work, pp.301-326.
173 This latter right is only exercisable in cases of insolvency of the
insured: section 1 of the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers)
Act 1930. See further, J. Birds, op. cit., pp.300-304.
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met. In addition, it seems unnecessary to bring the nominal defendant when
the real defendant - the insurer - is the one who would eventually conduct
the case. Perhaps, a better reform would be for the plaintiff to sue the
insurer direct. This is the case in Cameroon. By contrast to section 149 of
the Road Traffic Act 1972 in England, in Cameroon, article 4(3) of Law No.65
- LF - 9 of 22nd May 1965 does not make such a distinction. The third party
may initially sue the insurance company directly without joining the insured
or may sue the insured and the insurance company jointly. 174
In contrast to the present legislation in England, compulsory insurance
is required against personal injury and damage to property. Article 2 of
Decree No. 65-DF-565 of 29 December 1965 provides that the guarantee prescr-
ibed in article 1
175
must include bodily injuries and property damage
resulting either from a burst of flame, explosion or fire coming from the
vehicle or the goods carried on it whatever may be the cause of the said
burst of flame, explosion or fire or from objects falling from the
vehicle.
176
174 See supra, p.178.
175 See below, p.210.
176 Article 3 of the same Decree, further reinforces this as it provides
for the replacement of a damaged vehicle under the compulsory cover.
However, article 4 excludes from compulsory insurance damage to
property belonging, let or entrusted to the insured party or the
driver and damage resulting from loading or unloading operations of
the insured vehicle. As in England, it is customary for the owner
or carrier to obtain a separate 'goods in transit' insurance cover.
But quaerre implications of such an exclusion in regard to passen-
ger's luggage and possessions conveyed in a vehicle and damaged
through the negligence of the driver who has not taken advantage of
the additional insurance available to indemnify himself against such
losses: See Department of Transport Consultative Document, op. cit.,
para. 4.6.
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It is worth noting certain points which arise from the wording of
article 1 of Decree No. 65 - DF - 565 of 29 December 1965, especially the
aspect of the financial limit imposed.
	
Article 1(1) provides that the
compulsory insurance provided for by Law No. 65 - LF - 9 of 22 May 1965 must
guarantee:-
1. Civil liability towards persons not transported, not exceeding 50 mill-
ion Francs CFA per vehicle, trailer or semi-trailer and per accident;
2. Unlimited civil liability towards persons transported for valuable
consideration even occasionally;
177
3. Unlimited liability towards third parties for accidents caused by:
(a) Vehicles the total authorised loaded weight of which exceeds 3,500
Kilogrammes, or built to carry more than eight persons excluding the
driver, or towing a trailer or semi-trailer the total authorised loaded
weight of which exceeds 750 Kilogrammes. 178
The limited liability in respect of persons not transported, such as
pedestrians and other third parties who are not passengers in article 1(1)
seems anomalous. On a strict application, where there are several victims in
an accident and the total claim exceeds 50 million francs CFA, each victim
can only claim a proportion of the indemnity.
	 In practice, however,
insurance companies apply an unlimited guarantee for bodily injury and
property damage
179
 caused to third parties following an accident.
177 For reasons of convenience, we would delay discussion in respect of
article 1(2), see infra pp.216-217.
178 In respect of article 1(3), the unlimited civil liability concerns
vehicles whose driver requires a driving licence of class C,D or E
as specified by regulation 42 of the Highway Code: Decree No.79/341
of 3 September 1979 laying down regulations relating to Road
Traffic. Such driving licences are required by drivers of
commercial and public transport vehicles.
179 But note the exception in article 4 at note 176 above.
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In both England and Cameroon, policies frequently contain clauses
restricting the liability of the insurers in various ways. For example, by
reference to the driver of the vehicle, the condition of the vehicle or the
purposes for which the vehicle is used. In England the Road Traffic Act 1972
interferes with the contractual rights of insurers for the benefit of third
parties to whom the insured is legally liable to pay damages. By virtue of
section 148(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1972, . the insurer cannot avoid
liability under a policy in respect of a claim brought by a third party cover
for which is required under Section 143 of the 1972 Act.
180
Furthermore,
article 2(1) of the Directive will require additional items to be added to
the list in Section 148(1) of the 1972 Act of conditions which afford no
defence against an injured third party, such as conditions relating to the
condition or safety of the vehicle, or the use of vehicles by unauthorised or
unlicenced drivers.
181
The proviso to section 148(2) allows insurers to
180 Because first, of a failure of a person insured under the policy to
observe any condition in the policy which is precedent to the
liability of the insurer to pay the claim. Second, any restriction
in the policy relating to (a) the age or physical or mental
condition of the persons driving the vehicle; (b) the condition of
the vehicle; (c) the number of persons that the vehicle carries, the
weight or physical characteristics of the goods that the vehicle
carries; (d) the time at which or the areas within which the vehicle
is used; (e) the horse power or cylinder capacity or value of the
vehicle; (f) the carrying on the vehicle of any particular means of
identification other than any means of identification required to be
carried by, or under the Vehicles (Excise) Act 1971 are of no effect
against a third party's right of recovery. Further, section 148(2)
invalidates other breaches of condition by the insured with regard
to a claim made by a third party. The conditions referred to are
those providing that no liability shall arise under the policy, or
that any liability so arising shall cease, in the event of some
specified thing being done or omitted to be done after the happening
of the event giving rise to the claim. This covers a breach by the
insured of a condition regarding notice or particulars of loss and
an admission of liability in breach of a standard condition.
181 The latter requirement can be found in the new French law of July
1985, article 8.
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insert in their policy provisions, clauses allowing them to recover back from
the insured money which they have had to pay to a third party only by virtue
of this sub-section.
The extension of voidance in relation to unauthorised or unlicensed
drivers will not prevent an insurer from continuing to offer policies
restricted to named or approved drivers.
182
 However, since the law precludes
reference in certificates of insurance to policy conditions which are subject
to voidance, the certificate would no longer be a means of discouraging a
breach of the policy restrictions. 	 It is proposed
183
 that by amendment of
the Motor Vehicles (Third Party Risks) Regulations 1972, 184 the creation of a
summary road traffic offence
185
 of driving in breach of certain policy
conditions to which section 148 of the Road Traffic Act 1972 applied would be
required on insurance certificates without misrepresenting the insurance
protection given to third parties.
It should be noted that the insurer, in spite of section 148, can avoid
liability as against a third party for any other condition
186
 not referred to
in section 148 of the Road Traffic Act 1972, any condition limiting the
use
187
	of	 the	 vehicle	 and	 for	 breach	 of	 non-disclosure	 and
misrepresentation
.188
 In these cases, as will be discussed in Chapter
182 Department of Transport Consultative Document, op. cit., para. 2.4.
183 Ibid para. 2.5.
184 S.I. 1972 No.1217
185 With penalties similar to those for the offence of driving a motor
vehicle without insurance, see infra, p.242.
186 See for example, National Farmers' Union Mutual rnsurance Society v. 
Dawson [1941] 2 K.B. 424.
187 Jones v. Welsh Insurance Corporation [1937] 4 All. E.R. 149.
188 For further detail, see discussion on pp.323-325 and 345-346.
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Fo u r,
189 the Motor Insurers' Bureau will have to satisfy the third party's
judgment.	 In the light of the existence of the Motor Insurers' Bureau which
satisfies judgments in the situation where a policy is ineffective, it is
hard to see any reason for retaining an inexhaustive list of conditions in
respect of breach of which the insurer cannot avoid liability. In contrast,
in Cameroon, the legislation on compulsory insurance does not provide special
protection to the injured third party from the strict contractual rights of
the insurer as against the insured who is in breach of conditions in the
policy.
190
Before 1967, the injured parties might receive no compensation if
the insured himself could not satisfy the claim. However, article 12 of
Decree No.67 - OF - 495 of 17 November 1967 fixing the status of the Motor
Insurance Fund provides that, in the case of compulsory insurance, insurance
companies should notify the Motor Insurance Fund if they intend to raise a
defence of non-compliance with the terms of the contract. 	 In practice,
however, the insurance company repudiates 	 liability and the case is
considered as one of no insurance cover. In this situation the third party's
only recourse is against the Motor Insurance Fund,
191
 a similar body to the
Motor Insurers' Bureau in England.
Furthermore, the effect of section 145 of the Road Traffic Act 1972 in
England, is that insurance cover is required in respect of any liability for
the death or bodily injury of any person including a passenger. There is no
189 See infra, p.287.
190 This list will be increased but still be inexhaustible because of
the provisions of the E.E.C. Directive already discussed, see supra,
p.211 and note 180.
191 Instead, the legislation penalises an insured who obtains a policy
with exclusions of garantee in breach of the compulsory insurance
requirements: See, article 5 of Decree No.65-DF-565 of 29 December
1965.
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distinction between fare paying passengers and gratuitous passengers.
192
Compulsory insurance in respect of passengers was first introduced by section
1 of Motor Vehicles (Passenger Insurance) Act 1971. Before 1972, it was not
compulsory to insure in respect of liability for death or bodily injury
sustained by passengers carried in a vehicle unless they were carried for
hire or reward or by reason or in pursuance of a contract of employment.
193
This created a fairly substantial gap in the law and gave rise to some
consequences. In Morgans v. Launchbury,
194
 the permitted driver, husband of
the insured, gave permission to a friend to drive the car. The latter was
negligent and the passengers were injured. The issue involved in this case
was whether the insured as owner of the car was vicariously liable for the
acts of the driver.	 It was held that the insured was not liable. If the
insurance company were not liable then the passengers would get	 no
compensation at all. It would have been of no avail for the passengers to
make a claim on the Motor Insurers' Bureau as the Bureau was not obliged to
pay for injury to passengers. However, now that liability to passengers has
to be insured against, there is the possibility of making a claim to the
Motor Insurers' Bureau in the last resort.
192 Section 145 of the Road Traffic Act 1972.
193 Section 203(3) of the Road Traffic Act 1960 now see article 145(4)
of the Road Traffic Act 1972. The 1972 Act does not concern itself
with liability for death or bodily injury to an employee of the
person insured where such injury arises out of and in the course of
his employment: Compulsory Insurance for this risk is included in
the provisions of the Employer's Liability (Compulsory Insurance)
Act 1969, see infra, p.226-233. In respect to contracted
liabilities, it would seem unfair to burden an insurer with some
unknown liability arising out of an agreement involving, as it
usually does, liability outside tort except those prescribed by
Common Law and Statute.
194 [1973] A.C. 127; On appeal from Launchbury v. Morgans [1971] 2 Q.B.
245 at 253.
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Moreover, in respect to passengers section 148(3) of the Road Traffic
Act 1972 has provided statutory protection by modification of the Common Law
defence of volenti non fit injuria: It provides that the fact that the
passenger has willingly accepted as his the risk of negligence on the part of
the user (that is, the owner or driver of the motor vehicle), is not to be
treated as negating any such liability of the latter for any injury that may
be incurred. The full effect of section 148(3) of the Road Traffic Act 1972
seems to be unclear in the light of two conflicting decisions at first
instance.
	 In Gregory v. Kelly,
195
Kenneth Jones J. considered that the
provision effectively prevented a volenti defence being raised against an
injured passenger. The decision on this particular point was based on a
concession by both counsel.
196
However, in Ashton v. Turner & McLune,
197
 per
Justice Ewbark decided that a plea of volenti could be entertained despite
section 148(3) where an accomplice passenger was suing a negligent driver who
had an accident when both of them were escaping from the scene of a burglary
in which they had been involved.
	 The actual decision here was based on the
principle of public policy 198
 and therefore the consideration of the defence
of volenti non fit inluria together with the attendant question of the effect
of section 148(3) does not seem to be strictly necessary to the decision. It
may be contended that both cases were decisions by single judges and the
question arising under section 148(3) of the Road Traffic Act 1972 was dealt
with in somewhat telegraphic terms. This seems to suggest that the point may
not have been fully argued in either case and therefore, there is room for
195 [1978] R.T.R. 426 esp. at 430.
196 The brief observations by Kenneth Jones J. was technically obiter.
197 [1980] 3 W.L.R. 736 esp. at 746.
198 Ibid 740 esp. at p.745.
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argument either way. One may argue that section 148(3) of the Road Traffic
Act 1972 was designed to deal with the normal case of volenti non fit 
in uria 199
 in view of the daunting finality of such a defence. The fact of
raising a plea of volenti non fit injuria infers that a defendant has been
negligent.	 The result of a successful plea of volenti non fit injuria 
effectively means that the defendant who is basically a wrongdoer provides no
compensation. It may therefore be contended that section 148(3) was aimed at
obviating or preventing a victim, in this case, a passenger with a remedy.
In any event, if there is effective insurance in the background, the defence
of volenti would seem to be a defence of dwindling importance for obvious
200
practical reasons.
In contrast, in Cameroon, the legislation makes a distinction between
gratuitous passengers and persons transported for valuable consideration. 201
Article 1(2) seems to suggest that gratuitous passengers are not covered by
compulsory insurance. 	 In Alfred T. Tarkanq v. Royal Exchange Assurance, 202
the deceased was a pillion passenger who promised to fuel the insured's motor
cycle. The court held that even if that amounted to a valuable considerat-
ion, the insurers could not be liable in damages because the motor cycle was
not insured for the purposes of carrying persons for valuable consideration.
The motor cycle was insured for social, domestic and pleasure purposes and
199 See further, the Scottish case of Winnik v. Dick (1984) 2 S.L.T. 185
esp. at 190 per Lord Hunter.
200 See the views of the other judges in respect of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, supra pp.179-181. For further discussion of the
defence of volenti non fit injuria, see A.J.E. Jaffey, "Volenti non 
fit injuria", (1985) 44 C.L.J. 87 esp. at pp.94,( 101-104.
201 See supra, p.210; By virtue of articles 1 and 8 of the Law of July
1985, in France both gratuitous and paying passengers are now
covered by compulsory motor insurance.
202 Civil Appeal No. WCCA/10/71 of 22 December 1971, Buea, (Unreported).
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and for the insured's business.
203
	This seems to confirm the fact that
gratuitous passengers are not covered by the compulsory motor insurance laws
in Cameroon thus creating a gap similar to that which, as has been seen,
existed in England before 1971.
Unlike in England, the Cameroonian legislation is silent on the issue
of volenti non fit injuria in respect of passengers who are covered by
compulsory insurance. In the absence of any express statutory protection to
third parties similar to the provisions of section 148(3) of the Road Traffic
Act 1972, it may be assumed that the legislation simply provides for a
compulsory guarantee of liabilities to third persons transported for valuable
consideration without regard to the defence of volenti non fit injuria. On
the other hand, no similar privilege is accorded to gratuitous passengers.
It appears that in such cases these victims will seek compensation from the
Motor Insurance Fund.
In England, the obligation to insure is imposed on any person using or
causing or permitting another person to use a motor vehicle.
204
The
expression "any person" includes a limited company and is not confined to the
driver of the vehicle.
205
 Similarly, in Cameroon, the obligation to insure
falls on any person, natural or legal who may use or cause to be used on
roads a vehicle. Companies are included in this definition as they are legal
persons.	 Further, in the light of articles 1382 and 1384 of the Civil Code
three categories of persons could be civilly liable for any tortious acts.
203 Ibid at p.3. It was mainly for the latter reason that the judge
advised the plaintiff to apply to the Motor Insurance Fund.
204 For an elaboration	 of	 the	 words	 "using" Or "causing" Or
"permitting", see infra, pp.221-222.
205 Williamson v. O'Keefe (1947] I All. E.R. 307 esp. at 308 per Lord
Goddard, L.C.J.; See also, section 143(2) of the Road Traffic Act
1972.
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Firstly, the person whose physical act causes the damage, namely, the driver.
Secondly, persons liable by virtue of article 1384 for the acts of others,
such as parents and employers of drivers. Thirdly, the owner of the vehicle
on whom a presumption of liability falls by virtue of article 1384(1).
However, the obligation to insure is not placed on each of these persons
concurrently.	 The law limits the obligation on persons who put the vehicle
on the road. Normally, this would be the owner of the vehicle.
In both England and Cameroon, there are some statutory exemptions from
the obligation to insure. This may arise by virtue of their status. 206
206 These include vehicles in the public service of the crown: section
144(2)(a) ibid; vehicles owned by a public authority or the Receiver
for the Metropolitan Police District or vehicles while being driven
for police purposes, by or under the direction of a constable or a
police employee: section 144(2)(b) ibid; vehicles being driven on a
journey for salvage purposes under the Merchant Shipping Act 1894:
section 144(2)(c) ibid; or used for certain purposes under the Army
or Air Forces Act 1955: section 144(2)(d) ibid; tramcars and trolley
vehicles operated under statutory powers: section 198(5) ibid; and
pedestrian controlled motor mowers: section 193 ibid; vehicles owned
by the London Transport Executive while being driven under the
owner's control: section 144(2)(e) ibid. However, the majority of
local authorities buy insurance where it is considered a more viable
method of coping with the risk and some prefer to self-insure, for
example, Glasgow District Council and the scheme is operated by
charging a premium to each department within the Council, or fund
motor claims from internal resources. With respect to invalid
carriages: section 143(3) of the Road Traffic Act 1972. The
D.H.S.S. arranges third party insurance cover and it is left to the
user to insure for damage if he/she chooses to do so. This risk is
usually tacked on to a Householder's insurance policy. The number
of Invacar users is however decreasing by about 10% each year as
people either give up motoring in exchange for the allowance
provided or opt for the motability scheme. See: Post Magazine and
Insurance Monitor motor correspondent, "Invalid Cars", Post Magazine
and Insurance Monitor, 25 March 1976, Vol CXXXVII, No.13, pp.709-
710; Dan Cassidy, "Compulsory motor insurance and the alternative:
2", Post Magazine and Insurance Monitor, 17 October 1985, Vol.146,
No.42 at p.2860.
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Their operations are being funded ultimately by the Government, thus making
it unnecessary to compel any form of monetary guarantee. Similarly, in
Cameroon, only the state is totally exempt as its solvency cannot be
doubted. 207 However, the system of exemption in England is more flexible
than that in Cameroon as it provides alternatives to conventional insurance
cover, namely, the deposit and the security. In England unlike in Cameroon,
a person can maintain his individual liberty by depositing the sum of £15,000
with the Accountant General of the Supreme Court. 208 In 1984,
209
 there were
six depositors under section 144(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1972. It may be
worth noting that, in England a policy does not include any financial limit
on cover against third party risks, yet a person is exempted from the
obligation to take out a policy if he deposits the sum of £15,000 with the
Accountant General of the Supreme Court. This seems to be a sort of soft
option to make people feel they have an alternative to compulsory insurance.
However, it is far-fetched to expect that advantage will be taken of this
207 Article 3 of Law No.65-LF-9 of 22 May 1965. 	 There is a right of
action against the state in the event of any of its vehicles causing
injury and/or damage to third parties. Further, article 10 of
Decree No.65-DF-565 of 29 December 1965 provides that "with regard
to the use of state owned vehicles registered under normal series
and not covered by an insurance, an attestation of the ownership
must be established by the responsible authority".
208 Section 144(1) ibid. This has been confirmed by the Principal of
the Court Funds Office London, in reply to an inquiry, letter dated
11 January 1984. It seems rather curious that this provision still
survives.
209 Reply to an inquiry, letter dated 13 March 1984 from Mr. M.
Ainsworth, Department of Transport. Currently, nine deposits have
been made: see Dan Cassidy, "Compulsory motor insurance and the
alternative:2", Post Magazine and Insurance Monitor, 17 October
1985, Vol.146, No.42, 2860 at p.2862; The exemption from compulsory
insurance operates only while the vehicle concerned is used under
the depositor's or exempt authority's own control: Department of
Transport Consultative Document, op. cit., para. 6.3. See infra,
p.263 note 40A for the case where the vehicle is used without the
owner's authority and without the required insurance.
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opportunity to maintain individual liberty. 210
	The sum of £15,000 may
represent third party insurance premiums of ten to fifteen years. Most
people would prefer to pay the ordinary third party premiums yearly than hold
down such an amount of money. It is, therefore, not surprising that not many
people and in particular, individuals have taken advantage of this option.
Admittedly, a limit has to be fixed in the case of a deposit of security but
the present one seems too low: a policy against third party risks has no
financial limit. The deposit of £15,000 has stood at this level since 1930
and is now completely inadequate in relation to current levels of awards in
respect of compensation for bodily injury and death. 211	There is no
guarantee that the exempt person will have the additional finances necessary
to satisfy an award in excess of £15,000.
The person subjected to compulsory insurance must 'use', 'cause' or
'permit' another person to use a 'motor vehicle' on a 'road'. We would
briefly examine the implications of these requirements.
In England, the word "use" has given rise to some difficulties.
However, it appears that this involves at least some element of control,
management or operation of the vehicle. It has been held that a passenger
who opens the door of a car negligently and injures a pedestrian is not
210 It is worth remarking that out of the nine deposits we mentioned at
note 209 above, three of these are from branches of the same
organisation. Being large enterprises, the amount of the deposit is
trivial in comparison to the potential of third party injury claims:
See, Dan Cassidy, op. cit., at p.2862.
211 It is probable that this deposit would be updated in the near future
when compulsory insurance for damage to thid party property is
implemented. In the case of securities see, article 146(1) of the
Road Traffic Act 1972. This measure also bears similar criticisms
as in the case of deposits.
	
See further, Dan Cassidy, op. cit., at
p.2862.
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'using' the vehicle within the meaning of the statute.
212
 A passenger does
not "use" a car since there is no element of control, management or operation
by him and thus the compulsory policy need not cover the liability of
passengers to third parties. Further, in B (a minor) v. Knight,
213
 the
defendant entered as a passenger in a van which was being driven by another
who unknown to the defendant, had taken the van without the owner's consent
and without insurance cover. In the course of the journey the defendant
learned of the taking without consent but did not ask to be allowed to get
out.
	
He was convicted by the justices of using the van uninsured in
contravention of section 143(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1972. 	 On appeal
against conviction it was held, allowing the appeal, that a passenger in a
vehicle who had no power of control over its drivers did not use the vehicle
within the meaning of section 143(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1972 and did not
aid and abet the uninsured use of a vehicle merely by letting himself be
driven even if he knew of the lack of insurance and that accordingly, the
justices had erred and the conviction was quashed.
In addition to the prohibition against using a motor vehicle on a road
personally without effective insurance, to "cause" or "permit" any other
person to breach the requirement is also unlawful.
214
	Here, "causing" may
212 Brown V. Roberts [1965] 1 Q.8.1 at p.11 per Megaw, J.; The word
"use" must be distinguished from the word "drive" and is equivalent
to "have the use of" a motor vehicle on a road. See for example,
Elliott v. Grey, [1960] 1 Q.B. 367 esp. at p.370; per Lord Parker,
L.C.J.: The word "use" in the 1972 Act probably intends to cover a
motor vehicle both when it is being driven and when it is not being
driven on the road.
213 [1981] R.T.R. 136 esp. at p.138; Brown v. Roberts [1965] 1 Q.B. 1;
Smith v. Baker [1971] R.T.R. 350; Garrett v. Hooper [1973] R.T.R. 1;
cf. Drysdale and others v. Harrison [1973] R.T.R. 45; Cobb v. 
Williams [1973] R.T.R. 113; see also, Bennett v. Richardson [1980]
R.T.R. 358 esp. at p.361.
214 See note 215 below.
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involve some express or positive order or authority, but "permitting" denotes
permission expressed or implied as distinguished from a definite order or
authority. 215
In Cameroon, the legislation does not define the circumstances in which
a person uses or causes or permits another to use a vehicle on the road.
However, it is implicit from the legislation that the offence is committed by
the owner and driver as they are normally the persons having the use of the
vehicle as well as its management and control .216 Perhaps, more properly, an
interview with the Director of the Department of Insurance as to the
elaboration of the compulsory insurance provisions threw some light on these
phrases.	 He replied that, "L'obligation d'assurance joue des que la mise en 
circulation du vghicule cr gg un risque d'accident susceptible d'entrainer la
responsabilite civile de l'utilisateur	 que la circulation ait lieu
l'intgrieur d'une proprig16 privge ou sur une voie publique."
217
The phrase
mise en circulation connotes and necessarily means "put to use", "cause" or
215 For example, see Monk v. Warbey and others [1935] 1 K.B. 75. This
decision renders the owner of the car liable in the case where he
has allowed someone else to drive the car and therefore in practice
may place his insurance company at risk, see infra, p.242. Thus the
effect of the decision in Monk v.Warbey, supra, is that even where a
policy does not cover any person driving a car with the owner's
permission (as most policies provide in their permitted drivers
clauses) such cover is, in effect, compulsorily written into the
policy. The importance, however, of this decision has been greatly
reduced by the creation of a Motor Insurers Bureau which provides
compensation to victims where the tortfeasor's insurance policy is
ineffective: See infra, Chapter Four, pp.266-290. Moreover, if
article 2(1) of the Second Council Directive (0.3. No. 1984 L8/17)
op. cit., is implemented, the third parties would be protected by
the provisions of section 148(1) of the Road Traffic Act, see supra,
p.211.
216 See below at pp.240-241 for a discussion of articles 8 and 9 of Law
No.65-LF-9 of 22 May 1965 relating to enforcement and sanctions for
non-compliance with the legislation.
217 Added emphasis. The phrase mise en circulation can also be found at
article 6 of Decree No.65-DF-565 of 29 December 1965.
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"permit" when it refers to the use of a motor vehicle. This would normally
be done in the case of "use", or alternatively allowed in respect of "cause"
and "permit" by the owner to a driver who had the control, management or
operation of the vehicle.
Furthermore, the use of the vehicle must be on a road. In this
connection "road" as defined by section 196 of the Road Traffic Act 1972
means "any highway and any other road
218
 to which the public has access, and
includes bridges over which a road passes". An accident which occurs after a
vehicle has left the highway and entered a private road is not one arising
out of the vehicle's "use" on the road
219
, but in Randall v. Motor Insurers'
Bureau,
220
 the plaintiffs suffered injury whilst the greater part of the
lorry was on a road though part was on private land. It was held that in
such circumstances the lorry was using a road and accordingly the driver had
to be insured against third party risks. Further, in Oxford v. Austin,
221
the issue arose as to whether a car park was a road. The defendant who left
his uninsured motor vehicle which was without an MOT test certificate in a
car park with parking spaces marked by white lines was charged with unlawful
use of the vehicle on a road within the definition of section 196(1) of the
Road Traffic Act 1972. The justices were of the opinion that the area of the
car park was privately owned and was primarily intended for the use of shop
workers, residents of flats and shoppers for the parking of vehicles as
Indicated by signs at the entrance and that the area was one to which only a
restricted class of persons had access by virtue of restrictions on the
218 Added emphasis.
219 Lister V. Romford Ice and Cold Storage [1957] A.C. 555.
220 [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1900.
221 (1981) R.T.R. 416; CF. Griffin v.	 Squires [1958] 1 W.L.R. 1106 at
1108 per Lord Parker, C.J.
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entrance and therefore not a road. 	 On appeal it was held, allowing the
appeal, that on a question about a car park being a road within section
196(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1972 the justices had to determine first,
whether the car park was a road in that there was a definable way between two
points over which vehicles could pass and they then had to determine whether
the public or a sector of the public had access to the road and that if both
questions could be answered affirmatively the car park was a "road" for the
purpose of section 196(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1972.
It appears that the definition of a "road" within the meaning of
section 196(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1972 is fairly wide and goes beyond
public thoroughfares to which members of the public have access by virtue of
a positive right. It therefore includes what are normally termed "private
roads".	 Furthermore, it seems that the eligibility of members of the public
to access does not have to stem from a positive right, but may derive from a
mere licence, simply because their presence is tolerated by the owners.
The test is not whether the public has right of access but whether it is a
fact that the public has access.
223
The relevant issue is the actual access
had by members of the public as such.
224
	If, however, access to the road in
question was obtained by overcoming an obstruction or in defiance of an
222 But see however, the following discussion.
223 Cox v. White [1976] R.T.R. 248 at 250; See also Blackmore v. Chief
Constable of Devon and Cornwall, The Times, 6 December 1984.
224 It appeared that the attitude of the owners of the road to that use
ought to be consent rather than tolerance: Cox v. White [1976],
supra. In addition, there ought to be a sufficient degree of use by
members of the public in general to satisfy thd test of whether the
public in general have access. Access which fell within the maxim
de minimis non curat lex would not suffice to establish the public
use test required by section 196(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1972.
See: Kreft v. Rawcliffe, The Times, 12 May 1984.
222
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expressed or implied prohibition, for example, a trespass, then it has been
stated that the road concerned would not be a "road within the definition of
section 196(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1972.
225
	It may be worth noting
however, that in practice most English policies cover use on private land.
On the other hand, in Cameroon, the legislation itself does not provide
any definition as to the meaning of a "road". We may therefore, reiterate
the comment by the Director of the Department of Insurance in particular, the
phrase,
.
a 1'int4rieur d'une propr56tg orivge ou sot une vole pun 1 que22 6 .
This seems to suggest that a vehicle must be covered by insurance whenever it
is in a place open to traffic, private or public and regardless of whether it
is moving or stationary. Prima facie persons injured on private land are
better protected in Cameroon than in England where only use on a road to
which the public has access need be covered.227
It is interesting to note that the Cameroonian legislation applies to
motor vehicles
228
 as does the English. The English legislation incorporates
a definition of a "motor vehicle". It is a "mechanically propelled vehicle
intended or adapted for use on roads.
229
This definition makes it clear that
such things as hovercraft, lawnmowers and railway engines are outside the
225 Cox  v. White [1976] R.T.R. 248 esp. at 251.
226 See supra, p.222.
227 In England, the issue seems to be debatable: see, notes 223, 224 and
225 above.
228 Article 1 of Law No.65-LF-9 of 22 May 1965.
229 Section 190(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1972. 	 For a further
discussion on this, see: Kenneth Cannar, "The Frontiers of
compulsory insurance", Post Magazine and Insurance Monitor, 22 March
1979, Vol.CXL, No.12 pp.877-878.
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scope of the legislation.
230
They are not "intended or adapted for use on
roads".
Whether a vehicle is mechanically propelled will depend on the
circumstances.	 Thus, in Smart v. Allan,
231
the defendant was convicted of
using a Rover car without there being a policy of insurance. Evidence was
given that he had bought the vehicle for £2 as scrap. He had towed it on two
wheels from place to place and ultimately left it on the road.	 The engine,
incomplete and in a rusty condition, did not work. The tyres, one of which
was missing, were flat. Theme was neither a gearbox nor a battery, and the
vehicle certainly could not move of its own accord. The defendant appealed
and his conviction was quashed.	 Lord Parker, L. C. J. observed
232
 that
where, as in the present case, there was no reasonable prospect of the
vehicle ever being made mobile again, it seemed that it had ceased to be a
mechanically propelled vehicle.	 On	 the other hand, in Newberry v. 
Simmonds
233
, Widgery, J. observed
234
 that, "... a motor car does not cease to
be a mechanically propelled vehicle on the mere removal of the engine if the
evidence admits the possibility that the engine may be replaced and the
motive power restored".
2.	 Employers' Liability Insurance 
In England, unlike in Cameroon, Employers' Liability Insurance is
compulsory. By virtue of the Employers' Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act
230 In Cameroon, see, article 2 of Law No.65-LF-9 of 22 May 1965.
231 [1963] 1 Q.B. 291 at 298; See also, Lawrence v. Howlett [1952] 2 All
E.R. 74; However contrast, Law v. Thomas (1964), 108 Sol. Jo. 158.
232 Ibid p.298.
233 [1961] 2 All. E.R. 318 at p.320.
234 Ibid at p.320; see also Law v. Thomas (1964), 108 Sol. Jo. 158; Mc.
Eachran v. Hurst [1978] R.T.R. 462.
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1969 and the regulations made there-under it is compulsory for the vast
majority of employers carrying on business in Great Britain to have
employers' liability insurance.	 Section 1 of the Act provides, inter alia
that every employer must insure and maintain insurance under one or more
approved policies with an authorised insurer against liability for bodily
injury or disease sustained by his employees arising out of and in the course
of their employment.
235
The purpose of employers' liability insurance is to
protect employers against claims for damages brought by employees and to
ensure that such claims would be met by an authorised insurance company. The
Act
236
 exempts certain employers from the obligation to insure, for example,
nationalised industries, local authorities and police authorities.The grounds
for such exemption are evidently that any claim made against such bodies will
be satisfied out of monies provided by Parliament. The employees
237
 to be
covered by insurance are basically only those employed under contracts of
service
238
 or apprenticeship. Close relatives and self-employed persons are
excluded from the obligation to insure.
The amount for which an employer is required by the Act to insure and
maintain insurance is £2 million in respect of claims relating to anyone or
235 The Act relates to bodily injury and disease, death is embraced in
the expression bodily injury. The Act requires no form of property
damage cover. Damage to employee's effects may be covered by a
public liability policy.
236 Section 3 of the Employers Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act
1969.
237 Section 2 ibid.
238 For details on the distinction between contracts of service and
contracts for services, see Rideout, Principles of Labour Law, 4th.
ed., by R. W. Rideout and Jacqueline Dyson, London, 1983, chapter 1.
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more of his employees and arising out of any one occurrence.
239
 The
expression 'any one occurrence' seems to mean any single accident.
240
Insurance companies
	 are	 apparently	 reluctant	 to	 accept	 unlimited
liability.
241
 Thus a single occurrence causing serious injuries to a large
number of employees may restrict an employee to less than the full
compensation to which he is entitled.
The phrase "arising out of and in the course of employment" appears as
the standard limit in employer's liability policies.
242
It has been given an
extended meaning in the social security context.
243
The classic formulation
of Lord Loreburn in Moore v. Manchester Liners Limited
244
 provides that, "in
the course of" employment means that an accident must arise when the employee
"is doing what a man so employed may reasonably do within a time during
which he is employed, and at a place where he may reasonably be during that
time to do that thing". Thus the limits to the course of employment are
determined by three different criteria: place, time and activity. A claimant
239 Section 1(2) of the Employers Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act
1969 hereinafter referred to as 'the 1969 Act' and Regulation 3 of
the Employers Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Regulations 1971
(S.I. 1971 No.1117) hereinafter referred to as the Regulations.
240 Forney v. Dominion Insurance Co. Ltd. [1969] 1 W.L.R. 928.
241 R.C. Simpson, "Employers Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969",
(1972) 35 M.L.R. 63 at 66.
242 A typical insuring clause will provide as follows: subject otherwise
to the terms, exceptions, limits and conditions of this policy the
insurers will indemnify the insured against all sums which the
insured shall become legally liable to pay as damages in respect of
bodily injury sustained by an employee and caused during the period
of insurance arising out of and in the course of his employment by
the insured in connection with the business and occurring within the
geographical limit. (Emphasis added.)
243 Section 53 of the Social Security Act 1975.
244 [1910] A.C. 498 at 500-501; see also Ogus and Barendt, The Law of
Social Security, 2nd ed., 1982 London, pp.276-287.
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will set up a prima facie case if he is able to show that the accident
occurred at his normal place of work during his normal hours of work. The
activity must be connected with his employment and not merely matters
incidental to employment.
245
	Therefore, employees travelling to and from
work in the employer's vehicle are not in the course of their employment
246
unless their terms of employment oblige them so to travel.
247
The Act provides protection to employees by prohibiting certain condit-
ions in employers' liability policies.
248
Insurance has to be under approved
policies with authorised insurers. An approved policy is defined as one not
subject to any conditions and exceptions prohibited by regulations. 249
Statutory Instrument No.1117 made under the Act provides that:
"Any condition in a policy of insurance issued or renewed in
accordance with the requirements of the Act after the coming into
operation of this Regulation which provides (in whatever terms)
that no liability (either generally or in respect of a particular
claim) shall arise under the policy, or that any such liability so
arising shall cease -
a) in the event of some specified thing being done or omitted to
be done after the happening of the event giving rise to a
claim under the policy;
245 R.v. National Insurance Commissioner, ex parte Michael [1977] 1
W.L.R. 109.
246 Vandyke v. Fender [1970] 2 Q.B. 292.
247 Paterson v. Costain & Press (Overseas) Limited [1979] 2 Lloyd's
Rep.204
248 Section 1(3) of the Employers Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act
1969 and Regulation 2 of the Employers Liability (Compulsory
Insurance) General Regulations 1971.
249 Section 1(3)(a) ibid.
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b) unless the policy holder takes reasonable care to protect his
employees against the risk of bodily injury or disease in the
course of their employment;
c) unless the policy holder complies with the requirements of any
enactment for the protection of employees against the risk of
bodily injury or disease in the course of their employment;
and
d) unless the policy holder keeps specified records or provides
the insurer with or makes available to him information
therefore,
is hereby prohibited for the purposes of the Act."
The purpose of these provisions is to prevent policies including conditions
which relieve the insurer from his contractual liability to pay compensation
to injured employees since it is the policy of the Act to ensure that such
compensation is paid.	 The first condition prohibited in (a) above covers
such matters as failure to give notice or particulars of loss in time, and
any unauthorised admissions of liability.	 This is analogous to section
148(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1972 .250	The effect of these words is to
reverse decisions such as Farrell v. Federated Employers Insurance Co.
where an employee's claim was defeated because his employer gave details of
the accident outside the period prescribed by the policy. However, it is not
clear whether the words of regulation 2(1)(a) above may be sufficient to
render invalid as against any employee's claim a condition providing that
payment of premiums is a condition precedent to liability, as it only covers
250 See p.211 supra.
251 [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1400.
251
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things "after the happening of the event".	 In Murray v. Legal and General
Assurance Co,
252
the court decided that on the construction of that
particular policy, a provision making the payment of insurance premiums a
condition precedent to liability did not have that effect. 	 The second
prohibition in (b) above relates to conditions which would preclude liability
if the employer failed to take reasonable care for the safety of his
employees.	 As will be discussed later in Chapter Seven on the Construction
of the Insurance Contract, the courts have construed
253
conditions in
liability policies generally requiring the insured to take reasonable care as
applicable only if an employer is more than merely negligent.
254
The third
prohibition relates to failure to comply with statutory safety requirements.
Many statutes impose liability on the employer and a breach of any of the
provisions of such a statute may expose the employer to liability, for
example, the Factories Acts, the Construction Regulations, Offices, Shops and
Railways Premises Act. The prohibition ensures that where the employer is in
breach of a statutory regulation, his liability will be covered by a policy
of insurance. Finally, the fourth prohibition relates to the keeping of
specified records, such as wages and salaries ledgers. These are most often
used for adjusting premiums. A failure to maintain such records cannot now
defeat an employee's claim. However, it should be noted that, as in the case
of the Road Traffic Act 1972, Regulation 2 (2) of the Employers' Liability
(Compulsory Insurance) Regulations 1972 provide that a policy can expressly
provide for the insured to pay the insurer any sums which the insurer is
252 [1970] 2 Q.B. 495.
253 Woolfall & Rimmer v. Moyle [1942] 1 K.B. 66; Fraser v. Furman (B.N.) 
(Productions) [1967] 1 W.L.R. 898. See infra, at p.430.
254 See J. Birds, "Modern Insurance Law", 1982, London at pp.346-7; cf.
R.A. Hasson, "Employers Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act - A
Broken Reed" [1974] I.L.J. 79 at p.85.
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liable to pay and which have been paid to employees.
It would seem that the Employers' Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act
1969 has made an attempt to ensure that employees do not go uncompensated
through the prohibition of certain conditions. Unfortunately, the Act is far
from adequate. 255 There is no provision for an established body such as the
Motor Insurers' Bureau, as in the case of motor vehicle insurance from which
an injured employee may be able to claim when his employer has simply failed
to insure or if insured, the policy is ineffective for any other conditions
not stipulated by the prohibitions and is unable to meet his claim. As will
be seen in the next chapter, in the case of compulsory motor insurance, when
someone is injured by an uninsured motorist such a person may claim from the
Motor Insurers' Bureau. Moreover, there is nothing in the Act dealing with
the insurer's defences of breach of the basis of the contract clause or
warranty, non-disclosure and misrepresentation. An insurance company which
Intends to use these defences does not even have to give notice to the
plaintiff that it intends to raise these defences. It should be noted that
motor vehicle insurers are not given any such privileged treatment. 	 As we
have already observed section 149(3) of the Road Traffic Act 1972 requires a
motor vehicle insurer who intends to use the defence of misrepresentation or
non-disclosure to give notice of that fact to any accident victim who is
seeking to recover. The effect of this subsection is to make it impossible
for a motor vehicle insurer to rely on a breach of a "basis of the contract
clause" as against the injured victim. And even in the event of the defence
succeeding, the injured person will be able to claim from the Motor Insurers'
255 For a critical analysis of the 1969 Act see R.A. Hasson, op. cit.,
pp.79-86; J. airds, op. cit., chapter 20 esp. at pp.348-349.
Recently the same point has been made in Alfred James Dunbar v. A & 
B Painters Ltd. and Economic Insurance Co. Ltd. and Whitehouse & Co. 
[1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 616 esp. at pp. 618 and 622 per J. Pratt; see
also on appeal, Dunbar v. A & B Painters Ltd., The Times, March 14,
1986, per Balcombe, L.J.
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Bureau. It will be observed in Chapter Five that warranties and the doctrine
of disclosure operates very unfairly against the insured in the field of
insurance law.	 There seems to be no justification for retaining it in this
particular area. To achieve completely the aim that no employee injured at
work should be denied compensation because of the inability of his employer
to meet his claim the establishment of an employers liability insurers'
bureau would appear to be essential.
The Act seeks only to improve the present system of compensation.
However, this must be seen against the background of current re-thinking of
the problem of providing adequate compensation for the injured worker
principally in terms of comprehensive state insurance and compensation
regardless of fault.
256
The origin of the modern social security system in England can be
traced back to 1897, when the first Workmen's Compensation Act was passed.
This Act introduced into employment law the concept of liability without
fault and the provision of cash benefits as of right and without a test of
means.	 Thus it conferred on workmen (or their dependants) a right to
compensation for any accident 'arising out of and in the course of his
employment'. In effect this Act treated workmen as insured against such
risks, although employers were not themselves compelled to insure against
their new statutory liability. In Cameroon, workmen's compensation insurance
was made compulsory by Ordinance No.59-100 of 31 December 1959. 	 In the
English-speaking Cameroon the Workmen's Compensation Ordinance of the Federal
Laws of Nigeria was applicable. After the unification, Law No.68 - LF - 17
of 18 November 1968 rendered applicable in the English-speaking Cameroon the
provisions of Ordinance No. 59-100 of 31 December 1959. 	 This class of
256 P.S. Atiyah, Accident Compensation and the Law, 3rd ed., London
1980, pp.617 et seq.; see supra, pp.170 and 185-194.
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business is not now transacted by the private insurance companies but by the
National Social Insurance Fund 257 (Caisse Nationale de PrAtoyance Sociale).
In England as well Workmen Compensation Acts have now been repealed and
replaced by a compulsory scheme of national insurance.
Public Liability Insurance 
There is no legal obligation generally to have public liability
Insurance either in England or in Cameroon. However, in England, the Riding
Establishment Act 1970 requires riding establishments to have a public
liability insurance against liability for any injury sustained by those who
hire and use a horse from them and against the liability of the latter for
injury to third parties. In addition, in i-)gland, tbe operator oT a nuclear
establishment is required to effect insurance under the Nuclear Installations
Act 1965-1969. Furthermore, certain provisions in the Finance (No.2) Act
1975 have had the effect of imposing a compulsory insurance requirement. By
virtue of sections 68-71 of the Act contractors in the construction industry
have to deduct income tax before paying certain sub-contractors, unless a
sub-contractor has an exemption certificate from the Inland Revenue. In
order to obtain such a certificate, it is in general necessary for a sub-
contractor to show inter alia that he has public liability insurance cover
for at least £250,000. 258
In Cameroon, only in respect of construction insurance is anyone
obliged to take up public liability policies. Construction insurance was
rendered compulsory in Cameroon by Law No.75 - 15 of 8 December, 1975.
	 The
purpose of this insurance is to protect members of the public against the
257 See Decree No.76/321 of 2 August, 1976, transferring Workmen's
Compensation to the National Social Insurance Fund.
258 See Schedule 2 of Finance (No.2) Act, 1975.
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financial consequences of defects resulting from faulty construction and
damage to property adjoining the construction site. Article 1(1) of the law
provides that all natural persons or corporate bodies responsible as prime
contractors for construction projects in Cameroon shall be bound to take out
comprehensive insurance against "site risks" (taus risques chantier) and
"assembly risks" (tous risques montage) with an insurance company licensed to
do business in Cameroon. Article 2(1) further provides that the persons
mentioned in article 1,	 notably building contractors, architects and
consulting engineers shall be additionally bound to insure their civil
liability in respect of defective construction or workmanship. The insurance
cover shall run for a period of ten years from the date of official
acceptance of the project • 259 The scope of the insurance cover is set out
in article 2 of Decree No.77-318 of 17 August 1977. Compulsory insurance
provided for in article 1 of Law No.75-15 of 8 December 1975 mentioned above
must include a comprehensive site insurance covering:
(a) Civil liability for damage to the construction project while it is being
executed.
(b) Civil liability for damage caused to third parties during the execution
of the project.
(c) Damage to the project during the period of maintenance which runs
between the provisional and final handing over of the project to the
owner; and
(d) Damage to building machinery while it is being assembled.
Article 4(1) further provides that "comprehensive site insurance" shall be
taken out for all building projects whose value is at least equal to 100
million francs CFA and by article 5(1) the policy of insurance must be
259 Article 2(2) Law No.75/15 of 8 December 1975.
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underwritten before the commencement of any work on the site. In addition,
in England and Cameroon, although statute does not in terms require
insurance, aircraft operators are in practice required to insure against
third party liability. An applicant for an air service licence must state in
his application form, the provision which he has made or proposes to make
against any liability in respect of loss or damage to persons or property
which may be incurred in connection with the aircraft operated by him.
260
An
applicant without any insurance cover is hardly likely to be granted a
licence. For all practical purposes this requirement has the effect of
compulsory insurance for any aircraft operator under the Civil Aviation
(Licensing) Act 1960.
Professional Indemnity Insurance 
In England, the Insurance Brokers Registration Act 1977 sections 11 and
12 and the Estate Agents Act 1979 ensures that insurance brokers and estate
agents must take out specified professional indemnity insurance. This is not
the case in Cameroon.	 Furthermore, in England, professional indemnity
insurance may be required, not by statute, but by the rules of profession.
For example, a member of the Law Society is required to be a member of the
Master Policy Scheme run by the Society in order to practise. In Cameroon as
well advocates at the Bar are required to take up insurance policies before
they can set up in practice.
260 Civil Aviation (Licensing) Regulations 1964, S.1. 1964 No.1116,
Regulations 4(1)(g) enacted pursuant to section 2(2)(b) of the Civil
Aviation (Licensing) Act 1960, section 2; see for further details,
MacGillivray and Parkington, On Insurance Law, 7th ed., London 1981
pp. 880-883
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Compulsory Insurance of Imports 
In England, there is no requirement that importers should take up
insurance. However, in Cameroon, by virtue of Law No. 75 - 14 of 8 December,
1975, all goods imported into Cameroon whose F.O.B. value is 500,000 Frs. CFA
or more must be insured. 261 The insurance must be taken with an insurance
concern in Cameroon authorised to transact insurance business in Cameroon.
262
It is not clear why insurance for the importation of goods should be rendered
compulsory. The only probable reason is the desire of the state to
consolidate the national insurance market by requiring all importers to
Insure with the local insurance companies. The limit of goods imported into
Cameroon whose F.O.B. value is 500,000 Frs CFA may seem arbitrary. 	 However,
it is significant to note that claims above 500,000 Frs are tried by the High
Courts. Insurance claims are technical and it is arguable that the high
courts are deemed to be conversant with such civil claims. Thus this may be
a probable reason for the imposition of a limit of 500,000 Frs CFA in this
case.
261 Decree No.76-334 of 6 August 1976, Article 1.
262 Article 6 of Ordinance No.85-004 of 11 December 1985; Article 1(1)
and (2) of Law No.75-14 of 8 December 1975; Article 3 of Decree
No.76-334 of 6 August 1976 relating to the implementation of Law
No.75-14 of 8 December	 1975	 rendering insurance of imports
compulsory. Article 5 of Order No.102/MINFI/MINEP applying Decree
No.76-334 of 6 August, 1976 relating to compulsory insurance of
goods imported into Cameroon.
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Article 2(2) of Decree No.76-334 of 6 August 1976 provides that in the
absence of a comprehensive coverage, the insurance policy must be taken out,
in the case of sea transport, under the minimum conditions guarantee "free of
particular average".
263
Further, article 2(2) provides that for all other means of transport
compulsory insurance shall be limited to the coverage of "total loss". And
article 4 of the Decree provides that the goods or cargo transported must be
insured from the port or airport of landing to the port or airport of
delivery: the parties may, however, agree to an insurance coverage for
preliminary or supplementary risks of travel by sea or air. This legislation
does not regulate the contractual rights of the insured and insurer as
article 2(1) specifically states that the type of insurance shall be fixed by
the parties. Moreover, there is no protection afforded to the insured who is
in breach of any conditions as we observed in the case of motor vehicle
insurance and employers' liability insurance in England. Thus it does seem
to confirm the view stated above that the purpose of rendering compulsory
insurance in respect of goods imported is to consolidate the national
insurance market and further to place a check on importation of goods into
Cameroon.
263 Particular average warranties, in marine insurance, are clauses
excepting the insurer from liability for partial losses. Where the
subject-matter insured is warranted free from particular average, the
assured cannot recover for a loss of a part, other than a loss incurred
by a general average sacrifice unless the contract contained in the
policy is apportionable, the assured may recover for a total loss of any
apportionable part: Marine Insurance Act 1906 s.76(1). See further
sections 76(2) and (3); see E.R.H. Ivamy, Dictionary of Insurance Law,
1981, London pp.56-57 and 103-104; For the meaning of general average
sacrifice and general average loss. For a detailed account of the
meaning of the phrase in Marine Insurance see: Arnould, Law of Marine 
Insurance and Average, Vol.2, 16th ed., 1981 London, Stevens and Sons,
para.841 p.713 and para.1100 p.887.
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We may conclude this section by stating that the development of
liability insurance and in particular, compulsory insurance appears to depend
on the evolution of the law which has throughout tended to augment the scope
of potential liabilities. This trend may continue in the future either
directly by legislation or indirectly by the requirements of professional
bodies as a condition of a licence to practice. The former may be effected
eventually through the introduction of some system of no fault liability and
the latter through private insurance. 	 There seems to be some validity for
Professor	 Hugh	 Cockerell's comment
264
that, "No fault liability and
compulsion to insure are alike symptoms of the public's demand for security."
Nevertheless, private insurance would in one area or another, play an
increasing role to complement this desire.
VI ENFORCEMENT AND SANCTIONS
There would be little point in instituting compulsory insurance unless
there were measures for its enforcement accompanied by sanctions for the
breach of the obligation. In both England and Cameroon penal as well as
civil sanctions have been provided by legislation to compel compliance.
However, penal sanctions against the errant culprit are no remedy for the
injury suffered by an innocent victim of a motor vehicle	 accident.
Admittedly, it is such persons that the legislation on compulsory insurance
in both England and Cameroon set out to protect, subject to liability being
found.
264 Hugh Cockerell, "Insurers and no fault", Post Magazine and Insurance
Monitor, 26 August, 1982, Vol.CXLIII, No.34, 2050 at p.2051.
wherewell as, applicable,
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To comply with the enactments in respect of motor vehicle insurance the
law requires that the policies must be issued by authorised insurers. 265
 The
insurance companies must issue a certificate of insurance which is proof that
the requirements of the law have been met.
266
	In Cameroon article 4(2) of
Law No.65 - LF - 9 of 22 May 1965 provides that the insurance company shall
on acceptance of a proposal issue a certificate of insurance in a form to be
prescribed by decree.	 In 1965 a decree was enacted in pursuance of the
aforementioned law.
267
 Article 6 of this decree requires that a certificate
of insurance must be obtained before the vehicle is put into circulation.
Further, article 8(1) provides that the insurance company must deliver free
of charge a document in proof of insurance for each of the vehicles covered
by the policy and where the guarantee applies at the same time to a motor
vehicle and to its trailers or semi-trailers only one document in proof may
be delivered on condition that it specifies the type of trailer or semi-
trailer which may be used with the vehicle as
their registration number.
In Cameroon the police and gendarme officers conduct routine road
checks to ensure that all motor vehicles are in possession of a valid policy
of insurance covering the drivers liability towards third party risks or a
certificate of insurance. Article 9(1) of Law No.65 - LF - 9 of 22 May 1965
provides that any driver of a vehicle who is not in a position to produce to
the officers or officials responsible for investigating traffic offences a
265 In England, this is provided by section 145(2) of the Road Traffic
Act 1972; and in Cameroon by article 4(1) of 65-LF-9 of 22 May 1965.
266 In England section 147(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1972 makes
provision for a certificate of insurance and section 147(2) of the
same Act requires a certificate of security.
267 Decree No.65-LF-565 of 29 December 1965 applying the Law No.65-0E-
565 of 29 December 1965.
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document evidencing its insurance under article 3 shall be punished with a
fine of up to 10,000 Frs CFA. Further section 9(2) provides that failing the
said production and until evidence of insurance has been furnished the
vehicle shall be impounded by the police authorities and the costs incidental
to the impoundment, transport and custody of the vehicle shall be borne by
the owner. It must be observed that article 9(1) makes it clear that an
offence is committed once the driver fails to produce a certificate of
insurance. The provision nevertheless does not mention anything about a
subsequent production, for example, whether a fine would still be imposed.
In practice, however, the police authorities detain the vehicle and prosecute
only when the driver has failed to produce a certificate within a reasonable
time. Thus the only offence which the courts take into consideration is the
actual failure to insure the vehicle.
	 This offence is punishable under
article 8(1) of Law No.65 - LF - 9 of 22 May 1965 with a fine of up to one
million francs CFA or with imprisonment of up to twelve months or with both
such imprisonment and fine. The offender's driving licence may at the same
time be suspended for up to twelve months 268
 and any fine imposed shall be
increased by half payable to the Motor Insurance Fund. 269
	This provision
ensures that some of the burden imposed upon the community by uninsured
motorists falls on the offenders themselves. This seems fairer than the
English system whereby the Motor Insurers' Bureau is financed solely by
contributions from insurance companies.
	 Evidently, the insurance companies
meet this cost by an increase in premiums. Premiums higher than really
necessary to cover the risk have to be paid in order that the insurers may
contribute to the Bureau's funds.
	 In the end result only the insured
motorist community bear this burden.
268 Article 8(2) of Law No.65-LF-9 of 22 May 1965.
269 Article 8(3) ibid.
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Although in Cameroon, the	 penalty	 for non-compliance with the
compulsory insurance law is severe, the courts in practice seem to extract a
small fine. In the People v. Konye Ohaechesi Benedict,
270
 the accused drove
a vehicle with an expired insurance certificate.	 The Court held him liable
to pay a fine of 16,000 Francs CFA or seven days imprisonment with hard
labour and a further 8,000 Francs CFA payable to the Motor Insurance Fund.
The penal sanction in England is not as severe as that provided under
Cameroonian law.	 A 'user' of a motor vehicle who is not insured or secured
against third party risks will be liable on summary conviction to a fine not
exceeding fifty pounds or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three
months, or to both such fine and imprisonment.
271
A failure to insure may
lead to civil proceedings as well.
272 English defaulters expose themselves
to an action for breach of statutory duty.
273 The measure of damage will be
the damage suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the breach, in other
words, that suffered in an accident caused by the uninsured motorist.	 The
advantage of this action is that, where the motorist is without means, the
victim may sue directly any person who caused or permitted him to use the
vehicle without insurance. In practice, however, this action has fallen into
disuse, since compensation for damage caused by uninsured motorists may be
270 Charge No. TM/14C/84 of 5 January 1984 Tiko(Unreported); see also
The People v. Kamsi Michel, Charge No. TM/34C/84 of 12/1/84 Tiko
(Unreported) and The People v. Lonola Joseph Charge No. TM/157C/84
of 29 March 1984 Tiko (Unreported).
271 Section 143(1) and Schedule 4, of Part 1 of the Road Traffic Act
1972.
272 Section 143(2) ibid.
273 Monk v. Warbey and others [1935] 1 K.B. 75 at 79. See further, Dan
Cassidy, "Compulsory motor insurance and the alternative: 1," Post
Magazine and Insurance Monitor, 10 October 1985, Vol. 146, No.41,
2795.
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obtained from the Motor Insurers' Bureau.
274
Even though the sanctions may serve to deter motorists from committing
an offence, a considerable number of persons still drive uninsured. A system
of prevention is most desirable. 	 In England a vehicle's excise licence
cannot be obtained without the production of a certificate of insurance,
security or exemption. Admittedly, this does not prevent a motorist becoming
uninsured in the course of the period of its validity but at least it
prevents him starting off without an insurance. Moreover, quite a lot of
people do not even obtain a road fund licence.
275
In Cameroon there is no
requirement preventing a motorist licensing a vehicle without effective
insurance in force.	 The best system of control and prevention exists in
Germany. There, the certificate of insurance consists of a tag which must be
affixed to the vehicle's registration disc. If the insurance is terminated
for any reason this tag must be surrendered to the administrative body that
issued it.	 The latter must be notified of the termination by the insurer.
This enables the body to take steps to ensure compliance with the law.
With regard to employers'
	 liability	 insurance in England, the
enforcement machinery embraces both criminal and administrative sanctions.
The administrative procedure is based on the issuing, display and production
of certificates of insurance. By virtue of section 4(1) of the 1969 Act and
regulation 5, insurance companies are required to provide employers with
274 See later Chapter Four, pp.265-290. However, a third party is still
at liberty to bring such an action even in spite of the existence of
the Motor Insurer's Bureau, though, of course, he will not be
entitled to retain both the compensation paid by the Bureau and the
damages recovered from the owner of the vehicle a ,Corfield v. Groves 
[1950] 1 All E.R. 488 at p.62.
275 See Home Office Statistics on Offences relating to Motor Vehicles in
England and Wales 1977, Cmnd.7349 p.50; 1978, Cmnd. 7687 p.58;
Cmnd.8087 p.62. Furthermore, the Accident Offices' Association
produced figures suggesting that about one and a half million
motorists drive without insurance cover: The Guardian, 31 August
1983.
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certificates of insurance in prescribed form within thirty days of the
insurance commencing or being renewed. The employer is required to display
copies of the certificate at each place of business where he employs an
employee whose claim may be subject to an indemnity under the insurance
policy. 276 The responsibility for enforcing the duty to insure and the duty
to display insurance certificates is placed on inspectors of the Health and
Safety Executive. 	 Thus section 4(2)(b) and regulation 7 empowers an
inspector to require an employer after reasonable notice, to send to the
executive either the original or a copy of the certificate and section
4(2)(c) and regulations 8 and 9 empower inspectors to demand inspection of
certificates or policies of insurance at the employer's place of business. A
failure to comply with any of these requirements is liable to a fine of
£50. 277 Furthermore, failure to hold insurance required by the Act can
render an employer liable to a fine of £200 for each day of such default. 278
Consequently, the observance of the Act depend very much on the efficiency of
the administrative sanction of inspection.
In Cameroon, the measures for ensuring compliance with the compulsory
insurance of imports are provided for by Decree No.76/334 of 6 August 1976.
Article 5 of the Decree provides that the insurance company must deliver free
of charge to the insured importer a certificate of insurance which shall be
prima facie proof that the obligation to insure has been complied with: a
duplicate of such a certificate must be made available to the insured at his
request in the event of loss or theft thereof. 	 Furthermore, article 2 of
Ministerial Order No.102 MINFI/MINEP of 27 April 1976 implementing the
276 SectiOn	 4(2)(a)	 of	 the	 Employers'	 Liability	 (Compulsory
Insurance)Act	 1969	 and regulation 6 of Employer's Liability
(Compulsory Insurance) General Regulations 1971 (S.I. 1971 No.1117).
277 Section 4(2)(b) and Regulation 7 ibid.
278 Section 4(2)(c) and Regulation 8 and 9.
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Decree provides that the certificate of insurance must be issued by the
insurer in four copies each made available to the service in charge of
External Commerce, the Service of Exchange Control, the importer and the
Custom department; the certificate of insurance must be appended to the
application for a foreign exchange permit. The prospective importer will not
qualify for a foreign exchange permit if he fails to produce proof of
insurance as required by the order. The importer must also present a copy of
the certificate of insurance to the custom officers before he can take
delivery of his goods.	 Further article 7 of the Decree provides that the
issue or renewal of any import licence must be subject to the presentation of
a copy of the insurance certificate. Further sanctions for failure to insure
imports are provided by article 3 of Law No.75/14 of 8 December 1975; the
importer is liable to a fine equal to one quarter of the value of the goods
imported and/or imprisonment of up to twelve months.
With regard to construction insurance in Cameroon, article 6 of Decree
No.77-318 of 17 August 1977 provides that, at the time of signing the
insurance Contract, the insurance concern must issue free of charge to the
insured person a document showing evidence of insurance. Further article 7
of the Decree stipulates that the payment of the first installment for
contract work or the execution of any other agreement relating to realisation
of a project must be subject to presentation of the document showing evidence
of insurance. By virtue of article 6 of Law No.75 - 15 of 8 December 1975,
failure to obtain an insurance cover is punishable by fine from one million
to ten million francs CFA and by imprisonment for one to five years, or one
or other such penalty only. In England, any failure by the constructors to
obtain a public liability policy will result in a denial of the certificate
provided by the Act.	 And finally, a failure by riding establishments to
obtain the above insurance is an offence under the principal Act of 1964 and
punishable by a fine not exceeding £50.
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Despite the existence of other forms of compulsory insurance, it is
clear that motor insurance is by far the most important. As shown in Table 5
overleaf, the premium income from motor insurance in relation to other
classes of insurance business reveals that motor insurance accounts for
almost half of the premium income of insurance companies. This also seems to
be the case in England. This preponderance is probably due to the fact that
this class of insurance is more commonly obtained than other classes of
insurance business.
Table 5 :
	 CAMEROON WRITTEN PREMIUM INCOME 1975 - 1981 
BRANCH OF BUSINESS
	 YEAR AND SHARE OF MARKET OCCUPIED ( % )
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Motor Vehicle Insurance 49.91 42.59 42.23 44.36 42.86 42.46 41.37
Fire Insurance 11.64 11.41 5.05 10.22 11.67 11.39 12.02
Theft/Burglary 1.80 1.39 1.26 1.55 1.67 1.75 2.71
Personal Accident 1.75 1.78 1.85 3.38 4.21 4.87 1.65
Sickness Insurance 4.05 3.98 3.88 3.92 3.85 3.85 4.66
Aviation Insurance 1.98 1.75 1.91 1.65 1.84 1.84 3.75
Workmen's Compensation 14.08 17.38 10.01 0.68 0.06 0.02 0.01
Liability Insurance 3.84 4.34 4.76 3.92 4.62 5.20 5.47
Source	 :	 Department of Insurance 1982, Yaounde
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Table 6 :	 U.K. NET WRITTEN PREMIUM INCOME 1977 - 1981 
YEAR 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Branch of Business £m. £m. Em. Ern. Em.
Liability 320 379 414 456 443
Motor 873 1,064 1,290 1,544 1,694
Pecuniary Loss 170 200 216 253 291
Personal Accident 68 73 97 117 126
Property 788 924 1,099 1,397 1,635
TOTAL GENERAL 2,219 2,640 3,166 3,767 4,189
Source:	 Insurance Facts and Figures 1981.
British Insurance Association, London.
-=<>=-
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CHAP TER	 4
PROTECTION OF ROAD TRAFFIC ACCIDENT VICTIMS
I INTRODUCTION
In the last chapter we examined the reason for and scope of compulsory
motor insurance in England and Cameroon. An extension of the idea underlying
compulsory insurance would be government concern for compensating those
injured where compulsory insurance should have been in force, but was not.
The study of protection of road traffic accident victims in this chapter
will, therefore, look primarily at what happens when motor insurance has not
been taken out.
The use of motor vehicles causes enormous risks to individuals.
According to statistics obtained from the Ministry of Transport in Cameroon,
the severity of road accidents was alarming, especially before 1965.
1
Vehicles in circulation as at 1st. January 1962 numbered approximately
27,000. By 1965 the number had risen to 45,000, an increase of 57 per cent.
2
Between 1961 and 1965 the number of accidents on the road in Cameroon
1 In 1965 the insurance of motor vehicles against the risk of
liability for injury to, or death of, third parties caused by the
driver's negligence was made compulsory: Article 1 of Law No.65-LF-9 of
22 May 1965. See Chapter Three, supra, pp.204-205.
2	 Cameroon: Ministry of Transport, Department of Statistics, 1966.
- 250 -
increased from 530 to 1900 and the number of deaths and injuries increased
from 800 to 2850.
3
The seriousness of these accidents poses problems which the general law
on civil liability seemed inadequate to deal with, particularly on the
subject of compensation for personal injuries and death. 4 In respect of
these accidents it seemed
5
 that more than 60 per cent of the vehicles were
not insured and accordingly in some accidents numerous victims had no
effective redress.
Although it was possible to punish the authors of such accidents
criminally through the courts, there were no other means under the then
existing regulations of guaranteeing compensation to the victims. Since the
3	 TABLE 7: Road Accidents in Cameroon (excluding existing towns), 
1961-1965 
Year
Number of
Accidents
Number of
Fatal accidents
Number of Persons
Killed & injured
1961 530 280 500
1962 550 300 800
1963 850 500 1000
1964 1100 750 2000
1965 1900 1150 2850
The above figures were obtained from the Gendamerie Nationale for
the whole of the national territory excluding the then existing
towns in the course of field research in 1982. The absence of
statistics for the entire country makes the information inadequate.
4	 This subject has been dealt with in Chapter Three of this work. See
supra., pp.150-177.
5	 Cameroon: Ministry of Transport, Select Committee Report on problems •
caused by Road Traffic Accidents 1964, at p.4.
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abolition of "an-eye-for-an-eye"
6
 amongst the clans, injury arising from road
accidents can only be repaired by compensation: the victim is awarded
damages.	 Unfortunately, few people in Cameroon are in a position to meet
from their personal means, the financial obligations flowing from road
accidents for which they are responsible. Consequently, their victims remain
without a remedy even when a court awards them damages for loss and injury
sustained from road accidents. 	 It became necessary to impose compulsory
motor vehicle insurance against third party liability
7
 with the object of
providing injured third parties with a sure financial source from which to
recover any damages to which they may become entitled.
If the obligatory insurance policy is of help to victims, it is far
from being an absolute guarantee against the risks caused by motor vehicles.
There are cases where an injured victim may be deprived of compensation
because he can find no one to sue, for example, if he is injured by the
negligence of a 'hit and run' driver, or the person responsible is uninsured
or the insurance company is insolvent or goes into liquidation.
Furthermore, even where an insurance policy has been obtained, the
policy	 may be ineffective for many reasons: for example, breach of
conditions, terms and exceptions of the policy.
8
In Cameroon, few of the
drivers or owners of vehicles plying the highway have ever gone to school or
6	 See: T. Olawale Elias, British Colonial Law - A Comparative Study of 
the Interaction between	 English	 and	 Local Laws in British
Dependencies, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1962, p.101 et seq. 
7	 See note 1 above.	 Third Party motor vehicle insurance has been
compulsory in Britain since 1930 by the Road Traffic Act 1930 and in
France since 1958.	 One purpose of the Road Traffic Act 1930 as
stated in the preamble was "to make provision for 	 the protection
of third parties against risks arising out of the use of motor
vehicles."
8	 This will be discussed in Chapter Seven on construction of insurance
contract, see infra pp.434-439.
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are educated enough to understand the technicalities of an insurance
contract. Nor may they be able to resist the high-pressure sales tactics of
local insurance agents who issue policies and claim that the insured is
covered in all respects whereas there may be certain conditions and
exceptions limiting their liability. It is not uncommon to find vehicles
insured for the carriage of 'goods only' used to convey passengers. This
practice, mostly carried out in the suburbs and cities under cover of
darkness, is unofficially condoned by the authorities. 	 Again, it is not
unusual to find a vehicle carrying more than the restricted number of
passengers and a member of the forces of law and order as a conspicuous
passenger sitting in front to avoid any police road checks, notwithstanding
that the insurance policy covering the vehicle contains an exception clause
stating that the underwriters will not be liable for loss or damage whilst
the insured vehicle is 'conveying passengers in excess of the number for
which it was constructed.' However, not until there is an accident are the
victims or third parties informed by the insurance companies that their
claims cannot be met for the policy of insurance does not cover that
particular risk. These are only a few of the malpractices in which drivers
indulge and the result is that many victims of road accidents go without
compensation from insurance companies.
Similarly, in England, further protection of victims of road accidents
who received no compensation despite the protection afforded by the Road
Traffic Act 1930 was realised. The initiative came from the then Ministry of
Transport (now the Department of the Environment).
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II ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANISATION OF THE MOTOR INSURANCE FUND IN CAMEROON
AND OF THE MOTOR INSURERS' BUREAU IN ENGLAND
There was a need for state intervention to protect its citizens against
the risk of accidents due to the intensification of traffic. The legislator
nevertheless did not lose sight of the fact that whatever the scope of any
law and the rigour with which it is applied, defaults are always possible.
Thus, in Cameroon, article 7 of the same law making motor insurance
obligatory, provided for the creation of a Motor Insurance Fund.
9
The M.I.F.
is a public establishment with a legal personality and financial autonomy
whose status is governed by Decree No.67-DF-495 of 17 November 1967.
10
This
decree came into force on 17 December 1967
11
 in pursuance of article 7 of Law
No.65-LF-9 of 22 May 1967.
In Britain, while the Road Traffic Act 1930 made insurance against
third party liability compulsory, there was no provision in the Act, or
elsewhere, for third parties to be compensated where a motorist had been
9 Hereinafter referred to as the M.I.F. Cameroon was fortunate to
learn from the experience of other countries and made provisions in
one enactment. As stated already, the same law that made third
party liability compulsory established the Motor Insurance Fund;
whereas in England there was no provision in the Road Traffic Act
1930 under which victims could be similarly compensated.
10 Article 7 of Law No.65-LF-9 of 22 May 1965.
11 Decree No.67-DF-495 of 17 November 1967 fixing the status of the
Motor Insurance Fund. The Cameroon legislator got inspiration from
article 15 of Law No.51-1508 of 31 December 1951 creating the 'Fonds 
de Garantie Automobile' in France. The regulations governing the
operation of the fund in France are more specifically defined in
Decree No.52-763 of 30 June 1952: D. 1952, 235. For a discussion on
the background and purposes of the 'Fonds de Garahtie Automobile' in
France see, generally, Suzanne Tunc, "Establishment of 'Fonds de
Garantie' to compensate victims of Motor Vehicle Accidents", (1953)
2 Am. J. Comp. Law 235; M. Picard and A. Besson, op. cit., pp.614-
623; M. Picard, "Le Fonds de garantie pour les victimes d'accidents
d'automobile", D. 1952 Chr. 97.
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negligent and was not covered for some reason Or another by a policy of
insurance.	 Even if it was not fully realised at the time, it soon became
apparent that there were certain types of risks for which there was no
protection under the Act. It was because of this situation that a committee
to consider compulsory insurance was set up under the chairmanship of Sir
Felix Cassel.
12
On December 31, 1945, the Ministry of War Transport (now the
Department of the Environment) and the insurance companies dealing with motor
insurance business entered into an agreement for the establishment of a fund
to be administered by a body to be set up and which is known as the Motor
Insurers' Bureau (M.I.B.). The M.I.B. is a limited company 13
 whose members
are all insurance companies engaged in motor insurance in the United
Kingdom.
14
By virtue of section 20 of the Road Traffic Act 1974, it is now a
condition of authorisation to
	 transact motor insurance business that
Insurance companies and Lloyd's syndicates be members of M.I.B. Limited. The
main object of the agreement was to implement the recommendations of the
Cassel Committee. The Committee proposed the compensation of victims of road
accidents where no compensation was available or recoverable due to the
absence or ineffectiveness of insurance cover of the driver liable for the
accident.	 Practice showed that there was another loophole. The 'hit-and-
run' driver who could not be traced could not be sued. The agreement for the
compensation of victims of uninsured drivers was inapplicable in this case.
In 1969 another agreement between the government and the M.I.B. was entered
into	 dealing with compensation for the victims of untraced drivers.
12 For the recommendations of the Cassel Committee, see Report of the
Committee on Compulsory Insurance, London 1937, Cmnd.5528. See
further, 649 Hansard, H.C. Cols.1814-1824 (5 March 1965).
13 The M.I.B. was incorporated under the Companies Act 1929 (see now
the Companies Act 1985).
14 Article 3 of the Articles of Association of the M.I.B. adopted by
special resolution passed on 24 September 1974.
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Eventually, in 1972 the two agreements
15
were updated as: (a) the agreement
for "Compensation of victims of Uninsured Drivers", and (b) the agreement for
the "Compensation of victims of Untraced Drivers", both of which are dated
November 22, 1972. In 1977, a third agreement 16
 supplemented to the second
agreement was entered into dealing with 'hit-and-run' cases. This agreement
simply provides for claims in respect of the victims of hit-and-run drivers.
Thus there are now three agreements between the Secretary of State for the
Environment and the M.I.B.
Whereas the Motor Insurance Fund in Cameroon is created by an Act of
Parliament, the Motor Insurers' Bureau in England is the result of an
agreement between the Secretary of State for the Environment and motor
insurance companies. The agreement can be dissolved at any time by the
Secretary of State or the M.I.B. on twelve months notice without prejudice to
the continued operation of the agreement in respect of accidents occurring
before the date of termination.
17
The agreements of 1972 and 1977 are on the
face of them, contracts under seal between the Secretary of State for the
Environment and the motor insurance companies and this contract cannot be
15 For the full text of the Agreements, see Department of the
Environment, Motor Insurers' Bureau (Compensation of Victims of
Uninsured Drivers), London H.M.S.O. 1972, (SBN 11 550268 8) in
respect of the first agreement and (Compensation of Victims of
Untraced Drivers), London H.M.S.O. 1972, (SBN 11 550267 X) in
respect of the second agreement. See also E.R.H. Ivamy, Fire &
Motor  Insurance, 3rd ed., 1978 Londom, Butterworths, Appendix XIII,
p.459. For a detailed discussion of the agreements of 1972, see
E.R.H. Ivamy, op. cit., pp.337-353; D.B. Williams, Hit and Run and 
Uninsured Drivers - Personal Injury Claims, (The Role of the Motor 
Insurers' Bureau), 4th ed., 1983 Barry Rose Publishers, Chichester;
"The 'hit and run victims' charter", Law Society Gazette, May 1969,
pp. 304-305
16 Department of Transport, Motor Insurers' Bureau (Compensation of
Victims of Untraced Drivers), London H.M.S.O. 1977.
17 Clauses 24 and 5 of the Agreements relating to Untraced Drivers 1972
and 1977 respectively and clause 3 of the Uninsured Drivers
Agreement 1972.
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enforced by the accident victim because of the doctrine of privity of
contracts.
18
In theory, no doubt, if the M.I.B. broke this agreement the
Department of the Environment might be able to get an order of specific
performance requiring the M.I.B. to comply with the agreement. 19 In
practice, however, injured parties sue the M.I.B. directly 20
 and the point
that they have no cause of action is not raised by the M.I.B. or by the
court.
21
In Hardy v. Motor Insurers' Bureau 22
 Lord Denning said that he
hoped the point would never be taken. However, it may be possible that if
the M.I.B. violates this agreement, the whole scheme or some alternative
would be put onto a statutory footing, possibly by nationalisation of motor
insurance business.
The Motor Insurance Fund in Cameroon is placed under the authority of
the Minister of Finance.
23
The National Reinsurance Fund is responsible for
the management of the Motor Insurance Fund, and all the personnel of the
18 See the remarks of Lord Denning M.R. and of Diplock L.J. in Hardy v. 
Motor Insurers' Bureau [1964] 2 Q.B. 745 at pp.757 & 766 and also in
Gurtner v. Circuit [1968] 2 Q.B. 587 at pp. 596 & 598. It may be
this difficulty can be overcome by the Secretary of State against
the M.I.B., followed by an enforcement of the judgment by the
injured party. If the Secretary of State refuses to sue, he might
conceivably be joined as defendant in an action brought by the
injured party against the M.I.B. See, Gurtner v. Circuit [1968] 2
Q.B. 587 per Lord Denning at p.596, Salmond L.J. ibid. at, 13.606.
•
19 Beswick v. Beswick, [1968] A.C. 58; Gurtner v. Circuit [1968] 2 Q.B.
587.
20 Lees v. Motor Insurers' Bureau [1953] 1 W.L.R. 620; Buchanan v. 
Motor Insurers' Bureau [1955] 1 W.L.R. 488; Coward v. Motor 
Insurers' Bureau [1963] 1 Q.B. 259.
21 Albert v. Motor Insurers' Bureau [1972] A.C. 301 esp. at 302per
Viscount Dilhorne; Hardy v.Motor Insurers' Bureau [1964] 2 Q.B. 745;
Coward v. Motor Insurers' Bureau [1963] 1. Q.B. 259.
22 Ibid. at p.757.
23 Article 2(2) of Decree No.67-DF-495 of November 17, 1967.
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M.I.F. are those of the National Reinsurance Fund 24
	
They share a common
administration, namely, the Board of Governors, the Managing Director and the
Auditors.	 The Board has the widest powers of management and administration
of the M.I.F. It decides on the general policy of the M.I.F. and regulates
and controls its activities.
III THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES OF THE MOTOR INSURANCE FUND IN CAMEROON AND OF
THE MOTOR INSURERS' BUREAU IN ENGLAND
The financial resources of the M.I.F. in Cameroon are provided for by
decree.	 These resources are from three kinds of contribution, namely,
contributions by insurance companies; by uninsured motorists and by the
government.
25
 In England, the M.I.B. is financed by insurance companies26
and government contributions. 27
Contributions by Insurance Companies 
Insurance companies engaged in motor insurance business in Cameroon are
obliged by decree to contribute towards the financing of the Motor Insurance
Fund.	 This contribution is assesed on the premium income of insurance
companies in the motor insurance business received in the course of the
preceding calendar year after deduction of tax and cancellations. It is
fixed each year before 31st. January by an order of the Minister of Finance.
Article 1 of Order No. 750/MINFI/DCE5 of 7 August 1985 provides that 1.75 per
cent of the motor insurance premium should be contributed to the Motor
24 Articles 4 & 5 of the 1967 Decree, ibid.
25 Articles 7 & 8 of the 1967 Decree, infra. pp.260-263.
26 Article 35(1) of the Articles of Association of the Motor Insurers'
Bureau 1974.
27 See infra, pp.262-263.
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Insurance Fund.
27A
The source of financing here is therefore limited to the
number of insurance companies and the volume of business in the motor
insurance branch. Consequently, with every increase in the total amount of
premiums and the number of insured persons, there will be a corresponding
increase in the contributions by insurance companies.
Similarly, in England, the M.I.B. makes calls or levies on any of its
members by way of contribution to the finances of the Bureau to enable it to
discharge its obligations.
28
However, unlike in Cameroon where contribution
is assesed on a fixed percentage basis, in England, any contribution required
by the M.I.B. is apportioned between each member pro rata on the motor
insurance premium income received by the companies during the calendar year
immediately preceding that in which the call or levy in question is made.
29
It seems therefore that in England, the contribution is flexible and varies
according to the amount required each year to finance the scheme and further,
as in Cameroon in proportion to the total amount of premiums held by
Insurance companies. In addition, members each pay a subscription calculated
according to the table as shown overleaf.
27A It is worth pointing out that this percentage has not been changed
since 1978.
28 Article 35(1) of the Articles of Association of the Motor Insurers'
Bureau 1974. The M.I.B. in England, basically assumes the position
of a liability insurer.
29 Article 7 of the Articles of Association of the Motor Insurers'
Bureau 1974.
- 259 -
TABLE 8:	 Premium Income and Subscription of Member 
(or Group) of the Motor Insurers' Bureau in England
Premium Income of the
Member or Group £	 Subscription £
Up to & including
Exceeding
but not exceeding
Exceeding
but not exceeding
Exceeding
but not exceeding
Exceeding
but not exceeding
Exceeding
but not exceeding
Exceeding
	
100,000
	 For each £1,000 of
premium income
	 1
100,000
	
250,000
	 Flat rate	 200
250,000
	
500,000	 Flat rate
	
400
500,000
	
1,000,000
	 Flat rate
	 800
1,000,000
5,000,000
	 Flat rate
	
1,200
5,000,000
10,000,000
	 Flat rate
	 1,400
10,000,000
	 Flat rate
	 1,600
SOURCE: Article 7 of the Articles of Association of the Motor
Insurers' Bureau 1974
It is interesting to note that for the year ended 31st. December 1983,
the Members contribution and subscription paid to the M.I.B. amounted to
£10,717,498. 30
It is without doubt that the financial resources of the M.I.B. and
30 Motor Insurers' Bureau: Balance Sheet and Accounts for the year to
31 December 1983, Jordan & Sons Ltd., Search Report 17/04/85, Re:
Motor Insurers' Bureau, Company Number 000412787.
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M.I.F. in England and Cameroon respectively, are partly a charge on insurance
companies generally, to which of course insuring motorists eventually
contribute.
Uninsured Motorist Contribution 
In Cameroon, as we saw earlier in Chapter Three 31 , there is a penalty
imposed by law for failure to insure. By virtue of article 8(3) of the 1965
Law, all fines imposed on motorists for failure to insure shall be increased
by one half which is payable to the M.I.F.
	 Thus the M.I.F. indirectly
punishes those who breach the law on compulsory motor insurance. In The
People v. Thomas Ateh, 32
 the Magistrates Court found the accused guilty of
driving without insurance cover contrary to article 1(1) of the 1965 Law. He
was fined 10,000 francs CFA plus 5,000 francs CFA payable to the Motor
Insurance Fund or three months imprisonment.
	 In another case, Mekoulou 
Felicien c. Apano Elono and others, 33
 an accident occurred on 28 October
1973. The insurance policy of the vehicle responsible for the accident
expired on 23 October 1973 and was renewed on 9 November 1973. A charge was
brought against the driver for failure to comply with article 1(1) of Law
No.65-LF-9 of May 22 1965, conduct punishable under article 8(1) of the same
law.	 The driver was found guilty and fined 10,000 francs CFA plus half
thereof, that is, 5,000 francs CFA payable to the M.I.F. or three months
imprisonment.
31 Supra pp.239-242.
32 Charge No. KM/1121 T/28, 1978 Kumba (Unreported);
	 See also, The
People v. Fombin Charles, Charge No. BA/692C/71, Bamenda
(Unreported) per Magistrate Nganje (as he then was) giving similar
judgment to the above case on similar facts.
33 Judgment No.224 of 19 December 1977, Yaounde (Unreported).
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This contribution by uninsured motorists could be very substantial if
the maximum penalty for failure to insure is imposed. 34 The courts seem to
be soft on the imposition of heavier fines. In practice fines are so meager
for example 50 per cent of a fine of 5,000 francs CFA would be only 2,500
francs CFA.	 Moreover, these fines are paid to the treasury of the Ministry
of Finance and it is often difficult for the M.I.F. to obtain these fines
despite many letters reclaiming them.
34A
In the Douala court
35
 for instance,
between 1983-1984,
36
 out of 266 judgments pronounced the total fines imposed
amounted to 7,370,000 francs CFA. However, it is doubtful whether the M.I.F.
recovered this amount from the Ministry of Finance. 36A
By contrast, in England, there is no requirement that uninsured
motorists contribute to the running cost 0 the
Government Contribution 
The Motor Insurance Fund also benefits from government contribution.
37
Between 1968 and 1972, the Motor Insurance Fund received a total sum of
61,007,626 francs
38
 CFA from the government.	 Since then	 no	 other
34 The maximum penalty is 1 million francs CFA.
34A Reply to inquiry, letter dated 26 October 1985 from Mr. Ngwa Che,
Director of the Motor Insurance Fund, Yaounde: It seems that this
difficulty experienced by the M.I.F. is due to high bureaucracy
involved within government departments.
35 Reply to inquiry carried out in March 1985, in correspondence with
Justice Pius Takam, Douala Court. This court is notable for
imposing heavier penalties than other courts in the Republic of
Cameroon, probably because Douala is a commercial town.
36 In Cameroon the judicial year starts from the first day of October
and ends on the last day of September of the following year: The
1983-1984 judicial year chosen by us covers the period running from
1 October 1983 to 30 September 1984.
36A See further, Table 9, p.264.
37 Article 8 of Decree No.67-DF-495 of 17 November 1967.
38 Figures supplied by Essongo Mbella Ferdinand, Financial Secretary of
the Motor Insurance Fund in an interview in July 1983.
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contributions have been received.
38A
 The M.I.F. may receive a grant annually
from the government depending on the financial commitments of the M.I.F.
after the preparation of its budget by the financial division.
Similarly, in England, the Department of Transport contributes to the
financing of the M.I.B. 39
 However, this contribution is not required by the
formal agreement between the Secretary of State and the M.I.B. but, it is
nevertheless an established practice. It is paid in recognition of the fact
that a certain (though obviously unknown) number of payments made by the
M.I.B. under the untraced Drivers' Agreement will be in respect of accidents
caused by vehicles exempt from compulsory insurance, for example, vehicles
owned by the Crown or a local authority. Since the motor insurance market
which finances the Motor Insurers' Bureau's operations receive no premium
income in respect of such vehicles, it has been agreed40 that the Government
38A See Table 9 at p.264.
39 Motor Insurers' Bureau: Balance Sheet and Accounts for the year to
31 December 1983, op. cit. 
40 Reply to an inquiry, letter dated 11 July 1985 from M. Ainsworth,
Department of Transport.
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should make a payment to the M.I.B. in recognition of these cases.
40A
The
amount is assessed by calculating the percentage of the total vehicle
population represented by these "legally uninsured" vehicles. The Government
contribution is then taken as that percentage of the M.I.B.'s total payments
under the Untraced Drivers Agreement in the previous year. 	 It is worth
noting that the Department of Transport's contribution to the M.I.B. in 1983
amounted to £19,000.
40B
A separate and indirect source of financing for the M.I.F. is provided
by article 7(7) of Law No 65 - LF - 9 of 22 May 1965 which provides that: "On
payment to the party to whom the damages are due, the M.I.F. shall have a
right over against the party principally liable. The M.I.F. shall further-
more be entitled to interest calculated at the official rate in civil matters
40A It is worth pointing out that the M.I.B.'s liability will be
increased with the extension of compulsory third party insurance to
cover property damage: See supra., p.206. In this respect it is
proposed that the depositors and exempt authorities could be made
liable for all use of their vehicles where compulsory insurance is
required whether such use is authorised by them or not. On the
other hand, the owners of such vehicles could be liable to pay a
contribution to the M.I.B. based on the number and type of vehicles
they run: see, Department of Transport Consultative Document, op. 
cit., paras. 6.3, 6.4 and esp. para. 6.5. It seems that the first
possibility will create an anomaly between the settlement of
personal injury claims and property damage claims since the M.I.B.
will be required to settle claims in the case of the former and not
the latter. However, the second possibility appears to incorporate
both claims under the M.I.B. agreement. The better view seems to be
that the depositors and exempt authorities ought to pay such
contribution to the M.I.B. as is equitable to cover to some extent
the cost of claims in respect of accidents caused by their vehicles.
Alternatively, it could well be possible for the financial deposit
and security provisions to be updated to take account of this
extension of liability: See supra_ p.219 for criticism of this
financial limit. It should be recognised that any increase in the
financial limit will require a further inCrease in Government
contribution to the M.I.B. If such contribution is not made it
would be inequitable for the M.I.B. (which is funded by motor
insurers from premium income) as it would be vulnerable to claims in
respect of accidents caused by vehicles for which insurers have
received no income from insurance premiums.
40B Motor Insurers' Bureau: Balance Sheet and Accounts for the year to
31 December 1983, op. cit. 
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and to the collection charges."
	 Hence there is a legal subrogation to the
rights of the victim against the person responsible for the accident. It
appears from the Table below that the M.I.F. has never exercised this right.
Similarly, in England, Clause 4 of the first agreement 1972 in respect of
Uninsured Drivers provides that contracts of insurance can still provide that
all sums paid by the insurers or by the M.I.B. by virtue of the agreement
will be recoverable from the insured or any other person.	 Obviously, this
provision is inapplicable to Untraced Drivers as the tortfeasors would remain
untraced.
The table below shows the actual sum received by the Motor Insurance
Fund in Cameroon. Regrettably, the amounts received by the treausury of the
Ministry of Finance to whom payments in respect of awards made by the court
against uninsured motorists are required to be made have not been obtained by
the M.I.F. It therefore seems that the significant source of finance comes
TABLE 9:	 Insurance Companies Contribution to the Motor 
Insurance Fund in Cameroon 1968 - 1986 (in francs CFA) 
Year
Contributions by
Uninsured Motorists
Contributions by
Insurance Companies
Government Contrib-
ution (Subvention)
1968 ) _
1969 ) -
1970 )- 43,613,094 61,007,626
1971 ) 40,283,118 Paid by the Gover-
1972 ) 24,101,291 nment between
1973 28,259,653 1968 and 1972
1974 31,640,787
1975 34,145,252
1976 Court awards from 41,741,877
1977 uninsured drivers paid 58,883,604
1978 to the Government 80,235,403
1979 Treasury,
	 but the MIF 110,378,574 Nothing has been
1980 has never had its 102,485,669 paid by the
1981 share from the 107,934,819 Government since
1982 Government,
	 though it 145,285,937 the last payment
1983 is supposed to have 175,379,676 in	 1972.
1984 50% of the award. 217,539,120
1985 249,449,185
1986 Up to 7 April 	 Awaiting decision fran Ministry of Finance for
Covell 'lent contribution, if any, for the year 1986.
SOURCE: Mptor Insurance Fund (Fonds it Garantie Putanobile ) , Yaande, 1983 - 1986.
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from the insurance companies' contributions.
IV THE ROLE OF THE MOTOR INSURANCE FUND IN CAMEROON AND OF THE MOTOR
INSURERS' BUREAU IN ENGLAND IN THE PROTECTION OF ROAD TRAFFIC ACCIDENT
VICTIMS.
In Cameroon, the Motor Insurance Fund is required to play a dual role
in questions of motor insurance: a social role of indemnifying victims of
accidents who sustain personal injuries in the type of cases considered
below
41
 and the role of prevention of motor accidents by financing road
accident prevention schemes.
42
Clearly the M.I.B. could do something in that
field as it falls within the scope of its objects clause. 42A However, it is
not realistic to expect the M.I.B. to forward such projects because the
Department of Transport fosters and finances road accident prevention schemes
and there is in England an established road research laboratory and road
repair centre at Thatcham.
Unfortunately, in Cameroon, the M.I.F. has not been able to do anything
in this field. The reasons for this may be explained by the fact that they
receive increasing claims every year and they have limited funds at their
disposal to meet all their claims.
428
Moreover, such activities seem to be
conducive to one of the primary function of the Department of Transport which
presently is engaged in nation wide campaigns and activities for enhancing
road accident prevention schemes. 	 In addition, the establishment of the
41 Article 7(3) of Law No.65-LF-9 of 22 May 1965. See infra pp.266-
290.
42 Article 7(8) ibid.
42A Article 3(0) of the Memorandum of Association of the Motor Insurers'
Bureau, 24 September 1974.
428 See Table 13 at p.285.
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National Insurance Board
42C
 which would work in liaison with government
departments would do a great deal to complement this role.
In Cameroon, there are four types of cases in which the M.I.F. may be
made liable.	 First, where there is an identified uninsured motorist who is
responsible for the accident. Second, in the case where a 'hit and run'
driver cannot be identified or traced. Third, where the motorist responsible
is identified and there is in fact an insurance policy in force at the
material time, but the insurer is not legally liable under the policy. For
example, the policy may have been obtained by fraud and misrepresentation Or
the insured may have been in breach of the conditions in the policy or the
policy does not cover the liability at all, for example, because of an
exception clause limiting the use of the vehicle for domestic purposes and it
was being used for business purposes at the time of the accident.	 And
fourth, where a motor vehicle insurer becomes insolvent. 	 Similarly, in
England, the first two cases are dealt with by the Motor Insurers' Bureau.
However, in respect of the third and fourth cases quite a different approach
is adopted in England. 	 In cases where there is an insurance policy in
existence, the practice of the M.I.B. is for the insurers concerned to deal
with the claim
43
 although this would not normally be the responsibility of
the insurers. The fourth case is now covered by sections 6 and 7 of the
Policyholders Protection Act 1975 which provides that the Policyholders
Protection Board has a duty fully to satisfy the claims of the insured whose
insurer becomes insolvent when the insurance was compulsory. 44 It may be
noted that there is no such Board in Cameroon, thus, it is only fair that the
42C See supra, p.100 note 101A.
43 Note 4, Department of the Environment, Motor Insurers Bureau
(Compensation of Victims of Uninsured Drivers Agreement), 1972 op. 
cit., see infra, p.287.
44 Supra, pp.125-137.
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M.I.F. ought to continue to deal with such claims.
The determination of claims by the Motor Insurance Fund in Cameroon and of 
the Motor Insurers' Bureau in England.
One significant similarity between the Motor Insurance Fund in Cameroon
and the Motor Insurers' Bureau in England is that they only compensate for
personal injuries and not for damage to property although in Cameroon
compulsory cover does extend to the indemnification of third parties for loss
of their property. However, as a parallel to the introduction of compulsory
third party property damage insurance 44A the United Kingdom Government
favours the extension of the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1972 with the M.I.B.
under which third parties are at present compensated for personal injury
caused by uninsured drivers. On the other hand, the Government does not seem
to propose a similar extension in respect of the Untraced Drivers Agreement
1972. 44B Undoubtedly, extension of the M.I.B.'s remit on uninsured drivers
claims to include property damage will increase considerably the volume of
claims they handle, and will of course result in extra sums paid out in
settlement of claims. 44C Consequently, the total extra cost and its effect
44A See Chapter Three of this study, pp.206-208.
44B Article 1(4) of EEC Directive No. 72/166/EEC (0.3. 1972, L103/1),
permits such an exclusion. The reason for this appears to be that
claims against the M.I.B. for property damage would open the way to
obvious possibilities for fraud by unscrupulous persons who damage
their own property and then allege that an unidentified driver was
responsible: Reply to inquiry, letter dated 31 January 1986 from Mr.
M. Ainsworth; see further, the Department of Transport Consultative
Document, op. cit., para 1.9.
44C Clearly, there are vastly more property damage claims than personal
injury claims; some claims of course combine both aspects. In a
property owning democracy, the Directive appear t to be in line with
consumer sentiments. However, it is worth pointing out that the
cost of administering and settling claims against uninsured
motorists is met from the premiums paid by those who do insure. The
amount therefore paid could be regarded as a supplementary premium
paid to ensure reasonable treatment in the event of being injured by
an uninsured motorist. As a corollary, the cost of such improved
protection will eventually have to be recovered by higher premiums.
- 268 -
upon premiums will eventually depend on what use is made of the provision the
Directive makes for limiting the call on the 'guarantee fund' and the
capacity in which the M.I.B. will be acting.
A practical difficulty in implementing article 1(4) of the E.E.C. Directive
No. 72/166/EEC may arise. The M.I.B. would be entrusted with a much larger
task of providing compensation of at least up to the limits of the insurance
obligation for damage caused by an unidentified driver or a vehicle for which
the insurance obligation has not been satisfied. The Directive itself shows
some recognition of these problems in article 1(4) in two respects. Firstly,
it provides that the government may limit or exclude payment of compensation
by the M.I.B. in the event of property damage by an unidentified vehicle.
Secondly, in the case of an identified but uninsured vehicle article 1(4)
permits the operation of an excess of up to 500 ECU's (about £260). It is
probable that the effect would be to limit payments by the M.I.B. leaving
those whose property had been damaged to recover amounts falling below the
excess from their own property damage insurance.
440
In addition, article 1(4) of the E.E.C. Directive No. 72/166/EEC
recognises the issue of subsidiarity
44E
 whereby, any settlement of claims
with respect to property damage would first take into account compensation
for damage available from other sources such as, comprehensive motor
insurance, insurance in respect of other fixed property, consequential loss
insurances and vehicle recovery or replacements arrangements (for example,
agreements between insurers). 	 This seems desirable as widespread public
440 In the absence of no claims being made against the M.I.B. for an
amount less than the excess, the number of smalls
 claims on which the
M.I.B. would otherwise incur the usual cost of investigation would
be limited.
44E Contrast settlements in respect of personal injury accidents which
are not made on this basis. See further, Department of Transport
Consultative Document, op. cit., para. 5.1.
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sympathy is unlikely to be raised for victims of property damage as in
personal injury cases where the consequences are social and involve the
community at large. For example, the loss of a "bread" winner in an instant
second has serious repercussions on the dependants and even the society
depending on the personality of the deceased.
44F
 Moreover the incidence of
loss in relation to property damage often involves very small amounts and
could easily be averted by purchasing an insurance policy to cover the risk,
thus questions like "he ought to have insured against the risk" would be
raised.
Admittedly the subsidiarity principle would largely permit the M.I.B.
to foster the underlying social purpose of a guarantee fund, and further be
expected to reduce the additional costs of its added responsibilities in
meeting property damage claims.
446
	Nevertheless, this might require
differential treatment in compensation depending on whether damage is caused
by an insured or uninsured driver.	 However, it is arguable that this
difference is not crucial.	 With respect to damage caused by an insured
driver, it is contended that the result will not be inequitable as premiums
would have been paid somehow to cover the cost whereas any damage caused by
uninsured drivers would have to be met from premiums paid by the former.
With respect to the determination of claims by the Motor Insurance Fund
in Cameroon and the Motor Insurers' Bureau in England, a crucial difference
which is a startling departure from the English system lies in the measure of
compensation.	 In England, the M.I.B. either satisfies a judgment or a
settlement negotiated in favour of the victim of an uninsured driver in
44F Corstvet, "The Uncompensated Accident and Its Consequences", (1936)
3 Law & Contemp. Prob. 466 et seq. 
446 For a similar view see, Department of Transport Consultative
Document, op. cit., para. 5.2.
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respect of the first agreement of 1972.
45
	Such an award is naturally
assessed according to the ordinary principles of common law. Thus any degree
of personal injury is compensated for. However in respect of the second
agreement,
46
 since there will be no judgment against a tortfeasor or the
untraced driver the M.I.B. awards to the applicant a payment of an amount
which is assessed in the same manner as a court would assess damages in a
tort action except that the M.I.B. does not award damages for pain and
suffering or loss of expectation of life or loss of earnings in so far as
they have been paid by the applicant's employer.
47
On the other hand, in
respect of untraced drivers, the M.I.F. in Cameroon, works on the certificate
of a medical officer stating the degree of disability and a fixed scale is
stipulated. By article 10 of the 1967 Decree, the victim of the accident
must have a total temporary incapacity (incapacit6 temporaire totale or 
I.T.T.) of at least 10 days or partial permanent incapacity (incapacit(
permanente partielle or I.P.P.) of at least 10 per cent. 	 It should be
observed that where the percentage incapacity is less than 10 days the M.I.F.
is not liable.	 This seems unfair to daily paid workers and self-employed
persons who would receive no wages for the days they are out of work.
In Cameroon, in the	 case	 of	 total temporary incapacity, the
compensation is for expenses incurred and any loss of salary and fringe
benefits, though credit must be given for benefits received from social
insurance authorities or employers, as the case may be.	 The I.P.P. is
assessed by a doctor authorised to act as an expert by the courts and is
45 Clauses 2 and 5(d) of the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1972 op. cit. 
46 Untraced Drivers Agreement 1972.
47 Clauses 3 & 4 of the Untraced Drivers Agreement 1972 op.  cit.and
Clause 3 of the supplemental Agreement between the Secretary of
State for Transport and the Motor Insurers' Bureau, 1977.
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calculated on a percentage basis taking into account future discomfort and
a reduction in the victim's physicalloss	 of	 pleasure as well as
port stating the degree of incapacity must becapacities. 48 The medical report
sent to the M.I.F.	 From an interview with Mr. Ngwa Che, the Managing
Director of the M.I.F. it emerges that there is a fixed amount of
compensation per percentage point. Each percentage point of incapacity is
equivalent to 100,000 Francs CFA in money's worth -. 48 This appears to be an
arbitrary evaluation as it fails to take account of the degree of disability,
the nature of employment of the injured plaintiff, and his age. It is
therefore desirable that a table be drawn up taking into consideration the
above relevant factors.
In Cameroon, the victim of the accident or his representative in
Interest must be entitled to compensation as against the owner, driver or
other person in charge of the motor vehicle according to the laws of civil
liability. 49
 Similarly, in England, negligence of the tortfeasor must be
established in every case. 50 The mere fact of the accident therefore does
not support a claim against the M.I.F. or the M.I.B.
In Cameroon, by virtue of article 16 of the 1967 Decree, claims can be
brought by persons responsible for the accident. Such claimants are mostly
48 This method of evaluating damages in respect of personal injury
claims has also found favour in the courts: Samuel Jenqob Gizanq v. 
John Nqassa, Onouba John & Guardian Royal Exchange Ltd., Suit
No.HCSW/6/75 of 4 August 1976, Buea (Unreported), where the judge
awarded 350,000 general damages for 35% functional disability. (A
case in the English-speaking Cameroon).
For a decision in the French-speaking Cameroon, see Affaire Sound'a
Gaston c. Ekobe Ewane Joseph, Douala 1981, (Unreported). For a
similar approach under french law see, P. Hawkes, "The Law and
Practice Relating to Accident Claims on France", The Law Society's
Gazette, 6 October 1976, p.821.
49 See Chapter Three of this work, supra., pp.150-170.
50 As in tort law, this is also required by Clause 2 of the Uninsured
Drivers Agreement 1972; Clause 1(c) and Note 3(17) of the Untraced
Drivers Agreement 1972 op. cit. 
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uninsured motorists, that is to say, persons driving a motor vehicle in
contravention of the provisions of article 1 of Law No. 65 - LF - 9 of 22 May
1965.	 The person responsible for the accident should notify the M.I.F.
within one month from the occurrence of the accident.
	 It should be noted
however that the M.I.F. satisfies such claims only if the person responsible
for the accident is unable to meet the claim and this must be clearly
established before any payment is made.	 The person primarily liable in
damages is deemed unable to pay the damages awarded against him if a judgment
debt remains unsatisfied during a period of one month. 50A In England, it is
a condition precedent to the M.I.B.'s liability that notice of the bringing
of proceedings or the intention to bring proceedings against any uninsured
person be given to the M.I.B. before or within seven days after the
commencement of such proceedings. 51 In practice the Motor Insurers' Bureau
does not require the case to be fought to judgment, but acts precisely as an
insurance company itself, that is, it negotiates with the claimant or his
solicitors over the claim, but if no settlement is arrived at, the M.I.B.
normally defends the proceedings on behalf of, and by agreement with, the
uninsured defendant.
	 In both England and Cameroon, the claimant must be
unable to obtain compensation either from the responsible party or from any
other source. If the victim or his representative in interest is able to
claim partial damages in another respect, the M.I.F. in Cameroon
52
 and the
M.I.B. in England
53
 only assumes responsibility for the additional portion.
50A Article 14(2)(b)(ii) and article 16(1) of the 1967 Decree.
51 Clause 5(1)(a) of the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1972 op. cit. 
52 Article 18 of the 1967 Decree.
53 Clause 5(2)(c) and (d) of the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1972 op. 
cit.
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The plaintiff is permitted to accept compensation under a settlement negotia-
ted on his behalf from the person or persons responsible.
There are certain procedural requirements in the case where the person
liable remains untraced.
	
In Cameroon, when the person responsible for the
accident remains unknown, the victim or his representative in interest may
make a claim to the M.I.F. within one year following the accident.
54
The
victim must forward to the M.I.F. information about the date and place of the
accident, the type of vehicle involved, the authority who made out the report
on the accident and the amount of the claim for damages for personal injuries
or death resulting from the accident.	 It is necessary that the person
responsible for the accident remain untraced.
55
The injured party has to
submit evidence that it is not possible to identify the tortfeasor. For this
purpose, all police or gendamerie reports concerning the accident are
required to mention whether the individual responsible for the accident is
known or unknown. These reports are transmitted by the police to the M.I.F.
within one year following the accident.	 The M.I.F. investigates the
circumstances of the accident to establish the liability of the untraced
driver before deciding to pay the claim. 	 In England, under the Untraced
Drivers Agreement any injured third party may apply directly to the M.I.B.
within three years from the date of the event giving rise to the death or
54 Articles 9(2) and 17(1) and (3) of the 1967 Decree. Note that the
M.I.F. does not take any measures or sue anyone responsible for the
accident. It is the duty of the police and the gendamerie to pursue
the insurance defaulters. Once the defaulters are recovered or
caught, the M.I.F. can take over investigation. Otherwise, the
M.I.F. will settle the claim for any victim affected by a hit and
run driver.
55 Article 7(3) of the 1965 Law.
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injury. 55A The M.I.B. makes a preliminary investigation in which the
applicant must give all such assistance as may be reasonably required to
ascertain that the person responsible for the accident fully or partially
cannot be traced
56
 and that on a balance of probabilities the untraced person
would have been liable to the applicant in damages.
	
On the basis of a
report, the M.I.B. proposes an award to the claimant of compensation. The
applicant whose claim is refused, or who objects to the award offered, has a
right to appeal to an arbitrator selected from a panel of Queen's Counsel
appointed by the Lord Chancellor. 57 The decision of the arbitrator is
binding on both the M.I.B. and the claimant.
	 Attempts have been made to
circumvent this procedure by bringing proceedings in court, though these have
failed. In Clarke v. Vedel 58 the plaintiff was run down by a motor cyclist
who gave his name as David Vedel. In fact the date of birth and address
given by the so-called David Vedel was unknown.	 The plaintiff sued David
Vedel but being unable to serve a writ successfully obtained an order for
substituted service under Rules of the Supreme Court Order 65, mule 4 oh the
M.I.B. The Court of Appeal confirmed that the order should be set aside. In
effect, there is no right to sue M.I.B. unless and until they have refused to
consider an application in respect of a negligent driver who is untraced. 59
55A Clause l(f) of the Untraced Drivers Agreement 1972. The three years
period stipulated here is the same as the limitation period under
the Limitation Act 1980: see note 68 below. In Cameroon, the
limitation period for the bringing of claims to the M.I.F. is
normally one year. It seems rather curious that this period is
different from the three years limitation period (in English-
speaking Cameroon and ten years in French-speaking Cameroon) in
personal injury cases. However, as we will see later at p.276 the
M.I.F. does not adhere strictly to these period.
56 Clause 7 of the Untraced Drivers Agreement 1972.
57 Clauses 11 & 18 ibid.	 For an outline of the appeal procedure see,
clauses 12 - 22 ibid.
58	 [1979] R.T.R. 26.
59 Persson v. London Country Buses [1974] 1 W.L.R. 569.
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Thus, only if the plaintiff's cause of action is against an uninsured driver,
can an order for substituted service be obtained. The procedure for dealing
with claims under the Untraced Drivers Agreement 1972 is somewhat lengthy.
In 1978, a new accelerated procedure
60
was introduced for claims up to
£20,000.
61
Instead of causing a report to be made on the application as
provided by Clause 7 of the 1972 Agreement, the M.I.B. may offer to the
applicant a sum, assessed in accordance with Clause 3 of the Principal
Agreement.
62
The claimant has the option, but is not obliged to use the
simplified procedure. However, it is a condition precedent to application of
this procedure63 that there must be unidentified potential defendants only
involved: if there is a joint tortfeasor element, or a passenger in a public
transport vehicle is concerned, then the former procedure applies. A further
exclusion from this procedure is of cases involving unusual features, for
example, a point of principle or a question of interpretation of the M.I.B.
Agreement or of the Road Traffic Act 1972.
	 A case may switch itself from
the new procedure to the former because it has proved impossible to reach a
negotiated settlement. 	 A claimant who elects to pursue his case under this
procedure, gains the advantage of a speedier procedure in that some of the
formalities that have to be followed in the former procedure are relaxed and
hopefully should get a quicker decision on his claim. 	 What he loses in
60 Department of Transport, Motor Insurers' Bureau (Compensation of
Victims of Untraced Drivers) dated 7 December 1977, London H.M.S.°.
61 The limit is subject to periodic review. 	 The original figure was
£3,000 and no doubt will increase to some extent with inflation.
62 Clause 1 of the Untraced Drivers Agreement 1977 ibid.
63 Clause 1 and Note 3 of the Untraced Drivers Agreement 1977 ibid.
- 276 -
return for this advantage is the right of appeal. 64
	For this reason the
claimant must be legally represented before the option may be taken.
As regards the various limitation periods mentioned above, the M.I.F.
is very flexible and provides no sanction for non-compliance with limitation
periods.
65
Claims are heard out of time if there is enough evidence to
support the claim.
	 The M.I.F. see the limitation periods as merely
encouragement to claimants to bring their actions in time so as to facilitate
investigation.
In England it appears that quite a lot of claims are rejected. In 1983
out of 9700 claims handled by the M.I.B., approximately 2500 claims were paid
and 6,200 claims were carried forward into 1984; 1000 claims were rejected
for three reasons.
66
The obvious reasons were first, cases were ifstiffty
had not been established against the alleged "Untraced" or "Uninsured"
driver, and secondly cases where the claimant could obtain compensation from
another source such as an identified and insured motorist involved in the
same accident. The third reason concerns cases where there has been a breach
of time limit for notice of the bringing of the claim or notice of the
bringing of legal proceedings.
	 Unfortunately, the figure of 1000 rejections
relate to all the above three reasons.
67
It may well be that most of the
claims are rejected on the first ground which obviously does not fall within
the M.I.B. agreements. However if a significant proportion of claims were
64 Clause 2 and the Schedule referred to therein of the Untraced
Drivers Agreement 1977.
65 Interview with Mr. Ngwa Che, Managing Director of the Motor
Insurance Fund, August 1983. See supra, pp.272273.
66 Reply to letter from Mr. C.B. Garwood, Secretary of the Motor
Insurers' bureau, dated 29 March 1985.
67 The M.I.B. does not retain statistics for different categories of
claim rejection. Reply to inquiry, letter from Mr. C.B. Garwood,
Secretary of the Motor Insurers' Bureau, dated 8 July 1985.
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rejected for breach of the limitation period this would be attributable to
the failure of the lawyers. On the other hand, the claimants may perhaps not
know in time that they have a claim against the M.I.B. This may be the case
where the seriousness of a victim's injuries is only established at a later
date. In such cases time begins to run out for the purpose of legal
proceedings when the victim is aware of the injury. 68 It is suggested that
there should be some amendments to Clause l(f) of the Untraced Drivers
Agreement 1972 to take account of the realisation of the injury by the
victim.	 This clause ought to include that the application should be made
within three years from the date of knowledge (if later) of the person
injured.
Finally, there are certain exceptions to the liability of the Motor
Insurance Fund and the Motor Insurers' Bureau. In both England and Cameroon,
the victim is not entitled to recover, where he was a passenger and party to
some scheme to steal the vehicle or, being the owner of or user of the
vehicle, he knew or had reason to believe that there was no insurance in
force as required by the Road Traffic Act 1972.
69
In England, the case of
Porter v. M.I.B.
70
 illustrates this point. The plaintiff brought a car into
England from Holland but was not insured to drive it. She asked a friend to
assist her, knowing that he drove a car and assuming that he was also
insured. It turned out that he was uninsured. The Motor Insurers' Bureau
argued that they were not bound to satisfy the judgment awarded against the
friend by virtue of the exception. The court held that they were liable.
68 Sections 11(b), 12 and 14 of the Limitations A4 1980.
69 In England, see Clause 6(1)(c) of the Uninsured Drivers Agreement
1972 and Clause 1(2)(b) of the Untraced Drivers Agreement 1972 op. 
cit. In respect of Cameroon, see article 10 of the 1967 Decree.
70 [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep.463.
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The victim assumed that the friend was insured and there was nothing which
should have caused her to have reason to believe otherwise. The exception
was therefore construed from the point of view of the victim.
It is worth noting that the M.I.B. only satisfies a judgment in respect
of any relevant liability which is required to be covered by insurance.
71
In
Gardner v. Moore and Another,
72
the plaintiff suffered serious injuries when
the defendant deliberately drove his motor vehicle at the plaintiff and
Injured him. At the time of the accident the defendant was not insured
against third party risks as required by sections 143 and 145 of the Road
Traffic Act 1972. Judgment was obtained in favour of the plaintiff and the
M.I.B. was called upon to satisfy the claim by virtue of clause 2 of the
Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1972. The sole question for decision depended on
whether the events that had happened constituted a "relevant liability"
within the meaning of Clause 2 of the Uninsured Drivers Agreement.
73
It
follows from the construction of sections 143 and 145 of the Road Traffic Act
1972 that a motorist is required to take out a policy of insurance
indemnifying him against "any liability" however arising, incurred by him in
respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person "caused by, or arising
out of the use of", a vehicle on a road. The plaintiffs injuries were so
caused and accordingly, if the judgment against the defendant remained
unsatisfied, the M.I.B. would be liable to indemnify the plaintiff. The
71 Clause 2 of the Uninsured Drivers Agreement and Clause 1(c) and (d)
of the Untraced Drivers Agreement 1972.
72 [1984] 2 W.L.R. 714. See also Hardy v. M.I.B. [1964] 2 Q.B.745 on
very similar facts.
73 "Relevant liability" means a liability in respect of which a policy
of insurance must insure a person in order to comply with part VI of
the Road Traffic Act 1972: see Clause 1 of the Uninsured Drivers
Agreement 1972.
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M.I.B. invoked a general principle of insurance law 74
 and indeed of the wider
law of contract
75
 that a person might not stand to gain an advantage arising
from the consequences of his own iniquity. That was rooted in the idea of
public policy. 76
 Essentially that principle exists to prevent wrongdoers
benefiting themselves as a result of their crime, but does not preclude
innocent victims from being compensated
77
 by a machinery set up by the Road
Traffic Act 1972 and the M.I.B. Agreements 1972. 78
	This principle has
effectively deprived a plaintiff who was a joint participant in a criminal
offence of a right of action against the defendant. The actual decision in
Ashton v. Turner
79
 was based on the principle of public policy and therefore
the consideration of the defence of volenti non fit injuria together with the
attendant question of the effect of section 148(3) of the Road Traffic Act
1972 were not strictly necessary to the decision. 80 However, the House of
Lords to some extent, seems to have settled this question.
	 In Gardner v. 
Moore and Another,
80A
 the House of Lords countered the argument on public
policy that there was also a countervailing public policy that innocent
victims of motor vehicle accidents ought to be compensated by virtue of the
74 Gray v.Barr [1971] 2 Q.B. 554.
75 Beresford v. Royal Insurance Co. Ltd. [1938] A.C. 586.
76 Hardy v. M.I.B. [1964] 2 Q.B. 745 at 760.
77 Cleavei v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association [1892] 1 Q.B. 147.
78 The satisfaction of the defendants liability to the plaintiff was
Incidental to the main purpose of the Agreement which was the
protection of innocent third parties, supra, pp.253-255.
79 [1980] 3 W.L.R. 736 esp. at 740-741, 743-745.
80 Ibid. pp.746-747; c.f. Gregory v. Kelly [1978] R.T.R.426 at 430 and
Winnik v. Dick (1984) 2 S.L.T. 185 at 188-190. See further, supra,
p.214.
BOA [1984] 2 W.L.R. 714 esp. at pp.721 and 723.
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provisions of the Road Traffic Act 1972 and the M.I.B. Uninsured Drivers
Agreement 1972.
Furthermore, the M.I.B. is under no duty to satisfy a judgment if the
liability did not arise out of a liability which was required to be covered
under the Road Traffic Act 1972. In Cooper v. Motor Insurers' Bureau 81 the
relevant issue turned on the wording of section 145(3)(a) read with section
143 of the Road Traffic Act 1972. Section 145(3)(a) provides that the policy
of insurance must insure the user in respect of any liability which may be
incurred by him in respect of death of, or bodily injury to any person caused
by, or arising out of, the use of the vehicle on a road.
	 The phrase "any
person" here refers back to the third party section in section 143. Section
143 refers to "use" of a vehicle and basically means that the driver must be
insured against his liability to third persons, that is, persons other than
himself, and of course extends to cover the liability to such third persons
of someone causing or permitting the driver's use. In this case, the words
"any person" were given their ordinary meaning of any member of the public. 82
The policyholder did not come within the terms not because he was not a
person: but because the clause only relates to a claim by any person which
the policyholder is legally liable to pay. Consequently, such a liability
cannot exist on a supposed claim and at the same time by and against the
policyholder. It is suggested that the decision is clearly correct and that
any	 other	 construction would have extended the compulsory insurance
requirements beyond what the Road Traffic Act 1972 warrants. This reveals a
lacuna in the protection afforded to third parties by the Road Traffic Act
1972 and the M.I.B. Agreements 1972. It is desirable that the Road Traffic
Act and the Agreement between the M.I.B. and the Secretary of State should be
81 [1985] 1 W.L.R. 248.
82 Ibid., at p.252.
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revised to offer such protection. The case may be thought to illustrate yet
again the need for a system of no-fault-compensation for the victims of road
accidents.	 In England, the M.I.B. is under a duty to indemnify the third
party only if the injuries arise out of the use of a vehicle on a road; the
word "road" being defined under section 196 of the Road Traffic Act 1972 as
"any highway and any other road to which the public has access. However, the
M.I.B. will be liable if only part of the vehiclg causing the injury is on a
"road" at the time of the accident.
83
By contrast, in Cameroon as in the
case with compulsory insurance as we have already seen in Chapter Three,
there is no distinction made between private and public road. A victim can
recover whether the accident occurred on private land or on a public highway.
In Cameroon, the persons entitled to apply to the Motor Insurance Fund
are insurance companies, victims of accidents and persons responsible for the
accident.	 In England, an application to the Motor Insurers' Bureau for a
payment in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person may be made
by the applicant, that is, the person for whose benefit the payment is to be
made; or any solicitor acting for him; Or any other person whom the M.I.B.
may be prepared to accept as acting for him. Since the creation of the Motor
Insurance Fund in 1967 substantial sums of money have been paid out to
victims of accidents in Cameroon who otherwise would have gone without
compensation. Nevertheless, with the exception of 1982, it does not seem
that the M.I.F. has been very generous if one compares its revenue in Table 9
to the total payments made in Table 13. It is possible that administrative
costs account for most of its expenditure. In England as well, increasing
83 Randall v. Motor Insurers' Bureau [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1900; Buchanan v. 
Motor Insurers' Bureau [1955] 1 W.L.R. 488.
84 Supra, p.223.
84
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claims are being made to the M.I.B. every year. The following tables show
the extent to which the M.I.B. in England and the M.I.F. in Cameroon has
settled claims brought under the Agreements in the case of England and with
respect to Cameroon under the legislation.
TABLE 10: Awards and Payments in respect of the Motor Insurers' Bureau
Uninsured and Untraced Drivers Agreements in England 1978 - 1984 
Uninsured Drivers	 Untraced Drivers
Agreement	 Agreement
YEAR
Number	 Total	 Number
of Awards	 Payments	 (E)	 of Awards
Total
Payments
	 (E)
1978 750	 2,276,635 854 2,014,738
1979 704	 3,138,725 1029 2,285,114
1980 656	 3,508,750 1085 3,240,218
1981 805	 4,384,027 1395 4,132,045
1982 852	 5,877,059 1313 4,223,688
1983 1044	 6,591,723 1447 4,664,225
1984 1120	 8,120,180 1469 5,826,030
SOURCE : Department of Transport,	 London 1984.
TABLE 11:	 Awards and Payments in respect of Uninsured and Untraced Drivers
in Cameroon by the Motor Insurance Fund 1968 - 1986 
Uninsured Drivers	 Untraced Drivers
Agreement	 Agreement
YEAR
Number
of Awards
Total
Payments	 (CFA)
Number
of Awards
Total
Payments	 (CFA)
1968	 2 2,350,000 - -
1969	 - - -
1970	 1 250,000 - -
1971	 3 1,700,000 - -
1972	 - - - -
1973	 6 6,650,000 - -
1974	 1 1,000,000 - -
1975	 3 12,100,000 2 825,000
1976	 4 16,125,000 2 3,250,000
1977	 3 10,650,000 2 1,950,000
1978	 8 21,567,000 2 2,100,000
1979	 8 26,775,000 1 3,875,000
1980	 5 17,100,000 7 11,500,000
1981	 4 16,100,000 5 13,179,915
1982	 10 24,716,666 7 16,385,818
1983	 4 8,563,200 15 33,246,279
1984	 - - 7 23,230,220
1985	 2 1,350,000 3 9,466,807
1986 Up to 7 April - - -
SOURCE :	 Motor Insurance Fund,
(Fonds de Garantie Automobile), Yaounde 1983 - 1986
TABLE 12: Awards and Payments in respect of Liquidation of Insurance 
Companies and Breach of Insurance Companies' Conditions by the 
Motor Insurance Fund in Cameroon 1968 - 1986 
Breach of Policy
Liquidation	 Condition
YEAR
Number
of Awards
Total Payments
Francs	 (CFA)
Number
of Awards
Total Payments
Francs	 (CFA)
1968	 - - - -
1969	 1 1,500,000 1 1,000,000
1970	 13 7,504,067 6 10,710,000
1971	 - - 9 6,210,000
1972	 - - 5 6,430,000
1973	 - - 4 9,800,00
1974	 - - 2 10,310,000
1975	 - - 5 10,075,000
1976	 - - 2 4,550,000
1977	 - - 3 6,350,000
1978	 - - 7 17,285,000
1979	 - - 9 19,532,000
1980	 - - 8 27,545,000
1981	 - - 15 43,211,989
1982	 - - 12 65,050,000
1983	 - - 12 16,950,000
1984	 - - 6 14,806,500
1985	 - - 4 10,450,000
1986 Up to 7 April - - -
SOURCE :	 Motor Insurance Fund,
(Fonds de Garantie Automobile), Yaounde 1983 - 1986
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TABLE 13:	 Total number of Claims and Awards and Total Payments made 
by the Motor Insurance Fund in Cameroon 1968 - 1986 
Year Number of Claims	 Number of Awards Total Payments
(Francs CFA)
1968 4	 2 2,350,000
1969 28	 2 2,500,000
1970 108	 20 18,464,067
1971 86	 12 7,910,000
1972 94	 5 6,430,000
1973 122	 10 16,450,000
1974 103	 3 11,310,000
1975 79	 10 23,000,000
1976 85	 8 23,925,000
1977 113	 8 18,950,000
1978 282	 17 40,952,000
1979 488	 18 50,182,500
1980 470	 20 56,145,000
1981 620	 24 72,491,904
1982 958	 29 106,152,484
1983 674	 31 58,759,479
1984 614	 13 38,036,720
1985 856	 9 21,266,807
1986 up to 7 April	 157	 - -
SOURCE : Motor Insurance Fund -
(Fonds de Garantie Automobile), 	 Yaounde 1983 - 1986
In Cameroon where the person responsible for the accident is known and
insured, judgment may be entered against the insurance company to pay the
damages which have been awarded. 	 In the face of such a situation the
insurance company held liable to pay the damages can adopt one of two
different attitudes. It may pay the damages awarded or deny liability on the
grounds such as nullity or suspension of the insurance contract
85
 or that the
loss fell within an exception clause in the policy or that the insured has
broken a condition in the policy. The insurance company must notify the
M.I.F. within 15 days by registered letter of its intention to deny liability
to the victims or third parties.
85
The M.I.F. has the right to verify the
85 Article 12 of the 1967 Decree.
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validity of the refusal by the insurance company to pay the damages and to
examine the arguments raised by it. If the M.I.F. intends to contest the
validity of the arguments it must, within three months of receiving the
registered letter of the insurance company, inform it as well as the victim
of the accident of its intention to do so. Where the M.I.F. is in agreement
with the objection raised by the insurance company, the victim or the
beneficiaries would be informed and they will forward a claim to the M.I.F.
The M.I.F. is bound to settle such claims where the insurance company has
grounds to deny liability.
In the case of Fouda Sgbastian c. Passaoe're Morte and others
86
, an
accident occurred on the Obala/Yaounde road in which one person died and two
were injured. A car in the service of the Ministry of Health was used for
,
social and domestic purposes. 	 The insurance company, Assurances Mutuelles 
Aoricoles du Cameroun (AMACAM) declined responsibility on the basis that the
passengers were being transported clandestinely. 	 The vehicle was insured
exclusively for transporting goods and not passengers. 	 The court made an
award of 3,060,000 Francs C.F.A. An application was made to the M.I.F. The
M.I.F. arranged for the circumstances of the accident to be investigated
fully. The argument of the insurance company was upheld. 	 The M.I.F.
undertook to pay damages of 2,500,000 Francs C.F.A. in respect of the death
of and personal injuries suffered by the victims but declined to pay damages
in respect of the car. The M.I.F. however recovered part of this amount from
the owner of the vehicle pursuant to article 22 of the 1967 decree. In the
case of Nlappa Josua c. Piston and others
87
 an infant of four years was
killed in an accident. The car was insured under category 1, that is to say,
86 Judgment No.967/COR of June 20, 1978, Yaounde (Unreported).
87 Judgment No.336/COR of January 27, 1977, Yaounde (Unreported).
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for social and domestic purposes. 	 At the time of the accident the car was
used for business purposes, carrying passengers for reward. 	 This was
confirmed by the police report. The insurance company denied liability and
made an application to the M.I.F. 	 Damages of 2,000,000 Francs C.F.A. were
awarded to the mother of the deceased victim.
By contrast, in England, the practice of the M.I.B. where it is
ascertained that there is in existence a policy issued in compliance with the
Road Traffic Act 1972, but the policy is ineffective in respect of the
accident, for example, the vehicle was being used for a purpose other than
the permitted use described in the policy or the insurer is entitled to
repudiate a claim through non-disclosure or misrepresentation is to require
insurers to settle the claim.
88 In such circumstances, the insurer who
issued the policy is the "insurer concerned" and under the terms of the
domestic agreement between the M.I.B. and its members, the insurer will deal
with the claim.
89 The claimant does not have to give separate notice of
proceedings to the M.I.B. but does of course to the insurer.
90
Section 149
of the Road Traffic Act 1972 provides for payment by an insurer to third
parties of any judgment in respect of liability under a policy of insurance
even though the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel the policy. The
Insurer retains the right to recover the amount they have paid to third
parties from their own insured. In this way the burden is spread over the
insurance companies and Lloyd's syndicates who would in any event ultimately
contribute to the M.I.B.'s funds.
With regard to insolvent tortfeasors in Cameroon, the injured party has
88 Note 4 of the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1972 op. cit. 
89 Regrettably, there is no central record of such cases.
90 Clause 5(1)(a)(ii) of the Uninsured Drivers Agreement, ibid.
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three years within which to call upon the M.I.F. He must present evidence of
the insolvency of the author of the accident. When the compensation has been
established by judgment or agreement the injured party gives notice to the
person liable demanding payment. If the demand is not complied with, a claim
may be made on the M.I.F. within a month. The lawyer or 'Huisser de Justice'
makes a 'signification commandement'.
	
This shows all the property of the
person liable. Where this is not sufficient to meet the claim, the 'Huisser'
makes a 'proas verbal de carence' which is forwarded to the M.I.F. 	 If the
victim or beneficiaries are able to recover part of the award from the
individual responsible for the accident, the M.I.F. assumes responsibility
for the additional portion only. The victim cannot have more rights against
the M.I.F. than he had or would have had against the person who caused the
accident. In all cases, the M.I.F. is to be informed of all suits instituted
in court by victims of motor vehicle accidents, so that it may follow or
intervene in such suits.
91
Insurance companies submit claims to the M.I.F. when they do not have
sufficient funds to meet their liabilities. In John Nkem v. Joseph Ashu, 
Anayo Okaye and le liquidateur de la Mutuelle Camerounaise d'Assurances,
92
the plaintiff claimed 5,225,000 Francs C.F.A. for injuries and losses
sustained as a result of an accident which was caused by a vehicle insured
with Mutuelle Camerounaise d'assurance against all third party claims. 	 The
court awarded damages to the plaintiff to the tune of 3,500,5000 Francs
C.F.A.	 The owner of the car left for Nigeria without leaving an address and
the driver was unable to meet this sum. The insurance company applied to the
M.I.F. The M.I.F. sent a representative to assess gll the assets of the
91 Article 14 of the 1967 Decree.
92 Suit No.WC/106/69, Buea High Court (Unreported).
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insurance company.	 The investigation revealed that the insurance concern
could not meet its liabilities and as a result the M.I.F. paid to the victim
such part of the damages as were related to personal injuries sustained.
However, where an insurance company goes into liquidation or does not have
sufficient funds to meet its liabilities the M.I.F. cannot be held liable to
pay damages which have been awarded to the victim unless it is proved that
the person responsible for the accident is insolvent or otherwise unable to
settle the award.	 The case of  Nqufor III c. Andreas Chefor and the Motor 
Insurance Fund 93 illustrates this practice. The plaintiff, Fon Ngufor III of
Nkwen brought an action against the defendants as father of a child who died
in a motor vehicle accident for which the first defendant, Andreas Chefor,
was alleged to be responsible. On February 22, 1969, the defendant, owner
and driver of the motor vehicle was insured with Mutuelle Camerounaise 
d'Assurance, an insurance concern which had gone into liquidation during the
hearing of the case. The plaintiff's claim was for funeral expenses, loss of
expectation of life and loss of services.	 Since the first defendant was
insured at the time of the accident, he had to be indemnified by his
insurers.
	 The first defendant's insurer having gone into liquidation, the
court invoked article 7(3) of Law No. 65-LF-9 of May 22, 1965 which provision
requires the M.I.F. to pay under such circumstances.
	
The Motor Insurance
Fund was accordingly ordered to pay the damages awarded against the first
defendant.	 The Motor Insurance Fund appealed to the Bamenda Court of
Appeal 94
 on the grounds, inter alia, that the judge had erred in law by
failing to determine the insolvency of the first defendant-tortfeasor before
ordering the M.I.F. to pay. Article 7(3) of Law No. t5-LF-9 of May 22, 1965,
93 Suit No. HC/17/69 Bamenda High Court (Unreported).
94 Appeal No BCA/4/1975, Bamenda Court of Appeal (Unreported).
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requires that the person responsible in damages, in this case the first
defendant, must be found to be wholly or partially insolvent as well as his
insurer. Thus the court held that since the insolvency of the first
defendant had not also been established by the learned trial judge, the
M.I.F. were not liable to pay the award made against the first defendant.
The decision of the Bamenda Court of Appeal was later confirmed in another
case, Fonds de Garantie Automobile c. Kamqa Joseph
95
 by the Supreme Court.
Here, an appeal was made by the Motor Insurance Fund to set aside the
judgment of the Bafoussam Court of Appeal which had ordered the M.I.F. to pay
an award of 2 million Francs CFA made against an insured whose insurer had
gone into liquidation. 	 The M.I.F. contended that the Bafoussam Court of
Appeal had failed to establish the insolvency of the party primarily liable,
in this case, the insured tortfeasor before making the order.	 Accordingly,
the judgment of the Bafoussam Court of Appeal was set aside.
By contrast, in England, the Policyholders Protection Board
96
 is
responsible for paying claims in cases where the insurance company is
insolvent. Therefore in such situations the M.I.B. would not be called upon
to settle the claim.
With respect to Cameroon, the accident must have occurred in Cameroon
and the claimants must be of Cameroonian nationality or be resident in
Cameroon or be nationals of a state which has reciprocal agreements with
Cameroon.
97
It appears from an interview with the Managing Director of the
Motor Insurance Fund that no agreement has been concluded with any country.
Therefore foreigners travelling or staying for a short time in Cameroon are
95 Arret No. 17/CC of December 11, 1975 Yaounde.
96 Supra pp.125-137.
97 Article 9 of the 1967 Decree.
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generally excluded from the benefit of the M.I.F. even though they may have
taken out temporary insurance cover.
	
This may appear unfair, since
foreigners pay their share in financing the M.I.F. when they obtain insurance
in Cameroon.	 It is arguable, however, that their contribution is not
intended to be the counterpart of the risks to which they are exposed but of
the risks which they create.
In Europe, the problem of compensating a foreigner who is a victim of a
motor accident has been resolved by the Green Card System which was
established on January 1, 1953.
98
By this system insurers in 26 European
countries set up a Bureau in each country.
99
The Bureau has two functions:
98 See, Motor Insurers' Bureau, "Uniform Agreement between Bureaux," (a
private agreement between national Bureaux based upon
recommendations which were adopted by the Sub-Committee on Road
Transport at Geneva on the 25th January 1949; . "summary about the
European Green Card System, "OSM/MF, Council of Bureaux, December
1982. One of the characteristics of the Green Card System is that
it is based on agreements under private law entered into bilaterally
between the national insurance bureaux using a standard form of
contract known as 'Uniform agreement between Bureaux' - see above.
Pursuant to those agreements each national Bureau undertakes on the
one hand, to settle claims arising in its own copntry out of
accidents caused by vehicles registered in other member countries in
respect of which a 'Green Card' has been issued and, on the other,
to reimburse foreign bureaux which have settled claims arising out
of accidents caused by vehicles insured in its own country.
For further details, see Donald B. Williams, op.cit. pp.13-15. Its
legal basis is to be found in the Motor Vehicles (International
Motor Insurance Card) Regulations 1971 S.I. 1971 No. 792 as amended
by Motor Vehicles (International Motor Insurance Card) (Amendment)
Regulations 1977 S.I. 1977 No. 895.
99 Ibid. See also, Motor Insurers' Bureau, "Supplementary Agreement
between National Bureaux dated the 12th December 1973 which is as
the term states, a supplementary agreement to the Uniform Agreement
referred to in note 98 above.
	
The Supplementary Agreement between
National	 Bureaux	 dated 12 December 1973 included non-member
countries of the EEC.
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as a Paying Bureau to provide international motor insurance cards (Green
Cards) for issue by members of the Bureau to their policyholders 100 and as a
Handling Bureau to deal with claims brought against visiting motorists who
carry the Green Cards. 	 The various national Bureaux enter into agreements
under which the Paying Bureau agrees to reimburse the Handling Bureau. The
Motor Insurers' Bureau is both the Handling and Paying Bureau for the United
Kingdom. It also acts as the international secretariat for the Council of
Bureaux to administer the Green Card system. Where the foreign negligent
motorist is the holder of a valid Green Card, the M.I.B., following
settlement of a claim, recovers its outlay from the foreign insurer issuing
the green card or, failing this, from the Bureau which provided the Green
Card. On the other hand, British motorists involved in accidents in other
countries who have adopted the Green Card system are required to notify such
accidents to their insurers' appointed representative in that country or to
the local Bureau. A claim which falls within the ambit of the local
compulsory third party insurance law will be disposed of by the Bureau in
that country, who will seek reimbursement of their outlay from the insurer in
the United Kingdom issuing the Green Card or from the Motor Insurers' Bureau.
One particular area which still causes confusion among the motoring
public is the desirability or even necessity of obtaining a Green Card for
travel to certain countries.
101
The inspection of Green Cards was abolished
at the internal frontiers of the nine E.E.C. countries and at the common
frontiers of the E.E.C. countries with Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden and
Switzerland as a result of a multilateral agreement signed by the Green Card
s
100 The cost of the Green Card is determined by each insurance company
on the basis of the insured premium, the duration of stay abroad,
the age of the insured, the type of vehicle and the use of the
vehicle.
101 P.H. News, Policy Holder Insurance Journal, October 8 1976, No.40,
Vol.94 at p.1784.
- 293 -
Bureaux of six countries which came into force on 15 May, 1974. 102 For
travel to other European countries not covered by the non-inspection
requirements it is still necessary to obtain a Green Card. In January 1974,
all United Kingdom motor insurance policies were extended to provide the
minimum legal cover required by E.E.C. countries and Austria, Finland,
Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.
103
It should be emphasised that the
continental cover which is provided automatically in United Kingdom policies
is only for the minimum legal requirement in the 16 countries. Therefore, it
is important to realise that motorists who drive abroad without consulting
their insurance company and so rely on the extra cover automatically written
into the policy could find themselves without insurance in many situations,
such as, accidental damage to their own vehicles or loss by fire or theft, or
102 Article 1(e) of the Uniform Agreement between Bureaux, op.cit., and
articles 1 and 2(a) of the Supplementary Agreement entered into
between the Bureaux inter alios dated 12 December 1973 made pursuant
to article 2 of Council Directive No.72/166/EEC of 24 April 1972 on
the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to
insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor
vehicles, and to the enforcement of the obligation to insure against
such liability (0.3. 1972, L103/1), Part I, English Special Edition
1972 (ii) p.360. The above two agreements seem to be consistent
with the construction of the obligation in article 2(2) of Council
Directive No. 72/166/EEC. The primary object of the Directive was
to abolish such checks in order to facilitate the free movement in
the Community of vehicles normally based in the Member States: Added
Emphasis.	 See later, pp.294 to 298, for the consequences of this
expression: article 1(4) ibid. In 1975 these arrangements were
extended to Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic and Hungary:
See also article 7(2)ibid. The scheme thus provided for by article
2 of the Directive was extended by a Supplementary Agreement (Second
Commission Decision No. 74/167/EEC Annex) concluded on 12 December
1973 by the National Bureaux to vehicles normally based in the
territory of certain non-Member countries in conformity with the
principles of article 7(2) of the Directive. In addition, it is
necessary to mention the Second Commission Decision No. 74/167/EEC
of 6 February 1974 relating to the application of the aforesaid
Council Directive which appointed 15 May 1974 as the date when
checks on vehicles 'normally based' in the European territory of the
Member States and other third countries, inter alios should cease.
103 Articles 3 and 6 of Council Directive No. 72/166/EEC of 24 April
1972, op.cit. 
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in the event of an accident in some countries causing injury to passengers,
particularly if the passenger is the driver's spouse or a member of his
family. 104
In the case of Britain it should be noted that the M.I.B. deals with
claims only in respect of personal injuries against foreign motorists in the
United Kingdom whereas other national Bureaux who have adopted the Green Card
system and whose compulsory motor insurance laws require policies against
third party property damage consider the liability of British motorists in
this respect.	 It is therefore apparent that an element of reciprocity is
lacking in the extent of their liabilities. It is relevant to note here, as
mentioned earlier 104A in this chapter that the Directive of 30 December
1983 105 will extend compulsory insurance to cover liability for property
damage. However, two areas of difference will still remain, namely, the
M.I.B. may, if the Member State wishes, be relieved from satisfying an award
for damage to property caused by an unidentified vehicle in view of the
danger of fraud whilst in the case of damage caused by uninsured vehicles an
excess of up to 500 ECU (about £260) may be applied. 106
It may be convenient here to examine the implications of the provisions
of article 2 of Council Directive No. 72/166/EEC of 24 April 1972 in respect
of exemption from the checking of Green Cards at the frontiers of Member
States in the context of 'vehicles normally based in another Member State or
third countries' who are party to the Uniform and Supplementary Agreements
104 In 1981, the Automobile Association, the Association of British
Travel Agents and Norwich Union teamed up to produce the Extrasure
European Motoring Insurance Policy - a comprehensive insurance
package for drivers on the continent.
104A Supra at p.267.
105 Second Council Directive No. 84/5/EEC, (0.3. 1984, L8/17), op. cit. 
106 Article 1(4) ibid.
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and in particular, the expression 'in accordance with the provisions of
national law on compulsory motor insurance , which refers to the settlement of
claims.	 It is to be noted that the questions raised have apparently been
widely canvassed in the different Member States and are of general importance
especially as concerns considerations in the implementation of Council
Directive No. 84/5/EEC of 30 December 1983. 1"	 By a judgment of 22 February
1983, the Cour de cassation referred to the European Court of Justice of the
EEC for a preliminary ruling under article 177 of the Treaty of Rome 1957 on
the meaning first, of the expression - 'provisions of national law on
compulsory motor insurance' contained in article 2(2) of Council Directive
No. 72/166/EEC of 24 April 1972 as amended by Council Directive No.
72/430/EEC and second, as to whether a vehicle which has been taken out of
circulation in a Member State of the European Economic Community in which it
had been registered may be regarded as still normally based in the territory
of that state within the meaning of article 1(4) of Council Directive No.
107 However desirable it may be that the law on compulsory insurance for
motor vehicle accidents should be identical in each Member State of
the Community, so that the citizens know that they will be covered
everywhere on a uniform basis, it does not seem that Council
Directive No. 72/166/EEC of 24 April 1972 goes that far. It is to
be noted that it abolished the need for 'Green Card' inspection and
control at the frontier whilst leaving intact the provisions of
national law on compulsory insurance save where express obligations
were imposed (see for example, article 3(1) ibid.) The exemptions
referred to in article 3(1) ibid. have been slightly modified by
article 2(1) of Council Directive No. 84/5/EEC of 30 December 1983.
However, article 2(2) of Directive No. 72/166/EEC as amended by
article 1 of Council Directive No. 72/430/EEC of 19 December 1972
(0.3. L291/162 of 28 December 1972 and even article 2(2) of Council
Directive No. 84/5/EEC do not themselves impose an obligation on the
National Bureaux of Member States but envisage that the National
Bureaux of Member States would conclude an agreement guaranteeing
settlement of claims arising out of the use of a vehicle required by
the law of the Member State where the accident occurs, to be covered
by insurance and this would include claims in respect of a vehicle
acquired by theft or duress if the national law of the Member State
where the accident occurs requires claims arising out of the use of
a vehicle acquired by theft or duress to be covered by compulsory
insurance.
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72/166/EEC of 24 April 1972. In Bureau Central Fransais v. Fonds de Garantie 
Automobile and others, 108 there was a collision in France between a car
registered in France and a car bearing number plates issued in the Federal
Republic of Germany. It emerged that the latter had been stolen and its
driver was not covered by accident insurance under German or French Law. On
the questions, first, concerning the expression guarantee the settlement of
claims "in accordance with provision of national law on compulsory insurance"
In article 2(2) of Council Directive No. 72/166/EEC, the court held that this
referred to the limits and conditions of civil liability applicable to
compulsory insurance, provided always that the driver of the vehicle at the
time at which the accident occurred was deemed to be covered by valid
108 [1985] R.T.R. 142 esp. at pp. 163-164 See also Gambetta Auto S.A.V. 
Bureau Central Fransais and Fonds de Garantie Automobile [1985]
R.T.R. 129 esp. at p. 141 (a car belonging to a French company was
damaged by a vehicle registered in Austria where authorisation had
been withdrawn and insurance cancelled. 	 It was impossible to trace
the owner of the vehicle); and Bureau Beige des Assureurs 
Automobiles ASBL v. Fantozzi and Another [1985] R.T.R. 225 esp at p.
228, 233-235 (here, a Belgian national insured his car with a
Belgian company in Belgium and the car was damaged through the
negligence of a stolen car registered in France - the insurance
company refused to accept liability. In these cases the courts
adopted the same ruling as in Bureau Central Fransais v. Fonds de 
Garantie Automobile and others, op.cit. 
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insurance in conformity with that legislation. 109
	Second, that when a
vehicle bore a properly issued registration plate that vehicle was to be
regarded as being normally based, within the meaning of article 1(4) of the
Directive in the territory of the state in which it was registered, even if
at the relevant time the authorisation to use the vehicle had been withdrawn,
irrespective of the fact that the withdrawal of the authorisation rendered
the registration invalid or entailed its revocation. It appears that there
is no longer any need to inquire whether or not a vehicle is insured.
Registration seems to be the sole and necessary criterion for determining the
territory in which a vehicle is normally based (whether valid or not).
Consequently, claims are borne by the country of origin in exchange for free
passage at frontiers and payment of claims in the first instance by the
Bureau of the country in which the accident takes place. This principle has
109 See especially discussion in note 107 above. The Council Directive
No. 84/5/EEC of 30 December 1983 article 2(1) and (2) (0.3. 1984
L8/17) made changes in the law relating to compulsory insurance of
motor vehicles. It is hoped that these changes would influence the
courts decisions if and when national legislation have been altered
in conformity with the Directive's provisions. Furthermore, it is
anticipated that the Directive will modify the existing system by
removing the possibility of pleading theft against a third party
victim but would allow Member States, by way of derogation, to
provide for a national formulae which nonetheless eliminates all
risk of disputes and legal proceedings. In respect of French law,
see the scope of compulsory insurance cover in article 8 and the
conditions under which the Fonds de Garantie is expected to pay
compensation in article 9 of the law of July 1985. The law refers
to unauthorised drivers but seems to be silent on the question of
stolen vehicles. It is probable that compulsory insurance is not
required in the latter case as in the former law. However in
England, see discussion in Chapter Three of this study, pp.215-216
concerning the uncertainty created by two conflicting decisions of
first instance in interpreting section 148(3) of the Road Traffic
Act 1972. And also see supra p.279, the case of Gardner v. Moore 
and Another [1984] 2 W.L.R. 714 esp. at p.721 and 723. Never-
theless, note the exemptions under the Untraced Drivers Agreement
1972 Clause 1(2).(b)(i) and the Uninsured Drivers Agreement Clause
6(i)(c)(i) at p.277 supra. One may emphasise that the expression
refers only to the binding rules of national law defining the scope
of the obligation to insure and determining the minimum amount of
the guarantee. It does not refer to any optional exemption which
national laws may allow so as to refuse the insurance guarantee.
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the advantage of helping the victims by allowing them to avoid having to take
part in litigation in which they have no direct interest but which delays the
settlement to which they are entitled because their ultimate debtors cannot
agree among themselves. 110 Moreover, the objective which Council Directive
No. 72/166/EEC sought to achieve requires that the territory in which the
vehicle is normally based may be identified without any possible doubt. It
is possible that to require that the registration be both legal and valid
would result in the re-establishment of frontier checks and the replacement
of the Green Card check abolished by Council Directive No.72/166/EEC by a
systematic check on the validity of the registration. It should therefore be
emphasised that the result of any other interpretation mouid be to deprive
the Directive of a great part of its usefulness.
111
Accordingly it seems clear that the Directive facilitates the entry of
motor vehicles by temporary visitors in the United Kingdom (and Member States
and other third countries) and further guarantees the payment of compensat-
ion, indeed whether the de facto registration was valid or by reason lack of
insurance. It is therefore desirable that Cameroon ought to consider the
introduction of such a system with at least its frontier countries.
112
-=<>=-
110 If it were otherwise the investigation of the validity of a
registration could raise detailed and lengthy enquiries contrary to
the clear intention of the Directive.
111 A necessary pre-condition of the removal of control was that
national insurance Bureaux in the Member States should guarantee
compensation in respect of loss or injury, giving entitlement to
compensation caused in the territory of the Member States of each of
the national insurance Bureaux and that all Cbmmunity Vehicles
travelling in the Community should be covered by compulsory
insurance against civil liability throughout the Community. These
essential characteristics are clearly set out in the last three
recitals in the preamble to Council Directive No.72/166/EEC of 24
April 1972.
112 For our proposal, see Chapter Nine of this study, pp.499-500.
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CHAPTER 5
FORMATION OF THE INSURANCE CONTRACT
I INTRODUCTION
It is customary, when discussing the formation of contracts in gen-
eral, to examine such matters as offer and acceptance, consideration and
intention to create legal relations
1
.	 These matters are as relevant to the
contract of insurance as they are to contracts of other types. 	 However, in
the present discussion of the formation of the contract of insurance, it is
not intended to embark upon a general study of the above mentioned matters.
Instead, this chapter focuses on the phenomenon of disclosure, a concept
fundamental to every contract of insurance. 	 However, we do intend to prov-
ide a comprehensive discussion of this topic which can be found in many
sources
2
. The emphasis will be on comparing and contrasting the position in
English and English speaking Cameroonian Law on the one hand and French and
French speaking Cameroonian Law on the other. 	 The possible reform of the
law is discussed throughout and some conclusions are drawn at the end of the
chapter.
Parties to an insurance contract are expected, in their pre-contract
negotiations, to disclose to each other certain vital facts, situations and
circumstances within their knowledge. It is on the basis of facts
3
 so
disclosed by the proposer that the insurer decides whether or not to
1 See, for example, G. H. Treitel, The Law of Contract, 6th ed., 1983,
Chaps. 2-4, pp. 8-132; Cheshire and Fifoot's Law of Contract, 10th
ed., 1981 Chaps 3-5, pp. 28-105.
2 See especially MacGillivray and Parkington, On Insurance Law 
relating to all risks other than marine, 7th ed., 1981, London Sweet
& Maxwell.
3	 In this discussion, unless the context otherwise requires the word
"facts" when used shall include situations and circumstances.
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accept the proposed risk and, if so, at what premium. For his part, the
proposer finally decides in the light of questions asked by the insurer
whether to insure with that particular insurer or with another.
Disclosure, as used here, has two senses: one wide, and the other
narrow.	 In its wide sense, it stands for the representation of facts by one
party to the other. Such representation can be effected either positively or
negatively. Positive representation is the assertion of a fact. This
assertion is disclosure in its narrow sense. In this sense it stands in
contradistinction to negative representation.	 Negative representation can
take one of two forms: first, abstention from asserting a fact that exists,
is known to exist and ought to be asserted; second, the assertion that a fact
exists which is known not to exist or that a fact does not exist which is
known to exist. Negative representation in its first form is non-disclosure.
In its second form it is misrepresentation.
Facts are not immutable.	 They are constantly changing. They may
change between the moment of their initial representation and the conclusion
of the insurance contract. Or they may change between the conclusion of the
insurance contract and the occurrence of the event which gives rise to the
insured's claim to be indemnified by the insurer. The mutability of facts
gives rise to certain important questions. 	 Is a party to an insurance
contract under a duty to warrant the continuing existence of a particular
fact throughout the duration of the contract? This question is at the basis
of the concept of "warranty" in English and English speaking Cameroonian
insurance law. Must a party disclose to the other throughout the duration of
the contract, all changes affecting a previously represented fact? This
question underlies the French and French speaking Cameroonian insurance law
concept of "aggravation du risque". Yet another question may be asked: what
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are the consequences, if any, of non-disclosure, misrepresentation, breach of
warranty or aggravation du risque?
In the light of the foregoing considerations, the discussion in this
chapter of Formation of the Contract of Insurance will proceed in four parts:
first, disclosure next, non-disclosure and misrepresentation; then, warranty 
and aggravation du risque; and finally, the consequences of non-disclosure,
misrepresentation, breach of warranty and aggravation du risque.
The nature of the insurance transaction is such that the duty of
disclosure in its wide sense weighs more heavily on the proposer/insured than
on the insurer.	 Consequently, without wishing thereby to suggest that the
insurer has no obligations in the matter, the following discussion will focus
primarily on the duty of the insured.
II DISCLOSURE
A The Rationale of the duty to disclose 
It is settled law in England, France and Cameroon that a person
proposing to take out an insurance policy must disclose all material facts to
the insurer before the conclusion of the contract of insurance. Two
considerations have traditionally been advanced as the rationale of this duty
to disclose.
The first consideration concerns fairness between policyholders and the
equal treatment of equal risks.	 In order that the insurer may equitably
classify and assess the risk, thus enabling him to require each insured to
pay a premium commensurate with the proposed risk, it is necessary that each
proposer should make full disclosure of all facts affecting the risk.
The second and more important consideration is the idea that facts
affecting the proposed risk are usually in the peculiar knowledge of the
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proposer, the insurer being in a very weak position to discover them. Thus,
in England, Scrutton L. J. declared
4
:
"....as the underwriter knows nothing and the man who comes to him
to ask him to insure knows everything, it is the duty of the
assured, the man who desires to have a policy, to make full
disclosure to the underwriters without being asked of all the
material circumstances, because the underwriter knows nothing and
the assured knows everything."
The origin of this idea may probably be traced to early practice in marine
insurance.	 In the 18th Century, when marine insurance was the dominant type
of insurance, prospective insurers were usually people with good knowledge of
sea perils. As professionals in the field, they were more likely than the
insurer to know or to have available information concerning the hazards of a
particular voyage that might affect the risk which they proposed to insure.
Marine insurance was effected on ships while they were at sea, the insurer
sometimes being in no position to inspect the ship or any other subject-
matter of the insurance. Insurers lacked the means of communication necess-
ary for long-distance enquiries.	 Furthermore they generally lacked the
capacity to calculate the probabilities of the insured event occurring.
These factors are no longer prevalent. 	 Today, in addition to the means
of long distance communication which modern science has placed at their
disposal and the use of advanced statistical methods to assess proposed
4 In Rozanes v.Bowen (1928) 32 LI. L. Rep.98 at 102. See also:
Greenhill V. Federal Insurance [1927] 1 K.B‘ 65 at 76.; Seaton v. 
Heath (Burnard) [1899] 1 Q.B. 782 at 793 per Romer L.J. For similar
views in France, see: M. Picard and A. Besson, Les Assurances 
Terrestres en Droit Frangais, 5th ed., 1982, pp.123-134.
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risks, insurers have the opportunity, in the case of property insurance, of
arranging for pre-contract inspection of property by surveyors and other
experts and, in the case of life insurance, of arranging for medical examin-
ation.	 They make preliminary enquiries by requiring the proposer to answer
a long list of detailed questions touching upon the proposed risk. Indeed,
insurers in various branches of insurance today dispose of sophisticated
facilities of acquiring most of the relevant information.
These radical changes in the means of acquiring information and
evaluating risks render substantially untenable in modern times such a view
as that "the underwriter knows nothing and the assured knows everything".
Not surprisingly, this view has come under attack in recent years. Hasson,
for example, criticises it for mistakenly assuming that even if the insured
had greater knowledge of the facts than the insurer, this would not
necessarily put him in a stronger position than the insurer.
	 On the
contrary, he argues, the insurer is in a stronger position since he alone
decides which information, out of the mass in the proposer's possession, is
relevant to the conclusion of the insurance contract.
5
Do the insurer's improved facilities for acquiring relevant information
of his own initiative inexorably lead to the conclusion that the proposer
ought today to be released from his traditional duty to disclose all relevant
facts? The answer to this question must be in the negative. The use of some
of the facilities available to the insurer necessitates considerable expense
which could be avoided by requiring the proposer to disclose facts within his
knowledge rather than calling upon the insurer to investigate and discover
5 See R. A. Hasson, "The Doctrine of Uberrima Fides in Insurance Law -
A Critical Evaluation", (1969) 32 M.L.R. 615; see also, R. Merkin,
"Uberrimae Fidei Strikes Again", (1976) 39 M.L.R. 478 esp. at p.479-
480.
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those facts. Policyholders as a class would thus be saved higher premiums
which they otherwise would pay if the insurer were to pass on to them
increased costs incurred in ascertaining by expensive means relevant facts
within the knowledge of the proposer. Furthermore, there must, on the nature
of things, be a residue of relevant facts which are peculiarly in the
knowledge of the proposer and which the most assiduous and sophisticated
investigation by the insurer could never discover. 	 Discovery of such
information can only be the result of disclosure by the proposer himself. It
seems, therefore, that even in modern times a duty of disclosure which the
law of insurance in England, France and Cameroon casts upon the proposer must
remain.	 This view has been supported by the English Law Commission in its
report
6
 although the Commission recommended significant changes to the scope
of the duty of disclosure.	 References to their comprehensive review of this
area of insurance law are made throughout this chapter.
7
It does not follow, however, that the basis of that duty must continue
to be the idea that the insured knows everything while the insurer knows
nothing. It seems rather that the basis of the duty must, in modern
conditions, be "good faith", an old notion in the law of contract.
B The Principle of Good Faith 
The notion of "good faith" looms large in English law. Whereas its
genesis may lie in equity, its application may be observed in various
branches of the law which involve dealings between persons: partnerships,
6	 Law Commission: Insurance Law: Non-Disclosure an Breach of Warranty
1980 Report No. 104, Cmnd, 8064, paras. 4.47 - 4.60, London H.M.S.O.
7	 As to the prospects of legislation in England to implement the
report, see infra, p.340 note 125.
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company promotions, family settlements, succession to land, and so on.
English law does not, as a rule, impose a duty of good faith on parties to a
contract.
9
There is an exception in respect of the so-called contracts of
utmost good faith - contracts uberrima fides -, the most important of which
is the contract of insurance. It is a fundamental requirement of insurance
law that the parties should observe the utmost good faith in dealing with
each other. As James V.-C. said in Mackenzie v.-Coulson:
10
"There is no class of documents as to which the strictest good
faith is more rigidly required in Courts of Law than policies
of assurance..."
In connection with the proposer's duty to disclose material facts to the
insurer, Lord Mansfield said as long ago as 1766:
11
"Good faith forbids either party by concealing what he
privately knows, to draw the other into a bargain, from his
ignorance of that fact, and his believing the contrary."
The doctrine of good faith applies substantially to contracts of
8	 On "good faith" generally, see: Chitty Joseph, Chitty on Contracts,
Vol.I,	 General	 Principles,	 paras.460-463,	 Vol.II,	 Specific
Contracts, paras,3684-3692, 25th. ed., 1983, London Sweet and
Maxwell; R. Powell, "Good Faith in Contracts", (1956) 9 Cur. Leg.
Prob. 16; G. Gilmore, "The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith
Purchase", (1954) 63 Yale L.J. 1057; Sumners, "Good Faith in General
Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code", (1968) 54 Virg. L. Rev. 195; Littlefield, 'Good Faith
Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the Subjective Test'.
(1966) 39 So. Calif. L. Rev. 48
9	 See Keates v. Cadogan (Earl of)	 (1851) 10 C.B. 591, 138 E.R. 234;
Fletcher v. Krell (1873) 42 L. J. Q. B. 55. French law, by contrast
imposes a general duty of good faith in respect of all contracts:
see Art. 1134 of the Civil Code.
10 (1869)8 L.R.Eq. 368 at 375.
11 In Carter v. Boehm (1766) 3 Burr. 1905 at 1910; see also Mathias
Djoumessi v. Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance (Cameroon Ltd.) 
(1975), Suit No. HCB/18/74 of 11 July 1975, Bamenda (Unreported) a
case in the English-speaking Cameroon.
8
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all kinds of insurance. 12 However, in the rules which the courts have devel-
oped in this respect, clear distinctions may be observed which take into
account the variety in types of insurance and differences in the nature and
object of each type. In the case of marine insurance, the common law rules
developed since Carter v Boehm 13 were codified and given statutory authority
in sections 17 and 18 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 14 .
As Powell points out, good faith can be either objective or subjective.
"By objective good faith", he explains, "I mean the standards of the ordinary
man. Subjective good faith means individual honesty ..." 15
A concept of good faith, similar to that prevalent in English law, is
known to French law and French-speaking Cameroon 16 . Article 1134 of the
French Civil Code stipulates that contracts, including, of course, those of
insurance, must be performed in good faith. 	 The Code does not define good
faith; nor does it provide the standard by which it is to be judged. Planiol
and Ripert explain that article 1134 means that every contracting party must
12 See, for example, Joel v. Law Union and Crown Ins. Co. [1908] 2 K.B.
863, at 878 (life insurance); Rozanes v. Bowen (1928) 32 LI.L.R 98,
at 102 (burglary insurance); Locker and Woolf Ltd. v. Western 
Australian Insurance Co. Ltd. [1936] 1 K.B. 408 (fire insurance);
Seaton v. Heath (Burnard) [1899] 1Q.B. 782 (Solvency insurance).
13 (1766) 3 Burr. 1905.
14 See also a recent emphasis of the requirement of utmost good faith
in a marine insurance case: Black King Shipping Corporation and 
Wayanq (Panama) S.A. v. Massie [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 437 at 507-519,
where the insured failed to disclose the fact that 'The Litsion
Pride' would sail into the Persian Gulf - a war zone. The court
held that the insured was required to notify any relevant
information from time to time and as they failed to do so they were
in breach of a material warranty.
15 R. Powell, op. cit., at 23.
16 For the view that the general notion of bona fides may be traced to
Greek influence, see Fritz Pringsheim "L'Origine des contrats
Consensuels", (1954) 32 (4E Serie) Revue Historique de Droit
FrarTais et tranger 475. See also by the same author, The Greek 
Law of Sale Weimar, Hermann Bohlaus Nachfolger, Germany, 1950,
pp.14, 58, 87 and 418.
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act as an honest man in everything connected with the conclusion and
execution of the contract.
17
In this opinion echoes of Powell's concept of
subjective good faith can be discerned. With specific reference to insurance
contracts, a French writer has remarked:
on observe un phSnomene parallele en Angleterre et en France
pour affirmer que le contrat d'assurance est un contrat de bonne
foi et que les parties doivent Schanger entre elles tous les
renseignements nftessaires pour appricier le risque, faute de quoi
le contrat d'assurance est declar‘nul..."18
Does the duty of disclosure which weighs upon the proposer require him to
represent to the insurer all facts within his knowledge, without discriminat-
ion, or does it extend only to facts of a particular character? It has long
been recognised in both England and France that the proposer could not be
expected to tell the insurer just anything and everything. A criterion had
to be established for discriminating between facts that had to be disclosed
and those that did not need to be. That criterion now is the "test of mater-
iality". Section 18(2) of the Marine Insurance Act defined 'material fact'
thus:
"Every circumstance is material which would influence the judgm-
ent of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining
whether he will take the risk."
Any suggestion that this definition is valid only for marine insurance, the
subject-matter of the 1906 Act, would be untenable 19 in the light of
17 See: Planiol and Ripert, Traits Pratique de Droit Civil Franvois, 
Vol.6, Obligations by Paul Esmein, 2nd ed., 1952, 508.
18 See:Borham Atallah, L'Action Directe Contre l'Assureur de la 
Responsabilit6 Automobile Obliqatoire, 1967, at 152-153. See also
Picard and Besson, oa• cit. at 126.
19 Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Ontario Metal Products Co.[1925]
A.C. 344, 351.
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section 149(5)(b) of the Road Traffic Act 1972 which, with regard to motor
insurance, defined material facts as facts which are "of such a nature as to
Influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in determining whether he will
take the risk, and, if so, at what premium, and on what conditions". Similar-
ly, in Lambert v. Cooperative Insurance Society
20
 It was decided that a fact
is material for the purposes of disclosure if it is one which would influence
the judgment of a reasonable or prudent insurer 21
 in deciding whether or not
to accept the risk or what premium to charge or whether to impose special
terms such as an excess or an exclusion clause in the contract with the
proposer
22
.
	 This definition was adopted by the Law Commission
23
. In
Container Transport International Inc. v.
	 Oceanus
24
,	 the	 court	 in
interpreting section 18 of the Marine Insurance Act 1908 said the word
"Influenced" means that the fact is one which would have had an impact on the
formation of the prudent insurer's opinion and on his decision-making process
in relation to matters covered by S.18(2) rather than his final decision
whether or not to take the risk.
20 [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep.485.	 See also: Woolcott v. Sun Alliance Ltd.
[1978] 1 W.L.R. 493; Reynolds v. Phoenix Assurance Co. Ltd.	 [1978]
2 Lloyd's Rep. 440 at 456-457.
21 The expressions 'reasonable insurer' and 'prudent insurer' are
apparently, interchangeable in the present context. See: E.R.H.
Ivamy, General Principles of Insurance Law 4th ed., 1979, at 136.
22 For a discussion of this definition of 'material fact', see Birds,
Modern Insurance Law London, 1982, p.90.
23 See Law Commission: Insurance Law - Non-Disclosure and Breach of
Warrranty (1980) No. 104, Cmnd, 8064, para.4.48; Clause 2 of the
Draft Insurance Law Reform Bill (L.C. Report, No.104 Appendix A)
gives effect to the recommendations of the Report.
24 [1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep.476 at 492.
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French and French-speaking Cameroonian definition of material fact
differs from that of the English and English-speaking Cameroonian definition
which has just been considered.
According to article 15(2) of the law of 13 July 1930, the insured is
obliged to declare accurately at the time of concluding the contract all the
circumstances known to him "that are of the nature to enable the insurer to
assess the risk he is undertaking". 	 In relation to the content of the duty
of disclosure, the article relates the facts to be disclosed to the
insurer.
25
This simply means the particular or actual insurer.
	 Thus by
relating the facts to be disclosed to the particular insurer's assessment or
acceptance of the risk, the article potentially goes further than English law
which only requires an applicant to disclose those facts which would
influence the judgment of a prudent insurer. 26 The formulation of a legal
test of materiality does not of itself resolve the issue whether a particular
fact is material or not.	 To answer this question with respect to a
particular fact in a given case requires application by the courts of the
materiality test to that particular fact: is the fact of such a nature as to
have influenced the decision of the insurer as to acceptance of the risk,
evaluation of premium and imposition of special conditions? In England this
question is determined by the court after hearing the evidence of expert
witnesses.
27
Whether a particular fact is material depends, in the final
analysis,	 upon the circumstances of the particular case and the type of
25 Added emphasis.
26 See: P. Catala and J. A. Weir, "D gclaration du Risque en Droit
Franpis et Anglais Compar g", (1966) 37 Rev. G gn. Ass. Terr., 449 at
459-462.
27 See Seaton v. Heath [1899] 1 Q.B. 782, at 791; see also Container 
Transport International Inc. v. Oceanus 119841 1 Lloyds Rep. 476.
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insurance involved. A similar situation prevails in France. According to
the Cour de cassation,
28
 it is for the judge at first instance to determine
whether or not a particular fact is of such a nature as to have influenced
the insurer's assessment of the risk. 	 No sanction is applied for failure to
disclose a fact which, in the opinion of the court, was not of a nature to
change the object of the risk or to diminish the insurer's opinion of the
risk.
29
Material facts are generally classified into two groups: those that
influence the insurer in determining the rate of premium and those that
influence his decision whether or not to accept the proposed risk. These two
categories are not necessarily exclusive, since a fact which increases the
proposed risk may also induce the insurer to demand a higher premium. Never-
theless, it is important for purposes of analysis to maintain the distinction
between the two types of fact. The distinction is recognised in both English
law where facts of the first group are generally termed the 'physical hazar-
ds' and those of the second group 'moral hazards' and French law where facts
of the former group constitute 'risques objectifs' while those of the latter
group make up 'risques subjectifs'. 30
Examples of facts of the first group include: the exposure of the
subject matter of insurance to abnormal danger by reason of its nature,
condition, use or location; facts which suggest that the liability of the
insurer will be greater than it otherwise might have been, for example, where
the insured entrusting insured goods to a carrier enters into a special
contract with the carrier under which the latter is relieved of his common
28 La Protectrice C. Veuve Poiron et autres, Cour de cassation (Ire Ch.
civ.), 24 January 1968(1968) 39 Rev. G gn. Ass. Terr. 485 at 486.
29 Ibid.; Motor Union c. Cons. Gillet, Cour d'appel de Paris (4a ch.),
10 July 1942, (1943) 14 Rev. Gdn. Ass. Terr. 344.
30 See, Catala and Weir, op. cit., 460.
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law liability for damage to the goods;
31
 in the case of motor insurance,
facts relating to the age of the vehicle, 32
 its value,
33
 the actual price
paid by the owner, 34
 its make, the place of habitual garaging and the
profession of the insured;
35
 in fire insurance of a building, the material in
which the building has been constructed, the location of the building and the
social class, mental condition and profession of its occupants. Among facts
of the second group, the following may be cited: any fact which suggests that
the particular proposer's application for insurance ought to be subjected to
special scrutiny, for example, on account of his previous convictions;
31 Tate v. Hyslop (1885) 15 Q.B.D. 368 (Marine insurance).
32 Santer v. Poland (1924) 19 LI.L. Rep.29
33 Brewtnall v. Cornhill Ins. Co. Ltd. (1931) 40 LI.L. Rep. 166.
34 Allen v. Universal Automobile Ins. Co. Ltd. (1933) 45 LI.L. Rep.55.
35 James v. British General Ins. Co. Ltd., [1927] 27 LI.L. Rep. 328; In
France see Dame Basile c. La Concorde, Cour de cassation (Ire Ch.
civ.), 8 May 1979, (1980) 51 Rev. G4n. Ass. Terr. 40; F.C.A. c. 
Consorts Garoowitsch, Cour de cassation (Ire Ch. civ.), 15 February
1972,(1973) 44 Rev. G4n. Ass. Terr. 71; Garantie Mutuelle des
Fonctionnaires c. Voisin, Cour de cassation (Ire Ch. civ.), 29
February 1972, (1972) 43 Rev. G6n. Ass. Terr. 506; Fonds de 
oarantie automobile c. Buttet et Compagnie l'Union et le Ph‘nix 
espaonol, Cour de cassation (Ire civile), 2 April 1974, Gaz Pal.
1975. 1. 429.
36 Schoolman v. Hall [1951] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 139; Regina Fur Ltd. v. 
Bossom [1958] 2 Lloyd's Rep.425. It is to be noted, however, that
by virtue of 5.4 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, the
proposer in England need not disclose previous convictions which are
'spent'. But section 5(1) provides an exception to the Act if a
sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding 30 months is imposed,
the conviction cannot become spent. Further, section 7(3) gives the
court a discretion to admit evidence as to spent convictions if the
court is satisfied that "justice cannot be done in the case except
by admitting it." The issue arose in Reynolds v. Phoenix Assurance 
Co. Ltd., [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 22; [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep.
440,460,457-459. It is unfortunate that the general effect of this
provision and in particular the extent to which it affects the
insured's duty Of disclosure was left uncertain by the Court of
Appeal. Cf. Cameroon: rehabilitation by lapse of time: Art. 70 of
the Penal Code.
36
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previous refusals of insurance
37
 or a long history of previous losses or
insurance claims;
38 in motor insurance the proposer's previous driving
experience, the period for which he has held a licence and whether his
driving licence had ever been 	 withdrawn or endorsed by judicial or
administrative decision;
39
proposer,
40
his occupation,
41
 his age
42
 and his
37 London Assurance v. Mansel (1879) 11 Ch. D. 363; Glicksman v.
Lancashire and Gen. Ass. Co. Ltd. [1927] A.C. 139; Locker and Woolf 
Ltd. v. Western Australian Ins. Co. [1936] 1 K.B. 408.
38 Condogianis v. Guardian Ass. Co. [1921] 2 A.C. 125; Rozanes v. Bowen 
(1928) 32 LI.L. Rep.98.	 See however, Ewer v. National Employers 
Mutual Gen. Ins. Ass. Ltd. [1937] 2 All E.R. 193 at 197, where it
was said that it is not necessary to disclose every sort of claim
which the proposer may have made during his life time.
For French authority on the point in the text, see; F.G.A. c. La 
Nationale, Cour de cessation, (Ire Ch. civ.), 27 January 1971,
(1972) 43 Rev. Ge'n. Ass. Terr. 56; Les Assurances Fransaises c. 
Moil, Cour de cessation, (Ire Ch. civ.), 20 October 1971, (1972) 43
Rev. Gen. Ass. Terr. 397; Caisse Securite Sociale Bouches-du-RhSne 
c. La  Flandre, Cour de cassation, (ire Ch. civ.), 24 March 1971,
(1972) 43 Rev. Gen. Ass. Terr. 58. Where the insured did not
disclose the fact that he had six accidents in the previous two
years, the contract was held null in application of Art.21 of the
Law of July 1930.
39 Corcos v. De Rougemont (1925) 23 LI.L.Rep 164; Babatsikos v. Car
Owners' Mutual Ins. Co. Ltd. [1970] 2 Lloyd's Rep 314; in France see
La Providence C. Pays, Cour de cassation, (Ire Ch. civ.), 8 October
1974, (1975) 46 Rev. Gen. Ass. Terr. 366.
40 The proposer's name may indicate the person the insurer is required
to deal with. A deliberate mis-statement of name is a very strong
indication of fraud: McCormick v. National Motor and Accident Ins. 
Union Ltd., (1934) 50 T.L.R. 528.
41 Some professions and callings involve significantly higher accident
rates than others: see Holmes v. Cornhill Ins. Co. (1949) 82 LI. L.
Rep. 575; per Lord Denning M.R. in McNealy v. Penine Ins. Co. [1978]
2 Lloyd's Rep. 18. If the proposer has several occupations in
relation to which he wishes the insurance to be operative he must
state all of them especially where the preium will be affected:
Bigger v. Rock Life Assurance Co. [1902] 1 K.8. 516; Perrins v. 
Marine Ins. Soc. (1856) 2 El. & El. 317; Ayrey v. British Legal and 
United Provident Assurance Co. [1918] 1 K.B. 136.
42 The proposer's age is always relevant to the premium since for
example, young persons are less experienced and may be more
careless: Broad v. Woland (1942) 73 LI.L. Rep. 263.
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physical condition in so far as it affects his capabilities as a driver.43
C. The Mechanism of Disclosure 
Under English, French and Cameroonian law the proposer is required, in
discharging his duty of disclosure, to volunteer all relevant information even
where such information has not been specifically asked for by the insurer.
This rule probably originated in the practice of marine insurance where the
prospective insured, being skilled and experienced, could be expected to give
the insurer the relevant information on his own initiative. In this branch of
insurance it has not been customary to elicit information through questions on
proposal forms. Once the insurance bargain extended to other types of insur-
ance, insurers found that they could not rely solely on the initiative of the
proposer or on the latter's 'good faith' to obtain information on all material
facts. It became evident that policyholders on the whole could not be expect-
ed to appreciate what facts the insurer considered material.
	 To aid the
proposer in the discharge of his duty of disclosure, therefore, insurers
resorted to the device of questions in insurance proposal forms, declarations
or other documents to elicit the necessary or material information. This
development has presented the courts with a problem in the field of non-marine
insurance: does the use of questionnaires prepared by the insurer to elicit
information from the proposer relieve the latter of his legal duty to volunt-
eer information? In other words, has a duty to volunteer information been
replaced by a duty to answer questions? The weight of opinion in both England
and France has been against any idea of abolishing the insured's duty to
volunteer information 44 . Thus, in England, Viscount Dunedin stated in a case
of burglary insurance that alongside questions in the proposal form, there was
"the duty of no concealment of any consideration which would affect the mind
43 James v. British Gen. Ins. Co. Ltd. (1927) 27 LI.L. Rep.328.
44 See e.g., The recommendations of the Law Commission: Non-Disclosure 
and Breach of Warranty, No. 104, 1980 Cmnd.8064 para. 4.59.
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of the ordinary prudent man in accepting the risk". 45 In Schoolman v. Hall 46
a duty to disclose previous convictions was imposed in the absence of any
question on the matter.	 Cohen L. J. held in that case that questions,
whether asked or not, did not "relieve the proposer of his general obligation
at common law to disclose any material which might affect the risk which was
being run ...".	 As Scrutton L.	 J. said in Rozanes v. Bowen
47
; "It has been
for centuries in England the law in connection with insurance of all sorts,
...that, ...it is the duty of the assured, ...to make a full disclosure to
the underwriters without being asked of all material circumstances...".
Significantly, in Regina Fur Co. Ltd. v. Bossom 48 (all risk insurance)
counsel for the insured, faced with the insurer's plea of non-disclosure of
previous convictions of the insured who was the director of a company, did
not even raise the contention that such a matter had not been the subject of
any question by the insurer. The position of French and French-speaking
Cameroonian law on this issue is similar to that of English and English-
speaking Cameroonian law.
49
The proposer is required to take the initiative
to volunteer information.
50 Questionnaires, where they are issued by the
insurer, are intended simply to facilitate the proposer's task of disclosure
and to draw his attention to some facts which the insurer particularly
45 See Glicksman v. London and General Ass. Co. Ltd. [1927] A.C. 139 at
143.
46 [1951] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 139 at p.142.
47 (1928) 32 LI.L. Rep. 98,	 at 102; see also: Roselodqe v. Castle 
[1966] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 113 (jewellry insurance).
48 [1957] 2 Lloyd's Rep.466.
49 See Picard and Besson, op. cit., 131-133.
50 Alliance Assurance Ltd. c.	 Izoard, Cour de cassation, (Ire Ch. .
civ.), 17 November 1970, (1971) 42 Rev. G4n. Ass. Terr. 405.
- 315 -
considers 'material'
51
. Where precise and clear questions are addressed to
the proposer, he fulfills his obligation if he responds loyally, precisely
and completely to all of them. But where his attention has been drawn to
matters not asked which he knows are important to the risk, his failure to
disclose those facts will result in bad faith being inferred; this might
lead, where appropriate, to nullity of the insurance contract in application
of article 21 of the law of July 1930.
52
The rule that by requiring answers to a series of specific questions in
a proposal form the insurer does not waive the need to disclose material
facts falling outside the scope of the questions asked has been criticised on
the ground that the insured may well have been misled to suppose that no
further information was required to be disclosed by him. 53 To this it may be
answered that the questions are designed only to ease the task of the insured
in discharging his legal duty of disclosure. The Law Commission advocates
the use, in addition to specific questions, of a general question such as
whether there were any other facts which might influence the judgment of a
prudent insurer in accepting the risk and fixing the premium.
54
A general
question of this kind would reiterate the proposer's residual duty to
51 A questionnaire is usually annexed to the policy and constitutes the
basis for appreciating the risk. See La Minerva de France c. Veuve 
Cantaloube, Cour de cassation, (ire Ch. civ.), 8 January 1969,
(1969) 40 Rev. Ggn. Ass. Terr. 506; Mutualitg Industrielle c. 
C.P.A.M., Cour d'appel de Pau (A Ch.), 28 October 1971 (1972) 43
Rev. Gdn.	 Ass.	 Terr. 362; D... c. Compaqnie X..., Cour d'appel de
Rouen (2 Ch.), 16 February 1973 (1974) 45 Rev. G gn. Ass. Terr. 360.
52 See Massador c. Union Industrielle	 et de Commerce, Cour de
cassation,	 (Ire Ch.	 civ.), 11 March 1970,(1970) 41 Rev. G gn. Ass.
Terr. 542; La Foncire C. F.G.A., Tribunal de grande instance de
Lyon (ire civ.) 22 October 1969, 	 (1970) 41	 Rev. G gn. Ass. Terr.
396.
53 See Birds, 'The Statement of Insurance Practice - a measure of
regulation of the insurance contract',(1977) 40 M.L.R. 677 at 680.
See also: The Law Commission Report, No. 104, op. cit., para. 3.60.
54 Law Commission Report, op. cit•, para. 4.57 e.sp. at para. 4.58
pp.52-53.
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volunteer further information.	 Its further advantage is to draw the
proposer's attention specifically and explicitly to his obligation to
disclose all material facts. It is now settled that questions asked by the
insurer in the proposal form which he issues are immaterial to the existence
of the applicant's residual duty of disclosure.	 The recent practice of some
insurance companies, however, is to treat the insurer's questions in the
proposal form as exhausting the material information which the insured is
under a duty to give.
55
Nevertheless, they can affect the extent to which he may be held to the
discharge of that duty.	 Where a question is ambiguous, only a fair and
reasonable construction must be placed on it. Accordingly, if an ambiguous
question is put to a proposer in a proposal form, the insurer cannot rely on
any inaccuracy in the answer as a ground for repudiating the policy if that
answer is true having regard to the construction which a reasonable man might
put on the question and which the proposer did in fact put upon it.
56
It
must be noted, however, that in this matter the courts do not presume that
the construction most favourable to the proposer is necessarily the fair and
reasonable one.
56A
The scope of the proposer's duty of disclosure may also be limited by
the so-called doctrine of waiver by the insurer, a doctrine known to both
English and English speaking Cameroonian law on the one hand and French and
French speaking Cameroonian law on the other. The following examples may be
offered of circumstances in which the doctrine would operate. 	 Where
55 See the circular letter of Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Issue
No.33 January 1981 to its agents. The residual duty of disclosure
could possibly become obsolete.
56 Law Commission Report, No. 104 op. cit. para. 4. 84; see also
Clause 6(2) of the Draft Insurance Law Reform Bill (L.C. Report
No.104 Appendix A).
56A Holt's Motors v. S.E. Lancashire Ins. 	 Co. (1930) 37 LI.L.R. 1, per
Scrutton L. J. at 4.
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questions are asked on a particular subject in such a manner as to invite
only a limited answer from the proposer it may be inferred that the insurer
has waived his right to information either on the same subject but outside
the scope of the questions or on kindred matters.
57
	Thus, when certain
information is sought in respect of a particular period of time, this
necessarily implies a waiver concerning the same sort of facts occurring
outside that period.	 Mackinnon J.	 said in Jester-Barnes v. Licenses and 
General Ins. Co. Ltd; 58
"If they ...
	 asked him ...
	
"have you or your driver during the
past five years been convicted of any offence", ... and he had
said: "No", and that was true, I should have come, without any
hesitation, to the conclusion that they were not entitled, ...
to take it to mean that he had failed to disclose that he had
been convicted eight years ago ... "
Recently, in Hair v. Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd., 59 a generous and broad
Interpretation of the doctrine of waiver was applied. Here, the plaintiffs
completed a proposal form for insurance of a house with the defendants and
stated inter alia, in answer to specific questions raised in the proposal
form that the buildings were kept in good state of repair; the property was
occupied by the insured's son but owned by the proposer; and the premises
were left unattended regularly apart from holidays for eight hours daily. The
house was later destroyed by fire and the plaintiffs claimed for an indemnity
against this loss. The defendants	 contended that the plaintiffs had
57 Laing v. Union Marine Ins. Co. (1895) 1 Com. Cas. 11 at 15; See also
MacGillivray and Parkington op. cit., para.625 at p.255.
58 (1934) 49 Ll.L Rep.231 at 237. See also Schoolman v. Hall [1951] 1
Lloyd's Rep. 139 at 143.
59 [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep.667 esp. at p.673. For fuller detail as to the
result of this case see: J. Birds, "Warranties and Waiver of the
duty of disclosure", [1984] J.B.L., March, pp.163-165.
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failed to disclose material facts which ought to have been disclosed, that
is, an order imposed by the Local Authority under the Housing of the Working
Class Act 1890 on the grounds that premises were unfit for human habitat-
ion.
60
	It was held that the existence of the closing order was relevant to
the state of repair of the premises and their occupancy and as these matters
were the subject of specific questions, the plaintiff was relieved of any
duty to disclose the fact of the order. The result in this case offers a
pointer to what is likely to be the legal position if and when an Insurance
Law Reform Bill is enacted following the Law Commission's recommendations for
reform.
61
The Law Commission as will be seen later,
62
 recommended that the
duty of disclosure should be reformulated to require disclosure of only those
material facts which a reasonable man would disclose. Since a reasonable man
would not normally consider that he had to provide more or additional
information than that expressly solicited when a proposal form is completed,
it may well be that any residual duty of disclosure would disappear.
A second situation in which the doctrine of waiver may operate is where
the proposer discharges his duty of disclosure so as to "call the attention
of the underwriters in such a manner that they can see that if they require
further information they ought to ask for it".
63
Waiver may also be inferred if in the particular circumstances the
60 Ibid. at p.673
61 Law Commission Report No. 104 op. cit., paras. 4.61 - 4.62; Clause
6(3) and (4) of the Draft Inurance Law Reform Bill (L.C. Report,
No.104 Appendix A); Department of Trade and Industry, Insurance
Contract Law Consultation Document, 7 June 1984, para.12.
62 Infra, p.321.
63 Asfar v. Blundell [1896] 1 Q.B. 123 at 129, per Lord Esher, M.R. See
also: Robert v. Avon Insurance Co. [1956] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 240;
Greenhill V. Federal Ins. Co. [1927] 1 K.B. 65, at p.85 per Scrutton
L.J.
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insured is justified in assuming that the insurer is waiving disclosure of
material facts as to which he appears to be indifferent or uninterested. If
the insured leaves a question wholly unanswered, the insurers cannot " ... at
some subsequent date, say that they have been misled by the form of the
answer ..."
64
In other words, the insurer by his conduct - the failure to
inquire about the blank answer - waives any future allegations of breach of
duty on the part of the insured and the common law duty of general disclosure
in respect of the subject-matter of the question ceases to apply. 	 As in
English law, the concept of waiver is recognised in French law. Where for
example, questions are asked requiring information for a given duration, it
is implied that the duration is unequivocal and thus the obligation is
limited to the period stipulated.
65
D. The Extent of the duty to disclose 
Another question that arises in connection with the proposer's duty to
disclose material facts is whether this duty is confined to facts within the
actual knowledge of the proposer or whether it embraces facts which, even
though not actually known, ought to have been known to him. So far as marine
insurance is concerned, the question has been settled in England by section
18(1) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 which provides that:
"... the assured must disclose to the insurer, before the contract is
concluded, every material circumstance which is known to the assured,
and the assured is deemed to know every circumstance which, in the
64	 Robert v. Avons Ins. Co. Ltd., [1956] 2 Lloyd's 240 at 249.
65 Les Assurances FranRaises c. Moll, Cour de cassation (Ire Ch. civ.),
20 October 1971, (1972) 43 Rev. G4n. Ass. Terr. 397. The insured had
been asked to declare previous convictions for the past twenty-four
months. It was held that this obligation in this regard was limited'
to the past two years.
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ordinary course of business, ought to be known by him. If the assured
fails to make such disclosure, the insurer may avoid the contract."
Clearly, then, in a proposal for marine insurance the duty of the
insured is not only to disclose material facts actually within his knowledge,
but also those which he ought to know - that is to say, those within his
"constructive knowledge'. Indeed, by providing that the assured is "deemed
to know every circumstance which, in the ordinary course of business, ought
to be known by him" the 1906 Act appears to be creating a category of
"imputed knowledge". Does the same rule apply to non-marine insurances?	 It
is arguable that a proposer for a non-marine insurance policy is under a duty
to disclose facts of which he has only constructive or imputed knowledge
because section 18, which imposes such a duty in respect of marine insurance,
reflects common law rules in respect of all classes of insurance.
66
Since
insurers are entitled to assume that they are being put in possession of all
material facts some duty would seem to be incumbent upon a proposer to make
enquiries as to matters which he ought to know. The proposer would clearly
be acting in 'bad faith' if his ignorance of material facts were due to his
failure to make such enquiries as he might reasonably have been expected to
make in the circumstances. 	 However, in Joel v. Law Union and Crown
Insurance, Fletcher Moulton L. J. said:
67
"The duty is a duty to disclose, and you cannot disclose what you
do not know. The obligation to disclose, therefore, necessari-
ly depends on the knowledge you possess".
The insistence upon the learned Lord Justice's view, the obligation to
disclose material facts covered only facts actually known. It has been
66	 See Lambert v. Cooperative Ins. Society [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep.485.
67	 [1908] 2 K.B. 863, at 884.
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argued, however, that statements such as the one in Joel's case that a prop-
oser is bound to disclose only what he knows should be taken to cover not
only what he actually knows but also what was ascertainable by him by means
of such enquiries as reasonable business prudence required him to make
68
. It
seems that the question as to disclosure of 'facts constructively known'
remains an open one so far as concerns non-marine insurance 69 . However, the
Law Commission
69A
 recommended that the proposer should disclose any fact
which a reasonable man "in the position of the proposer"
69B
 would disclose to
the insurer, having regard to the nature and extent of the insurance cover
which is sought and the circumstances in which it is sought.
Under French and French speaking Cameroonian law, article 15(2) of the
law of 13 July 1930 and French law (now article L.113-2 of the Insurance Code
70
1976)
	
provide that the insured is obliged to declare accurately at the
time of conclusion of the contract all the circumstances known to him which
are calculated to affect the assessment of the risk. French courts have
interpreted this provision as including circumstances which the insured ought
to know are capable of leading the insurer either to refuse the risk or to
68 See Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol, 25 4th ed., 1978, 206 para.373.
69 See Australian and New Zealand Bank v. Colonial and Eagle Wharves; 
Boaq (Third Party) [1960] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 241, at 252, per McNair, J.
(concerning an all- risk policy). In this case the question whether
5.18(1) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 represented the general
rule was left open. Only in respect of life assurance has actual
knowledge alone been required.
69A Law Commission Report No. 104 op.cit., para. 4.50. See also Clause
2(1)(b) of the Draft Insurance Law Reform Bill (L.C. Report No.104
Appendix A).
69B The reasonable man test set out above, would be made more objective
by omitting the concept "in the position of the proposer". This
concept could encourage arguments that the standard of disclosure
was affected by all the circumstances bearing on that particular
proposer. See Department of Trade and Industry, Insurance Contract
Law Reform Consultation Document, 9 August 1983.
70 See Codes des Assurances, 2nd ed., 1979, L'Arqus p.18.
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charge a higher premium. 71
 Thus the duty of disclosure in French law is not
confined to such facts as are within the actual knowledge of the insured but
extends to all material facts which the insured ought to know as a diligent
and reasonable man.	 This interpretation has been reiterated in the Fifth
Draft of the European Economic Community Directive on the co-ordination of
the legislative, statutory and administrative provisions governing insurance
contracts 1979 as amended in 1980. 72 Article 3(1) of the Draft requires an
applicant for insurance to declare to the insurer any circumstances of which
he ought reasonably to be aware and which he ought to expect to influence a
prudent insurer's assessment or acceptance of the risk.
Finally, it may be noted that the duty of disclosure exists on renewal
of the insurance policy. In England in contrast to France, most policies
other than life insurance are contracts for a term of one year and are
renewable annually. The renewal of an existing policy is regarded in law as
the making of a new contract of insurance. In the result, the insured is
subject to a fresh or repeated duty of disclosure on each application for
renewal. 73
	The extent of the duty of disclosure on renewal is the same as
on the original application.
71 See, e.g., Orlowski C. Martin, Cour de cassation (Ch. civ., sect
civ.), 26 January 1948, (1948) 19 Rev. G6n. Ass. Terr. 45; Houillot 
C. La Savoyarde, Cour de cassation (Ch. civ., Ire sect. civ.), 2
November 1954, (1955) 26 Rev. G6n. Ass. Terr. 37. See also A.
Besson, "Vers une certaine coordination des lois sur le contrat
d'assurance dans les six pays du march‘ commun", (1966) 37 Rev. Gri.
Ass. Terr. 145-173, esp. at 159.
72 Proposal for a Council Directive on the coordination of laws,
regulations and administrative provisions relating to insurance
contracts (0.3. No. C 190/2) 28:7:79 as amended by Amendment of
proposal for a Council Directive on the coordination of laws,
regulations and administrative provisions relating to insurance
contracts (0.3. No. C 355/30) 31:12:80
73 Lambert v. Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd. [1975] 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 485.
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One criticism has been leveled at the duty of disclosure on renewal, 74
namely, that the insured may not be aware of the existence of his duty and of
its extent since he is not in possession of documents previously supplied to
him by the insurer and in which the information is recorded. 	 The First
Statement of Insurance Practice 1981
75
provides that renewal notices should
contain a warning about the duty of disclosure including the necessity to
advise changes affecting the policy which have occurred since the policy's
inception.
III NON-DISCLOSURE AND MISREPRESENTATION
A failure on the part of the proposer to disclose a material fact in
accordance with the law described above is known in English and English
speaking Cameroonian law as "non-disclosure", or "concealment".
76
Misrepres-
entation may be defined as an inaccurate or untrue statement made by one of
the parties to the contract of insurance, or by his agent, prior to the
conclusion of the contract or at its renewal. It may be either oral or in
writing and often takes the form of an answer to a question in the proposal
form.	 As here defined, non-disclosure and misrepresentation are both .
concepts known to French and French speaking Cameroonian insurance law where
they are respectively known as 'rgticence' and 'fausse declaration' -
74 See R. Merkin,	 "Uberrimae Fidei Strikes Again", (1976) 39 M.L.R.
478, at 480.
75 First issued on 4 May 1977: see 931 Hansard (5th series) H.C.
Cols.218-220 (4 May 1977) following discussions between
representatives of leading insurers and the Government, and in 1981,
see 15 Hansard (6th series) H.C. Cols. 341342 (22 December 1981).
See further, infra, pp.336-339; see also, Law Commission Report,
No.104, op. cit., paras. 4.74 - 4.77 and Clause 4 of the Draft
Insurance Law Reform Bill (L.C. Reoprt, No. 104, Appendix A)
76 Per Jessel M.R. in London Assurance v. Mansel (1879) 11 Ch.D. 363,
at 370: "Concealment properly so called means non-disclosure of a
fact which it is a man's duty to disclose, and it was his duty to
disclose the fact if it was a material fact".
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silence and false declaration.
77
These expressions are evocative, since non-
disclosure consists essentially of silence on the part of the proposer while
misrepresentation takes the form of false declaration.
While non-disclosure and misrepresentation are conceptually distinct,
they are, in practice, not easily distinguishable. Total non-disclosure can
hardly amount to misrepresentation. Where non-disclosure is only partial,
however, the boundary between non-disclosure and misrepresentation becomes
tenuous.	 The courts have tended to confuse the two
78
, often approaching a
case of misrepresentation in terms of non-disclosure, and vice versa 79 .
Indeed, it appears to be standard practice for an insurer wishing to
repudiate a contract of insurance or to avoid his liabilities under such a
contract to plead both misrepresentation and non- disclosure.
To illustrate the possible confusion between misrepresentation and
(partial) non-disclosure, it seems desirable to mention the following
examples. On a fire insurance proposal form it was asked whether the proposer
had "ever been a claimant on a fire insurance company in respect of the
property now proposed, or any other property? If so, state when and name of
company". The proposer answered: "Yes. 1917,
	
'Ocean'". This was held to be
true so far as it went, but incomplete inasmuch as in 1912 another claim had
been made. The partial non-disclosure in respect of the 1912 claim rendered
the statement in respect of the 1917 claim a misrepresentation
80
 . As James
Landel stated:
77 In France, see article L.113.8 of Codes des Assurances 1976.
78 See, e.g., London Assurance v. Mansel (1879) 11 Ch.D. 363; Godfrey 
v. Britannic Assurance Co. [1963] 2 Lloyd's Rep.515.
79 See London Assurance v. Mansel, supra. note 78.
80 Condogianis v. The Guardian Ass. Co.	 [1921] 2 A.C. 125. See also: •
Holts Motors Ltd. v. South East Lancashire Ins. Co. Ltd. (1930) 37
Ll.L. Rep. 1, per Scrutton L. J. at p.3.
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"en cas de reponse incomplete ou equivoque a une question sans
ambiguite l'assure est presume avoir fait une fausse declaration" 81
.
In the French-speaking Cameroonian case of Nyamsi Kong v. Aqence Camer-
ounaise d'Assurance,
82
 the proposer in response to a question whether he had
ever been refused insurance previously replied: "one refusal, last year". In
fact two insurance companies had refused to insure his other vehicles because
of their unroadworthiness.	 The court considered this incomplete answer as
reticence and false declaration.	 In London Assurance v. Mansel, 83
 the
proposer was asked: "Has a proposal been made on your life at any other
office or offices;	 If so, where?"
"Was it accepted at the ordinary premiums or an increased premium?" The
proposer replied: "Insured now in two offices for £16,000 at ordinary rates.
Policies effected last year". This answer was partially correct since two
offices had issued policies on the insured's life.	 But it was thoroughly
misleading because five offices had declined to insure the proposer. 	 In a
case in English-speaking Cameroon, Mathias Djoumessi v. Guardian Royal 
Exchange Assurance (Cameroon Ltd) 84 , the defendant resisted a claim made by
the plaintiff because of breach of section 9 of the policy which stated that
the defendant's liability should depend upon the truth of the statements and
answers in the proposal form. The plaintiff answered "yes" to the question
whether the vehicle will be driven by the proposer and "no" to the question
whether the vehicle will be driven by a paid driver. An accident ensued in
81 James Landel, Fausse declarations 	 et rfticences en assurance 
automobile, 1982 L'Arqus, Paris, p.14.
82 Judgment No.200 of 27 June 1979, Douala, (Unreported).
83 Supra, notes 78 and 79.
84 Suit no. HCB/18/74 of 11 July, 1975 Bamenda (Unreported).
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which a paid driver was responsible. 	 The court held that the insurer was
entitled to avoid the contract and repudiate liability because the insured's
undertaking to drive the car himself which induced the defendants to enter
into the insurance contract was a material mis-statement and a breach of a
fundamental term of the contract.
IV. WARRANTY AND AGGRAVATION DU RISQUE 
Under English and French as well as Cameroonian law, the time at which
the proposer's answers must be correct is the time at which the contract is
concluded or renewed. The proposer is required to declare and correct any
85
changes in his declaration up to the conclusion of the contract. 	 me
statements made continue in their effect until the contract is concluded.
Any failure to correct them, where necessary, between their making and the
conclusion of the contract would render them false declarations. If any new
material fact arises before acceptance of the proposal, or if an existing
fact which was previously immaterial becomes material owing to a change of
circumstances it must be disclosed
86
.
85 See, in respect of France, Article L.113.8 Code des Assurances 1976;
in French-speaking Cameroon Article 15 of the law of 13 July 1930;
Silla Nkonque v. Chanas et Privat, Arre‘t No.114/CC of 11 June 1981
Yaounde (Unreported). And see in respect of England: With v. O'Fla-
nagan [1936] 1 Ch.575, at 585; Smith v. Kay (1859) 7 H.L.C. 750, per
Lord Cranworth at 769; Davies v. London Provincial Marine Insurance 
Co. (1878) 8 Ch.D. 469; Re Yager and Guardian Assurance Co. Ltd.
(1912) 108 L.T. 38, per Chanel J. at 44; Canning v. Farqhar (1886)
16 Q.B.D. 727 per Lindley L. J. at 733 and per Lord Esher M.R. at
731. See also: A.H. Hudson, 'Making Misrepresentation', (1967) 30
M.L.R. 369-370; Treitel, The Law of Contract 6th ed., 1983, Chap.9.
86 See, in England, Looker v. Law Union and Rock Life Ins. Co. Ltd.
[1928] 2 K.B. 554-559; Allis Chalmers Co. v. Maryland Fidelity and 
Deposit Co. (1916).  114 L.T. 433, per Earl Loreburn at 434; Harring-
ton v. Pearl Life Assurance Co. Ltd. (1914) 30 T.L.R. 613.
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Facts disclosed by the proposer prior to the conclusion of the
insurance contract may change over the duration of the contract. When
circumstances occur after the conclusion of the contract which change the
nature of the risk, the equilibrium of the contract is disrupted. Where the
risk increases in the course of the contract, it would be inequitable to
require the insurer to cover at the same premium a risk greater than that
which he originally undertook.	 Conversely, where the risk has been
diminished it would be inequitable to hold the insured to payment of premium
at the rate originally fixed in contemplation of a higher risk. The question
therefore arises whether the insured should be under a duty to disclose
material facts which occur, after the conclusion but over the duration of the
insurance contract.
French and French-speaking Cameroonian law manifestly favour modificat-
ion of the insurance contract in the light of changes affecting the risk.
These legal systems have, by statute, instituted a scheme of continuous
disclosure by the insured in the course of the contract of changes in
material facts. The insured is required to notify the insurer of matters
stipulated in the contract for the continuous assessment of the risk
throughout the duration of the contract, while the insurer is allowed to
propose corresponding adjustments of premium or other terms of cover in case
of H aqqravation du risque" that is, the change of material facts during the
currency of the contract.
87
By contrast, under English common law and English-speaking Cameroonian
law, there is no general duty to disclose material facts which occur after
the conclusion, but during the period, of the insurance contract. 	 English
law casts the duty to disclose material facts upon the proposer and insured
87 See in Cameroon article 15(3) and 17 of the law of 13 July 1930 and
in France article L.113-2 and article L.113-4 of the Insurance Code
1976. The proposed EEC directive (0.3. No.0 355/30) op. cit. on
insurance contact law refers to this sort of disclosure in articles
4-6. See, also, the English Law Commission Report No.104. op. cit. 
paras. 5.1. - 5.18, pp. 74-79.
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only until the conclusion of the contract, for the former, and at renewal of
the policy, for the latter. In Pim V. Reed 88 the insurance was on machinery
in a mill. At the time of effecting the policy the mill was being used for
the manufacture of paper, but during the currency of the policy the insured
started the business of a cleaner and dyer of cotton waste, using the same
mill. This was a more hazardous use. A loss occurred for which the insurer
refused to indemnify the insured on the ground that the change in use of the
mill had not been disclosed. 	 It was held that in the absence of the
alteration contravening any description of the subject-matter of 	 the
insurance, the change of trade did not invalidate the policy. Until the
middle of the nineteenth century, therefore, the insurer was not protected by
English law against the non-disclosure of changes in material facts occurring
after the conclusion but during the period of the contract. Subsequently,
however, by the "ingenuity of insurance lawyers and the genius of Lord
Mansfield,"
89
 the instrument of the "warranty" which was invented in the
field of marine insurance, 90
 was used to alter this in the area of non-marine
insurance
91
.
There are two types of warranties: promissory warranty 92
 and warranty
as to past or present facts. By promissory warranty the proposer warrants
88 (1843) 6 Man. & G. 1.	 See also for example, Baxendale v. Harvey 
(1859) 4H. and N.445, at 452.
89 See Kessler, "Forces shaping the Insurance Contract," (1954) Ins.
L.J. 151 at 162.
90 Pawson v. Watson (1778), 2 Cowp. 785; De Hahn v. Hartley (1786) 1
T.R. 343.
91 For an early example of the use of the warranty in a non-marine
insurance case, see Newcastle Fire Insurance Co. v. MacMorran (1815)
3 Dow.255.
92 The word promissory is ambiguous in this context since every
warranty is in a sense 'promissory' in so far as the insured is
giving an assurance in respect of facts warranted, present or
future: See Farnham v. Royal Insurance Co. Ltd., [1976] 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 437.
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that a given state of affairs will exist throughout the duration of the
insurance contract and not merely at its inception. Thus certain contracts
of insurance, notably those in fire insurance, in practise incorporate
clauses imposing upon the insured a duty to disclose facts occurring during
the insurance contract which materially increase the risk or any specified
change in circumstances such as any addition or alteration to the insured
premises, and changes in the nature of adjoining premises.
Warranties of past or present facts consist of representations made by
the insured before the completion of the contract. They arise normally as a
result of a completed proposal form where the statements and questions and
answers thereon are warranted to be the basis of the contract
93
.
A breach of warranty, as will be seen later in this chapter
94
, entitles
the insurer to be released from all liability under the policy. Thus, through
this device, the English insurer, who is not otherwise entitled to be
informed of changes in material facts occurring after the conclusion of the
contract but within its duration, is able to protect himself against liabil-
ity for any increased risk which may result from the change in material
facts.
It will be observed that the underlying purpose behind both warranty in
English and English-speaking Cameroonian law and "aggravation du risque" in
French and French-speaking Cameroonian law is the maintenance of a consensus 
ad idem between the insured and insurer and the observance of the agreement
in the sense that the risk the insurer is assuming is at all times comm-
ensurate with the premium paid by the insured. Premiums vary with the risk:
the insurer undertakes a certain risk for a certain premium under certain
93 For the legal mechanism for the creation of this warranty, see
below, pp.337-339.
94 Infra, pp.354-355.
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conditions.	 It is necessary that in so highly speculative a contract the
risk proposed should be accurately defined
95
. Warranty in English and Engl-
ish speaking Cameroonian law and aggravation du risque in French and French
speaking Cameroonian law represent two methods by which attempts to define
the risk accurately have been made.
WARRANTY IN ENGLISH AND ENGLISH-SPEAKING CAMEROONIAN LAW 
In a formula resembling that employed by s.33(1) of the Marine Insurance
Act 1906
96
, MacGillivray and Parkington define a warranty as:
n ... a written term of the contract of insurance in which the
assured warrants, owing to the force of express words or through
the operation of law, either that certain statements of fact are
accurate, or that certain statements of fact are and will remain
accurate, or that he will undertake the due performance of an
obligation specified therein".
97
The Characteristics of Warranties.
	
From this definition four
	 characteristics	 can be discerned as
constituting the nature of a warranty. First, a warranty is a term of the
insurance contract and is therefore, to be found in the contract documents
evidencing the parties agreement. Of these documents the two most common are:
	
the policy and the proposal form.	 The latter is usually incorporated into
95 See Vance, "The early history and development of Warranty in
Insurance Law" (1911) 20 Yale L. J. 525, at 526.
96 Promissory warranty is:
" a warranty by which the assured undertakes that some particular
thing shall or shall not be done or that some condition shall be
fulfilled or whereby he affirms or negatives the existence of a
particular state of facts".
97 MacGillivray and Parkington, On Insurance Law, 7th ed., 1981, at
290. For an elaborate discussion of the subject, see Patterson,
'Warranties in Insurance Law"., (1934) 34 Columb. L. Rev. 595-631.
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the policy and made part of it.	 As Lord Wright observed in Provincial
Insurance v. Morgan
98 the general scheme which has long been in use by
insurance companies comprises a proposal form, signed by the assured,
containing various
	
particulars	 and	 answers	 to various questions, a
declaration that the answers are to be the basis of the contract and an
agreement to accept the company's policy; a recital in 	 the	 policy
incorporating the proposal and declaration and setting out the risk insured,
certain	 exceptions	 and	 conditions and a schedule embodying various
particulars.
This general scheme of policy has often been criticised by judges who
point out, as Lord Wright did, that:
"... it must be very puzzling to the assured, who may find it
difficult to fit the disjointed parts together in such a way as
to get a true and complete conspectus of what their rights and
duties are and what acts on their part may involve a forfeiture
of the insurance. An assured may easily find himself deprived
of the benefits of the policy because he has done something
quite innocently but in breach of a conditigg, ascertainable
only by the dovetailing of scattered portions".
In comparison with the general scheme just mentioned, the practice,
sometimes resorted to, of not referring in the policy at all to a proposal
which the insured has warranted to contain true answers is even more object-
ionable.	 The omission of words of reference altogether is quite contrary to
the spirit of consumer protection legislation in other areas of the law of
contract which requires that vital terms in a complex agreement must be
.	 100delineated with special clarity	 .
Material warranties are of such importance to the insured that he ought
98 [1933] A.C. 240, at 252.
99 Ibid. See also: Yorkshire Insurance v. Campbell, [1917] A.C. 218.
100 See, for example, Consumer Credit Act 1974
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to be able to refer to a written document in which they are contained 101 . The
Law Commission has recommended
102
that the insurer should be obliged, as a
condition precedent to the legal effectiveness of the warranty, to furnish
the insured with a "document containing the warranties" as soon as practic-
able after the insured has given the warranty in question.	 It seems
desirable that where a proposal form has been completed a copy should be sent
to the insured; and if no proposal form is used promissory warranties should
be incorporated as an individual term on the face of the policy or in an
endorsement thereon. In the case of failure to comply with these formal
requirements, the insurer should be precluded from relying on a breach of
warranty in question as a ground for repudiating the policy or rejecting a
claim.
A second characteristic of warranty is that the facts warranted need
not be material to the risk. Unlike misrepresentation which entitles the
insurer to avoid the contract only if the misrepresented fact is material to
the risk, a breach of warranty gives the insurer a right to repudiate the
contract whether Or not the fact warranted affected the risk or in any way
influenced the insurer when he undertook the risk. As Lord Watson said in
Thomson v. Weems
103•
•
"When the truth of a particular statement has been made the
subject of warranty, no question can arise as to its materiality
or immateriality to the risk, it being the very purpose of the
warranty to exclude all controversy upon that point".
101 See E. R. H. Ivamy, "Insurance Law Revision", (1955) Cur. Leg. Prob.
147, at 158.
102 See Law Commission Report No.104, Cmnd. 8064 p.84 para.6.14. Lord
Mansfield held in some decisions that a separate document, even if
delivered with the policy, could not form part of the policy: e.g.,
Pawson v. Watson (1778) 2 Cowp, 785. He also held that even where
the document was wafered on to the policy a warranty contained
therein would only be a representation: Bize v. Fletcher (1779) 1
Dougl. 284.
103 1884) 9 App. Cas. 671, at 689. See also: Yorkshire Insurance v. 
Campbell [1917] A.C. 218; Condoclianis v. Guardian Assurance [1921] 2
A.C. 125; Dawsons v. Bonnin [1922] 2 A.C. 413.
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In Dawson v. Bonnin,
104
 a motor vehicle insurance case, a mis-statement by
the insured as to the place where a vehicle was garaged was held to be immat-
erial; nevertheless the insured was precluded by it from recovering under the
policy since he had warranted it to be true.
There has been considerable criticism of this aspect of the law of
warranties
105
Further, the Law Commission considered
106
 that insurers
should not be entitled to repudiate the policy for breach of an undertaking
which is immaterial to the risk even if the word "warranty" is used or if the
true construction of the contract provides the insurer with the right to
repudiate for breach of warranty. It further recommended that a term of the
contract should only be capable of constituting a warranty if it is material
to the risk, in the sense that it is an undertaking relating to a matter
which would influence a prudent insurer in deciding whether to accept the
risk and if he decides to accept it, at what premium and on what terms.
Warranty evinces a third characteristic: there must be strict and exact
compliance with the obligation or statement that is warranted
107
.
104 Note 103 supra. But see the dissenting judgments of Viscount Finlay
at 430-431, and Lord Wrenbury at 436-437; See also p50 infra See in
English-speaking Cameroon, Mathias Dioumessi v. Guardian Royal 
Exchange Assurance (Cameroon Ltd) Suit No. HCB/18/74 of 11th July
1975 Bamenda (Unreported).
105 See for example, Lord Wrenbury in Glicksman v. Lancashire and 
General Assurance Co. Ltd. [1927] A.C. 139, at 144-145.
106 Law Commission Report No. 104, op. cit. para. 6.12; Clause 8 of the
Draft Insurance Law Reform Bill (L.C. Report No.104 Appendix A).
107 In Pawson v. Watson (1778) 2 Cowp. 785, at 787,-788 Lord Mansfield
said that where there was a warranty "nothing tantamount will do or
answer the purpose; it must be strictly performed as being part of
the agreement".
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In De Hahn v. HartleV
108
 he returned to the same theme and said:
"There is a material distinction between a warranty and a repres-
entation. A representation may be equitably and substantially
answered: but a warranty must be strictly complied with. Supp-
osing a warranty to sail on the 1st. of August, and the ship did
not sail till the 2d, the warranty would not be complied with.
A warranty in a policy of insurance is a condition or a
contingency, and unless that be performed, there is no contract.
It is perfectly immaterial for what purpose a warranty is intro-
duced; but, being inserted, 185 contract does not exist unless
it be literally complied with"	 .
In English law it makes no difference that a breach of warranty occurr-
ed without the fault or even the knowledge of the insured or owing to someone
else's fault or that the risk is not increased by its breach
110
. English
courts have recognised that an insurer may require the insured to warrant the
accuracy of all statements made by him in the proposal form irrespective of
his personal knowledge. If an insured warrants that his statements are true
not only is subjective truthfulness warranted but also their absolute accur-
acy. In Duckett v. Williams
111
 Lord Lyndhurst remarked that a statement is
not the less untrue because the party making it is not apprised of the
untruth. However, the insured may warrant the truth of his statements only
108 (1786) 1 T.R. 343 at 345-346.
109 In Allen v. Universal Automobile Ins. Co. (1933) 45 LL.L.R. 55, a
proposer for motor insurance was asked: "what was the actual price
paid by the owner?" He answered: £285". It was held that there had
been a breach of warranty since he had in fact paid only £275. In
Newcastle Fire v. MacMorran (1815) 3 Dow. 255 a store pipe three
feet long was held not to answer a warranty that it was two feet
long.
110 Phillips v. Baillie (1784) 3 Dougl. K.B. 374; Trickett v. Queensland 
Insurance [1936] A.C. 159, at 165, per Lord Alness; Worslev v. Wood.
(1796) 6 Term Rep. 710; Newcastle Fire v. MacMorran (1815) 3 Dow.
255.
111 (1834) 2 C. + M. 348, at 351.
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so far as he knows it. In this case he declares that his answers to questions
asked are true to the best of his knowledge and belief. 112 For example, the
General Accident proposal form provides:
"I/We declare that the information given in this 'Keep Motoring Proposal'
is to the best of my/our knowledge and belief correct and complete in
every detail and will be the basis of the contract between me/us and
General Accident."
A fourth and final characteristic of warranty is that its breach need
not have caused a loss for the insurer to be entitled to repudiate the
policy. Thus, if the insured under a motor policy warrants that as a
condition of the insurer's liability he will maintain the insured vehicle in
an efficient or roadworthy condition and the insurers can prove that the
vehicle was not in such a state they will have a defence to the insured's
claim arising out of an accident involving the insured vehicle without having
to prove that the poor condition of the vehicle caused or contributed to the
accident. 113
The result could be even more absurd with regard to policies which
cover more than one risk. For example, it is compulsory under section 145 of
the Road Traffic Act 1972 in a motor insurance policy to cover liability in
respect of death or personal injury caused to third parties. The same policy
may, at the insured's option, provide cover against fire or theft if the
vehicle; a comprehensive policy may, in addition to the above, cover loss or
112 This modification is a consequence of the St4tement of Insurance
Practice, para. 1(a). This affects insureds in their private
capacity only. C.F. General Accident proposal form for commercial
vehicles, infra, p.338.
112A See General Accident 'Keep Motoring Proposal Form 1985'.
113 Jones v. Provincial Insurance (1929) 35 Ll.L.Rep. 135; Brown v. 
Zurich General Accident [1954] 2 Lloyd's Rep.243; Conn v. Westminst-
er  Ins. Co. [1966] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 407.
	
'
- 336 -
damage to, the vehicle and its contents.	 Suppose that in such a multi-risk
policy the insured warrants the roadworthiness of the vehicle. A defect in
the headlights would increase the chances of an accident occurring and would
be a breach of the warranty as to the vehicle's roadworthiness. If, in these
circumstances, the vehicle is stolen, the risk which actually occurred would
be found to be of a different nature from that which was increased by breach
of the warranty as to roadworthiness. Yet, under the present law the insurer
would be entitled to repudiate the policy and to reject the insured's claim
in respect of the theft of his vehicle.
Where the insured is in breach of a warranty which is relevant to a
risk other than that which actually materialises, it seems manifestly unfair
that the insurer should be able to rely on the breach to repudiate liability
for the actual loss. 	 The Statement of Insurance Practice provides, in
paragraph 2(b)(ii), that except where fraud, deception or negligence is
involved an insurer should not unreasonably repudiate liability to indemnify
a policyholder where there had been, a breach of warranty or condition with
which the loss was not connected 114 . This provision would in effect confer a
discretion upon insurers to repudiate a policy on technical grounds, for
example, where they suspect fraud but are unable to prove it.
While the initiative of the Association of British Insurers and Lloyd's
is clearly a step in the right direction, it is thought that the protection
of the insured and third parties requires more than self-regulation measures
by the insurance industry. Reform of the law of warranties is necessary
115
.
In what is referred to as "the nexus test", the Law Commission recommended
that the insured should not be entitled to reject a claim if the insurer's
114 See p.335 supra.
115 For the reasons, see Law Commission Report No. 104 op. cit., paras.
6.9-6.10
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breach of warranty could not have increased the risk of loss occurring in the
way it actually did, even though the loss was of a type which the warranty
was intended to make less likely.
The Creation of Warranties 
In order to give a statement the force of a warranty, no formal or
technical wording is required. 	 The court construes the entire document
containing the terms to determine whether the parties intended the term to
possess the attributes of a warranty.
Basically, a warranty may be created in one of the following ways.
First, the parties may expressly provide for it by use of the word "warran-
ty", for example, in the phrase "the insured warrants ...". This may not be
conclusive.	 The court might conclude that, as a matter of construction,
the parties could not have intended a warranty. In De Maurier (Jewels) Ltd. 
v. Bastion Ins. Co.
117
, despite the presence of the phrase "[Warranted] road
vehicles (whether owned by assured or otherwise) fitted with locks and alarm
system (approved by underwriters) and in operation" in an all-risk insurance
effected by jewellers, the court held that the clause was merely descriptive
of the risk
118
.
Second, the use in the policy of the phrase "condition precedent" may
create a warranty.	 This depends on the construction of the whole document
containing the term. What a policy describes as a condition precedent may on
its true construction be a warranty where it is clear that performance of the
condition is precedent to the validity of the policy and that on breach of
116 Law Commission No.104 p.89 para. 6.22; Clause 10 of the Draft
Insurance Law Reform Bill (L.C. Report, No.104 Appendix A).
117 [1967] 2 Lloyd's Rep.550.
118 Ibid.
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the condition, the insurer is entitled to repudiate the policy. 119
	Breach
of a mere condition, on the other hand, entitles the insurer to claim
damages, for such loss as he has suffered,
	 but not to repudiate the
.	 120policy
	 .
Third, warranties may be created by the "basis of the contract" clause.
Insurers often pre-empt the issue whether a particular fact is material by
including in the proposal form a declaration whereby the proposer warrants
the accuracy of all answers to the questions, the exact truth of which then
becomes a condition precedent to the validity of the policy. The usual
formula is:
"I/We declare that:
(a) the answers and particulars given are true and correct
and that I/We have not withheld any information which
might influence the acceptance of
	 this	 proposal
	 and declaration will form
	 the basis of the
contract of insurance between the Corporation and
myself/ourseMs and shall be held as incorporated in
the policy."
Further in the policy it is stated that:
... the truth of the statements and answers in the said
proposal shall be conditions precedent to any liability
of the Corporation to make any payment under this
Policy." lzi
119 See Conn. v. Westminster Ins. Co., supra. note 113. See also Mathias 
Dioumessi v. Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance (Cameroon Ltd.) Suit
No. H.C.B./18/74 of 11 July 1975 Bamenda (Unreported) where the
words "condition precedent" were interpreted as a warranty.
120 For more details see, MacGillivray and Parkington, On Insurance Law 
relating to all risks other than marine, 7th ed., 1981 pp.296-297.
121 See General Accident 'Goods-Carrying Vehicle Insurance' proposal
form and policy; See, Borne and Diamond, The Consumer, Society and 
the Law, 4th ed., 1981, 250. See also: J Birds, 'Warranties in
Insurance Proposal Forms', [1977] J.B.L., 231; c.f. General Accident
proposal form for private vehicles, supra, p.336.
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The legal effect is that answers in the proposal forms are incorporated into
the contract as warranties.	 In the event of any inaccuracy in any of the
answers, the insurer may repudiate the contract for breach of warranty
regardless of the materiality of the particular answer to the risk and
whether or not the insured answered the question in good faith and to the
best of his knowledge and belief.
122
The clause modifies the law regarding
the time of disclosure and the stage of the truthfulness of the representat-
ions. It is accepted law that disclosure and truthful representations should
be made until the moment of conclusion of the contract. But once the
disclosed facts and representations are governed by the "basis clause" they
may be construed as "continuing" throughout the period of insurance and thus
have the effect of "promises" instead of representations.
123
The absolute nature of the basis of the contract clause has been
judicially criticised as constituting a trap for the insured, 124 and its
122 See The Fifth Report of the Law Reform Committee, Conditions and 
Exceptions in Insurance Policies, 1957, Cmnd., 62, para.6; Dawsons 
Ltd. v. Bonnin [1922] 2 A.C. 413, esp. per Lord Haldane at 423;
Mackay v. London General Insurance Co. (1935) 51 LI.L. Rep.201, esp.
per swift J. at 202;
123 Provincial Insurance v. Morgan [1933] A.C. 240.
124 Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Co. v. Morrison 
[1942] 2 K.B. 53, per Lord Greene M.R. at pp.58-59; Anderson v. 
Fitzgerald (1853) 4 H.L. Cas. 484, 507; 10 E.R. 551, 560 per Lord
St. Leonards. Here, the court considered that to give effect to
such a clause rendered the policy in which it was contained not
worth the paper on which it was written and liable to produce a
result whereby no prudent man would effect a policy of insurance
with any company without having an attorney at his elbow to tell him
what the true construction of the document was. For academic
criticism, see R.A. Hasson, "The basis of the contract clause in
insurance law,"(1971) 34 M.L.R.29; G.H. Treital, The Law of Contract 
6th ed., 1983 pp. 259, 596; Cheshire and Fifoot's Law of Contract,
10th ed., 1981 pp. 132 et seq.
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abolition has been recommended by the Law Commission
125
 .
AGGRAVATION DU RISQUE IN FRENCH-SPEAKING CAMEROONIAN LAW 126
Unlike English and English speaking Cameroonian law, French and French
speaking Cameroonian law places the insured under a positive obligation to
declare to the insurer all increases in the risk which occur after the concl-
usion of, but during, the contract of insurance.. Article 17 of the law of 13
July 1930 stipulates:
127
"When, by his act, the insured increases the risks in such a
manner that, if the new state of affairs had existed when the
contract was concluded, the insurer would not have entered into
the contract or would have required a higher premium, the insured
must give prior notice to the insurer by registered letter."
"Where the risk is increased otherwise than by act of the insured,
the latter must give notice by registered letter within eight
days from the time he had knowledge of the circumstances
increasing the risk."
These provisions of article 17 call for closer analysis. It will be observed
that unlike warranties in English and English speaking Cameroonian law,
article 17 of the 1930 law deals only with the narrower notion of increase of
125 Law Commission Report No. 104, op. cit., paras. 7.8-7.9; Clause 9 of
the Draft Insurance Law Reform Bill (L.C. Report No.104 Appendix A).
However, Clause 9(2) makes it clear that 9(1) will not affect the
creation of promissory warranties.	 As to the effect of the
Statement of Insurance Practice see paras, 2(b)(ii); Actual
legislation is unlikely for the foreseeable futUre: see, 70 Hansard
(6th series) H.C. Cols. 273-274 (20 December 1984) written answer to
a Parliamentary question.
126 See P. Catala and Weir, "La declaration du risque en droit franiais
et anglais compar6 - l'aggravation du risque" (1967) 38 Rev. 66n.
Ass. Terr. 145-163.
127 Our translation of the original text.	 Article 17 does not apply to
life insurance.
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risk occurring after the conclusion of the contract and in the course of
it
128
. In the words of Picard and Besson:
"There is an increase of risk when after the conclusion of the
contract there arises, with regard to the circumstances declared
at the time of this conclusion, a change which increases the
likelihood of the risk occurring or of its extent:
129,
It must be emphasised that increase of risk presupposes that the risk •
has been completely and correctly declared before the conclusion of the
contract. A false declaration or omission in the proposal form amounts not to
an increase in risk, but to misrepresentation or non-disclosure under article
15 of the 1930 law. This is in stark contrast to the wider notion of warran-
ty in English and English speaking Cameroonian law. 	 As we have seen,
130
 the
latter embraces misrepresentations and non-disclosure affecting answers to
questions on proposal forms whose accuracy is warranted to be the basis of
the contract by a declaration signed by the insured as well as warranties to
the future (promissory warranties) applying in the course of the contract.
Under French speaking Cameroonian law the obligation to declare
increases in risk implies that the circumstances increasing the risk arise
128 In the event of a decrease in risk a reduction in premium is
justified and the insured is entitled to terminate the contract if
the insurer does not consent to a proportionate reduction in
premium. The insurer must then refund a proportion of the premium
corresponding to the period for which cover is not provided: see M.
Picard and Besson, Les Assurances Terrestres - Le Contrat
d'Assurance - Vol. 1, 5th ed. 1982, pp. 147-149 and Article 17 of
the law of 1930.
129 Our translation of M. Picard and A. Besson, Les Assurances 
Terrestres - Le Contrat d'Assurance, Vol.1, 5th ed., 1982, 132-133:
"Il y a aggravation du risque lorsque, post6rieurement a la
conclusion du contrat, survient, par rapport aux circonstances
declares lors de cette conclusion, un changement qui augments soit
la probabilit6, soit 1'intensit6 du risque".
130 Supra, pp.323, 330 and 338.
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after the conclusion of the contract.
	 It is essentially a change which
increases	 the chances of the fortuitous event happening and of the
consequences of the event being more serious. It is necessary that the new
risk be such that had the new state of things existed at the time of the
conclusion of the contract, the insurer would not have contracted or would
only have contracted for an increased premium. Examples of increase in risk
include: in a fire policy, the introduction of inflammable material into the
insured building
131
; and in a personal injury policy, the change of the
insured's profession to one involving a more dangerous activity 132
Unlike English and English speaking Cameroonian law which dispenses
with materiality of facts for the purposes of warranty 133
 , in French and
French speaking Cameroonian law materiality is relevant to the insured's
obligation to declare increases in risk.
	 The only changes that need be
declared are those which either have an influence on the rate of premium (for
example, in a motor vehicle policy, the change in use from private to
commercial purposes) 134
 or those which affect the insurer's opinion about the
risk such that he would prefer not to contract at all.
	 As in English and
English speaking Cameroonian law, however, under French and French speaking
131 Emmanuel Nkwanqu V.	 Groupement
	 Franais d'Assurance, Affaire
No.572/CC of 9 December 1972, Douala, (Unreported).
132 Sam Jimea v. Royal Exchange Assurance Affaire No.714/cc of 5 April,
1965; Douala, (Unreported).
133 See supra, pp.333-334.
134 jean Tandem v. Agence Camerounaise d'Assurance, Affaire No.519/CC of
3 March 1970, Douala (Unreported)
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Cameroonian law there need not be any connection between the circumstances
increasing the risk and the loss that actually occurs.
135
 Indeed, the
increase of risk being independent of any accident, the declaration of facts
increasing the risk should be made even though no accident has yet occurred.
Under article 15(3) of the law of 13th July 1930 the insured's
obligation to declare increases in risk pursuant to article 17 is restricted
to circumstances specified in the policy which are likely to result in
increase in risk.
136
This obligation is not, therefore, as wide as that of
initial disclosure under article 15(2). It is limited to circumstances which
the insurer has expressly mentioned in the policy as likely to increase the
risk.
137
The practice of some insurance companies which stipulate that, if
the risk is modified or increased in whatever way the insured must notify the
insurer, has been criticised as conforming neither to the letter nor to the
spirit of article 17 which exists in the interest of the insured. Case law
is strict on the specification of the circumstances which increase the risk.
The (then) East Cameroon Supreme Court insisted on a strict interpretation of
article 15(3) and declared that the specification must be precise, requiring
the mention of the facts increasing the risk with reference to article 17.
138
In contrast to the warranty regime under English and English speaking
Cameroonian law which does not require proof of knowledge or any fault on the
part of the insured, article 17 submits the insured to an obligation to
declare	 an	 increase	 in	 risk	 only	 when	 he	 has	 knowledge	 of
135 See article 17 of the law of July 1930.
136 See James Landel, Fausses d6clarations et rgticences en assurances 
automobile, 1982, 14.
137 See M. Picard and A. Besson op. cit., pp. 132-134. These
circumstances are expressly mentioned in Cameroon motor insurance
policies of all insurance companies.
138 Valentine Domas v. Societe' Nouvelle d'Assurance du Cameroun, Affaire
No.258/CC of 4th July 1966, Douala (Unreported).
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the facts responsible for the increase. The article distinguishes two situa-
tions. In the first, where the increase in risk arises by act of the insur-
ed, he is required to give prior notice of it to the insurer. He cannot
plead lack of knowledge, since he is himself the author of the increase. 	 In
the second situation, the risk may have been increased by the act of a third
party without the insured's knowledge, for example, where the neighbours of a
person holding a fire policy on his premises introduce inflammable materials
to their adjoining property without the insurer's knowledge. In this situat-
ion article 17 requires the insured to declare the new facts within eight
days 139 of obtaining knowledge of them.
Declaration of increase in risk in conformity with article 17 must be,
as the article itself stipulates, by registered letter.
140
The policy may
provide a simpler procedure, such as an ordinary letter, for giving notice of
increase in risk 144 . Subject to this, unless it is waived by the insurer,
the registered letter is a condition precedent for the validity of the decl-
aration of increase of risk 142 .
139 The parties may by mutual agreement increase, but not reduce, the
time limit of eight days: see Art. 15(1)(3) and 15(2) of the law of
13 July 1930.
140 See Fran5oise Chapuisat, "I'Utilisation de la lettre recommend6e en
droit des assurances,"(1981) 52 Rev. G6n. Ass. Tei. 473-489.
141 M. Picard and A. Besson, Les Assurances Terrestres - Le Contrat 
d'Assurance, Vol. 1, 5th ed., by A. Besson, 1982, Paris, pp.136-137.
142 M. Picard and A. Besson, op.cit., at p.138.
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V	 THE CONSEQUENCES OF NON-DISCLOSURE, MISREPRESENTATION, BREACH OF
WARRANTY AND AGGRAVATION DU RISQUE 
A The Consequences of Non-Disclosure and Misrepresentation
The distinction between non-disclosure and .misrepresentation is of more
than academic interest. The tenuous nature of that distinction is unsatis-
factory: it renders it more difficult to differentiate between insured per-
sons who actively mislead insurance companies and those who merely fail to
volunteer information.
143
 For underlying the consequences of non-disclosure
and misrepresentation in England, France and Cameroon is the idea of fraud,
the obligation of good faith.	 As a general rule total non-disclosure of a
fact does not amount to any kind of fraud unless there is a legal duty to
disclose the fact. Once there is such a duty, however, its breach produces
adverse consequences for the offender under English and English-speaking
Cameroonian law, notwithstanding that the breach was innocent. Since Lord
143 See Hasson, "Misrepresentation and Non-Disclosure in Life Insurance
- Some Steps Forward" (1975) 38 M.L.R. 89.
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Mansfield's judgment in Carter v. Boehm 144 it has been decided that in the
case of non-disclosure an insurer can avoid the insurance policy even in the
absence of a fraudulent intent on the part of the insured. Mistake or forg-
etfulness affords no defence.	 Thus Cockburn C. J. said in Bates v. 
Hewett:
145
"... it is also well established law, that it is immaterial
whether the omission to communicate a material fact arises from
intention, or indifference, or a mistake, or from it not being
present to the mind of the assured that the fact was one which
it was material to make known".
By contrast, as will be seen presently, French-speaking Cameroonian law
does not hold a non-disclosure or a misrepresentation against the party to an
insurance contract who is guilty of it unless he acted in bad faith. Bad
faith is often referred to as "dol", a term which in civil law means
146
 a
fraudulent manoeuvre whose object is to deceive one of the parties to a legal
transaction in order to obtain his consent. According to article 1116 of the
Civil Code, "le dol" is a ground of nullity of contract where the manoeuvres
of one of the parties are such that it is clear that, without them, the other
party would not have contracted.
The burden of proof of bad faith is on the insurer
147
.	 It is within
the "pouvoir souverain" of the trial judge to appreciate the insured's bad
144 (1766) 3 Burr. 1905 at 1909. See also: Lindenau v. Desborouqh(1828)
8 B & C 586; Godfrey v. Britannic Ass. Co. [1963] 2 Lloyd's Rep.
515; Anqlo-African Merchants v. Bayley [1970] 1 Q.B. 311. And see:
R.A. Hasson, "The doctrine of Uberrimae fides in insurance law - A
critical evaluation", (1966) 32 M.L.R. 615, at 616-617.
145 (1867) 2 L.R.Q.B. 595 at 607.
146 See: Raymond Guillien and Jean Vincent et al, Lexique de termes 
juridiques, 5th ed., 1981, 161; Gabriel Marty and Pierre Raynand,
Droit Civil - Les obligations, Vol. 1, 1962, 124-130.
147 Le Ph‘nix - Accidents c. Saly [ed. G.], Cass. Soc. 9 May 1947,
J•C.P. 11. 1947, 3852: "C'est 1 l'assureur qu'il incombe d4tablir
la mauvaise foi de l'assurd ...".
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faith
148
In the French-speaking Cameroonian case of Ebendenq Emmanuel v.
Mutuelle Aqricole d'Assurance
149
 the court said that bad faith was character-
ised by intention to deceive the insurer
150
	The fault, in the ultimate
analysis, was that the insured told the untruth with the knowledge that the
insurer would not have accepted the risk had the facts been correctly declar-
ed. Bad faith is not difficult to prove where the attention of the insured
has been drawn to a specific and unambiguous question in the proposal form to
which he gives an equivocal answer 151 In any event, it is relatively easy
under French-speaking Cameroonian law to establish bad faith. The view that
article 1134
152
 of the Civil Code provides for a residual obligation of
honesty has produced a considerable expansion of the concept of fraud. There
has been a wide extension of the idea of fraud by silence by resorting to the
obligation of good faith
153
.	 What, then are the consequences of non-
disclosure or misrepresentation? In English and English speaking Cameroonian
law a failure on the part of the insured to disclose a material fact renders
148 La Patrimoine c. Robillard, Cour de cassation (Ch. civ. Ire sect.
civ.), 11 July 1966, (1967) 38 Rev. Gdn. Ass. Terr. 175; Caisse 
Sgcurit Sociale Indre c. La Confiance, Cour de cassation (Ire Ch.
civ.), 16 June 1969, (1970) 41 Rev. G6n. Ass. Terr. 163-164.
A149 Arret No.108/CC of 5 October 1978, Yaounde (Unreported). See also:
Lyon Caen G., "De l' gvolution de la notion de bonne foi", (1946)
Rev. Trim. Dr. Civ. 75.
150 See also in France, M. Picard and A. Besson op. cit., p.128.
151 Ibid. at p. 136-138.
152 See above, p.306
153 See Michel de Juglart, "L'Obligation de Renseignements dans les
contrats", (1945) Rev. Trim. Dr. Civ. 1 et. seq. 
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the policy voidable at the option of the insurer
154
 .	 The insurer may on
discovering the facts elect to avoid the contract of insurance. Upon the
exercise of that right the contract is void ab initio, but it remains in
force until avoided by the insurer
155
. In the result, if the insurer has
already paid a claim, he is entitled to demand repayment of the sum so paid.
Repayment is made on the basis of money paid over under a mistake of fact.
On the other hand, the insured is entitled, in the absence of wilful, or
fraudulent concealment, to demand the repayment of such premiums as he may
have paid
156
.
	 The premiums are returnable on the basis of a quasi-
contractual action for money paid against a total failure of consider-
ation
157
.
In French and French-speaking Cameroonian law the sanctions for non-
disclosure and misrepresentation provided for by the law of 13 July 1930 and
Codes des Assurances 1976 make a distinction as between where the insured was
actuated by bad faith and where he acted in good faith. In the former case,
he incurs., by virtue of article 21 of the law of 1930, nullity of the
contract. In the latter case article 22 of the law of 1930 applies. Article
21 stipulates that independently of any ordinary grounds of nullity, the
contract of insurance is null and void in the case of non- disclosure or
misrepresentation if the non-disclosure or misrepresentation on the part of
the insured changes the object of the risk or diminishes the opinion of the
insurer in evaluating or assessing the risk even if the risk omitted by the
154 Carter v. Boehm (1766) 3 Burr. 1905. See also in English-speaking
Cameroon, Mathias Dloumessi v. Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance 
(Cameroon Ltd) Suit No. H.C.B. 18/74 of 11 July 1975.
155 Mackender v. Feldia A. G. [1966) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 449
156 Cornhill Ins. Co. v Assenheim (1937) 58 Ll.L. Rep. 27 at 31.
157 Feise  v. Parkinson (1812) 4 Taunt 640; Marine Insurance Act 1906,
S.84(3).
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insured had no connection with the loss. 	 The contract is thus not merely
voidable as in England but void.	 The guarantee provided by the insurer
retroactively disappears. The insurer has the right to reclaim all money
paid for previous losses and to keep all premiums already paid; he also has
the right to further payment of premiums that have fallen due
158
Article  21 is not applicable unless the insured's non-disclosure or
misrepresentation was intentional and, therefore, in bad faith.
159
Where bad
faith on the part of the insured has not been established, the policy cannot
be avoided on grounds of non-disclosure or misrepresentation.
160
Instead,
article 22(2) and (3) apply.
Article 22(2) deals with the situation where a non-disclosure or
misrepresentation without bad faith is discovered before the occurrence of a
loss giving rise to a claim of indemnity. Here the insurer has the option
between maintaining the contract for an increased premium and rescinding it.
The decision to increase the premium cannot be taken unilaterally, but in
agreement with the insured, in conformity with the general law requiring
consent and mutuality in contracts. Where the insurer rescinds the contract,
he has no right to demand further premiums. 	 If premiums have been paid in
advance, he must make a pro rata repayment of the premium for the period
during which the insured was not covered. And if the premium falls due he
can only require payment for the period up to the time of rescission.
Article 22(3) deals with the situation where a non-disclosure or
misrepresentation without bad faith is discovered after the occurrence of a
loss. In this case the insurer is bound to pay only that proportion of the
158 Article 21(2)of the Law of 13 July 1930.	 And see: Picard and
Besson, op. cit., 158-160.
159 Article 21(1). Ibid.
160 Article 22(1). Ibid.
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loss which the premium paid bears to that which would have been payable if
the risk had been completely and accurately disclosed.
160A
 The application
of this provision is termed the "proportionality principle". 	 The provision
applies even though the non-disclosed 	 or misrepresented fact had no
connection with the loss. It is intended to reduce the amount recoverable by
the insured in certain cases of failure to comply with his duty of disclosure
but without depriving him of the whole of hit claim. The proportionality
principle thus avoids the "all or nothing" approach of English law.
However, the application of the principle of proportionality is not
without some practical problems and certain inherent limitations have been
recognised.
161
 The idea underlying the principle appears to be that the
insured's entitlement is to be determined as though the insurer had been
aware of the undisclosed facts at the time of the proposal and had fixed the
premium on that basis, as it states that if the insurer would have charged a
higher premium, the insured's claim is to be reduced to the ratio between the
actual premium and the notional higher premium.	 In this respect there are
difficulties in proving the notional premium. Would it be what the particul-
ar insurer concerned would have charged or what a prudent and reasonable
insurer would have charged? In the former alternative it would be difficult
and burdensome for the insured to challenge successfully the insurer's evid-
ence as to the notional premium which he subjectively would have demanded.
In the latter alternative the court would have to hear expert evidence to
determine the level of the notional premium.
160A See for example, Lassus c. Compaqnie Nationale Suisse, Cour d'appel
de Pau, 13 April 1973, (1974) 45 Rev. Gin. Ass. Terr. 22.
161 See: The Law Commission Report, No.104 Insurance Law: Non-
Disclosure and Breach of Warranty, 1980, Cmnd. 8064, para 4.5 The
proportionality principle gives no guidance as to how the insured's
entitlement is to be computed. Any reduction by the courts or the
insurer in the amount due to the insured would necessarily be a
question of guesswork. See further infra pp.351-352.
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The proportionality principle has been applied in motor insurance where
there is a comprehensive system of fixed tariffs supervised by administrative
control and premiums corresponding to the circumstances of the risk to be
covered. However, tables of tariffs can only correlate specific quantitative
factors such as the age of the car, its date of manufacture, its engine
capacity and its use.
162
In the usual case where the undisclosed fact is
qualitative rather than quantitative in nature, notably facts relating to the
personal integrity of the insured (moral hazard), tables of tariffs will
almost certainly be unable to assist in the computation of the notional
premium. Yet, they are facts which would influence the insurer's decision
whether or not to contract.
Furthermore, as the English Law Commission points out
163
 there are
other ways in which the insurer might have reacted to the undisclosed or
misrepresented facts than by increasing premium. He might, for example, have
declined the risk altogether or imposed additional warranties on the insured.
He might have narrowed the scope of the risk through the use of exclusion
clauses or he might have imposed or increased an "excess" clause - stating in
the policy a sum which the insured himself must bear in the event of a loss.
The insurer might have re-insured the risk or a higher proportion of it. The
proportionality principle offers no guidance as to how the insured's
entitlement is to be computed if the insurer would have reacted to the
undisclosed or misrepresented facts in any one or more of these ways.
162 In England there is no comprehensive system of administratively
controlled tariffs. Insurers have in motor and life insurance
detailed rates relating to the make of the vehicle, age, occupation
of the owner, but these vary from one insurer to another.
163 Law Commission Report No.104 op.cit., para 4.5 at p.31.
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In France where the law embodies the principle of proportionality the
Cour de cassation has maintained
164
 that in the absence of tariffs, it is for
the court to determine a fair reduction in the insured's entitlement as a
matter of fact and discretion.	 This discretionary reduction has been
criticised by Picard and Besson:
165
 "Elle risque d' gtre theorique, arbitraire
et de ne pas correspondre 1 la realite des faits".	 They further ask whether
it is just to oblige an insurer to indemnify partially an insured if one is
certain that had the insurer known of the undisclosed fact he would not have
contracted at all.
166
	For these reasons various French courts have refused
to apply the proportionality principles.
167
	The consequences of non-
disclosure or misrepresentation could in theory be far reaching in the case
of motor insurance, as third parties may be affected by the avoidance of a
policy. However, in practice, in England, third parties will never be
164 La Participation c. Veuve Tesseyre et Cazabou 1s-qua1, Cour de
cassation (Ch. civ.), 9 June 1942, (1942) 13 Rev. Gen. Ass. Terr.
265; See also; Enterprise Gauthier-Dutartre c. Choisy et La 
Preservatrice, Cour d'appel de Lyon (Ire Ch.), 17 May 1 956, (1956)
27 Rev. Gen. Ass. Terr. 194; Fonds de Garantie Automobile c. La 
Preservatrice et autres, Cour d'appel de Grenoble (Ire Ch. aud.
sol.), 23 January 1962, (1962) 33 Rev. Gen. Ass. Terr. 483; For an
illustration of a nominal deduction, see Jallain c. La Fonciere,
Cour d'appel de Paris (191 Ch.), 28 April 1964 (1965) 36 Rev. Gen.
Ass. Terr. 87, where the court considered the difference in premium
at 7 per cent and fixed 15.000 francs as the amount of the
reduction.
165 Picard and Besson, Les Assurances Terrestres en Droit Francais, 5th
7
ed., 1982, Vol.1, 160.
166 It may be noted that article 6 of the French law on marine insurance
of 3rd July 1967 excludes the proportionality principle where it is
established that the insured would not have covered the risk if he
had known of all the circumstances of the risk.
167 See, for example, De Goeie c. Phenix Accidents, Tribunal civil de la
Seine (51 ch), 23 December 1946, 	 (1947) 18	 Rev. Gen. Ass. Terr.
253; Consorts Tisseyre c. La Participation, Cour d'appel de
Toulouse (Ire ch.), 31 May 1943 (1943) 14 Rev. Gen. Ass. Terr. 239.
Sweden which previously practised the principle of proportionality
has now abandoned the concept in the Consumer Insurance Act 1980.
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prejudiced where their loss is one in respect of which insurance is
compulsory.
168
	First of all section 149 of the Road Traffic Act 1972 169
restricts an insurer's
	
right	 to	 rely	 upon
	 a	 non-disclosure
	 or
misrepresentation as against such a third party. More importantly, the Motor
Insurers' Bureau Agreements
170
 will always protect such a third party and in
fact, as we have seen,
171
 the practice is for the insurer concerned to pay
the victim's damages.
	 Thus, so far as compulsory motor insurance is
concerned, even section 149 is to all intents and purposes redundant. 172
In France the third party normally has a direct right of action against
the insurer in the case of motor insurance by virtue of the decree of 7
January 1959. Article 14 of this decree stipulates that in all cases where a
contract has been subscribed to satisfy the requirement of compulsory
insurance, the insurer who intends to invoke in a case of an accident causing
bodily injuries, the nullity of the contract, or its suspension, or
suspension of the guarantee to the victim or those entitled to claim on his
behalf must by registered letter communicate this intention to the French
equivalent of the English Motor Insurers' Bureau - the 
	 Ids de Garantie
Automobile.
168 See Section 149(1) and (3) of the Road Traffic Act 1972.
169 See for full detail, Chapter Three and Four, supra pp. 208 and 287
respectively.
170 See supra, p.287.
171 supra p.287.
172 However, section 149 of the Road Traffic Act 1972 may become
important again when the EEC Directive No. 84/5/EEC of 30 December
1983 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating
to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor
vehicles (0.3. 1984, L8/17) is implemented. Supra, Chapters Three
and Four pp.206-209 and 267, 287 respectively.
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Similarly, in Cameroon, as we have already seen in Chapters Three
173
and Four, Law No. 65-LF-9 of 22 May 1965 gives a direct right of action to a
third party against insurance companies.
174
 Further article 7 creates the
Motor Insurance Fund which indemnifies victims of accidents in the case where
the insurance policy is ineffective.
175
B The Consequences of Breach of Warranty and Aggravation du Risque 
In the event of breach of promissory warranty as well as of breach of
warranty of past or present fact, the insurer is entitled to repudiate the
policy and to put an end to his liability under the contract.
	 However,
different principles determine in one case and in the other whether the
insured is entitled to recover the premium. 	 The breach of promissory
warranty leaves untouched any right which has already vested in the insured
at the time of the breach
176
.	 The insured may still claim in respect of a
loss that occurred before the breach.	 On the other hand, breach of a
warranty as to past or present facts deprives the insured of all rights under
the policy and the insured is entitled to the return of his 	 remium if the
insurer repudiates as he has never been on risk
177
. Reflecting criticisms of
the strictness of the law, particularly where the breach of warranty arises
173 Supra, pp.209.
174 See also, Mange Winifred Ndikum (suing by next friend) and Mukonq 
George v. S.O.C.A.R., Suit No. HCB/4/78 of 24 January 1978, Buea
(Unreported).
175 See supra, Chapter Four, pp.265-290.
176 Union Insurance of Canton v. Wills [1916] 1 A.C. 281, at 286-287,
per Lord Parmoor.
177 Section 33 (3) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906; But not if the
policy provides otherwise: Kumar v. Life Assurance Corporation of 
India [1974] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 147.
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from an immaterial mis-statement in a proposal form declared to be the basis
of the contract,
178
 the Law Commission has recommended 179
 that if insurers
exercise their right to repudiate a policy for breach of warranty, that
repudiation should take effect for the future only and should no longer be
retrospective to the date of the breach. The effective date of repudiation
should be the date on which the insurer serves a written notice of repudiat-
ion on the insured. The insurer would therefore remain on risk between the
date of the breach and the effective date of repudiation but would be entitl-
ed to reject all claims which occur during that period unless the insured
could show that there was no connection between the breach and the loss.
The French and French speaking Cameroonian legal systems do not concede
to insurance companies such a generous power to mould the law in their own
favour as is represented in England by the warranty and the court's attitude
to its effects. The 1930 law regulates the form of the contract and the
obligation of the parties and provides sanctions.	 It leaves only a very
narrow margin of manoeuvre by insurance companies in the making of policies.
An insured who, having knowledge of an increase in risk, omi	 to declare it
not with intention to deceive but by simple negligence does not act in bad
faith.	 In the event of the risk occurring, only the sanctions of article 22
of the law of 1930, already considered above,
179A
 would apply.
	
If the
insured does not know the circumstances increasing the risk, he will not
178 MacKay v. London General Insurance Co. (1935) 51 LI.L. Rep. 201
esp. at 202 per Swift J.; Zurich General Accident and Liability 
Insurance Co. v. Morrison [1942] 2 K.B. 53 at 61. Supra at pp.338-
339.
179 Law Commission Report, No.104 op. cit., p.89 para.6.23. Clause 10
of the Draft Insurance Law Reform Bill (L.C. Report No.104,
Appendix A).
179A Supra, pp.349-350.
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incur any sanction. If he deliberately fails to declare increases in risk of
which he knows this will be an indication of bad faith. The contract would
be nullified pursuant to article 21 of the law of 1930. In the French-
speaking Cameroonian case of Tenjoh James v. La Fonciere Assurances 180 , a
vehicle was insured for social and domestic purposes. It was involved in an
accident when being used for commercial purposes. The court upheld the
nullity of the contract as bad faith was established from the fact that the
insured was aware of the clause in the policy restricting the use of the
vehicle and voluntarily failed to declare the change of use. Moreover, he
had on several occasions used the vehicle for commercial purposes and had
never made any declaration to that effect.	 The intention to deceive the
insurer was clear, for the insured knew the premiums would be increased as a
result of the change of use.
More specifically, article 17 of the law of July 1930 governs the
consequences of an increase in risk in French and French speaking Cameroonian
law.	 Once the increase has occurred, whether or not by act of the insured,
the insurer has the option between repudiating the contract and proposing a
new rate of premium. If the insured refuses the new rate of the premium, the
contract is rescinded but the insurer retains the right, where the increase
of risk was by act of the insured, to claim an indemnity from the insured
before the courts
181
. The insurer can no longer rely on the increase in risk
either to rescind the contract or to propose a new rate of premium if, upon
becoming aware of the increase in whatever manner, he consents to the
maintenance of the insurance policy especially by continuing to receive
180 Affaire No.371/CC of 7 February 1969, Douala (Unreported).
181 Law of 13 July 1930, article 17(3).
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payments of premium or by paying upon the occurrence of the insured event,
any indemnity
182
.
VI REFORM OF THE LAW
Throughout this chapter, we have noted criticisms and proposals for law
reform. The rise in consumerism has extended the need for regulation of
insurance to embrace some supervision of insurance contract law. This may
raise the question of how and by what means regulation of insurance should be
pursued if the criticisms and reforms discussed in this Chapter are to be
achieved.
In both England and Cameroon the regulation of insurance companies has
been primarily the concern of the government.
183
	However, in England the
machinery of regulation of insurance contracts has embraced some measure of
self-regulation by the insurance industry through the Statements of Insurance
Practice agreed by various insurance industry associations and Lloyd's and
the institution of complaints bodies.
184
This latter method has not yet
been a significant feature of the Cameroonian regulatory sy c.	To this
extent the examination of the relative merits of government and self-
regulation, which in the present context cannot be more than schematic, seems
desirable.
Self-regulation depends on the acceptance by the industry that certain
standards are desirable in principle.	 This has the advantage that moral
persuasion may work at its most powerful and it may be easier to enlist high-
powered executives to play an active role in regulation. 	 Its effectiveness
182 Ibid., Art. 17(4)
183 See supra, Chapter Two of this study, pp.57-124.
184 See infra, Chapter Eight, pp.444-465.
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reflects the acceptance of the spirit of the agreements rather than their
letter. Principles and practices agreed in this way are likely to be adhered
to more enthusiastically than statutory controls. In particular, it is less
likely that the industry will spend time, money and ingenuity in trying to
get round the spirit and letter of an agreed Statement which the industry
itself has drawn up.	 Another benefit is that it is possible to revise or
expand them when necessary relatively quickly.	 An essential strength of
self-regulatory Statements is that they are flexible and can be adapted to
meet developing needs
185
. On the other hand, changing the law by legislation
is slow, time consuming and expensive.
However, there are clearly limits to the protection that could be
offered by self-regulatory Statements. Firstly, there may be imprecise and
vague rules formulated by the industry 186 .	 Further, resorting in some
circumstances to self-regulation, conducted internally within the industry,
may leave a suspicion in the minds of the public that justice has not
properly been done thus sapping public confidence. Moreover, there may be
difficulties of effective enforcement over non-members
	 d probably no
sanctions at all over members. In the latter case, an insured would have no
legal remedy if an insurer failed to act in accordance with the provisions of
the Statements and indeed, a liquidator of an insurance company would be
bound to disregard the Statements.
	 An example of this in the provisions of
the Statements of Insurance Practice is paragraph 2(b)(ii) where it is stated
that an insurer should not act" unreasonably in repudiating liability or
185 For example, the 1981 revision of the Statement of Insurance
Practice: 15 Hansard (6th. series) H.C. Cols. 341-342 (22 December
1981).
186 See for example paragraph 2(b)(ii) of the Statement of Insurance
Practice, infra. p.358.
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rejecting a claim". This is not satisfactory as the insurer is left to be
the sole judge in any particular case. The Director of Fair Trading has come
out in favour of law reform rather than self-regulation 187 .	 Where the line
should be drawn between legislation and self-regulation is hardly capable of
clear definition. How this issue is resolved in any society at a particular
period depends on the political structure of the state in that society, the
manner in which state power is conceived and exercised, the degree of liberty
accorded to the insurance industry and the objective it seeks to achieve. The
practical regulations affecting insurance in modern societies disclose one
reality, that is, the protection of policyholders and beneficiaries of
insurance contracts which, it is submitted alone ought to serve as the basis
of any regulatory law. On the other hand, the state must not use its powers
and resources in such a way that insurance companies' business is stifled
from excessive interference.	 Clearly therefore, the interests of the
policyholders, the purpose of the state and the interests of insurance
companies all require that the state which regulates insurance should not
make excessive and oppressive use of its regulatory p ers. Insurance
depends essentially on the good faith of insurers and their clients and
legislation alone cannot ensure good faith although it can prevent serious
abuses.	 If the regulatory environment is to ensure the sound practice of
insurers, it must involve a combination of legislation and self-regulation
ranging from formal and widely accepted agreements to the maintenance of
standards by insurers because they are recognised as desirable. In so far as
the protection of the policyholder is concerned 	 it is fundamentally
desirable to review the working of such agreements as a specific exercise at
certain intervals. Such a review can determine whether the agreements are
187 Director General of Fair Trading Report, Household Insurance,
September 1985, paras. 6.13-6.16, at p.28.
- 360 -
being complied with, whether the consumers are being adequately protected and
whether improvements are called for. 	 The two methods of regulation should
not be regarded as antithetical but as complementary. The ideal would be to
weld self-regulation and government regulation into a coherent statutory
framework in which each would perform the role which it does best, working
harmoniously together.
188
-=< >= -
188 For a similar proposal, see: L.C.B. Gower, Review of Investor
Protection - A Discussion Document, January 1982, London H.M.S.0.;
Review of Investor Protection, Report:Part I, Cmnd. 9125, 1984, and
Part II Cmnd. 1985; Department of Trade and Industry, Financial 
Services in the United Kingdom - A framework for Investor
Protection, Cmnd. 9432 1985 London H.M.S.O.
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CHAP TER	 6
INSURANCE INTERMEDIARIES AND DISCLOSURE
I INTRODUCTION
The insurance industry has grown from modest origins to a position
where it provides protection against a multitude of risks and at the same
time the market has grown so that purchasers of insurance include business
organisations, local	 authorities,	 public	 corporations, societies and
individuals.	 To reach this public the sellers of insurance have developed a
system of specialised 'middlemen' - agents and brokers. 	 Most insurance
business is in practice transacted through intermediaries.	 Insurers are
almost always incorporated companies
1
 which can only act through the medium
of insurance agents, from the directors down to a local ay it soliciting
proposals for insurance.
Agency is recognised in all modern legal systems as an indispensable
part of the existing social order as it assists in organising the division of
labour in the national and international economy by making it possible for
the principal to extend his individual sphere of activity.
2
1 The growth of commerce in the seventeenth century led to the
development of the use of companies as a trading medium. As a
company in the modern sense is a legal entity separate from the
individual members, it can only act through the agency of an
intermediary.
2	 This need is most felt in Cameroon where there are only five
insurance companies transacting the business of insurance: these
companies rely on intermediaries for the marketing of 	 their
products.
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As we have already seen in Chapter Five
2A
 of this work, in modern
insurance practice the insurance proposal form forms the basis of the
Insurance contract. It constitutes an offer of invitation from the proposer
to enter into a binding insurance contract.	 The completion therefore, of
that form is of crucial importance and the participation of an agent in the
formation of an insurance contract constitutes one of the most important
functions of an agent. Indeed given this importance it is proposed in this
chapter to confine our discussion of the role of an insurance intermediary to
his participation in the completion of the insurance proposal form. It
should be noted that intermediaries are of necessity sometimes involved in
the receipt of notices of claims, the investigation of claims and also play a
part in the settlement process. However, these other roles will not be given
detailed consideration in this work.
II CLASSIFICATION OF INSURANCE INTERMEDIARIES
In England, a broad	 range	 of insurance intermediaries can be
identified.
3
First, there are full time agents tied to part ular insurers
such as canvassing agents and employees of insurance companies engaged to
solicit business. This category of intermediary also exists in Cameroon.
The agent is exclusively linked to a particular insurance company by the
mandate of his appointment agreement (Traits de nomination).	 This mandate
prohibits him from working for any other insurance company.	 The agent
undertakes to represent solely the insurance company and may only represent
other insurance companies as regards risks refused or [lot covered by his
company or in the case of co-insurance.	 The agents are registered by the
2A Supra. p.331.
3	 See 3 Birds, Modern Insurance Law, 1982, pp.147-148
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insurance companies whom they represent.
	 Secondly, in England, there are
insurance brokers registered under the Insurance Brokers' Registration Act
1977
3A
 and hence genuinely independent of any particular insurer. Similarly,
in Cameroon, there are brokers registered by the 'Registre du Commerce'.
These brokers are commercial agents; they therefore figure in the commercial
register.
4
	This emphasises their independent nature. The broker is a free
intermediary who has no exclusive mandate linking him to any particular
insurance company. He represents his clients with all freedom vis-a-vis any
insurance company of his choice without any restriction.
	
Thirdly, in
England, Lloyd's underwriters are always represented by brokers recognised by
them. The public has no direct access to Lloyd's underwriters. 	 They can
only be approached through a Lloyd's broker.	 With regard to Lloyd's
Corporation Or underwriters, their intermediary - Lloyd's brokers, stand
apart from any other broker; there is no other insurance company which is
always represented by a particular broker. 	 In contrast, in Cameroon, there
is no equivalent of a Lloyd's broker. Fourthly, in England, there exist
part-time or occasional agents such as persons in non-insuran	 occupations.
This category includes estate agents, building societies, motor dealers,
accountants and solicitors, whose principal occupation bring them in contact
with prospective clients for insurance.	 In Cameroon, this category of
insurance intermediary used to exist as in England.
	
But now it has been
3A See further pp.393-409, infra
4	 For a similar position in France see Guy Picarda, "Commercial agents
and distribution in France", in Commercial agency and distribution
agreements in Europe, published by the British Institute of
International and Comparative Law, Special Publication No.3 (1964),
pp.24-35 and pp.76-87. A commercial agent is an agent who without
being bound by a service agreement but by way of a usual and
independent profession, negotiates and where necessary concludes
contracts of purchase, sale or hiring or service agreements for and
on behalf of producers, manufacturers or traders. A commercial
agent is entitled to accept other agencies without having to refer
to his principal.
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prohibited by legislation which considers the occupation concerned as
incompatible with the transaction of insurance. 5 Fifthly, in England, there
are other independent insurance agents not tied to particular insurers and
also not registered under the Insurance Brokers Registration Act 1977, and
hence not entitled to call themselves "insurance brokers".	 But they may
describe themselves as "insurance consultants" or other such names so long as
they do not offer the impression that they are registered or enrolled
brokers.
5A
By contrast, in Cameroon, this class of intermediary does not
exist.
	
Thus, whereas in England	 there	 are five classes of insurance
intermediaries, in Cameroon insurance intermediaries are agents (Agents 
	
g6n6raux) and brokers (Courtiers).	 Article 2 of Order No.358/MINFI/CEI of
27 December 1973 regulating the profession of insurance intermediaries
6
enumerated persons who can act as insurance intermediaries in Cameroon.
These include :-
(a) Natural or legal persons who hold a licence delivered by an
insurance concern Or any other body empowered to -o so - Agents
(Agents ggn(raux).
5	 See note 73 below.
5A It has been suggested that this class of intermediaries should be
assimilated under the auspices of the Insurance Brokers Registration
Act 1977 thereby extending the Insurance Brokers Registration
Council's role: See, L.C.B. Gower, Review of Investor Protection - A 
Discussion Document, January 1982, London H.M.S.O., paras. 3.21 and
9.06. See also, the White Paper, Financial Services in the United 
Kingdom: A new framework for investor protection, Cmnd. 9432,
January 1985. This will not happen in respect ok intermediaries in
the non-life insurance field in the immediate future as the
Financial Services Bill 1985 [51] which implements the above White
Paper is not concerned with insurance other than certain types of
life insurance.
6	 Hereinafter referred to as 'the 1973 Order'.
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(b) Natural persons figuring on the commercial register as brokers
(Courtiers).
The word 'agent' in this chapter will be used in two senses: in common
parlance and in a broad sense it includes brokers but in a technical and more•
narrow sense it refers to persons directly employed or tied to particular
insurance companies and it is in this narrow sense, unless otherwise stated
that the term will be employed here.
An insurance agent is basically someone who is employed by an insurance
company to solicit proposals and effect insurance. The insurer authorises
him expressly or implicitly to represent the insurance company in dealings
with third parties. This position is quite distinct from that of a broker
who acts as a middleman between the insured and the insurer. The broker as
we have already seen
6A is an independent intermediary under no employment
from any special company whose purpose is to assist the public by means of
his experience and contacts in the insurance market to purchase insurance on
the most favourable terms. Brokers are therefore specialists in assessing
the insurance needs of an individual and provide disinterested advice on the
insurance offices which offer a service closest to his requirements. Agents
and brokers exercise very similar functions, namely, they act as an
intermediary between the insuring public and the insurance company by
bringing all prospective clients to insurance companies; they sell insurance
to the public and are paid by commission on the amount of business they bring
to insurance companies (normally on a percentage basis of premiums earned).
6A Supra. at p.363.
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III AUTHORITY OF AN AGENT
6B
When the agents for each party carry out their instructions properly no
complication arises: the acts of the agent are imputed to and bind the
respective principals. 	 Quit facit per alium facit per se (he who does
something through another does it himself): the agent's act is deemed to be
the act of the principal so that the principal will get the benefit of it and
similarly will be answerable for its consequenCes.
	 The power conferred by
law on the agent is a facsimile of the principal's own power. It is this
notion that led Pollock
7
 to state that by agency the individual's legal
personality is multiplied in space.
	 A similar description can be found in
French law.
	 According to article 1984 of the Civil Code, "agency or
procuration is an act whereby one person gives to another the power to do
something for the principal in his name ..." 8
However, complications arise when an agent fails to follow the
instructions of his principal with the result that a third party is adversely
affected by his misconduct. Can the principal be held responsible for such a
misconduct? Whether he can depends on the scope of authority of the agent.
The principles of agency law concerning authority of agents are of crucial
importance here.
9
It is not proposed here to set forth a treatise on the
6B The word agent here is employed in a broad sense and refers to an
intermediary whether 'agent' or broker.
7	 Principles of Contract, 13th ed.,	 1950, London, Stevens & Sons Ltd.
at p.45.
8	 Translated by John H. Crabb, The French Civil Code (as amended to
July 1, 1976) 1977, p.358.
9 On the question of authority see, Fridman, The Law of Agency, 5th
ed., 1983, London, Butterworths, pp.47-115; S.J. Stoljar, The Law of
Agency, 1961, London, Sweet & Maxwell, pp.21-25. .
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general law of agency which can be found in text books on agency.
10
Nevertheless, it would be helpful to state briefly some of the basic
principles on the authority of an agent.
There is great similarity between the English and English-speaking
Cameroonian law and the French and French-speaking Cameroonian law of agency.
In all three systems a principal is bound by the acts of his agent within his
actual, apparent (or ostensible) or usual authority and by any unauthorised
acts ratified by him.	 In English and English-speaking Cameroonian law,
actual or real authority is the authority conferred by contract or agreement
with the agent. It may be express or implied. It is express when the whole
of its content can be discovered from the actual words used by the principal
whether orally or in writing.
Similarly, in French and French-speaking Cameroonian law, article 1985
provides that
"An agency may be given either by a public instrument or by
writing under private signature, even by letter. It may also be
given verbally; but oral testimony is received on it only in
conformity with the Title Contracts or Conventional Obligations
in General.
Acceptance of an Agency may be only implied, and result from the
execution given to it by the agent."
The insurance agent is normally vested with actual authority to carry out
certain acts for the company in the "Traits de Nomination". Such powers
include the authority to conclude contracts for the company.
10 For example, Fridman, op. cit.; B.S. Markesinis and R.J.C. Mundy,
Outline of the Law of Agency, 1979, London, Butterworths. For an
elaboration of the principles of agency see, Abbot, "The Nature of
Agency", (1896) 9 Marv. L.R. 507. Dowrick, "The Relationship of
principle and Agent", (1954) 17 M.L.R. 24-40; Seavey, "The Rationale
of Agency", (1920) 29 Yale L.J., pp.859-895; W. MUller-Freienfels,
"The Law of Agency", (1957) 6 Am. J. Comp. L., 165.
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In insurance transactions (as well as others where the principle of
agency applies) third parties are not generally in a position to know the
extent of the agent's actual authority.	 In England, France and Cameroon
(both English and French-speaking Cameroon), the concept of apparent or
ostensible authority was formulated to protect bona fide third parties.
11
There may be an appearance of authority even though there is no authority in
fact.
12 What really brings the rules of apparent authority into operation is
the principal's own conduct. In England, Slade J said
13
"Ostensible or apparent authority which negatives the existence
of actual authority is merely a form of estoppel, indeed, it has
been termed agency by estoppel, and you cannot call in aid an
estoppel	 unless	 you	 have	 three	 ingredients:	 (i) a
representation, (ii) a reliance on the representation, and (iii)
an alteration of your position resulting from such reliance."
Under the title 'Agency by estoppel', holding out, Bowstead writes:
"Where a person, by words or conduct, represents or permits it to
be represented that another person is his agent, he will not be
permitted to deny the agency with respect to anyone dealing, on
11 Rama Corp. Ltd. v. Proved Tin General Investments Ltd. [1952] 2 Q.B.
141; For the position in France see: Planiol and Ripert, Traits
Pratique de Droit Civil, Vol.11 by Savatier para.1500, p.951;
Jacques L g aut g , "Le Mandat apparent dans ses rapports avec la
th gorie g g n g rale de l'apparence", (1947) 45 Rev. Trim. Dr. Civ.,
pp.288-307.
12 Montrose, "The basis of the power of an agent in cases of actual and
apparent authority", (1932) 16 Can. Bar. Rev. 756, esp. at p.964.
13 Rama Corp. Ltd. v. Proved Tin General Investments Ltd. [1952] 2 Q.B.
147 at pp.149-150.
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the faith of such a representation, with the person so held out
as agent ..."
14
Also in the English-speaking Cameroonian case Alhaji M. Garba v. Mutuelle
Agricole Assurance Justice Ekor "Tarh said, 15
"If a principal by conduct or otherwise permitted someone to
advertise himself as the agent of that principal, he can no
longer be heard to deny that no proper agency relation
existed between them."
Similarly, the French and French-speaking Cameroonian courts have
declared that only by protecting the interests of third persons acting in
good faith could the law conform "au v6ritable intIrgts des socigt6s et mtme 
du commerce en q6n‘ral". 16 Where the insurance company held out the agent as
having the authority to conclude contracts and the insured legitimately
believed he had such authority, the insurance company would be held liable to
any third party who relied on the agents apparent authority. 17 What matters
is the manner in which third parties perceive the authority of the agent: "Le
mandataire apparent de l'assureur" is characterised by "la croyance 16qitime 
du tiers."
The doctrine of estoppel plays a very important role in common and
civil law systems. At its simplest, in English law, estoppel is based on the
idea of consistency.	 No one can blow hot and cold at the same time. If a
14 Bowstead, On Agency, 15th ed., 1985, London, Sweet & Maxwell, p.90.
The notion of holding out had to evolve and expand to meet the needs
of speedy commercial transactions. It made it unnecessary for a
person dealing, with an agent who appeared to have his principal's
authority.
15 Suit No.HC/35/73 of 4 June 1975, Bamenda, (Unreported).
16 Marcel Nyondo v. Agence Camerounaise d'Assurances, Affaire No.675/CC
of 10 December 1975, Yaounde, (Unreported).
17 See, Jacques L gaute., op. cit., pp.288-307.
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person admits or represents to another that a certain state of affairs exists
he will not be permitted afterwards to deny the existence or the truth of
this state of affairs.
	 He is "estopped" or "precluded" from alleging the
cohtvamy of what he has already admitted or represented to be true.
18
 As in
English law the doctrine of "apparence" in French law is based on the
principle of consistency. What appears to be true is taken in law to be true
without any further inquiry into the real state of things. "La verit6 est
sacrifige 1 l'apparence".	 The needs of the "sgcurit6 • uridique" are
considered more important and more vital for the community than the
exigencies of the pure "rgalitg • uridique". 19	 Reliance which is the same
concept in English, French and Cameroonian law must not be confounded with
good faith. Bad faith excludes reliance since it is illogical to submit that
someone can rely on a state of things which he knows not to be true. 	 But
reliance does not necessarily imply good faith. 	 In many cases, the third
party relies on an appearance or representation but he fails to make sure of
the authority of the agent. It suffices to note that the courts in many
Instances require that the reliance must be honest.
20
Appointing an agent to a particular position confers on him ostensible
authority to bind his principal in respect of the usual acts which someone in
18 Freeman and Lockyer v. Buckhurst etc.„ [1964] 2 Q.B. 480; Panorama 
Developments (Guilford) v. Fidelis Fabrics, [1971] 2 Q.B. 711; Eagle 
Star Ins. Co. v. Spratt, [1971] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 116.
19 See: J. Calais-Auloy, Essai sur la Notion d'Apparence en Droit 
Commercial, These, Montpellier (1959) published in Paris (1961).
The theory of 'apparence' is also dealt with in monographs on the
notion of good faith. See for example, Vouin, La Bonne Foi, Notion 
et Role Actuel en Droit Privg, These, Paris 1939; Planiol, Ripert
and Boulanger, Trait( de Droit Civil Vol.2, 1957 Paris, S, 2423
pp.846-847; Encyclopgdie Dalloz (1) "Droit Civil" pp.1-12.
20 Marcel Nyondo v. Agence Camerounaise d'Assurances, Affaire No.675/CC
•
of 10 December 1975, Yaounde, (Unreported).
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that position would have authority to do.	 A third party is entitled to rely
upon the representation of authority which derives from the appointment,
unless he is aware of any limitations on the appointee's power. It does not
matter that the agent is actually not authorised to do some of the usual
acts, for example, an agent in possession of cover notes issued by insurers
has ostensible authority to grant interim cover to an applicant for
insurance. His possession of the cover notes indicates prima facie that he
is authorised by the insurer to grant cover.
21
We may now consider the agent's authority in filling in proposal forms.
IV THE PARTICIPATION OF INSURANCE INTERMEDIARIES IN THE COMPLETION OF
PROPOSAL FORMS
Insurance companies usually make the completion of a proposal form an
essential requirement for obtaining an insurance policy.
22
It appears always
to have been common for the proposer to be assisted in this task by the
intermediary who brings the form to him for completion. Sometimes answers to
questions in proposal forms are filled in by the intermediary.	 Even where
the intermediary does not fill in the form he usually assists in its
completion by advising as to what answers are required. We have already
observed that contracts of insurance are based upon the common law principle
of utmost good faith calling for full disclosure by the insured of facts
21 Mackie v. European Assurance Society (1869) 21 L.T. 102. See also
in Cameroon, Marcel Nyondo v. Agence Camerounaise d'Assurances -
note 16 above.
22 The proposal form traditionally has formed the basis of the contract
and is incorporated into the contract itself by words to that
effect. See supra, Chapter Five, pp.338-339.
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material to the risk. 23
The participation of the insurance intermediary in the completion of
the insurance proposal form has given rise to difficulties as to whom to hold
responsible for any inaccuracies which may be contained in a form completed
by or with the assistance of the intermediary.
24
Should responsibility for
such inaccuracies be borne by the insured or by the insurer?
In favour of the proposition that responsibility should be borne by the
insurer is the argument that in the absence of any expressly stated
prohibition the intermediary should be taken to have the powers to fill in
proposal forms.
25
In Bawden v. London, Edinburgh and Glasgow Assurance 
Co.,
26
 it was held that as the intermediary was described as "the agent of
the company", it could be implied that he had authority to "negotiate and
settle the terms of a proposal and to put them into shape".
27
Indeed, in the
Bawden case, the Court of Appeal relied, in effect, on the principle of
estoppel: the fact that agents are provided with insurance proposal forms
and frequently complete them to the knowledge of insurers arguably gives them
23 See generally, Chapter Five esp. pp. 304-312. The obligation of
good faith applies to the insured as much as to the insurer: Re
Bradley and Essex and Suffolk Accident Indemnity Society [1912] 1
K.B. 415 at 430 per Farwell L.J.
24 See: J.F. Timmins, "Misrepresentation in insurance proposal forms
completed by agents" (1974), Vic. Univ. of Welli Ington L.R. 217.
25 Facer v. Vehicle and General Insurance Co. [1965] 1 Lloyd's Rep.
113.
26	 [1892] 2 Q.B. 534.
27 Ibid., per Lindley L.J. at p.540.
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ostensible authority to complete the forms. 28
However, Bawden's case was decided on its peculiar facts and it is
questionable whether it can be taken to represent the general law regarding
the incidence of responsibility for inaccuracies contained in an insurance
proposal form completed by or with the assistance of an intermediary. In
that case the insured on whose behalf the form was completed was illiterate.
The intermediary who filled the form was fully aware that the proposer was
blind in one eye but failed to record this fact in the form. Instead, he
stated, misleadingly, that the insured had no physical infirmity rendering
him peculiarly liable to accidents. When the insured lost his other eye, the
insurer resisted his claim on the ground that there had been a mis-statement
in the proposal form.	 The Court of Appeal, in unanimously rejecting the
insurer's contention, considered that the intermediary had completed the form
as "the agent of the company" and held that the company was estopped from
denying the ostensible authority which their intermediary had to negotiate
and settle the terms of proposals and to put them into shape.
29
While Bawden's case may have been correctly decided on its peculiar
facts, the better view would seem to be that responsibility for inaccuracies,
contained in an insurance proposal form - even where the form was completed
28 This approach of the Court of Appeal in Bawden derives support from
the Law Reform Committee which in its 5th Report recommended that
"any person who solicits or negotiates a contract of
insurance should be deemed for the purposes of the
formation of the contract to be an agent of the
insurers and that the knowledge of such persons should
be deemed to be the knowledge of the insurers."
See: Law Reform Committee 5th Report, Conditions.and Exceptions in
Insurance Policies 1957, Cmnd.63, para.14 at p.7. See further the
Department of Trade, Insurance Intermediaries 1977, Cmnd.6715.
29 Bawden's case was applied and followed in Stone v. Reliance, etc. 
[1972] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 469, the facts of which will be discussed
later.
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by or with the assistance of an intermediary, should lie upon the insured.
This proposition is founded upon the argument that since the duty of
completing an insurance proposal form is that of the insured, any person
performing this duty on his behalf or assisting him in its performance does
so as his agent, so that he alone ought to be held responsible for any
inaccuracies attributable to that person. As Halsbury states:
30
"It is irrelevant to inquire how the inaccuracy arose, or whether
the agent acted honestly or dishonestly, whether the agent had
forgotten or misunderstood the correct information he had been
given or whether the answers were a mere invention on the part
of the agent. If the result is that inaccurate or inadequate
information is given on material matters or that a contractual
stipulation as to accuracy or adequacy of any information given
is broken, it is the proposer who has to suffer."
The general rule of law laid down in Parsons v. Bionold
31
 is that where there
is prima facie a breach of warranty the onus of proof is on the proposer to
show that he did not make the answer that is the occasion of the breach. A
man is deemed to be responsible for what he signs. In Bigger v. Rock Life 
Assurance Company,
32
 a proposer signed a completed proposal form without
reading it.	 It was held that it was his duty to read the answers in the
proposal form before signing it and that he must be taken to have read
30 Laws of England, 4th ed., 1978, Vol.25, para.396 at p.219.
31	 (1846) 15 L.J. Ch.379.
32 [1902] 1 K.B. 516. See also New York Life Insurance Co. v. Fletcher 
(1885), 117, U.S. 579. However, although this American case is in
line with prevailing English law, it does not represent American
decisions, see:J.F. Timmins, "Misrepresentation in Insurance Forms
Completed by Agents", (1973) 7 Vic. Univ. Wellington Rev. 217 at
230-232.
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and adopted them. As Scrutton L.J.	 said in L'Estranqe v. F. Graucob Ltd.,
33
"when a document containing contractual terms is signed, then in the absence
of fraud, or misrepresentation, the party signing it is bound, and it is
wholly immaterial whether he has read the document or not".
In Newsholme Bros. v. Road Transport and General Insurance Co.,
34
 the
proposal was for motor insurance and the agent of the insurance company who
had been told the true facts filled in answers which were materially untrue
in the proposal form and the proposer signed it.	 The answers to the
questions were warranted by the proposer's signature to be true and to form
the basis of the contract. It was found as a fact that the agent was not
authorised by the insurance company to fill in proposal forms, and it did not
appear that the company knew that he had in fact done so. The company
successfully repudiated liability on the ground of mis-statement in the
proposal form. It was made clear that if the agent filled in the form at the
request of the proposer for that purpose he must have been acting as the
agent of the proposer and not of the insurers.	 Lord Justice Scrutton
stated
35
 that:
"I find considerable difficulty in seeing how a person who fills
up the proposal can be the agent of the person to whom the
proposal is made. A man cannot contract with himself. A. makes
a proposal to B. by signing it, and communicating it to B. If A
gets someone - C. - to fill up the form for him before he signs
it, it seems to me that C. in doing so must be the agent of A.
33 [1934] 2 K.B. 394 at 403; see also Treital, The Law of Contract, 6th
ed., 1983, pp.248-251
34 [1929] 2 K.B. 356.
35 Ibid. at p.369, see also, MCMillan v. Accident Insurance Co. Ltd.,
(1907) 14 S.L.T. 710.
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who has to make the proposal, not of B. who has to consider
whether he will accept it."
Further on in his judgment, the learned Lord Justice added 36
“ ... I have great difficulty in understanding how a man who has
signed, without reading it, a document which he knows to be a
proposal for insurance, and which contains statements in fact
untrue, and a promise that they are true and the basis of the
contract, can escape from the consequences of his negligence by
saying that the person he asked to fill it up for him is the
agent of the person to whom the proposal is addressed."
This decision establishes that the agent in filling in the answers
ceases to be the agent of the insurer. He becomes the agent of the proposed
assured and therefore his knowledge cannot be imputed to the insurer. 	 By
signing the proposal, the proposed assured adopts the answers as his own and
is responsible for any inaccuracy.
It is undeniably plausible to declare the signatory bound by the legal
effect of that to which he puts his signature and this seems to be a
sufficient reason for a decision in favour of insurance companies. 	 However,
this may not justify the assertion stated by Lord Justice Scrutton, that the
insurance agent . was the proposer's agent to enter false answers. It may be
assumed (though this was not the position in Newsholme's case), that in the
majority of cases it is within the authority of the insurance agent to insert
answers in the proposal form in accord with the information supplied to him
by the proposer. In so doing he acts as the agent of the insurance company,
and cannot be said to become at this point the agent of the proposer. 	 When
he invents answers and thus acts in fraud of his principal, plainly that
36 Ibid. at p.376.
v. Reliance Mutual Insurance Society. The insurer's agent who was
37
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agency then ceases, and this is the view taken in the Newsholme's case. What
is difficult to apprehend and therefore concede is why at this juncture a new
agency with the proposer supplements the old. If, as Scrutton L.J. said, the
agent can never be the company's agent to invent answers, the authority he
receives from the proposer should surely be regarded as extending only to
truthful answers, which conform to the information supplied,
36A
 (except where
the agent and proposer have acted in collusion in a fraud on the insurance
company). It is suggested that it is not desirable to hold that the proposer
impliedly authorised falsification of information accurately supplied by him,
and that just as the agent ceases to be the agent of the insurance company
when he acts in fraud of the latter, so he cannot then become the agent of
the proposer, who is similarly the victim of his fraud.
Another English decision which brings Bawden's case into focus is Stone 
instructed by the insurer to fill in the proposal forms for proposers filled
in without consulting the insured, the answer "none" to both the questions on
whether the insured had made any previous claims and whether any previous
policies had lapsed. In addition to the usual basis clause, the proposal
form concluded with the following declaration
36A It may be argued that the agent's knowledge of the truth ought
necessarily be imputed to the insurer; for a fuller discussion of
the knowledge rule see: G. Tedeschi, "Assured's Misrepresentation
and the Insurance Agents' Knowledge of the Truth", (1972) 7 Israel
L.R. 475-495.
Ayrey v. British Legal and United Provident Ass. [1918] 1 K.B. 136;
Blackley v. National Mutual Life Ass. of Australasia [1972] N.Z.L.R.
1038; See also J. Birds Modern Insurance Law, 1982, pri.88-89 and
pp.154-155.
37 [1972] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 469.
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... in so far as arty part of this proposal is not written by me the
person who has written the same has done so by my instruction and as my
agent for that purpose."
When the insured suffered a fire loss the insurer repudiated liability on the
grounds of misrepresentation. It was held that the policy was not voidable.
Lord Denning said
38
 "It is quite clear that in filling in the form, the agent
here was acting within the scope of his authority" as it was the company's
policy and instruction that the agent "should put the questions, writing down
answers". This distinguishes the present case from Newsholme's case where
the agent had no authority to fill in the proposal form and was merely the
amanuensis of the proposer. It was the insured's duty therefore to check the
completed proposal form before adopting or signing it. In Stone's case, the
agent was authorised to fill in proposal forms and the erroneous answers were
brought about by the fault of the insurer's own agent acting in his capacity
as such so that the insurance company could not treat the insured's non-
disclosure as material. The agent may have inserted the wrong answer, either
deliberately so as to earn a commission or because he had forgotten or
misinterpreted the insured's instructions. It would seem that the insurer
would be taking unconscionable advantage of the insured if the second
declaration above was allowed, that is, a notice to the effect that the
Insurance agent is the agent of the insured in filling in proposal forms. On
the other hand, whilst it is plausible to disregard such a declaration, a
prudent insurer may reduce the effects of Stone's Case by simply rescinding
all instructions to his agents to fill in proposal forms, although the
38 Ibid. at 474. Clearly, the agent in Stone's case was more than a
canvasser, be was an inspector of reasonable position who had
authority to fill in proposal forms; this fact distinguishes it from
Newsholme's case.
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illiterate, as we will see in the case of Cameroon, will still have to rely
on the agent for assistance in filling in the proposal form.
Similarly in English-speaking Cameroon, in so far as the duty to
declare material facts by completing an insurance proposal form lies upon the
proposer, anyone performing this duty on his behalf or assisting him in its
performance acts for this purpose as his agent. However, in certain cases
the insurance company may expressly or implicitly take upon itself the duty
of completing the insurance proposal form, for example, by adopting as its
policy that all forms should be completed by its nominees or by instructing
its employees or nominees to complete all forms. In these cases the nominee
Or employee is considered to be acting as the agent of the insurance company
when he fills in an insurance proposal form.
39
In Cameroon the common practice has evolved whereby employees or
nominees of insurance companies with whom the proposer negotiates an
insurance policy fill in the insurance proposal form without giving the
proposer, even a literate proposer, the option to complete the form himself
or nominate someone to complete it for him or to assist him in its
completion.
40
	In so doing these employees or nominees of the insurance
companies appear to be carrying out the policies and instructions of the
companies in this regard. By analogy with such cases as Bawden and Stone in
England, and for the same reason as in those cases, those employees or
nominees of Cameroonian insurance companies ought to be held to be acting as
agents of the companies rather than of the proposer when they complete
insurance proposal forms.
39 See, for example, the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Bawden and
Stone.
40 Enquiries among agents and insurance companies in Cameroon confirmed
this in the course of fieldwork - August 1983.
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Nonetheless, the rule in Newsholme's case appears firmly entrenched in
English-speaking Cameroon.	 In Mathias Djoumessi v. Guardian Royal Exchange 
Assurance (Cameroon) Ltd. 41 ,	 the proposal form was filled in by the
insurance company's agent and signed by the plaintiff. The answer "yes" was
inserted to the question whether the vehicle would be driven by the proposer
(the plaintiff) and "no" to the question whether the vehicle would be driven
by a paid driver. The defendant insurance company's liability depended upon
the truth of the statements and answers in the proposal form as a condition
precedent to liability. On a claim on the policy the insurance company
contended that the plaintiff made a material mis-statement in answering the
questions on the proposal form. 	 The plaintiff alleged that he did not
understand the questions and the answers were given by the agent for him to
sign. He further argued that as the agent was the agent of the defendant, he
would not be responsible for any mis-statement contained in the proposal form
filled in by them. The court held that the agent who produces an insurance
proposal form to the insured and then completes it for him acts as the agent
of the insurer in producing the form, but as the agent of the insured in
completing the form by answering the questions contained in it. This
decision recognises the fact that a man is deemed responsible for what he
signs and further, in so far as the proposer delegates to another (the agent)
the responsibility of filling in a proposal form, that person becomes his
agent for that purpose and not the agent of the insurance company.
With respect, this sort of decision does not produce a desirable and
sensible result in the situation of Cameroonians. 	 Given the fact of
widespread illiteracy, the multiplicity of languages and also the widespread
practice by which the agents who canvass insurance business for the insurance
41 Suit No. HCB/18/74 of 11 July 1975, Bamenda, (Unreported).
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companies regularly assume the filling in of proposal forms for proposed
Insureds and assist in its completion by advising as to what answers are
required, the law's response in this field of insurance law ought to be
comparatively well litigated upon in favour of the insured.
Insurance contracts as we observed in Chapter One are standard form
contracts which are almost inevitably drafted by companies. In the selling
of this invisible product, the insurance company employs an agent who plays a
big role in the explaining of and filling in of the proposal form. 	 This, in
effect, is a recognition of the disparity between the bargaining positions of
the insurer and insured. Furthermore, the insured perceives the agent as
being the agent of the	 insurance company and therefore accepts his
representations as being both authoritative and on behalf of the insurance
company. The insurer benefits from his position that this agent holds and
ought not to be allowed to deny that the agent is acting on his behalf as he
has clothed the agent with implied or apparent authority and is aware of the
practices that the agent adopts. The responsibility is on the insurance
company to recruit reliable and honest agents and if they fail in this, they
ought to bear the consequences in the ordinary course of business as business
losses; part of being in a profit-making enterprise is the responsible
assumption of the normal risk which that enterprise entails and insurance
business is one of them. 	 In fulfilling the reasonable expectations of
proposers or insureds therefore, it is desirable that the insurer ought not
to be permitted unconscionable advantage of an insurance transaction even
though the policyholder has manifested fully informed consent.
Furthermore, with regard to Cameroon, if there is any area of the
common law where English case law must be adopted sparingly, that area is the
law of insurance.	 English insurance law is unjustifiably weighted against
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the consumer; insurance companies are entitled to avoid liability by invoking
legal technicalities. They claim to invoke technicalities to avoid contracts
whenever they suspect fraud on the part of the insured but they cannot prove
it.
41A
	The only probable reason why no change of the law has been effected
in England, is the restraint exhibited by insurance companies in England
which have not availed themselves of all the opportunities for legislative
control. For example, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, was not applicable
to insurance contracts because of the pressure exercised by the powerful
lobby of the insurance industry.
In view of this, it is hoped that the English-speaking Cameroonian
courts will, when another occasion arises, interpret Newsholme and Stone's 
line of cases in a manner that will relieve some of the hardships of the
insured which are caused by the sharp practices of insurance companies.
By contrast, in French-speaking Cameroon, the role played by the agent
at the time of the subscription of the contract is subordinated by the
appreciation of good and bad faith of the insured and the liability of the
insurer concerning reticence and/or false declaration depends on the extent
and degree of participation of agent - whether he is passive or active.
42
In
determining the good and bad faith of the insured, the intellectual level of
the insured is taken into consideration. In this regard, the illiteracy and
41A See, for example, insurance company's defences- breach of warranty
and basis of the contract clause, supra pp.330-355.
42 For a discussion	 on	 this	 in	 France, spe: Chapuisat, "La
participation de l'agent general d'assurance 	 la declaration du
risque impose	 l'assur g", (1975) 49 J.C.P.	 1975.	 1. 2719; P.
Drancey, "Le pouvoir d'engagement de l'agent general d'Assurances",
(1977) 48 Rev. G gn. Ass. Terr. pp.596-604; L'Agent General 
d'Assurances -Quante Juridioue et libert‘ de placement, 1982, Paris
Argus, pp.95-129; J.F. Lusseau, "Circonstances et modalites de
l'engagement de la societ‘ d'assurances par l'intermediaire de son
agent On6ral", (1979) 50 Rev. Gen. Ass. Terr. pp.132-156.
- 383 -
level of education of the insured are an indication of whether he understood
the nature and importance of the declaration. The bad faith of the insured
would be difficult to prove where the agent had been negligent (not having
communicated the declarations that have been made to him) or dishonestly
modifies the declaration to get the insured the best conditions and tariffs
and earn his commission. In this, the agent actively participates in the
fraud on the insurer. On the other hand, the agent may passively allow the
insured to be deceived. Picard
43
 considers that the silence of the agent is
no fault on his part. He justifies this attitude by the fact that it is the
duty of the proposer under article 15(2) of the 1930 law to make full
disclosure of all material facts to the insurer. He recognises the fact that
most proposers would be unlikely to perform this duty without some assistance
in the identification of material facts.	 To help him in this regard
insurance practice has devised forms, referred to as 'proposal forms', which
set out questions designed to elicit material facts from the proposer. The
completion of such forms is the responsibility of the proposer. In this he
may be assisted by the insurer's agent. But when the latter assists the
proposer in completing the insurance proposal form he acts as agent not of
the insurer but of the insured since in doing so he performs a duty which
falls not upon the insurer but upon the insured. The agent is described in
French in this capacity as Le mandataire occasionnel du souscripteur.
Where the agent is the agent of the insurer, and he has the authority
to conclude contracts, he represents the insurer and the knowledge he
possesses of facts omitted or iRcorrectly declared is the knowledge of the
Insurer. In this case the principle of apparent authority comes into play if
43 M. Picard, "La Connaisance par l'assureur des faits omis ou
inexactement declares par l'assure", (1935) Rev. Gen. Ass. Terr.
p.20 et seq.
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the agent has been held out as having such authority. 	 If effectively, the
agent has been informed or becomes aware of facts relating to the risk from
his own observation, he should communicate such information to the insurer.
Failing to do so is a fault committed in the exercise of his functions and
the insurer is responsible for the acts of his agents. In the case of Nam'in
Garba v. La Fonciere d'Assurance, 44 the agent knew at the time of the
conclusion of the contract, the infirmity of the assured (amputated leg) and
that the latter had had road accidents as a result of this infirmity. His
failure to mention these particulars in the proposal was regarded as a fault
committed in the exercise of his functions. Similarly, the insurer would be
responsible for the agent's acts if the agent had by his actions or
affirmation led the insured to believe that his declarations were regular.
In the case of Nchandjo Fransois v. S.O.R.A.R.A.F., 45 on a question whether
the insured had sustained any previous accidents the insured orally told the
agent that he had two accidents causing damage to the body of the car. The
agent estimated that by reason of their triviality it was not necessary to
mention them. The bad faith of the insured - that is, an intention to make a
false declaration - not having been established, the nullity of the contract
could not be pronounced. In another case, 46 the insured declared that he had
no infirmity.	 He was slightly deaf. The agent noticed that to communicate
with the proposer he had to shout or have recourse to signs. 	 In all these
cases the insurer was held responsible for the erroneous declaration. The
agent had to transmit, correctly, all the information of which he had
44 Affaire No.237/CC of 6 April 1965, Douala, (Unreported).
45 Affaire No.874/CC of 4 June 1965, Douala, (Unreported).
46 Chonowa v. Chanas et Privat Assurance, Affaire No.177/CC of 28 May
1979, Yaounde, (Unreported).
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knowledge. The insurer cannot take advantage of an error when he has
accepted the conclusion of the contract following the information furnished
by his agent who knew of the incorrectness and did not inform the company.
The insurer cannot in these circumstances claim to have been induced in error
by a proposal of insurance containing false declaration as the knowledge of
the agent was imputed to the insurance company.
However, notwithstanding that the questionnaire was filled by the
agent, the declarations contained in it are deemed to be those of the insured
where the latter signs the document against the words "read and approved".
By his signature at the bottom of the questionnaire the insured guarantees
the correctness of the declaration. 	 In Yanqadou Emil v. Mutuelle Agricole 
d'Assurance
47
the insured failed to disclose previous convictions in respect
of road accidents causing death and bodily injuries. 	 The court without
difficulty considered this a reticence and intentional false declaration and
applied article 21 of the law of July 1930. The agent had written the
response on the indications that the insured provided and this had been
confirmed and certified by the insured's signature after the mention "lu et 
n
approuve".
Furthermore, the insurer is not liable for the concerted fraud between
the agent and the insured.	 In Jenqes Gisanq v. Socierco Assurance,
48
 the
insured falsely declared the age of the car and gave the wrong engine number.
It was found as fact that the agent had inspected the car. It was held that
the complicity of the agent and insured excluded the civil responsibility of
the insurer.	 The insured could not rely on the fault of his accomplice and
47 Affaire No.936/CC of 25 March 1972, Yaounde, (Unreported).
48 Affaire No.498/CC of 29 November 1977, Douala, (Unreported).
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the agent's fraud could not be imputed to the insurance company. If the
insured knew of the falsity he could not complain that he had been badly
informed or advised.
The insurer is vicariously liable for the faults of his agent acting in
the course of his employment
49
except where he acts in collusion with the
insured.
Where there is a doubt as to the respective responsibility of the
insured and the agent, the intentional character of the false declaration or
reticence would not be considered as established and in the absence of proof
of bad faith the sanction of article 22 of the law of July 1930 would be
applicable.
50
It should be noted that a similar inconsistency in the decisions of
English cases would also be found in Cameroonian cases.
The lack of unanimity in the attitude of the courts regarding the
incidence of responsibility for inaccuracies contained in insurance proposal
forms completed by or with the assistance of agents is equally discernible
when one considers the incidence of responsibility for inaccuracies in forms
completed by or with the assistance of insurance brokers. One of the many
unsettled questions in this branch of the law is "For whom? and For what? is
the broker 'agent'?"
The position of brokers was first stated in the much-quoted case of
Rozanes v. Bowen.
51
Here, Scrutton L.J. observed that in all matters
relating to the placing of insurance, the insurance broker is the agent of
49 Article 3 of the 1973 Order. The insurance company can also have an
action against his agent.
50 On the application and effect of article 22 see Chapter Five pp.349-
355 above.
51 (1928) 32 Li. L. Rep. 98. Anolo-AfriCan Merchants v. Bayley 
[1970] 1 Q.B. 311; North and South Trust v. Berkley 
[1971] 1 W.L.R. 470.
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the insured and of the insured only.	 It would seem that Scrutton L.J. was
influenced particularly by Lloyd's practice
514
and further that general
insurance brokerage was not common at the time.
However, recent decisions have regarded particular brokers as agents of
the insurer.
52
Where, for example, there is a close relationship between the
brokers and the insurers and the former is actually authorised to conclude
interim contracts of insurance, the knowledge of the broker of certain
matters concerning the insurance contract is deemed to be knowledge of the
insurers. Thus in Stockton v. Mason,
53
the insured's wife instructed the
brokers to transfer an existing motor policy from a Ford Anglia to an M.G.
Midget. The brokers acknowledged that the insured was covered. On a claim
on the policy, the issue depended on whether the insurers were bound by the
broker's oral statement purporting to authorise the M.G. to be substituted
entirely for the Anglia. The Court of Appeal held that the insurers were
bound, as the brokers had implied authority to issue on behalf of the insurer
or enter into temporary contracts of insurance as agent for the insurer.
Similarly, in Woolcott v. Excess Insurance Co. Ltd.,
54
 the insured failed to
disclose a series of convictions for crimes he had committed. 	 He answered
all the questions put to him by the broker truthfully. The broker became
aware of the insured's criminal record in the course of business but did not
bother to alter the policy. A fire occurred in the insured's premises and a
claim was made.	 The insurer resisted the claim on the basis of non-
51A For the course of business at Lloyds see MacGillivray and Parkington
op. cit., para.674 at p.278 et seq.
52 Stockton v. Mason [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 430; Woolcott v. Excess Ins. 
Co. [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 210.
53 [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 430.
54 [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 210.
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disclosure. The court held that the knowledge of a material fact by the
broker was imputed to the 'insurers and that the latter's defence of non-
disclosure failed.
However, the broker will be liable in damages to the insured if he
fails to ask the insured questions about facts which he knows are material to
the risk. It was so held in McNealy v. Penine Insurance Company Ltd.
55
The
insured was a property repairer and part-time professional musician who
disclosed his first but not his second occupation to his insurance broker.
The broker completed the proposal form failing to read over to the insured
the list of excluded occupations supplied to him by the insurer. The broker
was held liable in damages in respect of the plaintiff's liability to a third
party as the insurer avoided the policy.	 The brokers with their knowledge
that the insurer refused to cover certain risks were under a duty to the
insured to ask him whether he was engaged in any occupation involving such
risks. In the McNealy case, it was clearly expressed that the broker was
solely the agent of the insured and therefore there was no ground for
imputation of knowledge. The brokers were clearly instructed by the insurer
not to undertake certain risks and therefore not to conclude insurance
contracts on those terms. Eventually, however, the insured will recover from
either the insurer or the broker. On the Woolcott basis, the insured will
recover from the insurer who will in turn recover from the broker,; and on
the McNealy basis he will recover from his broker directly. If the broker is
insolvent, the insured may be left without a remedy. However, it would seem
55 [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 18. On the ground of misrepresentation and
non-disclosure of material facts in proposal forms, the recent case
of Alfred J. Dunbar v. A & 8 Painters Ltd. and Economic Insurance 
Co. Ltd. + Whitehouse & Co. [1985] Lloyd's Rep.616 esp. at 620,
emphasised the obligation and responsibility of insurance brokers
not to misrepresent facts in proposal forms: to all intents and
purposes, the insured would not really be insured at all because a
policy which is voidable in these circumstances is as bad as no
policy at all. See further on appeal, Dunbar v. A & 13 Painters 
Ltd., The Times, 14 March 1986.
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that, to a certain extent, this situation has been alleviated by the
provision in the Insurance Brokers (Intermediaries) Act 1977 56 which requires
insurance brokers to obtain professional indemnity insurance and also
requires the Council to maintain a special fund whereby people who suffer
loss from the bankruptcy, negligence or fraud of a registered broker are
entitled to compensation. It should, however, be noted that this provision
does not cover unregistered "brokers" and in such cases the insured will
remain remediless.
In so far as the primary duty lies on the insured rather than the
broker in respect of disclosing material facts and answering questions
correctly, it appears unlikely that the court would hold the broker under a
duty to warn the insured of his duty to disclose these facts if he is unaware
of material facts. In O'Connor v. Kirby,
57
the plaintiff insured his car
through the defendant broker who incorrectly answered a question on the
proposal form relating to the garaging of the car. The insurer avoided the
policy for breach of warranty. The plaintiff sued the broker for failing to
complete the form properly. The broker was held not liable as the plaintiff
signed the form containing the mistake and was solely responsible; it was the
insured's and not the broker's duty to disclose material facts and to check
that the information in the proposal form was correct.
	 In this case the
broker had fulfilled his responsibility and had given the form to the insured
to check; the incorrectness of the representation was only due to a slip or
misunderstanding which the insured's perusal of the form could have revealed.
This case is reconcilable with McNealy case, in that
	
in the latter the
broker was aware and had knowledge of material facts which affected the risk
and were not therefore under a duty to the insured to ask him whether or not
56 See later for a discussion of this, pp.399-401.
57	 [1972] 1 Q.B. 90.
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he was affected by the excluded risk.
The Insurance Brokers Registration Council's Code of Conduct lays down
that insurance brokers must place the interests of their clients before all
other considerations and must use their skill objectively in their client's
best interest.
58
In accordance with the decision in O'Connor v. Kirby above,
the Code specifically states
59
 that; "In the completion of the proposal form,
claim form, or any other material document, insurance brokers shall make it
clear that all the answers of statements are the client's own responsibility.
The client should always be asked to check the details and told that the
inclusion of incorrect information may result in a claim being repudiated".
One pertinent question that may be raised here is that, could the Code of
Conduct be used as a basis for a professional negligence action if it is not
complied with in comparison to the fact that a failure to observe a Highway
Code is evidence of negligence?
59A
It seems that there may be an action in
negligence assuming that the insured has suffered a loss.
In Cameroon, article 3 of the 1973 Order provides that any person who
sells insurance on behalf of an insurance concern shall be deemed in law to
be the agent of the concern, who shall be vicariously liable by virtue of
article 1384 of the Civil Code, for the damage caused by the fault,
imprudence or negligence of the agent in the exercise of his functions
notwithstanding any provision to the contrary. Brokers are in law generally
regarded as agents of the insured and not of the insurer and thus the
58 Insurance Brokers Registration Council (Code of Conduct) Approval
Order 1978. (S.I. 1978 No.1394) rule 3(c)(14).
59 Ibid.
59A See supra, Chapter Three, pp.165-166.
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provisions of article 3 above are inapplicable to them.
60
This approach
seems desirable, as the insured who is dealing with a broker will not in
practice have any direct communication with his insurer and thus the exact
nature of the broker's duty with regard to advising his client about
insurance matters is vital. His responsibility and liability therefore are
to his clients.
V THE REGULATION OF INSURANCE INTERMEDIARIES
The plethora of insurance intermediaries raises doubts concerning their
suitability and qualifications. 	 In England there had been no restriction
placed on any person who wished to set up in the business of selling
insurance and calling himself an insurance broker. Another area of public
concern
61
 was the potential conflict of interest faced by the insurance
broker.	 He received remuneration through the commission system and in order
to get the policies that pay him the best rate of commission he may use "high
pressure" sales techniques to sell insurance unsuitable to his client's
needs.	 The insurance intermediary who appears to the public to be a
disinterested adviser often is not. The intermediary may have a financial
Interest in some insurance companies. Notwithstanding this state of affairs,
and in contrast to insurance companies which are closely controlled by the
Insurance Division of the Department of Trade and Industry by virtue of the
Insurance Companies Act 1982 and other legislation, intermediaries had not
60 For a similar position in France see article 31 qf the Decree-law of
14 June 1938 now article L511.1 of the Insurance Code 1976; see
further on this, Yvonne Lambert-Faivre, Droit des Assurances, 10th
ed., 1977, Pr6cis Dal1oz, Paris, paras.599-601.
61 See the British Insurance Brokers Association (BIBA) Consultative
Document (1976), paras. 3 and 4, pp.5-6; Department of Trade,
Insurance Intermediaries 1977, Cmnd.6715 paras. 3 and 4; For
further detail see, Morgan, "Insurance Intermediaries - Recent and
Projected Developments - Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act 1977",
(1978) 39, L.M.C. L.Q. pp.39-48.
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prior to 1977 been subject to much control and supervision, in spite of the
fact that it is with the insurance intermediary that the public most
frequently comes into contact.
By contrast, with respect to Cameroon the regulation of intermediaries
was contemporaneous with the regulation of insurance companies by Ordinance
No.73-14 of 10 May 1973 fixing regulations applicable 	 to	 insurance
concerns.
61A Article 71(1) of the 1973 Ordinance lays down the requirement
of prior authorisation as a necessary condition for operating as an insurance
intermediary. Article 71(2) of the same Ordinance provides that the classif-
ication of insurance intermediaries, the duties and conditions governing the
practice of their profession shall be fixed by an order of the Minister of
Finance. To this effect Order No.358 - MINFI-CEI of 27 December 1973 was
passed regulating the profession of insurance intermediaries. Article 4 of
this Order provides the conditions that must be fulfilled before a natural or
legal person can operate as an insurance intermediary. Intermediaries listed
62
in article 2	 must satisfy conditions as to morality in article 70 of
Ordinance No.73 - 14 of 10 May 1973 fixing regulations applicable to insur-
ance concerns, possess certain professional qualifications and establish
their status. In contrast to England, entry into the profession was restric-
ted.
In England, however, increasing preoccupation with consumer protection
led to two regulatory provisions. The first regulatory provision applied
generally to all intermediaries and the second 	 concerned	 only	 the
registration and regulation of insurance brokers. 	 The Insurance Companies
61A Note that there . is a new Ordinance No.85-3 of 31 August 1985
relating to insurance business, see supra, Chapter Two pp.58-111 of
this study. The Order implementing this Ordinance in respect of
intermediaries has not been made. It is expected that further
provisions would be made but there will be no change in substance.
In this chapter we will continue to use the old one.
62 Supra, p.364.
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Regulations 1981,
63
 made under what is now section 74 of the Insurance Comp-
anies Act 1982, 63A require any intermediary who invites a member of the
public (ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom) to make an offer or prop-
osal with a view to entering into a contract of insurance with an insurance
company and is connected with that company to disclose in writing details of
his connection. It further requires a similar information where the insurer
is not authorised under the 1982 Act, for example, in the case of overseas
insurers.	 These provisions are made primarily to enable the percipient
purchaser to distinguish an agent from an independent broker. 	 Failure to
comply with these requirements is a criminal offence. An intermediary is
considered to be connected with an insurance company if the intermediary is a
partner, director, controller or manager of an insurance company and vice
versa. A connection also occurs if the intermediary or controller thereof
has a significant interest in the shares of the insurance company.
63B
Disclosure of a connection is also required where the intermediary has an
arrangement with the insurance company whereby he undertakes not to perform
any services relating to any class of insurance business for another insuran-
ce company. This would include an agent under a contract for services tied
to a particular insurer but not an employee of an insurer.
Further consumer protection measures were taken by the passing of the
Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act 1977.	 The 1977 Act dealt with the
competence, solvency and professional objectivity of insurance brokers.
63 S.I. 1981 No.1654, regs.67 and 68, formerly the Insurance Companies
(Intermediaries) Regulations 1976 (S.I. 1976 No.521).
63A First introduced as section 64 of the Insurance Companies Act 1974.
638 For the description of "significant interest", see regulation 67(2)
of the Insurance Companies Regulations 1981, S.I. 1981 No.1654.
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Under this Act an Insurance Brokers' Registration Council was established to
register eligible insurance brokers and supervise their activities.
64
Educational Requirements 
To be eligible for registration a broker needs to have obtained a
recognised
	 professional
	 qualification and a minimum of three years'
experience in the profession. 65
	Applicants not holding	 professional
qualifications are only eligible for registration if they have at least five
years' experience. Section 5(1) and (2) of the 1977 Act makes provision for
appeal against a refusal to register and further provides that a statement of
reasons must be given to any individual our corporate body which is refused
enrolment or registration. In refusing registration therefore, the Insurance
Brokers'	 Registration Council ought to identify in what respects an
applicant's professional experience is deficient. The application of this
provision is desirable as it provides a useful balance between the rights of
refused brokers and the vital need to operate a system of registration that
is effective in keeping out unsuitable applicants. In Pickles v. Insurance 
Brokers' Registration Council,
66
 the appellants had been in partnership for
more than five years as estate agents, surveyors, valuers and insurance
brokers.	 They applied for registration and the Council sought further
information as to how much of their time was devoted to insurance braking.
The appellants refused to supply that information and their application was
refused. The appellants challenged the refusal of the defendants to register
64 Section 2 of the Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act 1977.
65 Ibid. Section 3. At present, there are both a body with statutory
oversight over registered brokers (the IBRC) and a trade
association, British Insurance Brokers Association (BIBA) which
accepts into membership only those eligible for registration by the
IBRC.
66 [1984] 1 W.L.R. 748 esp. at pp.755-756.
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them as insurance brokers and claimed that they had an automatic right under
section 3(1)(c) of the 1977 Act to registration. The Court held rejecting
that argument that the provision of the Act requires someone who had carried
on business for not less than five years to an extent which provided him with
adequate practical experience of insurance broking and therefore there was no
automatic right to registration. This is a desirable result, as section 3 of
the 1977 Act can be seen as providing adequate powers to test the practical
experience of insurance brokers. The 1977 Act seeks to achieve profession-
alism in insurance broking basically on the basis of a recognised academic or
professional qualification and three years experience but many brokers,
perhaps the majority, have been registered bn the alterhati\te albhe.67 ‘Ahile
one may welcome the establishment of qualifications as one valuable criterion
for the demonstration of competence, it is probable that admission through a
period of practice as a broker unsupported by a recognised qualification may
militate against the achievement of professional standards. 	 Furthermore,
once a broker is registered he is entitled to use the description 'Insurance
Broker' and canvass for business of any class or all classes notwithstanding
that his qualification or experience may be in two or three classes only and
not necessarily the class in question.
68
	This is a defect in the Act,
although it is arguable that the provisions of the Code of Conduct require
brokers to advise clients only in those areas in 	 which	 they	 are
experienced.
69
It is desirable that increasing emphasis should be made on
67 Tom Roberts, "A Company view on the Registration of Brokers", 14
September, Insurance Week 1984, Vol.102, No.37 at p.29; Robert
Carter, "Broker quality concerns Carter", 15 October, Policy Holder
Insurance Journal, 1977, Vol.97, No.40 at p.13.
68 Note that insurance companies are authorised on a class by class
basis, supra Chapter Two, p.72.
69 See infra. pp.402-403.
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brokers to be able to demonstrate technical competence and be professionally
qualified.	 The actual competence of a broker depends to a considerable
degree upon the demonstration in practice by individual brokers of the
reliability which can be placed upon their expertise across the range of
their business.
	
This can be nurtured and sustained with consistency over
time and can be greatly reinforced by exacting standards for qualifying
examinations. The Act enables the Insurance Brokers Registration Council to
ensure the availability of adequate and appropriate educational facilities
and qualifying examinations and continously to review the standard and
relevance of these facilities and examinations.
70
	The British Insurance
Brokers Association has adopted a five year education training programme to
supplement the courses offered by the Chartered Insurance Institute. 	 It
organises seminars and provides a forum for debate on topics of current
interests to brokers.
Similarly, in Cameroon, the legislation requires insurance intermediar-
ies to hold certain professional qualifications and experience in insurance
business before an authorisation can be granted to commence business. Artic-
le 8 of the 1973 Order provides a list of professional qualifications which
insurance agents and brokers must attain. These qualifications include a
70 Sections 6 and 7 of the 1977 Act.
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diploma of the International Institute of Insurance,
71
 a diploma of the Paris
National Insurance School or their equivalent in any recognised school.
Insurance inspectors who have served the Ministry of Finance for at least
three years are also eligible to become insurance agents and brokers. 	 Since
the coming into force of the 1973 Ordinance there has been a significant
increase of trained Cameroonian personnel in the insurance industry.
72
This
Is a desirable development. As has been pointed out previously it can be
surmised that the average consumer of insurance (especially in Cameroon due
to illiteracy and the general level of education) is ignorant of the most
rudimentary notions of insurance due to its technical nature. To provide the
services effectively, the personnel of insurance intermediaries must possess
some professional knowledge and ability to meet the requirements of their
customers.
Agents are prohibited from practising the functions of brokers and vice
versa. Either one decides to be a broker independent of any insurance
71 The International Institute of Insurance was created by CICA - a
regional insurance organisation grouping the following French-
speaking West African countries: Cameroon, the Ivory Coast,
Mauritania, Malagasy Republic, Niger, The Peoples Republic of Congo,
Senegal, Togo and Upper Volta, in November 1973 to promote regional
cooperation in insurance education 	 and Africanisation of the
insurance industry.	 It provides member states with qualified
personnel and facilitates the free flow of man power as is the case
within the European Economic Community. Junior personnel are also
required to hold certificates in insurance. One such certificate is
the "Certificat d'Aptitude Professionelle" (C.A.P.), equivalent in
England to the General Certificate of Education (G.C.E.), ordinary
level standard of education in insurance.
72 See, "La Formation du Personnel en matiere d'assurance"' Revue
I.I.A. No.4, January 11977, pp.19-21; For the need of trained
personnel in the insurance industry see, Eric Jelfs, "The training
of Middle and Junior Management", in Conference Papers of the 
Insurance Institute of Nigeria, Vol.1 1977, pp:118-128; see also
3.0. Irukwi, "Insurance Education and Training in West Africa"'
WAICA Journal, Vol.1 1975, pp.45-52.
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company or establishes as an agent linked to a particular insurance company.
The aim of this prohibition is to protect insurance companies from unfavour-
able competition and avoid possible conflicts of ‘
 interest in broker-client
and agent-insurance company relationships.
By contrast to the position in England, article 5 of the Order prohib-
its persons in certain professions from acting as insurance intermediaries. 73
These include car dealers, building contractors, solicitors and land estate
corporations. This eliminates the anomalous category of insurance agents Or
unregistered persons calling themselves insurance consultants as we saw
earlier in the case of England.
Intermediaries are also required to obtain a professional licence
granted by the Association of Insurance Companies in Cameroon. They should
be members of the "Syndicat des Intermniaires d'Assurance Aqr64 du Cameroun"
(SIAAC), which is a professional organisation registered as a member of the
Bureau International des Producteurs d'Assurances et Reassurances with head-
quarters in Paris.
73 Order No.325/MINFI/CE of 1980 modifying Order No.358/MINFI/CE of 27
December 1973 regulating the profession of intermediaries; and
Circular No. 015166/MINFI/CE of the Ministry of Finance of 4 June
1980 concerning activities incompatible with presentation of insur-
ance operation. See further article 4 of the 1973 Order and also
supra. at pp.363-364.
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Financial Requirements 
With respect to	 solvency,	 in	 England,	 the Insurance Brokers
Registration Council made rules as to the conduct of insurance brokers
business.
74
 Insurance brokers are required to have a minimum working capital
of which at least £1000 is paid up and be able to demonstrate to the
Registration Committee that there are 	 adequate assets to meet their
liabilities.
75
	They are required to place insurances with a sufficient
spread of insurers to ensure that they are not unduly dependent on one
insurer.
76
Insurance brokers must submit annual accounts and statements in
accordance with rules 8 and 
-9.77
One of the most noteworthy of these
accounting rules is the requirement that brokers must keep insurance money in
approved banks and in a special account called the Insurance Broking Account
for each separate insurance business which they carry on.
78
These monies
must be used solely for the purposes set out in this regulation. This
provision provides extra security for premiums and claims in transit between
policyholders and insurance companies.	 However, the protection afforded is
74 Sections 11 and 12 of the Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act 1977;
Insurance Brokers Registration	 Council (Accounts and Business
Requirements)	 Rules Approval Order 1979 (S.I. 1970, No.489);
Insurance Brokers Registration Council (Accounts and Business
Requirements) (Amendment) Rules Approval Order 1981 (S.I. 1981,
No.1630); See also Insurance Brokers Registration Council (Indemnity
Insurance and Grants Scheme) Rules Approval Order 1979 (S.I. 1979,
No.408).
75 Regulations 3 and 4 of the Insurance Brokers Registration Council
(Accounts and Business Requirements) Rules Approval Order 1979 (S.I.
1979, No.489).
76 Regulations 5(1) Ibid.
77 Regulations 5(2) Ibid.
78 Regulations 6 Ibid. See also Regulations 3 and 6 of the Insurance
Brokers Registration Council (Accounts and Business Requirements)
(Amendments) Rules Approval Order 1981 (S.I. 1981 No.1630). For
further details of accounting procedures see, Hugh Cockerell, "How
brokers will have to account", 22 October, Post Magazine and
Insurance Monitor, 1981, Vol. CXIII, No.43 at pp.2648-2650.
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limited as it permits brokers to invest premiums and claims monies in transit
for their own benefit and allows them to pledge those investments as
collateral for bank overdrafts.
Insurance brokers are required to take out professional indemnity
insurance covering them against losses arising from claims in respect of any
description of civil liability incurred by them or their employees in connec-
tion with their business.
79
This provision is commendable as it is likely
that where there is significant doubt about the competence or standing of a
broker, he will find it difficult to obtain the necessary cover in the mark-
et. The professional indemnity policies currently on the market have exclu-
sions and clearly do not cover brokers from losses of "any description".
This has been shown by the Signal Life scandal
80
 where the professional
indemnity insurers have rejected liability on the grounds that Signal Life
was a financial failure, an event not covered under policies sold to the
brokers. It would appear that the Insurance Brokers Registration Council
have failed to ensure that the conditions of the Statutory Instrument have
been met or the professional indemnity insurers have not produced a product
which conforms with the requirements laid down in the above Statutory Instru-
ment. This failure highlights the weakness of the present arrangements to
compensate policyholders.	 It is therefore, desirable that the Insurance
79 Section 12 of the 1977 Act. The policy must be for at least
£250.000 or a sum equal to three times the brokerage of the business
for the last accounting period ending prior to the inception or
renewal of the policy, whichever sum is the greater. However in no
case will the minimum limit of indemnity be required to exceed
£7.500.000. See Regulation 3 of the Insurance Brokers Registration
Council (Indemnity Insurance and Grants Scheme) Rules Approval Order
1979 (S.I. 1979 No.408).
80 Neil Thaper, "Signal discovery hits all brokers", 2 August 1984,
Post Magazine and Insurance Monitor, Vol. CXLV, No.30, at p.1834.
The key problem is that the professional indemnity policies exclude
cover in cases involving an insurer's collapse.
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Brokers Registration Council ensure that policies of insurance brokers offer
adequate protection for its registered members. 81
A further attempt to ensure protection is provided by section 12(2) of
the 1977 Act which establishes a grant scheme designed to relieve or mitigate
the losses suffered by victims of negligence, fraud or bankruptcy of a regis-
tered broker.
82
The compensation is raised by a levy on registered brokers
and paid to individual members of the public and unincorporated bodies
holding United Kingdom policies only. 83 It is noteworthy that payment out of
this fund is not made unless policyholders take legal action against brokers
and negligence must be proved not just a demonstration that a loss has
occurred.
84
For example, in the Signal Life Affair the Insurance Brokers
Registration Council refused to pay out of the special fund until successful
legal action was brought against brokers. It seems unnecessary that legal
action must be brought in order to compensate the luckless policyholders when
81 It is doubtful whether commercial insurers will be able to offer
professional indemnity policies as wide ranging as that intended by
the Registration Act. For an expression of this remark, see, Neil
Thaper, "Signal discovery hits all brokers," Post Magazine and
Insurance Monitor, 2 August 1984, Vol.CXLV, No.30 at p.1834. One
may suggest that what is needed is a bonding scheme similar to that
run by the Association of British Travel Agents which requires
agents to put up a cash bond before they are allowed to go into
business. It is probable that such a bonding scheme with its atten-
dant compensation fund may offer some real protection to investors.
See further, note 102A below.
82 Regulation 6 Ibid.
83 Regulation 9. Ibid. The maximum amount of levy which can be raised
from a broker in any one calendar year is related to the size of the
broking firm.	 The commitment to the fund by insurance brokers
collectively will not exceed Elm. in any one year. Note that the
argument that well-managed firms will be financing the activities of
poorly-managed firms analogous to that in respect of the Policyhold-
ers Protection Act 1975 equally applies here, supra. pp.137-138.
84 Note also that the fund is one of "last resort", that is, it will be
utilised only after any other possible rights which the insured
person might have against other parties to the insurance contract
have been exhausted.
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registration was 'sold' as a way of ensuring better protection against bad
advice from registered brokers. It is suggested that positive action ought
to be taken by the Insurance Brokers Registration Council to provide the
benefit of an out of court settlement which provides a solution for
policyholders who have chosen to do business with registered brokers instead
of a convoluted chain of legal action which would involve time and expense.
In Cameroon, the solvency controls are exercised by the MiskistmI of
Finance via insurance companies. 84A
Ethical requirements 
In England, professional objectivity is maintained by the Council which
has power to draw up a Code of Conduct for registered brokers approved by the
Secretary of State. 85 The effect of the Code is modified by the fact that it
is stated 86
 to be only a guide and the mention or lack of mention of a part-
icular act or omission is not conclusive of any question of professional
conduct. Regulation 3 of the Code lists nineteen examples of the ethical
principles which all registered insurance brokers are required to adhere to.
The Code of Conduct87
 requires brokers to display in their offices a notice
to the effect that the Code is available on request and that the Council may
be approached by any member of the public who wishes to make a complaint or
seeks the assistance of the Council in resolving a dispute. 88 It is doubtful
84A For a discussion of this control, see Chapter Two on Government
Control of Insurance Companies, pp.66-67, 88-96 and 104-111.
85 Section 10 of the 1977 Act.
86 Regulation 1 of the Insurance Brokers Registration Council (Code of
Conduct) Approval Order (S.I. 1978 No.1394).
87 Regulation 3(19) Ibid.
88 An aggrieved client may complain either to the British Insurance
Brokers Association or to the Insurance Brokers Registration
Council; a consumer relations officer has been appointed to handle
complaints from clients against Insurance Brokers.
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whether this is sufficient to draw the attention of clients. It will probab-
ly be better if brokers are required to include a copy of the Code in the
client's premium book when they conclude contracts of insurance. 88A
It is interesting to note that the British Insurance Association
formulated Codes of selling practice for intermediaries other than registered
brokers. These Codes embody sales principles similar to those for registered
brokers. Intermediaries are required to give advise only on those matters in
which they are competent and to seek or recommend other specialist advice if
this seems appropriate. There is also provision for intermediaries to keep a
proper account of all financial transaction with a prospective policyholder
which involve the transmission of money in respect of insurance. The
observance of the Codes by intermediaries is the responsibility of individual
insurance companies through their contractual and commercial arrangements or
through their normal supervisory procedures in the case of companies' own
sales staff. However, it is regrettable that the policing role has been left
with the insurance companies 89 themselves and no formal and independent
complaints procedure or body has been established to deal with complaints and
review its working and to identify from a study of any complaints any further
points that need to be covered. An independent arbitration appears to be a
88A This Code could be simplified and made reasonably comprehensive into
a leaflet or pamphlet. For example, see the Code of Practice For
All Intermediaries (Including Employees of Insurance Companies)
Other Than Registered Insurance Brokers, issued by the Association
of British Insurers in 1981.
89 This is not perhaps the best guarantee of imOartiality especially
when the intermediary may be placing substantial amounts of their
business.	 Contrast the Insurance Brokers Registration Council
Disciplinary Committee
	 which	 provides
	 an overall complaints
procedure for all registered brokers, infra, pp.404-405.
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desirable method by which a consumer's complaint can be equitably examined
and adjudicated.
In addition, there exist two rival organisations: the Federation of
Insurance Consultants and the Institute of Insurance Consultants
90
 for
unregistered intermediaries; all with their own Codes of Practice.	 Gower
criticises
91
 these Codes of Practice for containing moral exhortations
instead of prescribing precise rules and regulations. One essential feature
of any scheme appears to be the imposition of very clear obligations designed
to enable a policyholder to take effective action against an intermediary who
sells a policy other than that which is in the best interest of the
policyholder.
The extent to which registration protects the consumer depends directly
upon the standard laid down by the requirements of the legislation, the
efficiency of the disciplines and the rigour with which they are adopted and
sustained. With regards to registered brokers professional discipline is
provided by independent bodies.
92
	Where a complaint is made against a
registered	 broker	 a preliminary investigation is carried out by an
Investigating Committee
93
 of the Council. Thereafter, it is if necessary
90 See Institute of Insurance Consultants Reference book and list of
members, 1985.
91 L.C.B. Gower, Review of Investor Protection, Report; Part I,
Cmnd.9125, 1984 London H.M.S.O. para. 8.52 pp.120-121.
92 Sections 13 to 20 of the 1977 Act; Insurance Brokers Registration
Council (Procedures and Disciplinary Committee) Rules Approval Order
1978 (S.I. 1978, No.1456).
93 Regulation 3 of	 the	 Insurance	 Brokers Registration Council
(Constitution of the Investigating Committee) Rules Approval Order
1978	 (S.I. 1978, No.1456).
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reported to a separate Committee, the Disciplinary Committee,
94
 which has
power to erase the name of a broker from the register. A broker's name may
be erased from the register under section 15 of the 1977 Act for conviction
of a criminal offence or material contravention of the rules under Sections
11 and 12 relating to financial and professional indemnity matters or
unprofessional conduct in the judgment of the Disciplinary Committee. 	 There
is no further definition and the discretion of the Disciplinary Committee
seems to be the important factor.
95
The majority of firms have been struck
off the register for failure to meet the statutory requirements with respect
to accounting disciplines especially 	 in	 respect of accounts showing
substantial shortages in the Insurance Broking Account and maintenance of
professional indemnity insurance. 96 These firms then drop the description
"insurance broker" and continue trading exactly as before on the same terms
and conditions as if nothing had happened. It is arguable whether standards
can be raised appreciably while it is possible simply to leave the "club" and
carry on as before.	 However, as no details of the judgments of the
97 .
Disciplinary Committee are published	 it seems that, it would be contrary to
94 Regulation 3 of the Insurance Brokers Registration Council
(Constitution of the Disciplinary Committee) Rules Approval Order
1978 (S.I. 1978, No.1457).
95 In James v. Insurance  Brokers' Registration Council [1984] The
Times, 16 February 1984, James appealed against a decision of the
Disciplinary Committee to direct his name to be erased from the
register of insurance brokers under section 15 of the 1977 Act
relating to professional indemnity insurance which had rendered him
unfit to have his name on the register. His Lordship held that the
court would be slow to interfere with the profesional judgment of a
tribunal such as the Disciplinary Committee which could justify its
decision.
96 The Insurance Brokers Registration Council Bulletin, 1985.
97 Reply to inquiry dated 18 February 1985 from E. Jane Rees, Deputy
Registrar, Insurance Brokers Registration Council.
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natural justice for insurance companies not to continue to accept business
from de-registered brokers unless there is sure and certain evidence that
they are 'not fit and proper' persons. It is possible that some brokers may
use the failure to comply with the rules under sections 11 and 12 of the 1977
Act, as a means of de-registration as it appears that there is no other
machinery available to them.
98
It seems clear that one obvious deficiency in the 1977 Act is that the
Council cannot discipline those who contravened the rules. The Council has
no statutory obligation to prosecute and moreover the funds to do so are
extremely limited.
99
There is a complete lack of penalties other than
warning or striking off the name of a registered broker from the register.
It is suggested that errant brokers should be fined or suspended rather than
simply struck off the register. Further, the profession ought to be required
to set up procedures whereby persistent deviants are identified and not
allowed to practice as brokers. The incompetent broker who sells the product
of an insurance company should be struck off the register in just the same
way as a doctor carelessly prescribing the wrong medicine.
Under section 22 of the 1977 Act, it is an offence, punishable on
summary conviction by a fine not exceeding £400, or on conviction on
Indictment by an unlimited fine, for an unregistered person to use the
description "insurance broker" or "assurance broker" or "reassurance broker"
Or	 any other description falsely implying registration or enrolment.
However, the Act does not prevent unregistered persons from carrying out the
98 See, Regulation 16 of the Insurance Brokers Registration Council
(Registration and Enrolment) Rules Approval Order 1978 (S.I. 1978,
No. 1395)
99 Roger Anderson, "Unregistered Brokers and the IBRC", 6 May 1983,
Policy Holder Insurance News, Vol.101, No.18 at p.9.
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functions normally associated with the occupation of insurance brokers so
long as he does not call himself a broker. In practice, descriptions such as
"insurance consultants"
100
 are used by persons who wish to carry on insurance
business
	 without bringing themselves under the Act.
	 For example, a
Shropshire firm was charged with displaying a notice in front of its premises
which read "Lane Phillips Insurance Brokers" when the company was not
registered as a broker although its letter headings used the term insurance
consultants. On a plea of guilty, the firm was fined £500 with £70 costs. 101
Nevertheless the firm whose trading standards were never in doubt continues
in business much as before with support from insurers and clients as many
others who have decided not 	 to register with the Insurance Brokers
Registration Council.
102
	It seems that neither the public nor insurers
discriminate against unregistered intermediaries. 	 As such the registered
broker is left with greater administrative burden without any added advantage
over his non-registered counterpart.	 On the other hand, it does not seem
that the public is adequately protected by the operations of the non-
registered broker.
Clearly, the main weakness of the Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act
1977 is that brokers voluntarily became registered and consequently other
intermediaries are able to remain outside the regulatory process. It may be
noted that too much should not be claimed for registration in itself, it is
100 Supra. pp.404 and 406.
101 Shropshire County Council v. Ian K. Phillips and Lane Phillips Ltd.,
1983-4 (Unreported) Shinfal Magistrates Court, 16 December 1983,
details supplied by D.C.E. Roberts, Chief Inspector of Trading
Standards, letter dated 29 November 1985. Note that the prosecution
was brought by Shropshire Trading Standards Office.
102 See, Tom Roperts, op. cit., at p.29
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not a solution but it does provide an essential basis for development. If
one considers the sale of Signal Life
102A
 bonds through registered brokers
one may argue that the fact that a firm is registered with the Insurance
Brokers Registration Council does not necessarily guarantee total protection
and satisfactory dealings with clients. Nevertheless, the point is that the
policyholders have some form of redress, though not as adequate as it ought
to be. On the other hand, if an unregistered intermediary does not satisfy a
client's needs, the client has no clear source of help or compensation. The
unregistered intermediary may have professional indemnity insurance but he is
not obliged to do.
1028 The registration requirements for IBRC members cont-
ain certain minimum standards. One can claim that the IBRC regulations
overall are very much stronger than the Codes of Practice designed by insur-
ance companies and we have seen
103
 that the disciplinary powers of bodies
responsible for non-registered intermediaries do not contain any sanction.
It is not satisfactory that the disciplines that the Registration Act imposes
102A See, "Compensation: Court victory on investment advice will open
floodgates," The Times, 25th February 1984; Press Release,
Coordinator: John Potter, "High Court victory for signal gilt bond
investors," 14th July 1985. A convoluted chain of unreported legal
actions in the County Court and High Court have been won by
investors of Signal Life bonds. Many of the intermediaries who
sold the bonds were both registered brokers and members of the
British	 Insurance	 Brokers	 Association	 and	 unregistered
intermediaries. In the case of registered insurance brokers,
however, the Insurance Brokers Registration Council grants scheme
would come into operation at this point and might reimburse
investors; but see above discussion supra, pp.401-402.
1028 The Institute of Insurance Consultants requirement for professional
indemnity cover is less than that of the IBRC members for business
where turnover is less than £50,000 per annum. In addition, the
educational requirement depends upon experience and/or
qualification, with the possibility that if the requirements are
not fulfilled an applicant may write a thesis of 500 words on an
insurance topic in order to be registered as a member.
103 Supra, pp.403-404.
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on brokers should co-exist with the apparent freedoms available to non-
brokers.
This points to the need for a self-regulatory body to have statutory
powers, but as we have seen with insurance brokers a statute needs to be very
tightly drawn.	 If insurance brokers are to be regulated and disciplined it
is essential that there should be only one class of insurance brokers, that
is, those registered under the scheme outlined above.	 It should be a
necessary corollary that an individual will not be able to sell insurance
unless he has registered with the self-regulatory authority. 	 It will also
imply that if he contravenes any of the rules and regulations and he is
struck off the register he will be out of business possibly for all time. It
Is hoped that some form of registration covering all brokers with one Self-
Regulatory Agency
104
 capable of overseeing and monitoring the activities of
brokers and if necessary exercising, within the aegis of the law, disciplin-
ary measures is established to ensure that all concerned act in an ethical
fashion and provide the best possible service for the general public.
Certainly, the Insurance Brokers Registration Council's powers could be
strengthened to assume that role.Indeed, it is quite clear that the introduc-
tion of registration schemes will not necessarily lead to elimination of
persons who are prepared to act illegally. Nevertheless, as in the case of
the regulation of insurance companies
105
legislation should provide for
criminal and civil sanctions against unauthorised establishments.
The regulation of insurance brokers only, cannot, of itself be a
complete panacea as, clearly there is a need for some form of control and,
104 The arguments for a comprehensive system of statutory regulation
for life assurance intermediaries apply equally to the non-life
area. See, L.C.B. Gower, Review of Investor Protection, Report:
Part 1, Cmnd. 9125, London, H.M.S.O.
105 Supra, Chapter Two, pp.138-145.
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indeed, supervision of non-broker intermediaries through whom business is
obtained by the insurance companies. As regards insurance companies' agents
this more properly is a matter for the companies themselves to regulate
probably in agreement with the Department of Trade and Industry. Perhaps if
insurance companies were made responsible for the compensation of policyhold-
ers when their agent defaulted, 
5A 
they would make more diligent enquiries
regarding the character and financial stability of their agents.
In contrast to England, as has been seen, 106 entry into the profession
in Cameroon was restricted from the outset. With respect to the moral integ-
rity of an insurance intermediary article 70(1) of the 1973 Ordinance prohib-
its persons who have been convicted of certain offences from becoming insur-
ance intermediaries. It provides thus
"The following may not in any way found, direct, administer, manage, or
wind up any type of insurance, re-insurance or capital accumulation
concern, and may not act as insurance or re-insurance agents or
broker:
(a) Persons who have been convicted of crime under ordinary law,
theft, breach of trust, fraud, abstraction committed by a
public trustee, extortion of funds and securities, uttering
worthless cheques in bad faith, undermining the credit of the
state, receiving and concealing objects obtained by means of
these offences;
105A As, for example, under clause 4(2)(b) of the Draft Insurance Law
Reform Bill (L.C. Report, No.104, Appendix A), whereby notices etc.
sent out by insurance brokers to policyholders regarding renewal
would be deemed to be renewal notices within the meaning of clause
4 and hence would have to include a warning about the duty to
disclose material facts, on penalty of the insurer being unable to
rely upon non-disclosure (subject to clause 4(5)).
106 Supra, pp.362-365.
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(b) Persons who have been convicted of attempting to commit the
offences above or of aiding and abetting them;
(c) Persons who have been sentenced to imprisonment of not less
than one year, regardless of the nature of the offence;
(d) Undischarged bankrupts."
Article 70(2) further provides that
"The same prohibitions may be pronounced by law courts against:
(a) Any person convicted for infringement of insurance legislation
or regulations;
(b) Directors, administrators or managers of insurance concerns
which have been wound up following the withdrawal of
approval."
The range of prohibited offences contemplated by the 1973 Order thus appears
great, while the term of imprisonment necessary for this purpose need be only
one year.	 The effect of this is to render ineligible to act as insurance
intermediaries a wide class of persons.	 This is a welcome result since
insurance operations necessarily involve the management of large funds of
public money which ought to be entrusted only to persons of honour and integ-
rity.
	
Furthermore agents and brokers in Cameroon, are equally subject to
supervision by the Ministry of Finance whose Department of Insurance is
empowered by article 15 of the 1973 Order to cause a withdrawal of a brok'er's
name from the commercial register or to withdraw the professional licence of
an insurance agent if the requirements regarding their professional qualific-
ation and moral integrity have not been met.
Finally, mention should be made of the regulation of commission of
insurance intermediaries in Cameroon. 	 We noted earlier
107
 the temptation
107 Supra, p.391.
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which intermediaries, especially brokers paid by commission might face to
secure more business for themselves whilst paying little regard for their
client's insurance needs. In this respect the Cameroonian legislation but
only in so far as motor insurance is concerned, places limitation on the
amount of commission. 108 Articles 2 and 3 of Order No.137 of 6 March 1972
classifies intermediaries according to the various functions 109 they fulfill
and provides the maximum percentage of premium income pertaining to the
insurance which they can earn as their commission. This is as follows
(1) Ordinary insurance salesmen: 4 per cent of insurance of public
passenger or goods transport and 6 per cent for other insurance of land
motor vehicles;
(2) Insurance salesmen with powers: 8 per cent for insurance of public
passenger or goods transport and 10 per cent for other insurance of
land motor vehicles.
(3) Insurance agents with restricted powers: 12 per cent of insurance of
public passenger or goods transport and 15 per cent for other insurance
of land motor vehicles;
(4) Insurance agents with full powers: 18 per cent for insurance of public
passenger or goods transport and 20 per cent for other insurance of
land motor vehicles.
Further article 5 provides that as from 1971, insurance concerns must, if the
108 Article 1 of Order No.137 MINFI/DCE/OF 1 of 6 March, 1972 fixing
the rate of commission of motor vehicle insurance; Order No.
97/MINFI/CE/A modifying and completing certain provisions of Order
No.339/MINFI/CE/A of 3 October 1977 fixing the rate of commission
applicable to motor vehicle insurance. It was felt unnecessary to
regulate commissions of insurance intermediaries in England, see
article by Morgan op.cit., on p.40.
109 The differences in powers and status between the various categories
are specified fully in the relevant articles which list a number of
functions and duties of the agents.
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commission and other remuneration of the same kind granted by them to their
intermediaries exceed the percentages provided for in this Order, progressiv-
ely reduce the rate as stipulated in the article. It was hoped that this
restrictive remuneration scheme would be an incentive for insurance intermed-
iaries to be cautious in selecting the risks of their clients best suited to
their needs without their necessarily aiming at a high commission.
Basically, the standards required of insurance intermediaries in Eng-
land and Cameroon are appreciably high as a result of the registration with
their respective authorities. Direct state licensing does not exist in
either country; in England regulation is in the hands of the insurance indus-
try (more of a self-regulatory machinery) probably because of its favour of
free enterprise, whereas in Cameroon there is a somewhat partial or indirect
government control and supervision. Agents in England, unlike in Cameroon,
have not yet been regulated though proposals in this direction are envisaged.
As we saw earlier,
110
 the 1977 Act was concerned only with registered brokers
and aimed at a high level of professionalism and the maintenance of high
standards.	 However, the lacuna left by the Act, is the regulation of agents
and "insurance consultants" ex cetera, of whom there is a good number. It is
hoped that legislation will be made for the supervision and control of agents
by the insurance companies whom they represent. The ultimate result would be
that insurance agents would be limited to those tied to particular insurance
companies by an agency agreement, Or if "insurance consultants" insurers
would be responsible for them. This will eliminate the superfluous category
110 Supra pp. 393-408.
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of insurance agents mentioned previously (that is, part-time or occasional
agents). 111 Henceforth the classification of insurance intermediaries would
be confined to registered brokers and agents of insurance companies.
Allusion should be made to developments within the European Economic
Community in respect of Insurance Intermediaries. Pursuant to article 57 of
the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (the Treaty of Rome,
March 25, 1957), the Council of the European Community issued Directive
No.77/92/EEC 112 for the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and
other evidence of formal qualifications. The object of coordinating these
qualifications is to facilitate the effective exercise of freedom of establ-
ishment and freedom to provide services in respect of the activities of
insurance agents and brokers, thereby avoiding undue constraint on the
nationals of member states. The closer relation between member states would
lead to greater expansion and accelerate the raising of standards.
111 See the Government White Paper, Insurance Intermediaries 1977,
Cmnd.6715, para.14.
112 Directive of 13 December 1976 on measures to facilitate the
effective exercise of freedom of establishment and freedom to
provide services in respect of the activities of insurance agents
and brokers (ex. ISIC Group 630) and, in particular, transitional
measures in respect of those activities (0.J. 1977, L26/14)
31:1:1977. See further, T.H. Ellis, European Integration and 
Insurance (creating a Common Insurance market), 1980, London,
Witherby & Co. Ltd., pp.133-139. It should be noted that the
United Kingdom had at the time no requirement of professional
qualification and therefore the 1977 Act was an implementation of
the 1976 Directive as it provides for the registration of all
insurance brokers and the maintenance of professional standards
especially in sections 6 and 7.
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CHAPTER 7
CONSTRUCTION OF THE CONTRACT OF INSURANCE
I INTRODUCTION
One of the greatest difficulties in insurance law has perhaps been to
determine the precise coverage of a given policy. In England, France and
Cameroon, the contract of insurance will invariably in practice consist of
not just the policy document itself, but also the completed proposal form.
The proposal and statements and declarations therein contained may be and
usually are incorporated into the contract by reference.	 When a policy
refers to and incorporates	 other	 documents,	 such .as the proposal,
declarations and statements, they all have to be considered in order to
apprehend the full terms of the contract.
1
The proposal, statements and declaration are the first documents in
order of time. They occur contemporaneously and appear, in reality, as one
instrument. They are documents usually put before a proponent for his
signature and are intended to convey to his mind the terms to which he is
asked to pledge himself when entering upon the transaction. We observed
earlier in Chapter Five
2
 that the declaration may be one as to the absolute
and literal truth of the answers in the proposal or it may be merely a
declaration that the answers are accurate to the best of the proponent's
1 For the incorporation of documents into the insurance contract in
France see, Nicholas Jacob, Les Assurances, 2nd ed., 1979, Paris,
p.82.
2	 Supra, pp.338-339.
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knowledge and belief.
	
Where relevant, and often in addition, other
documents, including, in some cases, renewal notices, cover notes and slips
pasted onto the policy, all form part of the contract.
The broad judicial solution in England and the English-speaking
Cameroon, has been to adopt canons of construction intended to point towards
the true meaning of the words used in the determination of the extent of
coverage offered by an insurance contract. 	 However, in France and the
French-speaking Cameroon, the rules of construction are laid down by the
Civil Code. These rules or canons of interpretation are nonetheless similar
in their application. This chapter will briefly review the most important of
these rules, with special emphasis on the approach of the Cameroonian courts
in cases of motor insurance.
II THE ROLE OF THE COURT IN THE INTERPRETATION OF THE INSURANCE CONTRACT
In England, France and Cameroon the construction of a contract is a
matter for the court. The contract or policy is construed according to the
law of the country where it is granted. 	 Insurance policies are construed
according to the principles	 of construction applicable to commercial
contracts generally, and there are no peculiar rules of construction
applicable to the terms and conditions in a policy which are not equally
applicable to the terms of other mercantile contracts.
3
.
The primary task of the court endeavouring to interpret the contract of
insurance is to ascertain the intention of the parties in relation to the
3 As to English Law see, Drinkwater v. Corporation of the London 
Assurance (1767) 2 Wils. 363 at 364; also see MacGillivray and
Parkington, op.cit., para. 1031 at p.433. As to French and French-
speaking Cameroonian Law see, articles 1134, 1135, 1156 to 1164 of
the Civil Code. See also, Sir Otto Kahn-Freund, Claudine Levy and
Bernard Rudden, A Source-book on French Law, 2nd ed., 1979 Oxford
Clarendon Press, p.425.
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point in dispute
4
. In France and French-speaking Cameroon, article 1156 of
the Civil Code states that:
The common intention of the contracting parties must be sought in
agreements rather than to stop at the literal sense of terms."
5
Further, article 1163 adds that:
"However general may be the terms in which an agreement is conceived,
it includes only the things on which it appears that the parties
proposed to contract."
6
Such intention is, however, to be gathered from the wording of the policy
itself
7
 and from the wording of any other documents which may be incorporated
with it.
8
The intention of the parties can be collected only from the agreement
itself and it alone is to be looked at for the purpose of interpreting the
contract.	 Where there are both written and printed words in a policy, the
policy is to be construed as a whole 9 but the written words (whether hand-
written or type-written) prevail over the printed words in the event of an
inconsistency or variance, as written words are specially inserted to show
the intention of the parties.
4	 In England, see, Tarleton v. Staniforth (1794)5 T.R. 695 at 699
5 John H. Crabb, The French Civil Code as amended to July 1, 1976, 1977
New Jersey, p.224. Note that the translation seems to be inelegant but
the meaning is clear.
6	 Ibid.
7	 M'Swiney v. Royal Exchange Assurance (1849) 14 Q.8, 634 at 661.
8	 Nicolas Jacob, op. cit., at p. 82.
9	 Article 1161 of the Civil code states that:
"All clauses of agreements are interpreted through one
another by giving to each one the sense which results from
the entire document."
John H. Crabb, op. cit., p.224. Emphasis added.
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Extrinsic or parole evidence is inadmissible to vary or contradict the
written terms. Thus a person cannot free himself from an agreement by saying
that he thought it meant something different from what it does mean. 10
It must be pointed out that, in England, the primary rule that the
intention of the parties must prevail is, in the majority of cases, founded
on a priori assumption (the dubious premise) that the insurance contract is
the result of bargaining between the parties of equal strength, who having
bargained, reduced their agreement to writing. While certain judges may have
complained occasionally about the form of insurance policies, there are very
few signs of any attempt to give weight to criticism by the adoption of rules
of construction more favourable to the insured. 11 This contrasts with the
position in many of the states in the United States of America. Here,
doctrines described as "fulfilling the reasonable expectations of the
insured" and "disallowing the insurer any unconscionable advantage" are well
established. 12 This follows from an early recognition of the contract of
insurance as a "contract of adhesion" par excellence ; in other words, as
one of the classic cases in which there is absolutely no chance of the
10 See, Newsholme Bros. v. Road Transport and General Insurance Co. 
[1929] 2 K.B. 356, a case really on parol evidence rule.
For further details see Chapter Six above pp. 375-376.
11 A notable exception is the judgment of Farwell L.J. in Re Bradley 
and Essex and Suffolk Accident Indemnity Society [1912] 1 K.B. 415.
Common law courts exercise significant control over freely
negotiated contract terms through the process of interpretation.
12 See, especially, Keeton, "Insurance Law Rights at Variance with
Policy Provisions", (1970) 83 Harv. L.R. 961 and 1281. See
generally, Hasson, "The Special Nature of the insurance Contract: A
Comparison of the American and English Law of Insurance", (1984) 47
M.L.R. 505, 517-519
13 See, generally, Kessler, "Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts.
About Freedom of Contract", (1943) 43 Columb. L.R. 629; J Birds op..
cit., pp. 170-172.
13
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insured bargaining over the terms of the contract. 	 This approach was
followed by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Gerhardt v. Continental 
Insurance Companies.
14
The plaintiff held a householder's comprehensive
insurance policy issued by the defendant.	 A section of the policy provided
for indemnity against any sums which the insured would become legally liable
to pay to a third party for personal injury or property damage arising out of
his occupation of his house, but set out on a 'separate page were certain
exclusions to this section, one of which provided that the cover did not
apply with respect to bodily injury to a resident employee arising out of and
in the course of his employment by the insured. Such an employee was injured
In the insured's house and sued the insured who called upon the insurer to
conduct her defence. The insurer relied on the exclusion but it was held
that they were not entitled to do so. Read by itself, the exclusion appears
to have been clear and, on ordinary principles of construction, applicable.
However, the court said that, on a simple reading of this policy, which was
prepared unilaterally by the company and sold on a mass basis as affording
broad coverage to home owners, the average insured noting the section
covering third party liability, would assume that an injury to a domestic
employee was covered. The exclusion was not conspicuous and the cover was
described as comprehensive, and, while the insurer had the right to exclude
particular types of liability, the doctrine of honouring the reasonable
expectations of the insured required that it did so unequivocally.
If a "reasonable expectation of the insured" test had been applied to
for example, the English case of Samuelson v. National Insurance and 
Guarantee Corp. Ltd.
15
, the insured would probably have been covered, without
14 [1967] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 380.
15 [1984] 3 All E.R. 107
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the need to construe difficult, unclear and fairly standard terms in a motor
policy.	 In this case, the plaintiff left his car with a repairer and in the
course of the repairs, the latter drove the car to the premises of the sole
agent for that type of car in order to obtain spare parts. The car was
parked nearby.	 .While the repairer was away from the car, it was stolen and
was never traced. The plaintiff had insured the car against such loss with
the defendants and claimed its value from them. The appropriate terms of the
policy were contained in the policy, in the schedule to it and in the
certificate of motor insurance referred to in it. In resisting the claim by
the plaintiff, the insurers relied on the fact that the general exceptions in
the policy excluded liability when the car was being driven or, for the
purpose of being driven, was in the charge of anyone other than the insured.
Furthermore, they contended that the certificate stated that the car should
be used for social, domestic and pleasure purposes only and this excluded the
use of the car for "any purpose in connection with the Motor trade" and
excluded driving by anyone other than the insured. The plaintiff argued that
he was entitled to recover because paragraph 1(a)(i) of the general
exceptions provided that the exclusions of use for purposes in connection
with the motor trade was not to prejudice the indemnity to the insured whilst
the vehicle was in the custody or control of a member of the Motor Trade for
the purposes of its repair. This produced an ambiguity. The judge found for
the insurers, agreeing with their argument that the policy distinguished
between use of the car and driving of it, and was never intended to apply
when	 anyone	 other than the insured was driving it or, as in the
circumstances, had charge of it for that purpose
16
.	 However, the decision
was reversed on appeal with some slight indication that the judges considered
16 Ibid. per Esyr Lewis J. at 110.
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the insured.
15A
.	 It was decided that the function of paragraph 1(a)(i) of
the general exceptions is, as appears from its own wording, to ensure that an
exclusion of use for any purpose in connection with the Motor Trade should
not prejudice the indemnity to the insured while the car in question is in
the custody or control of a member of the Motor Trade for the purpose of
being repaired.	 It was established that at the relevant time when the car
was stolen, it was in the repairer's charge for the purpose of its repair
15B
 .
The above provision of the policy seems to contemplate that cover under the
policy will ordinarily be applicable in such circumstances.
The doctrine of honouring reasonable expectations can be said to be the
desirable in so far as it might cause insurers to clarify their policies.
But decisions of this nature depend entirely upon cases coming before the
courts for adjudication 17 . The principle therefore is vague and it is
impossible to predict the result on the facts of any particular case. It is
most unlikely that an English court would adopt such an approach. Far
better, it is submitted, would be a regime of prior approval of policy forms
within the guidelines laid down by statute.
In France and Cameroon, policies of insurance, as we observed
17A
 in
Chapter Two, are subject to the approval of the Sub-Department of Insurance
of the Ministry of Finance whose business it is to rectify any anomalies in
15A [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 541 esp. at p. 544.
15B Ibid. at pp. 542, 543 and 545 Note that there was more than one
purpose, that is, the purpose of repair and the purpose of driving,
but on the approach adopted in Seddon v. Binions,and Others [1978] 1
Lloyd's Rep. 381, see infra pp.438-439, regard should be had to the
primary purpose which was plainly the purpose of repair - driving was
contemplated as an activity incidental to the process of repair.
17. The contingency fee system in the United States of America encourages
litigation much more than in England. In this regard the doctrine of
reasonable expectation is a workable principle in that system.
17A Supra, pp.65 and 83.
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the policy provisions.	 The legislature frequently intervenes in the
formation of contracts and places many restrictions on the freedom of parties
to bargain as they will 18 .	 There does not exist in the common law any
general requirement that a contract satisfy certain "minimum decencies" 19 in
order to be enforceable nor can the court overtly reconstruct the contract to
supply such minimum decencies. Instead the court purports only to construe
the contract, in order to ascertain what the parties intended. The search
for the intention of the parties is a method used in common with the Anglo-
American systems but the express incorporation of good faith 20 and general
usage into the process of interpretation in civil law are departures from the
ostensible common law method.	 The most important rules of construction
therefore in France and French-speaking Cameroon are that contract terms must
be interpreted in order to give effect to the real intention of the parties
rather than to the literal meaning of the language used and that in the
interpretation of contracts both good faith and general usage are factors
that must be considered. 	 In addition, the nature of the contract and the
goals sought by it are weighed heavily in the process of interpretation 22 .
18. The normal method by which the legislature itself controls the terms
of insurance policies is, however, through the enactment of insurance
contract codes: legislation on insurance contract primarily serves
the purpose of fixing rules of law. The law of July 1930 applicable
in French-speaking Cameroon and which has been codified in France in
the Insurance Code of 1976 has restored to a certain extent the
balance . between the parties in protecting the insured by interfering
extensively with insurance contract terms.
19. The expression is borrowed from Llewellyn, Book Review (1939) 52
Marv. L. Rev. 700 at 703.
20. Article 1134 of the Civil Code.
21. Gabriel Marty and P. Raynaud, Droit Civil - Les Obligations, Vol.1,
1962, para. 219 at pp.208-209.
22. Article 1157; see generally, Nicolas Jacobs, op.cit., pp.81-83.
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In determining the extent of coverage of insurance contracts, the fact that
the contract is intended to provide security is thought to justify the
extension of coverage in doubtful clauses 23 . The role of the court is to
apply the law and on the whole to affectuate the "will" of the parties.
Judicial action serves to determine whether the contracts comply with
legislative standards and to enforce them to the extent that they do.	 In
this respect the civil law judge has more extensive authority than the common
law judge. It should be noted that what the common law judge does covertly,
his civil law counterpart is authorised by statute to do overtly.
It is not intended to cover all the rules of construct'
.
an
24
 and we will
in the following pages look at some of the cahohs n.1sed tl the toutts ih
England, France and Cameroon.
1 Previous interpretation 
In England, France and Cameroon the proper construction to be placed on
words is a matter of law for the court
25
.
Consequently in England, as with all questions of law the ordinary rules of
the doctrine of precedent apply. Once a word or phrase has been judicially
considered, that decision should be followed according to the usual rules of
precedent
26
. It is thus of overriding consideration in construing any phrase
or form of words in a policy to enquire whether these have been the subject
23. Spencer L. Kimball and Werner Pfennigstorf, "Legislative and Judicial
Control of the Terms of Insurance Contracts: A Comparative Study of
American and European Practice". (1964) 39 Indiana L.J. 675, 772.
24. For a comprehensive list, see E.R.H. Ivamy, General Principles of
Insurance Law, 1979, 4th ed., London, Butterworths, Chapter 35,
pp.353-393.
25 Simmonds v. Cockell [1920] 1 K.B. 843; Starfire Diamond Rings Ltd. v. 
Angel [1962] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 217 at 219; In France, see generally, Sir
Otto Kahn-Freund, Claudine L gvy and Bernard Rudden, op. cit., at .
p.99.
26 Lane (W.J.) v. Spratt [1970] 2 Q.B. 480 at 491-193 per Roskill.
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of any prior decision by a court.	 The court interpreting the words which
have already been the subject of construction will either be bound to follow
the previous court's interpretation or strongly be persuaded to do so. 	 When
a higher court has placed an interpretation upon a phrase to be construed, an
inferior tribunal has no option but to follow that interpretation
27
.
In France and the French-speaking Cameroon, though Stare decisis is not
an official doctrine of the law, the weight of a well considered case by the
Cour de cassation in the former and the Supreme Court in the latter may be
very considerable indeed and in the interpretation of policies it may be
decisive
28
 .	 However, this rule of interpretation is practically difficult
to follow in Cameroon because of the lack of regular law reporting".
2. Ordinary meaning 
As a general rule, in England, France and Cameroon, the words to be
construed are given their ordinary and proper meaning
30
 . The parties to the
contract must be taken to have intended as reasonable men, to use words and
phrases in their commonly understood and accepted sense.	 In a case in
Cameroon, Royal Exchange Assurance v. Layu
31
 the Court of Appeal was faced
27 Ibid at pp.491-492 per Roskill J.; Fraser v. Furman(B.N.) 
(Productions) [1967] 1 W.L.R. 898; Woolfall and Rimmer v. Moyle [1942]
1 K.B. 66; See also, Bankes L.J. in Re Hooley Hill Rubber and Royal 
Insurance Co., [1920] 1 K.B. 257 at 269.
28. Spencer L. Kimball and Werner Pfennigstorf op.cit., at p.722.
29. See further discussion on this in the introductory chapter, p.23 and
the General Conclusion, p.507.
30. Robertson & Thomson v. French (1803) 4 East. 130 at 135; Thomson v. 
Weems (1884) 9 App. Cas 671 at 687; Young v. Sun Alliance and London 
Insurance Co. [1977] 1 W.L.R. 104; Anderson v. Norwich Union Soc. 
Ltd., [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 253; For a good example, see the
construction of "left unattended in a jewellry block policy in
Starfire Diamond Rings Ltd v. Angel, [1962] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 217 at 219.
31. (1973) Suit No. BCA/8/73, Bamenda,
	 (Unreported) (English-speaking
Cameroon).
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with the interpretation of the words "no-claims bonus". The plaintiff/res-
pondent insured his car comprehensively with the defendant/appellant Royal
Exchange Assurance. The policy issued by the insurer contained a no-claim
bonus clause which stated:
"In the event of no-claim	 being made or arising under this
policy during a period of insurance specified below
immediately preceding the renewal of the policy, the
renewal premium for such part of the insurance as is
renewed shall be reduced ...".
The plaintiff/respondent, after driving his car for one year without making a
claim, renewed his policy with the defendant/appellant, but limited the cover
to third party liability only. 	 He then wrote to his insurers for "no-claim
bonus" to be calculated at 10 per cent as provided by the policy. The point
at issue was whether the 10 per cent "no-claim bonus" was to be calculated
from the premium of the preceding year or from that of the renewal premium.
The respondent contended that the bonus was to be calculated on the basis of
the premium paid for the preceding year in which he had made no claim.
The Court of Appeal held that the respondent's contention was unfounded and
entered judgment for the appellant. Justice O.M. Inglis said:
"What we are in effect asked to do here is to interpret this
"no-claim bonus" clause in the policy. This should present
no difficulty since the words which are used in the clause
must be understood in their plain, ordinary and popular
sense, unless they have generally in respect of the subject-
matter, as by the known usage of trade or the like, acquired
a peculiar sense different from the popular sense of the
words or unless the context evidently points out that they
must in the particular instance, and in order to effectuate
the immediate intention of the parties to that contract be
understood in some other peculiar sense ...
The clause means in effect that if no claim arose out of, or
was made under the policy in respect of the pre4eding year of
insurance, the insured is entitled to a bonus, which is
worked out on the renewal premium for such part of the
insurance as is renewed for the current year. This bonus is
then calculated by taking a given percentage of the renewal
premium of the renewed insurance and reducing the renewal
premium by that amount of such percentage."
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Similarly, in France and French-speaking Cameroon, if a clause of a contract
is claire et p r6cise the very attempt to interpret these words is a violation
of law
32
.
However, the presumption that words in a policy should receive their
ordinary, natural and unrestricted meaning is displaced if it can be shown
that they are legal terms of art, or they have acquired a special meaning by
force of long usage in a particular trade or business or the context in which
they appear compels a restricted or modified meaning to be given to them
33
.
In this respect	 articles 1158 to 1160 of the Civil Code provide some
guidance in the law of France and French-speaking Cameroon. Article 1158
provides that:
"Terms susceptible to two senses ought to be taken in the
sense which is most suitable for the subject-matter of the
contract."34
Further article 1159 states:
"That which is ambiguous is interpreted by the usage in the
region where the contract was made."
35
Finally article 1160 enacts that:
"Clauses which are customary are to be supplied in the
contract even though they are not expressed there."
36
32. Sir Otto Kahn-Freund, Claudine Levy and Bernard Rudden, op„sit., at
p.99.
33 Clift v. Schwabe (1846) 3 C.B. 437 at 649.
34 John H. Crabb, op. cit., at p. 224.
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid.
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3.  Businesslike Interpretation 
In England, it is an accepted canon of construction that a commercial
document such as an insurance policy, should be construed in accordance with
sound commercial principles and good business sense, so that its provisions
receive a fair and sensible application. The literal meaning of words is not
permitted to prevail where it would produce an unrealistic and generally
unanticipated result as, for example, where it would absolve the insurer from
liability on the chief risks sought to be covered by the policy
37
 . The
language used must be interpreted having regard to the business nature of the
transaction.	 The real question is what the legal effect of the agreement is
on the commercial object or function of the clause and its apparent relation
to the contract as a whole.	 An analogous principle of interpretation could
be found in the Civil Code of France and the French-speaking Cameroon.
Article 1157 provides that:
"When a clause is susceptible of two meanings, it must be
understood in the one in which it can have some effect
rather than in the sense in which it could not produce
any."
38
Some standard conditions in insurance policies require the insured to take
reasonable precautions or care to avoid loss. 	 Such a clause construed
37 Fraser v Furman (B.N.) Productions [1967] 1 W.L.R. 898.
38 John H. Crabb op. cit., at p.224
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literally would negate a large part of the cover intended to be effected,
since one of the major purposes of liability insurance is to insure the
insured against liability in negligence, and negligence is a failure to take
reasonable care when a duty of care is owed.
	 In Fraser v. Furman(B.N.) 
(Productions) 39
 the Court of Appeal construed such a condition so that only
recklessness on the part of the insured would amount to a breach of this
condition. The insured's omission or act "must be at least reckless, that is
to say, made with the actual recognition by the insured himself that a
danger exists, and not caring whether or not it is averted. The purpose of
the condition is to ensure that the insured will not, because he is covered
against loss by the policy, refrain from taking precautions which he knows
ought to be taken."
40
 Reasonable care does not mean reasonable as between
the insured and a third party but as between insured and insurer having
regard to the commercial purpose of the contract which includes indemnity
against the insured's own negligence. This interpretation was given in the
Cameroonian case of S.O.R.A.R A F v. Micheal Zeno Bassok. 41
	The respondent
insured his taxi against third party liability, fire and theft. The taxi was
parked at the respondent's premises as usual and it caught fire. The police
investigation disclosed that the fire was purely accidental and an experts'
report disclosed that the fire was caused by short circuit of electricity.
The appellants repudiated liability on the ground that article 15 of the
insurance policy excluded liability in case of fire caused by short circuit
of electricity. The court, in construing the policy as a whole and the
39 [1967] 1 W.L.R. 898; See also Woolfall and Rimmer V. Moyle [1942] 1
K.B. 66.
40 Ibid, at p.906, per Diplock J.
41 (1976) Civil Appeal No. CASWP/25/76, Buea, (Unreported). (English-
speaking Cameroon.)
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purpose of the contract, rejected the exclusion clause as this would defeat
the object of the contract. The court said, as regards perils covered under
a fire insurance policy, "The cause of the fire is immaterial, unless it was
the deliberate act of the insured himself or someone acting with his
knowledge or consent.	 Loss by fire caused by the insured's negligence is
covered ... To recover under a fire policy it must be proved that the loss
claimed was proximately caused by fire, that j., that it was the reasonable
and probable	 consequence of fire ..." The court considered it unconscion-
able to uphold the repudiation of liability based on article 15 of the
policy.
It is interesting to note here that the court, in giving effect to the
contract, was in some way recognising the fact that a reasonable insured
would have expected himself to be covered by such a policy.
42
4.	 Construction to avoid unreasonable result 
In England, France and the Cameroon, if the wording of a clause is
ambiguous and one reading produces a fairer result than the alternative, the
reasonable interpretation should be adopted. It is to be presumed that the
parties, as reasonable men, would have intended to include reasonable
stipulations in the contract. 	 In this respect, as well, the rule of
interpretation, stated in article 1157 of the Civil Code referred to above,
lends support. Further, article 1135 adds that:
"Agreements obligate not only for what is expressed therein,
but also for all the consequences which equity, usage or the
law gives to an obligation according to its nature."43
42 See supra, p.419.
43 John H. Crabb op. cit., at p.221
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In the Cameroonian case of Paul Salle v. Elsen Hans, Presbyterian College 
Nyasosso and Royal Exchange Assurance 44
 the High Court was called upon to
interpret a clause in an insurance policy which excluded the insurers from
liability if death or bodily injuries arose out of, and in the course of the
claimant's employment. The plaintiff was injured in a car accident, the car
being driven at the time by the first defendant. The car was insured by the
third defendants who filed a defence in which they did not deny that the car
had been negligently driven at the time of the accident, but sought to rely
on a clause in the policy which exempted them from liability.
	 The clause
stipulated that:
"Subject to the limits of liability, the company will
indemnify the insured in the event of accident caused by or
arising out of the use of the motor car against all sums
including claimant's costs and expenses which the insured
shall become legally liable to pay in respect of: (a) Death
of, or bodily injury to any person except where death or
injury arises out of, and in the course of the employment
of such person ...."
At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was a member of a party of
teachers and their wives from the Presbyterian College Nyasosso, on their way
to a holiday excursion in Douala. The trip was paid for by contributions
from members of staff of the college.
	 The High Court held in the
circumstances that a reasonable construction of the clause did not exempt the
insurers from liability under the contract because the plaintiff could not be
reasonably said to have been in the course of his employment at the time of
the accident.
44 (1971) Suit No. WC47/71 Kumba High Court, (Unreported). (English-
speaking Cameroon.)
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Even though the wording of a condition in a policy is apparently plain,
the court will sometimes narrow its scope or place a gloss on its words in
order to make it reasonably applicable. 	 So where a policy contains a
condition requiring that "every claim, notice, letter, writ or process
served on the employer shall be notified or forwarded to the Association
immediately on receipt", the words "immediately on receipt" have been
construed to mean "with all reasonable speed".
45
 In this case, the element of
ambiguity arose from the fact that an absolute literal interpretation , would
have produced results which were not merely unfair but quite impracticable.
Therefore, some gloss on the words became essential.
5.	 Contra Proferentem 
The insurance company which frames the documents is bound to make its
meaning as clear as possible in order to prevent insurers being misled with a
belief that they are to receive benefits to which in fact they are not
entitled and this especially applies to conditions, the breach of which may
create forfeitures. The consequence is that if there is any ambiguity in the
language used in a policy, it is construed against the insurer.
46
 A party who
proffers an instrument cannot be permitted to use ambiguous wotds in the hope
that the other party will understand them in a particular sense. Written
words may be the language of the insured, as, for instance, where the
description of the property or limits of the risk are taken verbatim from the
45 Re Coleman's Depositories Ltd. and Life and Health Assurance Ass. 
[1907] 2 K.B. 798 at 807.
46 English v. Western [1940] 2 K.B. 156 at 165; Provincial Insurance Co. 
v. Morgan [1933] A.C.; Re Bradley and Essex and Suffolk Accident 
Indemnity Society [1912] 1K.B. 415 at 422. For the rule of contra 
proferentem in French general contract law see article 1162 of the
Civil Code.
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proposal. In such cases the rule that t he instrument is to be construed
against the party who prepared it is li kely to operate in favour of the
insurer.
In construing a contract of insurance it is important to observe that
the questions in the body of the proposal are framed by the insurer. 	 If an
answer is obtained to a question which is, upon a fair construction a true
answer, it is not open to the insurance company to maintain that the question
was put in a sense different from or more comprehensive than that which the
proponent's answer covers. Where an ambiguity exists, the contract must
stand if an answer has been made to the question on a fair and reasonable
construction of the question. In the Cameroonian case of Agence Camerounaise 
d'Assurance v. Simon Oshijirin 47 the respondent insured his taxi with the
appellant insurance company for commercial purposes and paid the premium and
received a cover note to the effect that he was covered for the commercial
use of the vehicle.	 Whilst the car was being used as a taxi it became
Involved in an accident wherein damage was caused to a house. The insurance
company contended that the car was not insured as a taxi but for private and
business purposes only. 	 When the appellant, a French company in Douala,
received the proposal form written in English and saw the word "commercial"
the clerk who dealt with the preparation of policies translated it as Affaire 
and drew up the policy for "Affaire et promenade". Thus, when the respondent
reported the accident, the appellant perused the policy and came to the
conclusion that the company was not liable, as the written words in the
proposal and cover note revealed the intention of the parties when they
entered into the contract. The ambiguity thus created by the translation in
the policy was construed against the insurance company.
47 (1971) Appeal No. WCCA/9/70, Buea,	 (Unreported). (English-speaking
Cameroon.)
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The principle of fair and reasonable construction is applied to answers
given by the insured to questions on the proposal form. 	 If on such
construction an answer is found to be ambiguous, the contract may be avoided
even though, upon a literal construction of the words used, the answer is
unambiguous. It is the duty of the court to determine the limits of
reasonable interpretation.	 This canon of construction is nothing more,
however, than an aid to construction in the case of ambiguity and ought not
to be used for the purpose of creating an ambiguity where none exists.
48
If
the terms ascertained from the documents are unambiguous in themselves and
independently consistent with each other, effect must be given to each
according to its tenor.
In most statements of the rule of construction contra proferentem, it
has been justified by the fact that the insurance company drafted the
contract. When the basis for the rule disappears and when the policy is
subject to administrative control, there seems to be reason to reconsider and
perhaps to abrogate the rule. Thus it would appear that the standard policy
provisions that are left partly free to be drafted by insurance companies
should not be construed against the insurance company but in accordance with
the fair meaning of the language they contain.
	 In Cameroon, as we have
already seen, insurance policies are approved by the state and they are
required to make necessary corrections and modifications as they think fit.
Arguably, therefore, the contra proferentem rule should be applied sparingly
against insurance companies under such a system.
48 London and Lancashire Fire Ins. Co. v. Bolands [1924] A.C. 836 at 848;
see also Cole v. Accident Ins. Co. (1888) 5 T.L.R. 736 at 737. "...
one must not use the rule to create the ambiguity - one must find the
ambiguity first."; Alder v. Moor [1961] 2 Q.B. 57 per Sellers J. at
p.60.
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III CONDITIONS AND EXCEPTIONS IN MOTOR INSURANCE POLICIES
The general layout of English, French and Cameroonian policies is
similar in so far as they relate to third party risks. They open with a
broad statement of the risk covered.	 This is then qualified by diverse
clauses, most of which have the effect of reducing the cover.
A typical English policy states that the insurer will indemnify the
insured against liability at law for damages and claimant's costs and
expenses in respect of death or bodily injury to any person and damage to
property where such death, injury or damage arises out of an accident caused
by or in connection with a vehicle.
49
Similarly, in France and Cameroon, the
insurer covers the insured against pecuniary consequences of liability that
he may incur by reason of damage to persons and property caused in the course
of the use of the insured vehicle.
50
The clauses reducing the insured's
cover may fall into certain well-defined categories, namely, clauses relating
to the driver, the condition of the vehicle and the use of the vehicle.
These may be expressed in the policy in the form of a condition, warranty or
in respect of France and Cameroon, aggravation du risque or as an exception
in the policy.
51
In England, France and Cameroon, the standard terms and conditions
found in motor policies are relevant to both compulsory and non-compulsory
insurance. As we have already seen in Chapter Three, some of them may not be
enforceable against a third party victim where insurance is compulsory.
49 See Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Motor Insurance Policy.
50 See in France, Andr6 Besson, Les conditions q6n6rales de l'Assurance 
de responsibilit6 automobile obliqatoire (1960), Paris, p.10-11.
51 See further, Chapter Five, supra pp.326-345.
52 See supra, pp.211-213.
52
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However, they remain of effect between insurer and insured. The insurer who
has had to pay the third party, may later be entitled to recover any sums of
money from the insured. The conditions in respect of the use of the vehicle
considered below are enforceable against a third party because they are not
within the listed categories of conditions provided in the proviso to section
148 of the Road Traffic Act 1972.	 However the third party victims are
entitled to recover from the Motor Insurers' Bureau, and, therefore, the
distinction made by section 148 of the Road Traffic Act 1972 is redundant.
In England, France and Cameroon, motor insurance policies usually cover
other permitted drivers of the insured vehicle mentioned in the contract by
the insured. In England, by virtue of section 148(4) of the Road Traffic Act
1972
"... a person issuing a policy of insurance under section
145 of this Act shall be liable to indemnify the person or
classes of persons specified in the policy in respect of
soy liability which the policy purports to cover in the
case of those persons or classes of persons."
It should be noted that the subsection refers to "a person issuing a policy
under section 145" which, of course, concerns only compulsory insurance.
However, it is further stated that the insurer must indemnify the third
party "in respect of any liability which the policy purports to cover." In
this respect if the policy satisfies section 145 of the Road Traffic Act
1972, it is arguable that the third party will be covered by it in respect
of any third party liability within the policy's terms, unless there is
anything to the contrary in the policy. 53 In Cameroon and France, the
53 For the effect of the EEC Directive No. 84/5/EEC: Second Council
Directive of 30 December 1983 on the approximation of laws of the
Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in
respect of the use of motor vehicles (0.3. 1984, L8/17), see supra,
Chapter Three, pp.211-212.
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obligation to insure a motor vehicle extends to personal injury and damage to
property of any third party.	 Fur ther, article 13 of the law of July 1930,
provides that the insurer is liable for losses and damage caused by persons
for whom the insured is civilly responsible by virtue of article 1384 of the
Civil Code.
Naturally, insurers do not wish to cover incompetent drivers. In this
respect, policies in England, Fr ance and Cameroon make it a condition of
liability that the driver of the vehicle should possess a valid driving
licence, breach of which results in the repudiation of the policy.
Generally, motor insurance po licies provide that the insurers are not
to be liable when the insured vehicle is being driven in an unsafe or
unroadworthy condition and/or if the insured fails to maintain the vehicle in
an efficient and roadworthy condition. Furthermore, insurers have usually
established various categories of permitted use of an insured vehicle. These
vary from, for example, use covering social, domestic and pleasure purposes,
use by the insured for travel to and from his place of business and use by
the insured in person or use by others in connection with the insured's or
his employer's business.	 Where a vehicle is insured for any of these
purposes, a deviation in the use of the vehicle may well result in breach of
the contract. This is enforceable even against an injured third party. 	 In
England, these provisions may be drafted as exceptions to the risk or found
under the heading conditions so that they may be interpreted as conditions
precedent or possibly promissory warranties. 	 The effect of having such
clauses as warranties, as we saw in Chapter Five
54
 , is that there need not be
any causal connection between the breach of the clause and a loss, and the
54 Supra, pp.335-336 and pp.355-356.
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insurers may repudiate the contract and recover from the insured, as damages
for breach of a condition, the money which he has had to pay to a third
party.
In Cameroon, the above clauses are drafted in the policies as an
aggravation du risque, in which case a breach of any of the stipulations
render applicable the provisions of articles 21 and 22 of the law of July
1930.
55
 Where the vehicle is in an unroadworthy condition or is being used
other than for the purposes for which it is insured, this is considered as an
increase of risk which has to be declared to the insurer for an augmentation
of the premium. In the event of a failure to do so and of a claim being
made, the policy may be rendered null, in application of article 21 of the
1930 law where bad faith of the insured is proved, or the indemnity awarded
tc the insured may be reduced according to application of article 22 of the
1930 law where bad faith is not established.
However, the insertion in Cameroon policies of the principle of
aggravation du risque produces disparity in the application of the law in the
English-speaking and French-speaking Cameroonian courts. 	 Despite these
provisions in the policies in Cameroon, the courts in English-speaking
Cameroon follow English law principles. This will be considered below.
In England, in the case of Clarke v. National Insurance and Guarantee 
Corporation
56
, a four seater car was driven with nine people in it. The
Court of Appeal held, allowing the insurer to repudiate liability that the
55 nir a full discussion on the effect of these provisions, see Chapter
Five, pp.348-351 and pp.355-356.
56 [1964] 1 Q.B. 199.
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car was thereby rendered unroadworthy,
57
although, with the normal number of
people in it, it would have been quite safe. A similar approach was adopted
by the English-speaking court in the case of Royal Exchange Assurance v 
Raphael Ekane,
58
 where a goods only vehicle was so heavily loaded that an
accident ensued. The court held that the insurers were entitled to repudiate
liability as the insured was in breach of a condition in the policy as to the
capacity of goods to be carried on the vehicle, the breach of which rendered
the vehicle unroadworthy. In contrast, in the French-speaking Cameroonian
case of M. Kamden Joseph v. Kondo Samuel and S.O.C.A.R.,
59
 a commercial
vehicle was insured to carry nine persons. An accident ensued and it was
found that the vehicle was carrying more than the stated numbeT of peTsons
for which it was insured at the time of the accident. This was held by the
court as a case of surcharge and the insured's indemnity was reduced
accordingly.
Furthermore, in England and English-speaking Cameroon, where a vehicle
has been insured for social, domestic and pleasure purposes and is later used
for business purposes, the insurer is entitled to repudiate liability.
60
It
would appear that where the purposes of the journey are mixed, for example,
an insured covered for social, domestic and pleasure purposes and not for
57 Note that unroadworthiness does not relate to just the mechanical
condition of the vehicle, but can include other relevant factors; by
analogy to marine cases, in which overloading can render a ship
unseaworthy.
58 (1975) Civil Appeal No. CAWP/9/75 of July 1975, Buea, (Unreported);
see also, Aben and Aben V. Fomenky Enterprises, Suit No. HCK/2/77 of
28 August 1978. Kumba (Unreported).
59 (1976) Civil Judgment
	
No.	 175	 of	 5 April 1976 Nkongsamba,
(Unreported). See also, Dlimeli Boniface V. Cie d'Assurances 
"Le Patrimoine", (1976) Civil Judgment No. 175 of 5 April 1976,
Douala, (Unreported).
60 For example, in England, see Wood v. General Accident, Fire and Life 
Assurance Corporation Ltd., (1948) 82 LI. L.R. 77.
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business purposes used the car to travel to a business meeting followed by a
social dinner, would not be covered if the car was partly being used for an
unauthorised purpose.
61
 It seems clear that in the French-speaking Cameroon
the rule of proportionality would be applicable where appropriate.
However, in Cameroon, where the policy is repudiated by the insurer for
breach of conditions or an aggravation du risque, the third party victims are
entitled to an indemnity from the Motor Insurance Fund which, as we saw in
Chapter Four, indemnifies victims of motor accidents where a policy has
become ineffective by virtue of article 12 of Law No. 67-DF-495 of 17
November 1967.
61 Seddon v. Binions and others [1978]1 LLoyd's Rep. 381
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CHAPTER 8
THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS
I INTRODUCTION
The settlement of insurance claims, particularly from the point of view
of any policyholder, is the ultimate fulfillment of the insurance contract. '
me purpose of this chapter is to deal with yet another aspect of the
settlement process - settlement out of court. It is clear that claimants
scarcely resort to civil litigation and would prefer to settle by a machinery
out of court. This has often been pointed out
2
 in relation to tort claims
following accidents on the road or at work which in practice will involve
negotiation between an injured plaintiff and the defendant's insurers.
	 This
sort of out of court settlement has been formalised in relation to disputes
between insured and insurers.
2A	 The reasons for these are dictated by a
variety of factors and considerations.
1 It has been recognised that the wording of policies is not normally
seen as important by policyholders until a claim arises and at that
time it is examined simply with the object of discovering whether a
particular event is effectively	 insured.	 See, the Insurance 
Ombudsman Bureau, Annual Report, 1983 p.9
2	 Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation 
for Personal Injury, (Chairman: Lord Pearson) Vol. 2 Table 24, Cmnd.
7054-11 London H.M.S.O. 1978; Winn Committe ie Report, Personal 
Injuries Litigation, Cmnd. 3691, London H.M.S.O. 1968 paras 117 and
118; T.S. Ison, The Forensic Lottery, 1967 London, Staple Press p.155
note 5; P.S. Atiyah, Accidents Compensation and the Law, 3rd ed.,
1980 at p.296
2A See infra pp.444466.
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II FACTORS AND CONSIDERATIONS DETERMINING SETTLEMENTS OF INSURANCE
CLAIMS OUT OF COURT.
Settlements out of court appear to be predominant, especially in cases
in which liability is not in dispute and a claim is made merely to determine
the quantum of damages. In such cases therefore, the insurance companies may
make a payment into court, awaiting acceptance by the claimant or suggest
negotiation of the amount of damages.	 The incentives to such proposals are
fear of the risk involved and the necessary cost of a judicial hearing. 3 The
contestants of the negotiation process may be the solicitors of the plaintiff
or the claimants themselves and solicitors of the insurance companies or the
insurance adjusters each acting for one of their parties.
	 They are then
placed in a bargaining position 4 and confronted with risk averse behaviour.
On the part of the claimant, a decision on whether to accept an offer from an
insurance company involves some consideration and notion of what his claim is
worth.	 This entails some predictive judgment of what a court would do if
confronted with the case. There are two perspectives to this prediction.
First, an assessment of the strength of the claimants case on liability;
second, a forecast of the amount of damages. The legal adviser has to
contend with the probable outcome in the first situation, though on the
3 Usually, assisted litigants, that is, those obtaining legal
assistance often agree on a fair compensation settlement for reasons
observed below - pp.441-443.
4
	
	 For notable examples of insurers bargaining with the government to
secure private agreements see, Richard Lewis, "Insurers' Agreements
not to Enforce Strict Legal Rights: Bargaining with Government	 and
in the Shadow of the Law", (1985) 48 M.L.R. pp. 275 - 291. Private
bargaining within the criminal justice system has also been
explored, see: J Baldwin and M McConville, Negotiated Justice: 
pressures to plead guilty, 1977 Law in Society series, London; A.E.
Bottoms and J.D. McClean, Defendants in the Criminal Process, 1976,
London, International Library of Social Policy.
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question of the amount of damages, he is less likely to be without some
knowledge of the judicial tariff, as a result of his study of the various
publications which report the amounts awarded as damages, his knowledge of
current judicial practice, his experience and acquaintance with other members
of the profession.
Furthermore, the trial process is characterised by delay and the
claimant confronts the possibility of not receiving any compensation except
social security benefits while, as a result of his • injury, his earning
capacity is possibly reduced and his expenses may be increased. On the other
hand, the insurance companies almost invariably would prefer to settle claims
brought against their clients for better public impression. Moreover, most
claims made are small from the insurance company's point of view in relation
to the large number of risks pooled; the insurance companies are more likely
to be risk averse where a small sum is involved since only a small proportion
of their wealth is at stake.
	
They regard small claims as a nuisance to be
settled quickly because the administrative costs may be very high relative to
the size of the claim. 	 In addition, both parties are faced with the
potential costs in pursuing a claim further in the light of the probable
result of a court judgment.	 Insurance companies have great experience in
assessing what the outcome of the trial is likely to be and often make a
discount in settlement offers, taking account of the probable cost of
litigation. The claimant will usually accept an offer not because it is
adequate but in recognition that settling the case at a smaller sum
immediately represents the most prudent considerationi rather than proceeding
with an uncertain litigation process with the expectation of a higher but
less certain sum if the case ever went to trial. One important consequence,
therefore, of the settlement process is that the claimant may receive less
- 443 -
than a court award. For these reasons recourse to the courts and ultimately
trial of an action is rare. 5 This behavioural attitude of litigants to the
negotiation process has as much right to be regarded as part of the machinery
of justice as the process of settling claims by trial as it bears a close
affinity with the rational considerations involved in the court process and
therefore cardinal to the principles of justice.
From this perspective, so long as pressure is not brought to bear on
claimants to accept offers, the settlement of claims by negotiation serves a
salutory purpose in legal systems primarily designed for
	 attributing
liability. In Horry v. Tate and Lyle Refineries Ltd., 6
 the court established
that there is a relationship between the victim and an insurance company
settling on behalf of the tortfeaser which imposed on the insurers a
fiduciary duty of care in the course of negotiations between the parties.
Here, the court found that there was undue influence by the insurance company
as they offered a considerably lower amount than that which would have been
offered had the case gone to court and they failed to make the victim
understand the true nature of the settlement
7
. In this respect they were in
breach of their duty to the plaintiff and therefore the settlement could be
set aside.	 This case demonstrates the potential interest an insurance
company would exhibit in the settlement process.
Perhaps a better approach would be to retain tort with an independent
settlement procedure concerned with negotiation of compensation. 	 This
5 P.S. Atiyah, Accident Compensation and the L6J, 3rd.ed., 1980 at
p.296; see also, T.S. Ison, The Forensic Lottery, 1967, London,
Staple Press, p.155 note 5; Pearson Report, op. cit., Vol.2 Table 24;
Winn Committee Report, Personal Injuries Litigation, Cmnd. 3691,
London H.M.S.O. 1968 paras 117 and 118.
6	 [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 416
7	 Ibid. at pp. 420 -423
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chapter, therefore, also serves a subsidiary purpose. It offers occasion for
the necessary explanation of how self-regulation by the insurance industry
can assist in redressing the balance between parties to an insurance contract
without active government intervention.
III SETTLEMENT OF INSURANCE CLAIMS OUT OF COURT
One recent development has been the establishment by a number of
insurance companies of the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau (10B) in March 1981 and
the Personal Insurance Arbitration Service (P1AS) in 1982. These measures
were taken by insurance companies in recognition of the desirability of
providing personal policyholders with a simple and effective independent
procedure for speedily resolving disputes on their contracts. Perhaps, the
most important consideration is the realisation that the Common Law of
insurance with regard to personal insurance business has tended to favour the
insurer as against the policyholder and this has been widely recognised as
unsatisfactory
8
. Indeed, one could well argue that as the courts do not take
into account the insurance industry's Statements of Insurance Practice, it is
easy for an insurance company to win a case on a technicality. For this
reason and for obvious financial considerations, it has often not been
practicable for the aggrieved policyholder to gain satisfaction through the
courts.	 We will in the following discussion see how the insurance industry
has proceeded to establish separate arrangements as alternatives to the court
system to determine contentious issues.
1. The Insurance Ombudsman Bureau 
The Insurance Ombudsman Bureau was set up as an unlimited company
8	 Supra, Chapter Five of this study pp.301-357.
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without share capital
9
, governed by a Board of Directors.
	 The Board 10
appoints members of the Council
11
, a majority of which are independent of the
insurance companies concerned. The Council of the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau
is responsible for the appointment of the Ombudsman for a renewable period of
not more than two years. The Ombudsman is protected to some extent by the
Council, of which at least four appointees are representatives of consumer
interests chosen from consumer organisations such as the Consumer Associat-
ion, the National Federation of Consumer Groups as well as the Citizens
Advice Bureau. Two of the six members are insurance companies' representat-
ives. The Chairman of the Council is also Vice Chairman of the National
Consumer Council. This decision to appoint a Council Chairman of consumerist
leanings may seem to negate any suggestion that the Insurance Ombudsman
Bureau is operating within the industry. It was for the interest of consum-
ers that this body was set up.
The Board decides the Bureau's annual budget and membership levy. This
levy is split into two parts: half is calculated according to the member
company's premium income and the other half according to the number of
complaints brought against the insurance company. This appears to be a fair
and equitable manner of financing the scheme as the first determination takes
into consideration the share of the market represented by each member company
whilst the second would, to some extent, ensure that the complaints that are
9 The cost of actually setting up the scheme was borne by the three
founder member companies: Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance plc,
General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation plc and Royal
Insurance plc.
10 The maximum number of members of the board is twelve and the minimum
is three.
11 The Council is made up of not more than twelve and not less than six
members.
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brought to the Ombudsman are those which necessarily need his attention.
This would provide a deterrent to frivolous references to the Ombudsman.
Furthermore any argument that the less efficient companies are financing the
more efficient companies would seem to be untenable.
The Ombudsman deals with complaints relating to personal insurance
issued in the United Kingdom and taken out by a policyholder or by some
person who has acquired legal title to it
11A
. The Insurance Ombudsman Scheme
is designed to provide a publicised, informal independent aid free procedure
for dealing with policyholders complaints, disputes on facts, liability and
quantum and claims made in connection with or arising out of policies of
insurance effected with member companies of the Bureau
12
.	 In this, the
Ombudsman acts as an independent conciliator, counsellor, arbitrator and
adjudicator in cases involving disputes as to liability. However, it should
be noted that the Ombudsman is not an arbitrator in the real sense
12A
 because
he has no power to make an award which is binding on the insured party,
although it is possible that the insured party may have a legal right to
enforce his award against the insurer by virtue of the insurer's acceptance
of the Articles of Association with the Bureau
13
.	 Where the Ombudsman's
findings result in a monetary award, all member companies have agreed to
11A Persons pursuing third party claims against member companies are
normally advised, according to the size of the claim, to consult a
solicitor or Citizens Advice Bureau or to consider a claim in the
courts.
12 See note 13 below.
12A See the Personal Insurance Arbitration Scheme bel.ow, pp.453-462.
13 See Abstract of the Bureau's Memorandum and Articles of Association
and of the Ombudsman's Terms of Reference in the Insurance Ombudsman 
Bureau, Annual Report, 1981 pp. 28-29.
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abide by the Ombudsman's decision up to a maximum monetary award of
£100.000
14
but policyholders can reject his decision if they wish, without
prejudice to exercising their full legal rights against the insurance
company. One may argue that this does not bring equity between the two
parties to the insurance contract as one party, the insurer gives up all
rights in favour of the decision by the Ombudsman and the other party, the
insured, has nothing to lose and everything to gain
15
 . This however, may be
considered as a genuine will on behalf of companies which support the scheme
to ensure that complaints are handled in an impartial manner. 	 With respect
to complaints involving two or more insurers the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau
will be unable to adjudicate unless all the companies are in membership 16 .
With respect to complaints and enquiries relating to non-member companies
which are members of the Association of British Insurers and the Life Offices
Association, an arrangement has been made for the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau
to send enquiries on or refer the caller to the appropriate body
17
. If the
Insurance Ombudsman Bureau had within its membership all companies dealing
14 Ibid.
15 This appears to be one of the reasons why initially some insurance
companies did not consider that the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau was
an appropriate service for them: Reply to inquiry dated 4 March
1985, from Mr. B.W. Vigrass, Director and Secretary, Chartered
Institute of Arbitrators. See also, letter dated 27 February 1985,
from P.N. Baker, Manager, Cornhill Insurance Group: one of the
founder members of the Personal Insurance Arbitration Service.
16 See note 13 above; Note that half of all enquiries related to non-
member companies: see Table 14 at p.451 of this study.
17 Complaints concerning an intermediary are referred to the British
Insurance Brokers Association. Similarly all enquiries relating to
industrial life assurance policies are forwarded to the Industrial
Assurance Commissioner. 	 The Insurance Ombudsman Bureau has thus
become	 an	 unofficial	 clearing house for insurance consumer
complaints.
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with personal insurance, its ability to decide on such issues would have been
greater.
Before a policyholder can take a complaint directly to the Ombudsman,
all normal channels of negotiation with the member company must have been
exhausted. This means that the complaint must have been considered not only
by the branch office but also by the senior executive of the company
concerned.	 This ensures that a genuine attempt is made to resolve disputes
at responsible level. 	 Thus it is still necessary to maintain company
complaint services as	 they	 are	 better	 placed to conduct adequate
investigation of disputes.	 In the event of a disagreement, the company
will,in communicating its final decision, draw the policyholder's attention
to the services provided by the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau. The policyholder
then has up to a maximum of six months to refer a complaint to the
Ombudsman
18
. When a complaint is made to the Ombudsman, he will require both
parties to provide evidence in the form of documentation. If this is not
sufficient to arrive at a conclusion he will carry out his own investigation.
He does not rely solely on the cases put forward by policyholders and
defended by companies.	 The	 Ombudsman's	 job is inquisitorial, not
accusatorial or adversarial
19
. This enables him to inspect member companies'
books, claim files and policy covers.	 In this way he is most likely to
gather sufficient details concerning disputes which are brought for his
consideration. He then decides whether the company's terms and conditions
have been fairly applied by the company concerned.
20
 In interpreting a
18 Any legal proceedings instituted by the policyholder must be
withdrawn before a complaint can be considered.
19 The Insurance  Ombudsman Bureau, Annual Report, 1983 p. 3.
20 See Appendix (i), Abstract of the Bureau's Memorandum and Articles
of Association and the Ombudsman's Terms of Reference in the
Insurance Ombudsman Bureau,	 Annual	 Report,	 1981	 at	 p.28.
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member company's standard policy, the Ombudsman can hold the insurance
company bound by the terms of the contract but not the insured.
21
 If
this is as a result of uncertainty or lack of clarity in policy terms one
may consider this reasonable, as the Ombudsman is meeting reasonable
expectations.
22
	Furthermore, in the determination of disputes the
Ombudsman is required to act in conformity with any applicable rule of
law or relevant judicial authority, codes of practice, standards of
insurance practice, his Terms of Reference and general principles of good
insurance practice.
23
	The	 two	 latter considerations have been
criticised 24 as ambiguous as there is no indication of what should take
priority in the event of conflict 25 .	 It is argued
26
 that as the
Ombudsman is not confined to strict legal principles and can go beyond
the terms of policies and Statements of Insurance Practice, his decision
will be based on wider considerations than the applicable law and agreed
Statements of Insurance Practice.	 Consequently, this will result in an
undesirable element of uncertainty in insurance practice. However, it is
21 See, for example, Item No. 1, Annex II to Insurance Ombudsman 
Bureau, Annual Report, 1981 pp. 21; For the interpretation of
policies generally see Ibid., at p.11 and the Insurance Ombudsman 
Bureau, Annual Report, 1984 p. 7.
22 See supra, Chapter Seven on the Construction of Insurance Contracts
pp. 418-421.
23 See note 20 above; For examples of these, see, cases 3 and 25 in
Annex 1 to the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau, Annual Report, 1983 pp.
4-8.
24 Working party report, Complaints Procedure - An Alternative to the 
Insurance Ombudsman Bureau, 24 June 1981 para 3.5
25 Contrast the Personal Insurance Arbitration Scheme, infra, pp.458-
459.
26 Working Party report, op. cit., para 3.5. Note also that this is
one of the features of the Ombudsman Scheme which caused concern
among insurers who refused to join the scheme.
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arguable that since the Ombudsman is required
27
to collaborate with any
government bodies, consult with other companies and seek independent expert
opinion relating to complaints involving specialist areas, some element of
uniformity within the industry may be enhanced. Undeniably, discretion has
to operate at all levels of claim settlements as long as decisions are seen
to be fair and just.
The Ombudsman publishes each year a summary of his findings in a report
showing the number and type of complaints dealt with. This is illustrated
overleaf in Table 14.
It has been noted
28
 that there is a steady increase not just in the
number of complaints but also in requests for information and advice. The
reasons for the increasing number of enquiries are: first, an increase in the
number of member companies, and secondly, more consumer awareness of the
Insurance Ombudsman Bureau as an independent complaints body.
29
Perhaps one
may contend that this increase in enquiries has been due to a deliberate
policy of some companies to refer all cases to the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau
where the insured will not immediately accept their explanation. 	 Further-
more, it is probable that inadequate investigation by chief executives of
companies may result in some cases being readily referred to the Ombudsman
which would otherwise have been resolved by the company itself.
27 G.L. Williams, Chairman of the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau reply in
letters to the Editor, "IOB Terms", Policy Holder Insurance News,
March 18 1983, p 13; See also para. 3(h) of the Memorandum of
Association of the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau, Appendix (ii),
Abstract of the Bureau's Memorandum and Articles of Association and
of the Ombudsman's Terms of Reference in the Insurance Ombudsman 
Bureau, Annual Report, 1983 p. 41.
28 Joan Mackintosh,. Chairman of the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau, in the
Preface to the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau, Annual Report, 1983, p.l.
29 See leaflet circulated by the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau, "How the
Insurance Ombudsman could help you", November 1982.
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TABLE 14 : Operation of the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau 1981 - 1985
YEAR 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
All Enquiries including
non-members 1,571 2,504 2,857 3,477 4,728
Member Companies only 441 1,232 1,642 2,105 3,054
tv'otor 166 451 565 536 7C8
Cases adjudicated by
the IOB 39 179 284 465 629
Confinned 30 141 232 389 4E6
Revised 9 38 52 79 143
Summary advice 41 25 17 14 5
Cases resolved after
referal to company 59 298 475 494
EUdget (in £ Sterling) 64,000 105,000 173,000
SOURCE : THE MIMI CMEIJOSNAN BUREAU REPORT FOR 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984 and 1985
On the other hand, it may well be, that as it is in the interest of member
companies to ensure that as few complaints as possible actually reach the
Ombudsman, member companies will be inclined to seriously investigate *claims.
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Inadequate investigation can prejudice a company's public image and goodwill
and policyholders will lose confidence in their ability to obtain a fair
settlement. Moreover, the company will be faced with heavy financial costs if
all or most of the complaints it receives are referred to the Ombudsman.
Table 14 also reveals that, of the total cases that the Ombudsman refers
to the chief executives via a letter from the policyholder that mentions his
involvement in 1983 and 1984, one third now result in a settlement move as
compared to one quarter over 1981 and 1982, which seems to be a sizeable
improvement. It seems, therefore, that it is reasonable for the companies
concerned and most especially the chief executives to adequately investigate
claims in order to avoid the time, expense and uncertainty of going before the
Ombudsman on relatively small claims. As shown in Table 14 above, of the
total enquiries received by the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau, only a little more
than half the cases could be handled and adjudicated by the Ombudsman as he is
empowered to act only when a member company is involved.
	 Within its
membership, there are 163 insurance companies comprising 63 group members and
this represents approximately 70% of the total personal insurance market 30 .
Yet even the total enquiries received from member companies represent only a
tiny proportion of personal insurance claims dealt with by all the existing
complaints procedures
31
. Indeed one could well argue that the essential
weakness of the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau is the fact that it could not be
said to be satisfying the need to provide a forum to which policyholders
generally could refer complaints.
30 The Insurance Ombudsman Bureau, Annual Report, 1985, pp.35-40.
31 For other complaints handling services, see infra, pp.453-464.
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More importantly, these enquiries reveal areas of misunderstanding
between companies and policyholders and point out areas which need clarity,
such as a failure of communication and an inability of insurance companies to
explain policy cover and limitations. These reports have stimulated more
extensive criticisms 32 which will provide food for thought between periods of
enacting legislation, and the insurance industry could do a lot to improve
A
services provided by good insurance practice32 . Further, the digest of
decisions will build up a system of precedent 323
 of value to the industry.
2. The Personal Insurance Arbitration Service 
The Personal Insurance Arbitration Service was set up in August 1982 as
an alternative complaints procedure aimed at achieving a similar objective to
the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau.
	 Rather like the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau,
this scheme is limited to United Kingdom residents insured in their private
32 John Peverett, "The Ombudsman: another year, another report", Policy
Holder Insurance News, 25 February 1983, Vol. 101, No. 8 pp. 28-30;
"Digesting the Ombudsman's Report", Policy Holder Insurance News, 4
March 1983, Vol. 101, No. 9, pp. 21 and 23; "The Ombudsman Throws
Down the Gauntlet", Insurance Week, 15 June 1984, Vol. 102 No. 24,
pp.	 22-23; "In collision with the Ombudsman", Policy Holder
Insurance News, 11 March 1983, Vol. 101, No. 10, pp. 22, 24-25,
Henry Ellis, "Policyholder protection and policy terms", Policy
Holder Insurance News, 11 March 1983, Vol. 101, No. 10, pp. 20-22;
John Duncan, "Stamps, teeth, storms and the Ombudsman", Policy
Holder Insurance News, 23 July 1982, Vol. 100, No. 29, pp. 15-16;
Policy Holder Correspondent, "The case against the Ombudsman",
Policy Holder Insurance News, 26 June 1981, Vol. 99, No. 25, pp. 22-
23.
32A It is hoped that more extensive and detailed reports will be useful
for review of Codes and Statements of InsurSnce Practice by the
Industry, see further, Chapter Five, supra, pp.357-360.
323 Note however that the ombudsman is not bound by precedent: See,
Insurance Ombudsman Bureau, Annual Report, 1981, Abstract of the
Memorandum and Articles of Association and the Ombudsman's Terms of
reference, Appendix (i) at p. 28.
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capacity under policies issued in the United Kingdom
33
. This scheme provides
an informal method of resolving disputes in which an insured person claims to
have suffered financial loss through alleged failure of an insurance company
to fulfill its obligations under a contract of insurance
34
. Informality is
the essence of the scheme.	 An independent arbitrator appointed by the
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators decides disputes by reference to documents
supplied by the parties. If the insured prefers that the decision is made
after a hearing and the Arbitrator accepts that the application for such a
hearing is justified on its merits, then an informal hearing may be arranged.
The procedure appears to be simple and speedy
35
. However, the procedures of
arbitration require that even in a relatively simple dispute, certain
formalities should be gone through to ensure that each party has had a fair
chance to submit his case: even the simplified procedure of the PIAS can seem
rather cumbersome if all that is in dispute is a sum of say £25 or £50
35A
.
It is worth noting that, although the time scale set down in the rules of the
Service provides for a total period of about three months from the date of
application for arbitration to issue of the award, the average time so far
has been less than two months
358
33 Rule 2, Personal Insurance Arbitration Service Rules (1983 Edition).
The scheme is not designed to accommodate disputes which arise from
third parties nor does it apply in the case of insurance effected by
employers.
34 Rule 1, Ibid.
35 Rules 7 and 8 Ibid. 
35A Reply to inquiry, letter dated 25 March 1985 from LG. Slade, Deputy
Registrar, Chartered Institute of Arbitrators.
35B Bertie Vigrass, "Personal Arbitration - The PIAS in operation",
Policy Holder Insurance News, 20 August 1982, p.23.
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Similarly to the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau, the costs of arbitration
under the PIAS scheme are borne by the insurance company involved and the
service is free to the insured 36 . However, it could be argued that the
agreement by the insurers to pay all the costs of arbitration under the PIAS
scheme may render it an unlawful agreement. In  Windvale Ltd. v. Darlington 
Insulation Co. Ltd. 37 , Lord Justice Walton held that a provision in an
arbitration agreement whereby one party agreed in advance to pay the costs of
both parties was prohibited by section 18(3) of the Arbitration Act 1950 37A .
In this case, his Lordship said 38
 that this provision applied even where the
agreement was outside the strict wording of the sub-section because it
required one party to pay the cost of both.
	 However, he added 39
 that an
agreement on the costs entered into after the dispute had arisen was not
prohibited by section 18(3).
	 This qualification will probably apply to
arbitrations under the PIAS as the agreement on costs is not contained in the
arbitration condition on the policy and the agreement under the PIAS scheme
is arranged after the dispute has arisen and is entered into voluntarily by
36 Note that the insured's costs of preparing and submitting documents
or of attending a hearing are at the Arbitrator's discretion and the
insurer pays its own costs of preparing and submitting documents.
See, Rules 6, 11 and 12 op. cit. 
37 The Times, 22 December, 1983.
37A This subsection provides that:
"Any provision in an arbitration agreement to the effect that
the parties or any party thereto shall in any event pay their or his
own costs of the reference or award or any part thereof shall be
void, and this Part of this Act shall, in the case of an arbitration
agreement containing any such provision, have etfect as if that
provision were not contained therein:
Provided that nothing in this subsection shall invalidate such
a provision when it is a part of an agreement to submit to
arbitration a dispute which has arisen before the making of that
agreement".
38 The Times, 22 December, 1983.
39 Ibid.
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the policyholder. It would seem, therefore, that PIAS is not an unlawful
agreement. The costs of the scheme as incurred by the Chartered Institute of
Arbitrators, and which are thus in addition to those incurred by the insurer
in compiling its own evidence, are levied on the following basis
40
 :	 first,
on an annual standing charge, the amount of which varies from company to
company.	 This depends upon the number of companies participating and the
expected volume of cases. Second, an administrative charge in respect of
each case registered which is normally around £25; and third, the arbitrat-
or's costs in the case which vary from case to case and are calculated
according to the amount of time the arbitrator is engaged in the case
41
. For
cases involving no local hearing, and therefore judged only on documents, the
fee for each case is likely to be modest - probably no more than £100 in many
instances
41A
. Because the latter factor is variable, it does not seem
possible to provide any indication of total amounts paid as fees to arbitrat-
ors and consequently one cannot estimate what the actual cost of arbitration
is likely to be
42
. The cost of arbitration under the PIAS scheme therefore,
may not be any less than that which would have been incurred if the case had
40 Reply to inquiry, letter dated 20 November 1985, from L.G. Slade,
Deputy Registrar, Chartered Institute of Arbitrators.
41 The Arbitrators fees and expenses are paid by the Institute and are
part of the operating costs of the scheme - Rule 9 op. cit. 
41A Working Party Report, op. cit., para. 6.8
42 It is regrettable that, the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators is
not authorised by the insurers to issue annual reports and figures
on the total of amounts awarded and total of amounts paid as fees to
the Arbitrators. The only detailed explanation on the operation of
the scheme is provided by Bertie Vigrass,Director and Secretary of
the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, "Personal Arbitration - The
PIAS in operation", Policy Holder Insurance News, 20 August 1982,
Vol. 100 No. 33, pp.23-24.
- 457 -
gone to court. It is probable that the cost of arbitration may be one of the
reasons why so few cases ever go to arbitration.
	
Up to the middle of
November 1983 the PIAS had received 156 references to arbitration under the
scheme and these were dealt with by 16 different arbitrators
42A
.
The insurance companies which are members of the PIAS scheme have
adopted different maxima regarding the level of claims they will accept under
the Rules of the service and the monetary limit is between £25,000 and
£100,000
43
. The service is designed to operate after all the normal
complaints procedures of the insurer at the highest executive level have
failed to achieve an amicable settlement, and in this it is similar to the
Insurance Ombudsman Bureau.	 In contrast, the arbitration scheme has a
narrower scope than the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau, particularly as it is
concerned only with the resolution of disputes in accordance with the law in
the United Kingdom, terms of the contract concerned and Statements of
Insurance Practice applicable to insurers in respect of non-life or long term
insurance as the case may be
44
. It is interesting to note that the rules of
the PIAS expressly
45 provide that, in the event of conflict between the
42A John Peverett, "PIAS: A Binding Solution", Insurance Week, 8 June
1984, Vol. 102, No. 23, p.14.
43 Bertie Vigrass, op. cit.; at p.23.
The normal arbitration services of the Chartered Institute of
Arbitrators are however available for the parties to cover disputes
likely to fall outside the scope of the PIAS. The scheme is not
designed to accommodate disputes in which the issues are unusually
complicated or the sum involved is in excess of an agreed amount:
Working Party Report, Complaints Procedure - an Alternative to the 
Insurance Ombudsman Scheme, 24th June 1981, para. 6.10
44 Rule 5 op. cit. 
45 Ibid. 
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applicable cover and a Statement of Insurance Practice or Code, the
interpretation more favourable to the insured is to prevail.
46
The most important difference between the Personal Insurance Arbitrat-
ion Service and the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau scheme is the binding nature
of the PIAS decision.
47
 The PIAS acts as an independent final arbiter in
disputes between insurers and policyholders. 	 Both parties must agree to
refer the matter to arbitration and the arbitrator's decision is binding.
The policyholder is under no obligation to use the service but if he elects
to do so, he must agree to be bound by the arbitrator's decision. This seems
reasonable provided that the arbitrator is shown to be completely independ-
ent.	 The insurance companies and policyholders ought to be certain that the
arbitrators' have a sufficient knowledge of the rules of arbitration. 	 This
makes it essential to know how the arbitrators are selected, their qualific-
ation and occupation.	 Arbitrators are selected for appointment by the
President or vice President of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators from
its own Arbitrators' membership
48
 and all appointments are within the
Institute's exclusive and unfettered control.
49
 Under the PIAS scheme, a
total of 16 different arbitrators were appointed in November 1983
50
 and these
46 Contrast the scope the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau scheme, supra, pp.
449-450.
47 John Peverett, "PIAS: A Binding Solution", Insurance Week, 8 June
1984, Vol. 102, No. 23, p.14-15. See also, supra, pp.447-448.
48 It has a membership of around 4800, mainly from the U.K. but also
from seventy twO other countries throughout the world: See, B.W.
Vigrass, "Arbitration and the work of the Chartered Institute of
Arbitrators", Chartered Institute of Insurance Journal, April 1981.
49 The Institute has had many years of experience in arbitration. It
was formed in 1915 and was granted a royal charter in March 1979:
B.W. Vigrass, op. cit. 
50 John Peverett, op. cit., p.14
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included three practising barristers (two of whom were Queen's Counsel) a
•
senior solicitor, an architect, a consulting marine engineer, two civil
engineers, a chartered engineer, five quantity or building surveyors and two
professionals from the insurance industry. It seems clear that the appointed
arbitrators are independent of the insurers involved in any dispute in that
they are appointed by the Institute and not the insurers. In addition, it
cannot be doubted that the arbitrators are qualified and experienced to act
as arbitrators.
In contrast to the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau Scheme, policyholders
need their insurers' consent to refer to the Personal Insurance Arbitration
Service. They may proceed unilaterally to the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau.
51
In consequence, the full value of the independence of the PIAS may be
unjustifiably dimmed in the eyes of the average consumer.
Another difference between the two schemes is that a policyholder can
pursue a matter to court if he is unhappy with the Ombudsman's decision
52
 but
any decision made by the PIAS is binding and cannot then be taken through the
legal system.	 In this respect, it is similar to the ordinary arbitration
provided for, in respect of amount, by the terms of insurance policies
51 See supra, p.448.
52 See supra, pp446-447; Policyholders have a one way option in
availing of the service of the I0B, that is, proceeding to court to
get an improvement.
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arbitration condition.
53
	This involves the disadvantage that there has
historically been a disinclination on the part of policyholders to allow
disputes to be finally settled by arbitration,
54
 but on the other hand, the
policyholder has the advantage that he will not have to pay the cost of the
arbitration.	 Arbitration is a process the average policyholder is not
familiar with and he may view the binding nature of the outcome with less
enthusiasm. It is interesting to note that an arbitration clause does not
now appear in any policy issued by Guardian Royal Exchange in the United
_
53 Note however that, the arbitration condition on the contract of
insurance does not apply to the PIAS scheme. For a standard
arbitration condition, see for example, condition 10 of Sun Alliance
motor insurance policy thus:
"All differences arising out of this Policy shall be referred to the
decision of an Arbitrator to be appointed in writing by the parties
in difference or if they cannot agree upon a single Arbitrator to
the decision of two Arbitrators one to be appointed in writing by
each of the parties within one calendar month after having been
required in writing so to do by either of the parties or in case the
Arbitrators do not agree of an Umpire appointed in writing by the
Arbitrators before entering upon the reference. The Umpire shall
sit with the Arbitrators and preside at their meetings and the
making of an award shall be a condition precedent to any right of
action against the Company. If the Company shall disclaim liability
for any claim hereunder and such claim shall not within twelve
calendar months from the date of such disclaimer have been referred
to arbitration under the provisions herein contained then the claim
shall for all purposes be deemed to have been abandoned and shall
not thereafter be recoverable hereunder."
54 Law Reform Committee, Fifth Report, Conditions and exceptions in 
Insurance policies, 1956 Cmd. 62 para. 13.
The arbitration clause, which in the post-war national campaign
against private courts, applied to the fundamental question whether
there was liability under the policy in a given dispute, represented
an infringement of the insured's basic right to lay an issue before
the court. The Law Reform Committee played a part in this campaign
and insurers met the wishes of the Committee by modifying what had
been a standard clause to require only disputes as to amounts,
liability otherwise admitted, to be taken to arbitration.
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Kingdom.
55
 There was a general agreement
56
 between insurers about twenty
nine years ago which tended to remove the need for an arbitration clause,
because it was felt that it was better to give the insured the ability to
take civil proceedings against his insurer in those few cases where a dispute
arose. However, the full scale arbitration clause has been reintroduced,
admittedly on a voluntary rather than compulsory basis, since a dissatisfied
policyholder does not have to avail himself of the IOB and PIAS arrangements,
even if his dispute is with one of the member companies of both schemes. But
if he does, and the parties are unable to resolve their differences save by a
hearing before the Ombudsman, the latter's decision, whilst subject to a
period of one month in which to make an appeal, if accepted by the parties
becomes binding on them both, provided that the sum involved does not exceed
£100,000.	 Therefore, an eligible insured who accepts the Ombudsman's
services is in a position not so far removed from what used to happen in the
pre-1957 days of arbitration.
However, the aim of the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau and the Personal
Insurance Arbitration scheme is basically similar, namely, to provide
protection for members of the public in disputes with their insurers in
respect of personal insurance. 	 The two schemes provide a simple and
inexpensive procedure.	 There is in fact nothing to prevent a company
belonging to both organisations. The only effect joint membership has is to
present a policyholder with a choice of which adviser to go to. Sun Alliance
55 Reply to inquiry, letter dated 25 November 1985, from H.W. Laws,
Assistant Claims Manager, Guardian Royal Exchange.
56 see note 54. The clause does still appear in some policies which
are issued in the Republic of Ireland and some English policies, see
for example, condition 10 of Sun Alliance motor insurance policy,
supplied by D. Klean, Superintendent, Sun Alliance Insurance group
incorporating Phoenix Group, letter dated 18 December 1985. 	
.
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Insurance Company
57
 took the lead by joining the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau
on the basis that complaints can be referred first to conciliation with the
Ombudsman, and then referred to arbitration under the PIAS if the Ombudsman's
decision fails to dispose of the case. This may be regarded as a move to
bring the industry a step nearer a single complaints system. 58 With respect
to companies who are members of neither the IOB nor PIAS scheme, the
facilities available to the policyholders remain-something of a lottery. 59
As we have already seen
60
 only the policyholders of subscribing companies to
the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau can turn to the Ombudsman. The IOB may hear
from policyholders of non-member companies and in this case it will be
powerless to act. The Association of British Insurers, 61
 the Life Offices
Association and the Corporation of Lloyd's 62
 operate complaints investigation
services for policyholders although in the case of member companies who are
parties to either the IOB and PIAS, a complaint received would be referred to
the newer schemes. The outstanding weakness of the Association of British
57 This company is one of the founder members of the Personal Insurance
Arbitration Service. The other founder members of the PIAS are: the
Co-operative, Crusaders, Eagle Star, Northern Star, Provincial and
Cornhill Insurance Companies.
58 For a proposal on a single dispute settlement procedure for life
insurance, see, L.C.B. Gower, Review of Investor Protection, Report:
Part I Cmnd. 9125 para. 8.56
59 See also, Roger Anderson, "Report stresses role of IOB as diplomat",
Policy Holder Insurance News", 26 February 1982, p.5.
60 Supra p.447.
61 The Association of British Insurers Annual Reports 1983-1985
disclosed that in 1985, telephone and written enquiries from
individuals and consumer organisations notably, Citizens Advice
Bureaux exceeded 20,000; about the same number as in 1983 and 1984.
62 Lloyd's has an established complaints procedure involving its
advisory department. The Corporation guarantees the liability of
each syndicate; the situation is different from the relationship
between the Association of British Insurers and member companies.
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Insurers and Life Offices Association complaints body is that neither
organisation has any power of adjudication. Moreover, both organisations are
trade bodies set up by the industry. Consequently, the companies are, in
effect, supplying counsel for the defence and prosecution plus judge and jury
in any dispute. This appears to have been a strong influence in the original
germ of the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau idea.
	 In addition to the above
industry complaints handling schemes, an increasing number of complaints
relating to insurance are passed on to the Office of Fair Trading 63
 issuing
from trading standards offices, citizens advice bureaux and local advice
centres. Furthermore, the Department of Trade and Industry received 344
complaints by letter and 138 by telephone from policyholders in 1984 .64 The
Secretary of State, however, has no statutory powers of intervention in
disputes between policyholders and their insurers, complaints received by the
Department of Trade and Industry are dealt with on an informal basis.
Policyholders also receive an indirect form of non-statutory protection,
particularly during the negotiation stage of their contracts, by virtue of
codes of conduct and practice applicable to registered insurance brokers and
non-registered Intermediaries 
65
It seems that, in the event of a dispute, the current industry
complaints handling procedures are inadequate and ought to be reviewed and
63 Gordon Borne, Director General of the Office of fair Trading, "When
the consumer complaints...", Policy Holder Insurance Journal, 15
February 1980, Vol. 98, No. 7, pp. 20-26. These complaints amount
to approximately 6000 per year.
	 See also, Ken Addison, "Borne
speech: When criticism was not based on fact."
	 Policy Holder
Insurance Journal, 7 March 1980, Vol. 98, No. 10, pp. 35-38.
64 Department of Trade and Industry, Insurance Annual Report, 1984,
London H.M.S.O., para. 43, at p.9. For existing Complaints Handling
Procedures see: ' Department of Trade and Industry and the Office of
Fair Trading, Guidance on the Handling of Consumer Complaints about 
Insurance, [Release 3: 13-ii-85] London H.M.S.O.
65 Supra, Chapter Six, pp.402-404.
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strengthened. It is regrettable that there is not one complaints handling
service available to all policyholders. Perhaps it will be better if the
industry can agree on a single insurance consumer complaints forum acceptable
to all or at least to the great majority of insurers. It is desirable that
the aim of such an agency ought to be the provision of a simple and effective
independent procedure for speedily resolving disputes on contracts for
personal policyholders.
	 It is possible that something could be done to
centralise the system without necessarily interfering with the present set
up. A way forward would be to seek changes which would require all insurance
companies to be members of the IOB and PIAS by legislation. The Insurance
Ombudsman Bureau's role would be the attempted settlement of disputes
involving all insurance companies. It could be empowered to make a formal
ruling and be allowed to settle matters amicably. If a settlement cannot be
reached the issue could go to formal arbitration under the P1AS scheme. The
10B will therefore offer an effective conciliation service but its decision
will not be binding on the consumer, so further proceedings remain necessary
to obtain finality.
	 Thus the hope is that, eventually, virtually all
insurers will see fit to participate, otherwise some policyholders will be at
a disadvantage. It is also hoped that such a scheme would redress the
balance between an individual policyholder and the insurance companies and
would submit a large number of companies to the discipline of independent
decision making. A single complaints agency for all insurance matters would
instill co-operation between complaints bodies for insurance companies,
brokers and other intermediaries.
In Cameroon, every insurance company has a service contentieux which
deals with disputes and settlement of claims. In an interview in Yaounde
66 Inquiry carried out during field work in July 1983: Yaounde.
66
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with Mr. Charles Alaka, Head of the service contentieux of one of the leading
insurance companies, the Assurance Mutuelle Agricole du Cameroun, he revealed
that his service "vigorously denounces any court action and would prefer to
settle their claims out of court".
	 It is relevant to observe that the
Bamenda branch of the American Life Insurance Company has never been a party
to any court proceedings. The reason, as disclosed by the branch manager 67 ,
is that "the company deals with life not spare parts. Spare parts are easily
replaced, not life".	 She further remarked that there is no need to refuse
payment which is likely to bring about a court action.
Furthermore, in Cameroon, all policies contain an arbitration clause
whereby the victim, tortfeasor and insurance companies may settle their
claims without necessarily going to court. However, there is no independent
arbitration body, such as the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau or the Personal
Insurance Arbitration Service obtainable in England, who can settle disputes
fairly without the necessity of reopening issues in court. Such a body would
be very desirable in the settlement process as it would ease congestion in
the courts.
67A
IV METHODS OF ACCELERATING THE PROCESS OF SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS OUT OF COURT
This section seeks to demonstrate how insurance companies are aware of
the need to settle claims by negotiation. It is undeniable that it is in the
interest of both motorists and insurers that the cost of settling claims
should be kept as low as possible. The former's benefit, which may not be
immediately apparent, is that premiums are kept to a minimum. In particular,
67 Interview with Mrs Wazie, Manager of the Bamenda Branch of American
Life Assurance Company, June 1983: Bamenda.
67A For possible lines of reform see Chapter Nine, infra, pp.504-505.
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the method of self-regulation by the insurance industry has been applied so
as to avoid the uncertainties of legal rules and the expense of court
judgments. 68 It may be worth noting that in respect of damage to vehicles in
road accidents, the role of the law of tort has largely been replaced by the
prevalence of first party insurance in England and Cameroon. In England,
unlike in Cameroon, insurers have concluded agreements amongst themselves
relating to the payment of claims which thereby facilitate the settling
process and reduce vehicle owner's incentives to litigate on disputes
concerning damage to their respective vehicles. It is however, not intended
to delve into all the market agreements but an illustration of a few examples
may reveal the efficacy of this particular means of regulation.	 The main
inter-insurer claims agreements are the "knock-for-knock" Agreement, Third
Party Sharing Agreement, Immobile Property Agreement, Common Law Claims
Agreement and the Dual Indemnity Undertaking. 69 Briefly, Third Party Sharing
Agreement, unlike the "knock-for-knock" Agreement, applies where a third
party is injured in a collision between two vehicles. Each insurer agrees to
disregard the question of blame of their respective insured for the accident.
The third party claim is settled on an equally shared basis but usually these
claims are subject to an upper financial limit. Under the Immobile Property
Agreement, where a motor vehicle strikes insured immobile property, the motor
68 Richard Lewis, "No 'legal' agreements", Post Magazine and Insurance
Monitor, 9 August 1984, Vol. CXLV, No.32, p.1902; "Insurers'
Agreements not to Enforce Strict Legal Rights : Bargaining with
Government and in the Shadow of the Law", (1985) 48 M.L.R. at p.275.
69 It is important to observe that these methods of accelerating the
process of settlement of claims apply mainly to motor insurance.
See Claims Agreements issued by the Association of British Insurers,
letters dated 26 November and 17 December 1985 from B.E. Robinson,
Technical Officer, Liability and Accident Committee.
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insurer pays three quarters of the cost of repairing such property. The
Common Law Claims Agreement requires that, when a claim could be the subject
of both the motor policy and an employers' liability policy, the claim will
in fact be dealt with under the latter policy. It is worth pointing out that
this agreement is only made between insurers who underwrite both motor and
employers' liability insurance, for it is based on the idea that the concess-
ion lost in relation to the one type of policy will be gained in the long
term in relation to the other. The Dual Indemnity Undertaking which operates
between all motor insurers relates to the situation where cover is provided
under the "driving other cars" clause of a motor insurance policy and the
insured is driving some other person's vehicle, with that person's permiss-
ion. The owner of that vehicle has a policy which permits driving of his car
by other people. In the event of an accident occurring the resulting claim
will be dealt with by the insurer of the vehicle which was being driven, thus
obviating the loss of no claim discount under both policies. It should be
noted that "driving other cars" cover only covers liabilities to third .
parties.
The most notable of these agreements is the "knock-for-knock". Under
this agreement, 70 motor insurers have agreed to indemnify their respective
insured's, that is, bear their own loss in respect of the vehicle they
70 The agreement is set out in part in Hobbs v. Marlowe [1978] A.C. 16
at p.35 in L. Diplock's speech. See also, the "knock-for-knock"
Agreement supplied by D. Klean, Superintendent, Overseas Legislation
Unit, enclosed in a letter dated 18 December 1985. For a discussion
of these agreements see Richard Lewis, op. cit., p. 1902; "Insur-
ers' Agreements not to Enforce Strict Legal Rights : Bargaining with
Government and in the shadow of the Law", (1985) 48 M.L.R. at p.285-
287.
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insure,
71
 regardless of their strict legal liability in tort, following an
accident in which both or all the damaged vehicles are insured against first
party damage, normally, under the usual comprehensive motor policies.
	 The
insurers thereby reciprocally undertake to waive their contribution and
subrogation rights as the pursuit of such claims, often for very small
amounts, would be a wasteful and unnecessarily costly exercise. 72 This
emphasises the point that the agreement is of no effect when one of the
vehicles involved is not covered against the risk of damage to it. Here,
liability will have to be investigated. If one of the damaged vehicles is
insured for third party risks only, the owner of the damaged vehicle would
have to bear the repair cost and then pursue recover, against .k.ve 1Whem
insurer subject to ordinary considerations of legal liability. The effect of
the agreement would be to prevent the insurer giving comprehensive cover from
obtaining recovery of his outlay from the insurer providing third party
cover. For this reason the partial indemnity clause 73
 has been introduced by
some insurers in order to alleviate the problem, 74
 and the general effect of
the clause is that the insurer providing third party cover is required to
71 This is subject to the policy conditions and limitations, see below,
pp.469-470. See Clause 1(i)(c) of the "knock-for-knock" Agreement,
Ibid. 
72 Fleming, "The Role of Negligence in Modern Tort Law", (1967) 53
Virg. L. Rev. 815, 835-837.
73 The Partial Indemnity Clause which is an integral clause of the
"knock-for-knock" Agreement and is limited to two vehicle collisions
only, states that in all cases where one of the vehicles involved in
the collisions is insured for a third party risks only, under a
fleet rated policy, the insurer of such vehicle Will pay 50% of the
repair costs to the insurer of the other vehicle: See, Clause 2 of
the "knock-for-knock" Agreement, Ibid. 
74 Reply to inquiry from Mr H.W. Laws, Royal Exchange Claims Manager,
Guardian Royal Exchange, letter dated 25 November, 1985.
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reimburse the comprehensive insurer for one-half of his outlay irrespective
of liability.
The operation of the "knock-for-knock" agreement can thus constitute a
financial disadvantage to insurers who issue predominantly comprehensive
policies if their competitors issue a large proportion of policies for third
party cover only. It was this imbalance in the portfolio make-up of Service
Motor Policies, Take Service Motor Policies and Shead Motor Policies at
Lloyd's which prompted the cancellation of "knock-for-knock" agreements.
75
Service Motor Policies faced a gradual concentration of its motor account
portfolio for fully comprehensive policies in the region of 88% with the
remaining 12% in third/third party, fire and theft. This reveals that,
most insurers who have similar spreads or the same balance of third party and
comprehensive cover as those of their competitors, the "knock-for-knock"
agreement may be a sensible way of handling motor claims.
It should be recognised that the agreement is one between insurers and
thus does not prevent the innocent insured from pursuing his tort claim
against the negligent tortfeaser.
76
This agreement leaves outstanding
important questions of uninsured losses, excesses and bonuses. Most policies
75 Leigh Sharpe, "Knock-for-Knock is given a shake-up", Policy Holder
Insurance News, 17 February 1984, Vol.102, No.7 at p.9; Jenny
Harris, "Another Nail in the Coffin?", Post Magazine and Insurance
Monitor incorporating Insurance Week, 7 November, 1985, Vol. 146,
No. 146 at p. 3067; John Vann, "Losing faith with knock-for-knock",
Insurance Age, September 1984 p.27.
76 Hobbs v. Marlowe [1978] A.C. 16; Morley v. Moore [1936] 2 K.B. 359
at 369 per Scott L.J.; Bourne v. Stanbridoe [1965] 1 W.L.R. 189,
especially the dissenting judgment of Lord Salmon at pp, 197-199.
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contain excess clauses
77
 and this raises a problem in the application of the
"knock-for-knock agreement.	 Is an insured liable to pay the excess when he
is in fact blameless? Indeed, in Hobbs v. Marlowe,
78
 the plaintiff pursued
legal proceedings against the negligent motorist to recover his uninsured
excess and his uninsured loss, namely, damages for consequential loss in
hiring a substitute car. Here, the court confirmed
79
 the practice that each
insurer indemnifies his insured to the extent that the latter's damage is not
covered by an excess clause.	 The insured is left to try and recover the
excess in whole or in part, from the other party's insurer. In fact as one
commentator points out,
80
 "the excess looks like a hidden extra premium, in
that it is a charge payable in the event of a loss, with no extra protection
from the insurer". Furthermore, if the insured recovers damages after he has
already been indemnified by his insurer he must repay that indemnity less his
uninsured losses on request to his insurer who is then under the agreement
bound to pay them to the defendant's insurer.
81
The agreement, therefore, is only an administrative device, a scheme
which works only on the basis that a no claim discount is unaffected by any
claim admitted. In practice the no claim bonus system (reductions in annual,
 when no claim is made on the insurers) is not always a contractual
77 This is a questionable practice generally in motor insurance though
often justifiable as it lessens the effects of inflation on
insurers' cost and obviously discourage small claims.
78 [1978] A.C. 16.
79 Ibid. at pp.35-41.
80 See John Birds, "Motor Insurers and the Knock-for-Knock Agreements",
(1978) 41 M.L.R. 201 at 203 and also for an illustration of its
operation.
81 Hobbs v. Marlowe [1978] A.C. 16; Morley v. Moore [1936] 2 K.B. 359.
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entitlement and its operation may rest entirely in the discretion of
individual insurers.
	 Even in Cameroon where the Direction des Assurances 
requires
82
 insurance companies to operate a fair system of the bonus - malus 
- clause type, the amount of such bonus is entirely up to the insurer and
some claims, even of a fairly minor nature, will affect the increase in
premium and others will not. During field investigation,
83
 an insured, Dr.
B. Nassa complained against one of the leading insurance companies Mutuelle 
Aoricole for not considering a no claims discount in his favour in spite of
his not having filed a claim for the past twenty years.
The Insurance Ombudsman Bureau has had an increasing number of
complaints
84
 about insurance companies settling third party claims without
consulting their policyholders.
85
In one case,
86
 the insurer confirmed their
82 Article 1 of Arr gt‘ No. 96/MINFI/CEA rendering obligatory the
application of the clause-type de malus relating to contracts of
motor insurance.
Article 2 Ibid. : The conditions for applying the malus clause 
mentioned in article 1 are at the discretion of the insurance
companies.
Article 3, Ibid. : Any disputes which arise between the contracting
parties as a result of the application of the above provisions are
within the competence of the Central Bureau of Tarification, Control
and Conciliation created by article 6 of Law No. 65/LF/9 of 22 May
1965, rendering motor insurance obligatory. For a discussion of
this organisation, see, Chapter Three, supra, p.201.
83 Interview carried out in August, 1983 : Yaounde.
84 See the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau, Annual Report, 1982, at p.10.
85 Note that every policyholder is obliged by his policy conditions to
report an accident but he need not claim indemnity. See for
example, Clause 5 of Sun Alliance Insurance Company motor insurance
policy, op. cit. Where the position is not madO clear, a policy-
holder may find that the claim form which he used to report the
accident is treated by the claims department as automatic authority
to settle a comparatively minor claim.
86 Reference No. 82/11/63. 8218; See also, reference No. 83/12/18. CB5;
cases supplied by Heather Ridge for the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau .
in correspondence dated 14 March 1985.	 The identities of the
parties were not dsiclosed for reasons of confidentiality.
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"knock-for-knock" Agreement with the third party's insurers without first
asking the policyholder if he wished to deal with the matter himself without
claiming indemnity under his policy and, as a result, the policyholder's no
claim bonus was forfeited.
87
It was considered 88 that the insurer acted in
an arbitrary manner as the policyholder's inherent right not to claim
indemnity where only property damage was concerned was ignored. The Ombuds-
man suggested
89
 that policyholders should be given the option of handling
claims and thus preserve their bonuses.
90
One major insurance company 91 has
revised its motor claims form, the completion of which is required for
information only, and this will not affect the no claim discount under the
policy.	 Some policies save trouble by stating that the no claim discount
will be retained if the policyholder is blameless. More recently, insurance
companies 92 have introduced protected no claim discounts. 	 For instance,
87 Motorists dread the incident of a "knock-for-knock" agreement, as
they believe it is a means of depriving them of their no-claims
bonus by settlement for accidents not withstanding that they may be
blameless.
88 Reference No. 82/11/63. B218, op. cit., pp. 3-4
89 Ibid. at p.4; See also the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau, Annual Report 
1982, pp. 10 and 14.
90 This option becomes significant, if the value of the discount lost
is greater than the maximum which the policyholder would have had to
pay in any circumstances as a result of the accident. Conversely,
if the maximum probable payment is more than the discount was worth,
then the loss of the option is not to the policyholders
disadvantage. However, note that, in making this calculation no
account should be taken of the expense and time lost in
correspondence and possible attendance at court as these factors are
difficult to estimate.
91 See Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance, Accident Claim Form. The
accident report form is not itself a request for indemnity.
92 See General Accident, 'Keep Motoring' Insurance Policy, at p.19.
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Commercial Union
93
 offers a full no claim discount protection for the motor
insurance element, if a policyholder insures his household contents and a
private car under a key policy, subject to a £35 excess.
While it might seem unfair to a policyholder that he loses his bonus when
the company has paid out nothing on his behalf, the general picture that one
can perceive is that the losses incurred by one insurer as a result of not
claiming from the other will be offset by those claims from which he himself
is spared. At the same time there will be a large saving in administrative
costs which would normally have been incurred in the claim settling process.
In Cameroon where there is no "knock-for-knock" Agreement, it was
observed
94
that recovering repair outlay is not usually all that speedy a
process. In terms of the enormous volume of accidents in any one year,
95
 the
"knock-for-knock" Agreement seems to be a desirable method of disposing of
some relatively small claims. 	 Most especially, to apply the "knock-for-
knock" Agreement where both parties are comprehensively insured results in
each vehicle's repairs being authorised and paid for without much delay.
Oddly enough, these agreements do, however, highlight the fact that
insurers, through their marked efforts in co-operation, put into practice the
no-fault concept.
93 John Gaselee,	 "Knocking
	 Knock-for-Knock",	 POst Magazine and
Insurance Monitor, 24 January 1985, Vol. No. 4, at pp. 188-189.
94 Interview with Mr Charles Alaka, Head of the Service Contentieux of 
Assurance Mutuelle Aoricold du Cameroon, July 1983 : Yaounde.
95 In respect of England and Cameroon, see Chapter Three, Tables 3 and
4 at pp.148 and 149 respectively.
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In Cameroon, the process of settlement by negotiation is facilitated by
the use of a document called constat amiable 96
 (an agreed statement). The
form is designed to elicit the information required and each insurance
company would get the same version of how the accident occurred.
	 The
document contains routine information, such as the number of the policy, the
name of the insurance company as well as a series of straight forward
questions to establish the circumstances of the accident. The Agreement is
produced in duplicate which requires both drivers to fill in the details in
good faith and append their signature.
	 The 'constat amiable' document
provides a chart of various collisions between two vehicles in relation to
direction, points of contact, and the load carried by each vehicle. In this
way, the responsibility for the accident is determined with the aid of the
rules in the code de la route; the relevant claims associated with each
accident can readily be identified.
	 This is a much more reliable approach
than eye-witness accounts which tend to be biased towards one driver or the
other and moreover less accurate. - Passengers of a certain vehicle also tend
to be biased in favour of their driver.
	 This document became invaluable
because gendarme and police officers only intervened in accidents in which
any of the victims actually sustained bodily injury. The principle of the
document is absolute: the account of the accident given by the motorists
cannot be questioned or revoked. Responsibility for the accident can only be
determined from the chart or sketch. Each insurance company pays an indemn-
ity proportional to the responsibility of his client.
	 This indemnity is
either total or part of the whole or even nothing if the client is entirely
96 This document is also used by insurance companies in France. See:
J.P. Bauer, L'Assurance Automobile, 2e edn. 1968, Paris, L'Argus, at
p.263; See also, Charles de Bez de Villas, Le Ilqlement Amiable des 
indemnitgs dues 1 la suite d'accidents corporels,Librairie du
Recueil Sirez, Paris.
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blameless. This principle is extended to accidents involving more than two
vehicles.
The success of this procedure depends on the availability of the agreed
statement forms. Failure to draft the 'constat' leads to many problems: a
future attempt to reconstruct the accident may be met by contradictory
accounts from the two drivers and witnesses. 	 Consequently, insurance
companies emphasise the need to carry this document in the glove compartment
of all vehicles. It would appear that this scheme is desirable in any legal
system in which most claims, trivial as they might be, would have to be
investigated, as it would be cheiper and more certain than if the drivers and .
witnesses were later to be required to provide statements and accounts of
what happened at the time of the accident.
A similar document, known as the European Accident Statement is used by
many insurers in England but only in circumstances where an insured has
indicated his intention to take his vehicle to the continent of Europe. They
are not used domestically within the United Kingdom. In 1974,
97
 General
Accident Insurance Company carried out an experiment on the use of the
statement within the United Kingdom but this experiment was unsuccessful
simply because other insurers did not wish to use the form domestically.
98
97 Squaremiler, "Favours from the fair maid of Perth?", Policy Holder
Insurance Journal, 18 October 1974, Vol.92, No.42 p.2318. Personal
letter dated 18 November 1985 from J. Brown, Motor Branch General
Accident Fire and life Assurance Corporation plc.
98 Reply to inquiry, letter dated 17 December 1985, from B.E. Robinson,
Technical Officer, Liability and Accident Committee, Association of
British Insurers.
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V CONCLUSION
After examining all these examples of out of court settlements, we
arrive at the conclusion that it would be misleading to base evaluation of
the settlement process on a mere appraisal of the few reported cases in the
law reports. In fact the settlement process is characterised by thousands of
unreported private sessions between claimants or their solicitors and
insurance companies. In the light of this proliferation of out of court
settlements the courts may be regarded as a remote forum of compensation. As
Professor Atiyah observes:
99
"... the whole of the tort system could be
regarded as an administrative process designed to compensate accident
victims, in which a right of 'appeal' is given to the courts of law."
However, these 'appeals' are very rare for only the very difficult cases for
which there is disagreement ever reach the courts. Suffice it to state that
there is much truth in Conard's observation 100 that, a reading of tort text
books gives us a "small view of a large universe."
-=<>=-
99 P.S. Atiyah, Accidents, Compensation and the Law, ird. ed., 1980 at
p.297. This comment may equally apply to other civil disputes.
100 Conard et. al., Automobile Costs and Payments: Studies in the 
Economics of Injury Reparation, 1964, University of Michigan Press,
at p.242.
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CHAPTER9
GENERAL CONCLUSION
The motivation for undertaking this study was the need for a uniform
system of law for Cameroon and, what is more pertinent here, the perceived
need to unify the substantive law of motor vehicle insurance law in Cameroon.
As already pointed out in the introductory chapter on the legal system
of Cameroon, the laws of insurance in Cameroon are derived from French and
English law and there is a dearth of local legislation in this area of law.
At present there are two systems of law, one in the English-speaking Cameroon
and the other in French-speaking Cameroon, in part parallel in their operat-
ion.	 These two sets of legal systems with different substantive and proced-
ural rules may at the same time apply to one individual in relation to one
set of circumstances. The obvious consequence is that the chances of failure
or success of litigation may depend upon which court takes cognisance of the
case.	 The co-existence therefore of common law and civil law in one country
is patently unsatisfactory and ought to be eliminated.
The equal treatment of the citizens of one nation before the law
connotes their subjection to one and the same system of substantive and
procedural law. In Cameroon, dual citizenship was ruled out since the
emergence of Unification of the two Cameroons.
	
Every national enjoys one
citizenship only, that of the Republic of Cameroon. The Preambles of both
the Federal Constitution of September 1, 1961 and the Unitary Constitution of
June 2, 1972, affirm the equality of all persons before the law.	 Political
aspirations before reunification and the formation of the unitary state were
1	 Supra, pp.10-15
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for one law for one Cameroon - one nation - hence imbued with an egalitarian
philosophy.
	 In this regard, the case for differential treatment before the
law is even less sustainable. As Kenneth Roberts-Wray remarked:
2
"It cannot be seriously denied that the ideal for any
country is one law and one judicial system for everybody."
This argument in favour of consolidation of national laws ought to find its
primary expression in the domain of civil law. Upon the indigenous law in
Cameroon, there have been superimposed the general body of English law (that
Is, the common law, doctrines of equity and statutes of general application
before 1900) and French civil law. There ought therefore to be a process of
reconciliation between the received English and French laws.
Before embarking on specific proposals for law reform in connection
with the laws already discussed in the preceding chapters, we would attempt a
discourse on the framework within which the process of unification and
harmonisation of the laws in Cameroon might be expected to proceed.
To acbieve the integration of laws in Cameroon, the process of harmon-
isation would ideally derive its principles and practices from four principal
sources: namely, the realities of Cameroon contemporary society - economic,
social and political considerations; its colonial inheritance; indigenous
laws and comparative experiences of other countries.
One cannot, however, exclude the possibility of legislative change
dictated by economic, social and political realities of any given society.
Even the colonialists realised the desirability of adapting the laws which
they exported to the colonies by subjecting them to such modifications as the
local circumstances could permit and in a way suited to the needs of the
2	 Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray, "The Need for Study of Native Law", (1957)
1 J.A.L. 82 at 83.
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people.
3
This was also recognised by the legislators of the Cameroonian
Insurance Legislation as they expressed the view that:
4
"... il y avait donc place pour une legislation Camerounaise
de l'assurance, susceptible de refleter les choix superieurs
et les preoccupations de la Nation.
L'ordonance No.62-0E-36 du 31 mars 1962 fixant la legislation
applicables aux operations et organismes d'assurances consti-
tue une premnre 6tape decisive dans la volonte nationale 
d'adapter les 
5
institutions de l'assurance aux realite's 
Camerounaises."
The basic proposition and axiom is that law reflects societal values and
expectations.	 It is a 'mirror' of political, social and cultural events of
any given society. From this point of view, there is no consideration of
whether any particular system of law is bad. 	 One cannot compare two legal
systems to determine which is better than the other as each is responding to
its social set up. But this point of view contains a serious flaw which
makes it in the final analysis unacceptable as it rests upon the dubious
premise that in its development, a society's legal system inexorably progres-
ses in one direction unaffected by interruptive or diversionary factors of
internal origin and immune from outside interference.
Our second source of the content of law in the pursuit of law reform is
Cameroon's colonial inheritance.	 Cameroon's adoption of the colonial legal
system is a factor that was bound to influence the shaping of its law. That
as we have already indicated
6
 led to a situation in Cameroon whereby two
colonial legal systems exist together. 	 No legislation designed for Cameroon
3	 See the introductory chapter on the legal system of Cameroon, p.4.
4	 See Preface to the Cameroonian Insurance Legislation, Imprimerie 
Nationale, Yaounde, 1971 at p.10.
5	 Emphasis added.
6	 Supra, pp.10-15.
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can purport to ignore the colonial legacy as its principles, rules and
practices have become the 'droit commun' of the Cameroonian people. Since
the end of colonialism followed by the reunification of the two 'Cameroons'
there has long been a need and move to unify laws throughout the country, in
other words, to produce a uniform legal system. The Federal Law Reform
Commissions were established to prepare a code of civil and commercial
obligations in 1964.
7
It is recognised that England and France do not belong to the same
family of legal systems. 8
	The differences between the English and French
legal systems, common law and civil law respectively, have traditionally been
regarded as so great and fundamental that each of these two systems is often
portrayed as the other's antithesis and alternative. This traditional view
of common law and civil law overlooks the very considerable similarities in
their overall objectives, underlying principles and origin that exist between
the two systems. They clearly emerge when both systems are subjected to a
close comparative examination and analysis. 	 In broad terms the French and
English systems seem to share a common origin and a general Western European
philosophy. It must be conceded, however, that these considerable similar-
ities between the English and French systems relate rather to their overall
structure and underlying principles and objectives. 	 A synthesis and an
analytical study of both systems would reveal that numerous divergences are
perceptible, nonetheless on points of detail, many of which are minor neither
in their character nor in their consequences. 	 It is, indeed, these
7	 Eloi Langoul, "ProbAmes Particuliers de Codification du Cameroun",
(1966) 20 Rev. Jur. Pol. Ind. Coop. 107-112.
8 Rene David and John E. Brierly, Major Legal Systems in the World 
Today, 2nd. ed., London, Stevens & Sons, 1978 pp.21-24, 31-141 and
285-367.
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differences of detail that expose the distinct character of either system.
They are the focus of the traditional view that the French civil law and the
English common law are antithetical. They may be ascribed to conceptual
differences between French and English legal theory on the role of the state.
In France, the state is seen as an instrument of social control
9
 and theref-
ore there is more government interference in regulating companies, industries
and contracts of insurance than in England, where the laisser faire philos-
ophy and freedom of contract still survives to a greater extent. Other areas
of government intervention in France could be seen in the areas of criminal
law and procedure. Here there are comprehensive penal and criminal procedure
Codes whereas in England the Theft Act covers only certain areas of the
criminal law.
In the promulgation of law for Cameroon, it would be arbitrary,
discriminatory and objectionable to adopt wholesale either of the laws of
England or France to the total exclusion of the other. 	 From the point of
view of human rights, that would result in the favour of one sector of the
people of Cameroon to the disadvantage of the other. Moreover, if the bulk
of English law should necessarily supplant French law, it should be observed
that there are parts of English law which though they are suited to England
and the English, are not suitable for Cameroon and Cameroonians. English law
and system work in England only because their true foundation is embedded on
the mores and convention of its society. Therefore, one should recognise the
fact that transplants may not produce similar results, or rather that not all
legal transplants can survive well on foreign soil. 	 Consequently, and in
9	 Richard P. Claude, "Comparative Rights Research: Some Intersections
between Law and the Social Sciences", in Comparative Human Rights,
edited by Richard P. Claude, The John Hopkins University Press, •
Baltimore and London, 1976, pp.382-405, esp. p.386.
are no uniform laws. Essentially it is in these areas of law that the13
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consonance with our first source of the content of our uniform laws, the law
reformers ought to adopt what is commendable and appropriate for Cameroon.
The enactments applying the general body of English law are invariably
accompanied by a proviso which enables the courts to make any exceptions and
qualifications required by local circumstances.
10
	It may be questioned
whether sufficient use has been made of what Denning L.J. in Nvali Ltd. v. 
A.G.
11 
called "this wise provision". Whether this is so or not, the proviso
is not available where English or French legal principles have been specific-
ally reproduced in local statutes, perhaps with inadequate attention to the
need to eliminate technicalities and anachronism 12
 .	 Examples of wholesale
legal transplants can be found in the Cameroonian Insurance Legislation
already mentioned above
12
 in Chapters Two, Four and parts of Chapters Three
and Six of this work where uniform laws in the form of local legislation have
been enacted. The content of these laws and regulations are essentially
French in origin, probably because the legislators had a strong French influ-
ence. Disparity in insurance substantive laws exist in the areas where there
reformers for a uniform motor insurance code hereby proposed, are expected to
concentrate their efforts.
Where there is found to be a conflict in certain specific areas and
details, it is probable that a choice of either English or French law would
10 See the terms of the Mandate and Trusteeship Agreements supra, p.4.
11 [1955] 1 All E.R. 646, esp. at pp.652-653.
12 See supra, pp.57-145, 249-298, 204-246 and 391-413 respectively.
13 See supra, Chapter Three, pp.150-194, Chapter Five, pp.299-360,
Chapter Six, pp.366-390 and Chapter Seven, pp.415-439.
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be found to be suitable for the entire country and all its inhabitants. Such
a choice of or preference for one principle has to be based on rational
considerations.	 Where there is found to be a conflict in certain specific
areas and details, it is probable that a choice of either English or French
law would be found to be suitable for the entire country and all its inhabit-
ants. Such a choice of or preference for one principle has to be based on
rational considerations.	 Where there is uniformity between the French and
English systems the likelihood would be that Cameroon would adopt the
principles and practices of these countries, unless that particular aspect is
against or contrary to Cameroon's realities and contemporary society. But
where both English and French laws appear adequate then both would be
unacceptable and we would have to devise an original rule.
On the other hand, in those branches of law which are in general
adequately covered by uniform laws there may be no case for intervention, at
least for some time to come, except that where necessary, modifications may
be made to suite changing circumstances.
We have observed earlier
14
that before the coming of Europeans there
existed some indigenous laws which regulated the Cameroonian society and in
particular, some practices very similar in their objectives and purpose to
insurance. However, the concept of insurance as we know it today, if it
existed at all, was likely to have been in an extremely fluid and rudimentary
state.	 Commercial customs such as those from which Lord Mansfield
15
 in the
early part of the eighteenth century in England moulded a segment of the
common law of insurance cannot be expected to be found in a community whose
14 Supra, pp.30-37
15 See, H.G. Gutteridge, Extrait de Recueil d'6tudes sur les Sources du 
Droit en l'honneur de Franvise G6ny: Lord Mansfield, a comparative 
Jurist of the 18th Century, Recueil Sirey, Paris, 1935, pp.239-246.
pseudo-customary rules is more sustainable. This point of view was
17
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philosophy cannot conceive of the transactions to which they relate. This
nonetheless does not dispense with the suggestion that a search for the
principles, rules and practices of customary law in respect of an . insurance
transaction should not be undertaken if there is anything meaningful that is
to be gained by its incorporation in the law. It is with such reservation
that critics of adherents to the preservation of indigenous laws can sustain
a criticism for chauvinism and conservatism. 	 On the other hand, admitting
the difficulties of defining and ascertaining the content of customary law as
observed elsewhere
,16
 one may come to the conclusion that if a society has to
progress in line with others well ahead of it, especially in matters which
entail international transaction it would be a wasteful effort to begin by
ascertaining by empirical study the existence and dimensions of customary law
and then proceed to filling in the gaps where necessary. 	 The view of
Professor Arthur Phillips that the application of English law or indeed any
other modern law with modifications is to be preferred to the invention of
recognised by the Commission which drafted the Cameroonian Penal Code as they
pointed out that•
18
16 See C.M.N. White, "African Customary Law: The Problem of Concept and
Definition", (1956) 9 J.A.L. 86; A.T. Denning in the Foreword to the
Journal of African Law (1957) 1 J.A.L. at p.1; Eloi Langoul,
"Problemes Particuliers de Codification du Cameroun", (9166), 20
Rev. Jur. Pol. Ind. Coop. 107; A.N. Allott, The Future of Law in 
Africa, 1960, London, Butterworths; Kenneth Roberts-Wray, "The Need
for Study of Native Law"' (1957) 1 J.A.L. 82.
17 Kenneth Roberts-Wray„ op. cit., p.82
18 Eloi Langoul, "Le Projet de Code P gnal Federal du Cameroun", (1965)
20 Rev. Sc. Cr. Dr. P. Comp. at 212.
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"... l'objectif des redacteurs du projet 1 ete de depasser 
les coutumes Camerounaises, pour respectables qu'elles 
soient, d'inventorier les lois Onales existant tant au
Cameroun oriental qu'au Cameroun occidental, et de tenir 
compte des qrands courants de la pens6e internationale en ce
qui touche les fins du droit p gnf; et les m gthodes modernes
de lutte contre la criminalite."
This objective, it may be submitted, ought to be paramount in the reform and
unification of motor insurance law of Cameroon. Commercial dealings in
general have no internal origin in any particular country.
	 Even English
commercial laws are Norman-French in origin yet we talk of English customary
laws in respect of commerce. Lord Mansfield was able to derive some princip-
les, for example, the doctrine of'non-disclosure from the expansion of inter-
national commercial dealings especially in respect of marine insurance.
This leads us to our fourth source of the content of laws required for
the reform and harmonisation of the proposed motor vehicle insurance code.
It is conceded that the attitude of nations borrowing laws from another is
not objectionable. 	 In order to achieve progress and development, the
experiences of one country and the solutions applied to solve its problems
may provide a lesson for another going through comparable experiences and
faced with similar problems. 	 Nations do share experiences even in techn-
ology.	 However, the borrowing of rules and practices for reform ought to
take account of the fact that the laws of one country and the solutions
applied to them may not be found suitable for the receiving country. Hence
any such incorporation ought to look for the present and well ahead in order
to be meaningful and useful.
To conclude therefore, the primary consideration for the formulation of
laws in any given country ought to concern itself with the contemporary
realities of the country.
19 Emphasis added.
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Having disposed of these preliminary considerations, we must now
proceed to identify the major problem areas dealt with in the earlier
chapters of this work and then advance some possible solutions.
In Chapters Two and Three of this work we noted
19A
 that motor insurance
is the branch in which bad business is experienced by insurance companies in
Cameroon.	 Further, as was seen in Chapter One and Two of this work on the
reason for government control of insurance concerns, the main emphasis of the
law is on the financial stability of the insurance company. 	 This is a
natural consequence of our conviction that the only sound justification for
the supervision of insurance companies is the need to ensure the continuous
viability of insurance companies to fulfill their obligations.
One can fairly surmise that in both the United Kingdom and Cameroon,
the means of ensuring the financial stability of insurance companies are
commendable. Without over labouring the point, financial stability is the
sine qua non of a successful insurance company. In insurance regulation, all
the ado about licensing, regular returns, inspection, will lead to naught
unless a stringent margin of solvency is adopted and enforced.
The financial regulations in both England and Cameroon are not restric-
ted to the requirement of only a guarantee deposit. The solvency margin
concept in England and Cameroon, and the flexible guarantee and technical
reserves methods in Cameroon are better alternative approaches. The guaran-
tee deposit is not particularly effective in ensuring that insurance compan-
ies are always able to meet their obligations for it ties up capital and may
worsen rather than improve the financial security of an insurance company.
While we concede that a statutory deposit may discourage the formation of
out-and-out	 unsatisfactory	 companies, as a young company grows, the
19A Supra, at p.100 note 102 and p.202 note 159.
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shareholders' capital will bear little or no relation to the liability of the
company. It does not make any contribution to the overall solvency of the
insurance company.
Insurers trade in uncertainties. 	 Past experience of risk, though the
basis of underwriting, is no certain guarantee of future trends. The
conditions under which business is transacted change rapidly, a fact which
non-life insurers recognise by granting policies on an annual basis. There
are many ways in which an insurer can come to ruin. It can accept highly
speculative and unprofitable classes of business (for example, motor insur-
ance) over a number of years; it can transact profitable business on an
extremely competitive basis, resorting to cut-rates, high commissions and
excessive costs of advertisements and acquisitions of business in the form of
agency commissions and inspectors' expenses; it can be quixotic in claims
settlements, partly from the desire to acquire business by becoming known as
the generous company; it can under-estimate its outstanding claims owing to
lack of experience or poor judgment; it can be exposed to the devastating
blow of an immense disaster such as the numerous fires that result from
technology and industrialisation and may collapse through incautious under-
writing by incompetent staff.
Unlike the statutory deposit, the margin of solvency bears a definite
relationship to the liabilities of a company. 	 The margin of solvency con-
cept, as we have already observed,
20
 is a requirement that the assets of a
company should exceed its liabilities by a fixed amount or a certain percent-
age. Another method for calculating the solvency margin is the dual test
laid down in the E.E.C. Non-Life Establishment Directive which has the
advantage of reflecting individual companies' claims experience as well as
20 See supra Chapter Two p.86.
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responding to the growth in premium income. 21 The margin of solvency method,
thus, ensures the provision of adequate reserves as a protection for policy-
holders and also for use during periods of violent fluctuations. As well as
being the main bulwark and source of security for the insured, it provides
the investible funds.
Further the investment policies required by the legislation of both
England and Cameroon are desirable. According to figures released by the
British Insurance Association, British insurance companies in 1976 made a
record underwriting loss of £151 million on their world wide general busin-
ess, excluding marine.	 However, this overall loss was offset by the total
investment income of £631 million, thus resulting in a net profit before tax
of £480 million.
22
The sheet anchor of insurance against predictable under-
writing losses, which are more prominent than profits, is investment income.
While the underwriting profits of one year may suddenly be replaced by
losses, the investment income from the asset portfolios of the company which
are enlarged each year by further investment, will rise over a period of
time. This investment income is earned on the insurer's own portfolio of
strengthened assets, built up over the years by ploughing back profits to the
capital base and from the investment - of premium monies.
The legislation of both countries provides a wide basis and diversific-
ation of investment. An unwise investment policy, for example, concentrating
all the eggs in one basket, that is, in a particular form of investment
21 H.A.L. Cockerell and G.M. Dickinson, Motor Insurance and the 
Consumer, 1980, London, p.36; See also article 16(3) of Council
Directive of 24 July 1973 abolishing restrictions on freedom of
establishments in the business of direct insurance other than life
assurance (73/240/EEC): 0.3. of the European Communities No.
L228/20), 16 August 1973.
22 British Insurance Association, Insurance Facts and Figures, 1976,
(1977) at p.l.
ion as to who was at fault in the course of the accident. Similar propos-
25
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instead of securing the safeguard of spread and an inflexible investment
policy in rapidly changing times can slowly bleed a company to death.
In Chapter Three of this work,
23
 we saw that the law has increasingly
come to recognise the value of insurance as a guarantee that liabilities,
when they arise, will be met. This is shown by the periodical extension of
compulsion to insure.
24
 Nevertheless, this guarantee is still subject to the
law on civil liability.	 The present system of tort liability has been
subjected to criticism in France and Britain as no longer offering the best
means for the compensation of road traffic accident victims. 	 France has
established a limited no fault scheme, in which certain categories of
accident victims would expect to receive compensation without any determinat-
als have been made in England.
26
The adoption of no fault schemes can be
found in New Zealand, Singapore, Australia, Canada, Massachusetts and some
other states in the United States of America.
The need for similar schemes may be even greater in Cameroon. In
Cameroon there is a less well developed social security system compared to
the English and French social security systems. In fact, the only persons
eligible for state benefits in Cameroon are civil servants and employees of
nationalised corporations.	 Allied to this, there is no National Health
23 See supra, pp.177-198.
24 See supra pp.204-239, where compulsory insurance is increasingly
applied to liabilities of other types: riding establishments for
example, have been singled out in Britain as a fit subject for
compulsion to insure.
25 See supra, Chapter Three, pp.185-194.
26 Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal 
Injury [Chairman: Lord Pearson] Vol.1, Cmd. 7054-1, London H.M.S.O.,
pp.212-224. See also Chapter Three supra, p.167-168.
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Service. Medical bills are borne by the individuals themselves - everyone is
his own caretaker, especially those who are not civil servants. A third
reason for the establishment of a no fault scheme is that the family ties
which provided social security are rapidly disintegrating. 	 Fourthly, there
is a greater use and dependence on motor vehicles as the principal means of
transport. This, coupled with the bad roads, bridges and low level of infra-
structure result in a high incidence of accidents.
There is therefore a case for the introduction of a no fault scheme in
Cameroon. The aim to provide road accident victims with adequate, speedy and
certain recompense is laudable but the validity of transporting conclusions
from other countries places doubt on the original premises upon which the
theory of no fault is based.
27
We have noted earlier
28
 that a system suit-
able and acceptable in one country or community may be quite unsuitable in
another. This study recognises that a complete no fault scheme in Cameroon
would not achieve better results than the tort system and such a solution
would produce results inimical to the best interests of a large proportion of
Cameroon population. It is worth noting that Cameroon is a developing count-
ry. It is indeed a question of who should finance such a scheme. Experience
of claims settlement by the Motor Insurance Fund discussed in Chapter Four
29
and the National Social Security Fund reveals that claims settlement is not
generous and there is a possibility of mismanagement by government officials;
further, high administrative costs would be involved in the operation of such
27 See for example the experience of no fault in America: The
Economist March 6, 1976, Vol 258, No.6912 at p.69 "Help, help, fetch
a lawyer."
28 Supra, at p.481.
29 Supra pp.265-289 esp. Tables
	
9	 and	 13 on pp.264 and 285
respectively.
- 491 -
a scheme. The cost of implementing complete no fault scheme would clearly
increase the cost of motor insurance to most Cameroonians, a majority of whom
at present cannot afford it.
It is arguable that a complete no fault scheme does not provide a
complete answer for the results of every accident. The standard scale of
benefits leaves many eventualities uncatered for and the benefits payable are
largely fixed and inflexible.
Moreover, with the complete abolition of tort liability, insurers will
find themselves excluded altogether from the field of liability for personal
injury by accident especially in the motor field which represents an average
of 40 per cent of their premium income.
30
This would probably be the case
notwithstanding the fact that underwriting results for motor insurance have
been worsening during recent years as a result of the upsurge in road
accidents.
31 On the other hand, motor business does represent a cash-flow
with a resultant investment income which would disappear with such a change.
Furthermore, insurance provides a great percentage of Cameroon national
income
32
 which may diminish under a complete no fault scheme. It could also
well be that the legal profession would lose a great deal of civil suits and
may have to rely on contract, criminal and divorce cases which are relatively
rare in Cameroon. In this light one may contend that there may be social
30 See supra, p.40 Table 1 of premium income of insurance companies in
Cameroon. There may be plenty of scope for continued exercise of
other faculties and growth or potential growth in products and
professional indemnity liability but this appears very doubtful
since Cameroon is not an industrial country.
31 Institut International des Assurances, Le March6 Camerounaise des 
Assurances, January 1977, No.4, pp. 5-7; Institut International des
Assurances, Une assurance automobile plus compatible avec 	 le 
d6ve1oppement, Lom6 15-20 October 1979, Revue 11A Sp6cial, No. 4
"Rapport sur l'Assurance Automobile au Cameroun", at pp. 16 - 20 •
esp. at p. 16.
32 Ibid.
- 492 -
arguments in favour of no fault compensation, but it does appear that there
are no grounds Or rather, a weak basis for such a scheme to survive in
Cameroon, at any rate for the present.
Here, we would seek to search for ways of improving the system. In
this endeavour, where the principles and practices of other countries seem
unsuitable, an original principle would have to be derived.
	 The solution
which this study advances is that there should exist a two tier system, that
is, the continuation of tort remedies and an extensive social security scheme
to provide alternative measures of compensating road accident victims. There
are two possible alternative approaches to this idea. The first approach may
require claimants to elect whether to sue in tort to recover compensation or
opt for compensation under the proposed no fault scheme. Claimants accepting
payment under the no fault scheme would agree that payment is in full and
final settlement. If therefore, a claimant feels he would do better by
litigating he will be free to do so. The state however will not sponsor his
case. On the other hand, with the second approach, the claimant can use both
types of machinery to achieve compensation. Here, none of these systems will
be in substitution for the other. Rather, the proposed no fault scheme will
be complementary to the tort system, that is, it will provide supportive
payments leaving the injured victim with his right to sue for additional
damages.
The proposed no fault arrangement suggested under these two approaches
will co-exist harmoniously with tort liability. The administration of the
scheme would be either run by the motor insurers direct or by the state, with
insurers acting as its agents. The proposed scheme would provide compensat-
ion 33
 for anyone who suffered personal injury as a result of a road accident,
as well as the dependents of such victims, although if the victim himself had
been guilty of some gross or willful misconduct, his compensation would be
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reduced. The cumulative effect of these proposals may have the effect of
restricting tort claims to cases of serious injury and substantial pecuniary
loss thereby reducing the number of court cases in trivial cases.
	 As a
result, there might be considerable savings both in damages and administrat-
ive costs in the really trivial cases, a larger fraction of which could be
paid out in benefits instead of having to be spent on the costly and protrac-
ted procedures of investigating legal liability - the forensic lottery
33A
 in
which many accident victims would usually receive no compensation.
The choice of either approach in preference to the other will depend on
the economic and social conditions in Cameroon. This may require some study
and investigation of what lies behind the present realities of Cameroon.
Reforms ought to evolve out of informed analysis. We may only venture in
this study to suggest some possible sources of financing the proposed scheme.
It should be recognised that the task becomes formidable when a new procedure
has to be costed without clear guidance.	 However, it is suggested that it
should be the collective responsibility of the community to finance the
scheme.
34
33 Loss of earnings could be paid for on an agreed scale and at a
ceiling rate or percentage leaving high earners to sue for
additional damages if they claim more but hospital expenses and
rehabilitation would be paid for in full. The reduction of awards
for economic losses and in particular, even the elimination of some
non-economic losses such as pain and suffering under the proposed no
fault scheme would ensure that insurance premiums do not get out of
control. The losses may be claimed by the plaintiffs in civil
proceedings for negligence, as in the case of additional damages in
respect of high earners suggested here.
33A This expression is attributable to T.S. Ison, The Forensic Lottery,
1967 London, Staple Press.
34 This may represent a dent into individual responsibility which
characterises the tort system. Further, this suggestion reflects a
utilitarian approach towards compensation for road traffic accidents
- it stands in stark similarity to the traditional forms of
Insurance schemes mentioned in the introductory chapter, pp.32-36.
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Under this scheme, compensation would be paid out of a central fund
contributed to by the state, by motorists, both vehicle drivers and owners by
way of a levy on driving licences, road fund licence fees, an annual levy on
all registered vehicles, a slight increase in premiums and an extra tax on
petrol and by employers and employees where necessary by a general levy on
taxation.	 One could well argue that since drivers and pedestrians benefit
and create the risk of accidents by the presence of vehicular traffic they
should also contribute towards the central fund. 	 It is desirable that
drivers and pedestrians should retain maximum sense of responsibility on the
roads.
35
 A good theoretical case could be made out for the proposition that
they should have to pay a small part of any damages awarded. Unfortunately,
this would mean in many instances that a plaintiff or victim would not
receive the whole of his award, and present arrangements to guarantee that
given a valid cause of action, the plaintiff or victim will not get his
damages paid in full. The idea of personal responsibility for an accident is
basically a moral one which in practice is vitiated by insurance as claims
are met from the pool of policyholders contribution rather than the wrongdoer
himself. 36
	Any question of punishment ought solely to be a matter
35 The unanswerable question here would be, how will the pedestrians'
contribution be collected if they are neither employers nor employ-
ees? Secondly, would some persons not be subject to multiple
contribution? Perhaps one ought to ignore these questions as these
would raise arguments which are not dissimilar from those on tort
claims especially in relation to the idea of creating risk. A
better idea for ameliorating the position of drivers and pedestrians
would be to encourage personal accident insurance which does not
depend on the vagaries of tort liability and on he other hand, is
not detrimental to insurance companies.
36 Moreover, the growth of liability insurance and the thought that the
loss could be borne by an anonymous body has to some extent changed
the nature of liability and affected the assessment of damages: see,
for example, Morgans v. Launchburv [1973] A.C. 127 at 135 per Lord
Wilberforce; Lister v. Romford Ice an Cold Storage Co. Ltd.,	 [1957]
A.C. 555 at 577 per Viscount Simonds.
	
See further, G. Viney, Le
D6clin de la Resoonsabilite Individuelle, 1964, Paris, L.G.D.J.
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for the criminal law.
	 Rather unfairly perhaps, this suggestion would
perpetrate the injustice that a negligent defendant's civil liability is
determined not by reference to his culpability but purely arbitrarily by
reference to the damage suffered by the injured plaintiff.	 In general
society expects that wrongdoing will be followed by retribution in some form.
This would still be so in the proposed no fault arrangement because it is an
aspect that the criminal law would look after exactly as it does at present.
Nevertheless, it seems that the civil code of justice echoes this idea in
many guises even though in no apparent systematic fashion. This is manifest-
ed by insurance practice when motorists forfeit their no claim discount and
are required to pay an increased premium. Furthermore, if the victim himself
is guilty of contributory negligence this is taken into account and his
compensation is reduced.
The proposition for automatic compensation is desirable but, of even
deeper and greater significance, the government should become more involved
in accident prevention schemes - as the axiom goes, prevention is better than
cure. This could be achieved through improving the roads, providing modern
road traffic laws and enhancing road safety measures for the prevention of
accidents through nationwide campaigns.
36A
Insurers could concentrate their
efforts on improving safety with greater liaison between safety advisors and
safety officers of their clients. 	 Perhaps greater emphasis should be placed
36A This seems to have been recognised by the Government and may be
evidenced by a round-table conference discussion y on this issue inl 
Cameroon: See for example, Ministry of Transport, "Prevention routiire:
La plus grande partie des accidents se produisent dans les zones
urbaines - revile la table-ronde organise au lancement de la campagne 1
Yaound6", Cameroon Tribune, No 2936, 27 March 1984, p.3; See also,
interview by Laurent-Charles and Boyomo Assala, "Preventing Road
Accidents: How To Cut Our Death Rate By 10% " and "Road Accidents
Prevention	 Fortnight: Most Accidents Are Caused By Highway Code
Violations - Ngbwa", (interviewee) Cameroon Tribune, No.472, 6 July
1983, p.1 and p.3 respectively. It was acknowledged here that the
sensitization of the public is an important measure but is a long-term
task. See further, Shey Mabu Peter T. "Death On Our Roads, Anyway
Out?", Cameroon Tribune, No.472, 6 July 1983, p.l.
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on repair and maintenance facilities.	 The conditions in insurance policies
with respect to failure to keep vehicles in a roadworthy condition could be a
serious ground for contributory negligence of the driver and owners of
vehicles. In England, there is a voluntary organisation with branches all
over the country providing advanced training courses to already licensed
drivers to improve safety standards. In addition, there is an established
motor vehicle repair centre at Thatcham.
The inability of the French law of civil responsibility and the English
law of tort to which Cameroon owes its historical reception should awaken us
to the undue complexity, inadequacy and archaism of these laws in their
country of origin and further prompt us for a search of rules that are more
just, more practicable, simpler, capable of wide acceptance and suitable for
our needs.
In addition, with respect to Chapter Three on the Reason for and Scope
of Compulsory Insurance and Chapter Four on the Protection of Road Traffic
Accident Victims, a wider proposal may be advanced on an international basis
to provide co-operation and development in West African countries in the
legal sphere. It would be desirable to establish and implement a Brown Card
System similar to the Green Card system in Western Europe or the Orange Card
in the Arab countries with regard to motor vehicle insurance. This idea was
first mooted in 197737
 after various exchanges both with the British Insur-
ance Association and the UNCTAD Secretariat and a draft Brown Card Agreement
has been produced by the Committee of West African Insurance Companies
Association (WAICA) charged with this responsibility.
	
In a Round Table
Conference held in Yaounde Cameroon, in November 1976, the UNCTAD Secretariat
was mandated to prepare a draft agreement for the establishment of an Inter-
African Vehicle Third Party Liability Insurance Card and has nonetheless
37 See, F.C. Ozomah, "Ecowas and Motor Insurance in West Africa - the
Brown Card System", 1979, Vol. V., WAICA Journal, pp. 85-89.
•
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proceeded to evolve the Brown Card which will be used in the Sub-Region of
West Africa.
Having regard to the colonial histories from the sixteenth century one
will no doubt appreciate that the laws applicable in West African countries
with particular reference to insurance generally, and more so in the field of
motor vehicle insurance, follow the laws applicable in England and France.
In the WAICA countries which comprise the English-speaking countries, the
motor vehicle insurance legislation follows closely that of England. 38
Similarly, those of the CICA countries of West Africa which comprise the
French-speaking countries follow the French civil law model.
In order to satisfy the law on compulsory insurance in the English-
speaking countries, the user of a motor vehicle need only have an insurance
cover which will indemnify him against damages for death and bodily injuries
in respect of third parties. 	 On the other hand, in the French-speaking
countries the requirement for a compulsory cover is in respect of death and
personal injury to third parties and in addition property damage. 	 The
recognition of this disparity may cause difficulties in the implementation of
the proposed Brown Card system.	 However, the European Green Card system has
established and fostered the free movement within the Community of motor
vehicles, even with similar attendant difficulties, due to the implementation
in each member state, of an E.E.C. directive
39
 to the effect that the posses-
sion of a motor insurance policy would be regarded as having satisfied the
compulsory motor insurance laws of any country of the E.E.C. Consequently,
38 See, the Motor Vehicle (Third Party Insurance) Act 1945 in Nigeria;
the Motor Vehicle (Third Party Insurance) Act 1958 of Ghana; the
Motor Vehicle (Third Party Insurance) Act 1948 of Gambia; the Motor
Vehicle (Third Party Insurance) Act 1949 of Sierra Leone.
39 Council Directive of 24 April 1972 on the approximation of the laws
of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability
in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and to the enforcement of
the obligation to insure against such liability (72/166/EEC) 0.3.
No.L103/1 1972 Part I, Special Edition.
insurer under current insurance conditions. In addition the courts and
42
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a similar solution is possible within the West African Community.
In Chapter Five of this work on the formation of the insurance contract
and subsequent chapters we witness the disparity between the law in English-
speaking Cameroon and French-speaking Cameroon, each following English or
French law respectively. It is worth noting that there is substantial
similarity between the broad statements of principle in respect of the duty
of disclosure as the laws of insurance in France and England have a common
origin - marine insurance in the eighteenth and nineteenth century.
40
Further international interaction has whittled down the scope of disagreem-
ent, but not completely eliminated the conceptual differences and the
detailed application of the principles.
We observed earlier
41
 that in England, France and Cameroon there exists
a duty to disclose material facts in insurance contracts. And further, that
there has been recent criticism in England of the doctrine of non-disclosure,
questioning the retention of an eighteenth century rule of law which, it is
said, is Unduly harsh on the insured and unnecessarily favourable to the
academic writers have criticised the law on non-disclosure as being far too
40 See, EmSrigon, Traits des Assurances et des Contrats 	 la qrosse,
1938, Paris.
41 See Chapter Five of this study, esp. pp.301-326.
42 Richards, On Insurance, 5th ed., 1952, Vol.2, Chap.10, "The
Anachronistic Doctrine of Concealment"; Harnett, "A Remnant in the
Law of Insurance", (1950) 15 Law and Contemp. Prob. 391.
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stringent.
43
It is important to note that the majority of American state
jurisdictions have refused to apply the strict English rule of disclosure to
non-marine insurance. In American law only a deliberate non-disclosure
avoids liability and the insurer is under a duty to ask for information.
Clearly, there is some need for a duty on the part of the insured to
provide information on the risk he requires an insurer to undertake.
However, the onerous character of the duty placed upon the insured, by the
law, to disclose any fact which a prudent insurer would consider to be
material and the failure or breach of which, entitles the insurer to repud-
iate the policy and to reject any claim is far too wide and stringent on the
insured. An honest and reasonable insured may be quite unaware of the
existence and extent of this duty, and even if he is aware of it, he may have
great difficulty in forming any view as to what facts a prudent insurer would
consider to be material.	 Material facts are defined as facts which are
likely to influence the rate of premium fixed by the insurer and to determine
his decision whether or not to accept the proposed risk.	 This means, in
effect, that the proposed insured is expected to decide in advance which
facts are material in accordance with the above definition. In order to do
this he would have, quite independently, to form an opinion as to what
factors are likely to affect the insurer's decision with regard to the rate
of premium and/or acceptance of the risk. The insured is thus required, in
effect, to undertake an excursion into the mind of the insurer. The onerous
character of the burden thus placed upon the insured becomes all the more
striking when a dispute subsequently arises as to the materiality of a given
43 See the Law Commission Report (No.104), Non-Disclosure  and Breach of 
Warranty, 1980, Cmnd.8064; Hasson, "The Doctrine of Uberrima Fides 
in Insurance Law - a Critical Evaluation", (1969) 32 M.L.R. 615; J.
Birds, "The Reform of Insurance Law", [1982] J.B.L. 449-459.
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fact. To prove the materiality of such a fact the insurer would have to call
expert evidence of other insurers. 	 We are thus in a situation where the
question whether a particular fact would have affected the insurer's decision
as to the rate of premium and the acceptance of the risk had to be answered
by the insured without any assistance from the insurer if it arose before the
conclusion of the contract, whereas it could be answered by the insurer only
with the assistance of expert witnesses if it arose after the conclusion of
the contract. The burden thus placed upon the proposed insured is evidently
too high. A more realistic duty would be to require the proposed insured to
disclose not the facts which are likely to affect the decisions of the
insurer as to the rate of premium and the acceptance of the risk but those
which, in the opinion of a reasonable insured, he ought to disclose. The Law
Commission has recommended
44
 a reduction of the duty of disclosure to a duty
to disclose any material facts which the proposer knows or can be assumed to
know and which a reasonable man in the position of the proposer would
disclose after making such enquiries as are reasonable having regard to the
nature and extent of the cover which is sought, and the circumstances in
which it is sought.
There is yet a second problem which the duty of disclosure poses. The
question arises whether the duty to disclose is voluntary or whether the
insurer is obliged to ask questions. If the insurers are obliged to ask
questions then it may reasonably be supposed that any matter which is not
made the subject of any question is not relevant and therefore the proposed
insured disposes of his duty to disclose after answering specific questions
supplied by the insurer.	 The duty of disclosure operates harshly on the
44 Law Commission Report, (No.104), op. cit., para.4.47-4.52. See also
Clause 2 of the Draft Insurance Law Reform Bill (L.C. Report No.
104, Appendix A).
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insured, and produces something of a trap for the insured in relation to
proposal forms and renewals of the cover. In relation to proposal forms even
a reasonable insured is likely to be unaware that after answering a series of
specific questions he remains under a residual duty to volunteer further
information to which no question has been directed. In relation to renewals
even a reasonable insured is likely to be unaware that in law these
constitute fresh contracts of insurance and that the duty of disclosure
arises afresh on every renewal. Lord Mansfield in Carter v. Boehm 45
 made it
clear that both parties must act in good faith. By this he must reasonably
be understood to mean that whilst the insured must act in good faith in
disclosing all the relevant information, the insurer must also on his part
act in good faith in informing the insured seeking insurance cover what his
legal duties are. In this respect there is a recommendation 46 to the effect
that proposal forms and renewal notices should contain prominent warnings of
the proposer's duty and extent of his duty of disclosure, not only when he
makes the first contract of insurance but also on renewal, and that he should
keep copies of information supplied by him to the insurer. The insured will
be further protected by the requirement that he will be supplied by the
Insurer with a copy of the proposal form which he has completed and of any
information which he has given to the insurer on renewal.
The proposals for reform which we have just alluded to advanced by the
English Law Commission after a close study of the issues are equally
applicable to proposers of insurance in Cameroon. 	 The circumstances in
Cameroon may in particular be more demanding of protection for the insured,
45 (1966) 3 Burr. 1905. See, supra, p.305.
46 Law Commission Report, (No.104), op. cit., para.4.60. See also
Clause 4(3) of the Draft Insurance Law Reform Bill (L.C. Report No.
104, Appendix A).
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due to the prevalence of illiteracy, ignorance and lack of awareness of
contractual rights which affects one out of every two persons in Cameroon.
47
There are essentially three problems involved where an illiterate person is a
party to an insurance contract. First, in the discharge of his duty of
disclosure, he may not be aware of what facts are material for the purposes
of disclosure and this of course would affect the quality of enquiries which
it would be reasonable to expect him to make. Second, where the illiterate
party is assisted by an insurance agent in fulfilling his duty of disclosure,
he may be quite unaware of its legal implications. Third, since the contract
of insurance is a written contract, the contract may contain terms, such as
conditions	 and	 exclusions, limitations or penalty clauses which the
illiterate party is ignorant about. Cameroonian courts have demonstrated an
acute lack of sensitivity in this respect.
48
	In spite of the seriousness of
this problem, there is no legislation for the protection of illiterate
parties to an insurance contract. Related to the problem of illiteracy is
that the proposal form and policy may be written in a language alien to the
insured, a problem which recurs constantly in as much as there are two
official languages in Cameroon, English and French. A contracting party may
be literate in English and not in French, or vice versa. We observed in
Chapter Seven
49
on the construction of the insurance contract that a
translation by an insurance clerk of the phrase "affaire et promenade"
produced quite a different result. There is certainly a case for enabling
insured parties to benefit from legislation designed to protect illiterates.
47 See, Bureau Central du Recensement, Recensement 1166ral de la 
population et de l'habitat, April 1976, Vol.4 - Scolarisation -
Niveau d'instuction, p.71.
48 See, Chapters Six and Seven of this work, supra, pp. 379-385 and
416-433 respectively.
49 See, supra, p.432.
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The policy of insurance is a highly legalistic document which is
presented to consumers who are unable to read and even if they do read them,
they would be Unable to understand its contents. It is suggested that there
must be a legislative duty based on public policy on insurance intermediaries
to explain the terms of the insurance contract to the illiterate party. In
this connection, there must also be a presumption that the dominant party to
the contract, the insurer, is bound by what the agent proffers as the terms
of the contract and has knowledge of the meaning and scope of the terms thus
proffered: the insurance intermediary acting for him is his agent for the
purposes of effecting an insurance contract. This will prevent such dominant
parties, the insurers, from pleading that the insurance intermediary is not
his agent.	 The	 legislative
	
provisions should also incorporate the
requirement on all writers of documents to explain the documents to the
illiterate persons for whom they write, that is, a provision similar to the
Nigerian provisions, described below.	 Failure to comply with the above
should render the contract voidable. Nigeria has an illiterate Protection
Act 1948, 50 the pith and marrow of which is section 3 which provides
"Any person who shall write any letter or document at the
request, on behalf, or in the name of any illiterate person
shall also write on such letter or other document his own
name as the writer thereof and his address; and his so doing
shall be equivalent to a statement:-
(a) that he was instructed to write such letter or document
by the person for whom it purports to have been written and
that the letter or document fully and correctly represents
50 The different states in Nigeria have different Illiterate Protection
Laws, although they provide substantially the same provisions:
Illiterates Protection Act (Lagos), Cap.83; Illiterates Protection
Law (former Eastern Region), Cap.64; Illiterates Protection Law
(former Northern Region), Cap.51;	 Illiterates Protection Law
(former Western Region), Cap.47; See further, E.I. Nwogugwu, "An
Examination of the Position of Illiterates in Nigerian Law", (1968)
1 J.A.L. 32;
	
S.K. Date-Bah,	 "Illiterate Parties and Written
Contracts", (1971) 3 Review of Ghana Law 179.
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his instructions; and (b) if the letter purports to be
signed with the signature or mark of the illiterate person,
that prior to its being so signed it was read over and
explained to the illiterate peon and that the signature or
mark was made by such person."
With respect to the insurance contract the insurance intermediary would
normally be the person who would fill in the proposal form on behalf of the
illiterate person and in so doing he would be making an undertaking that the
written document correctly represents what the insured stated. Further the
insurance intermediary would be under a duty to explain to the illiterate
party the full import of the document he is signing. 	 This seems necessary
because, despite all the boldly printed warnings on proposal forms and
renewal notices, the duty to disclose material facts and the penalty for
failure thereto are clearly not understood by many policyholders who inhibit
a fundamental misunderstanding about insurance cover.
52
	It is hoped that
some explanation from either brokers or their insurers about the meaning of
an insurance contract in general and particularly the cover a client wishes
to purchase would assist illiterate and semi-illiterate parties in insurance
transactions.
More appropriately, an arrangement could be made within the insurance
Industry to establish an independent Central Advisory and Disputes Bureau
with local branches in all the provinces of the Republic of Cameroon to cater
for insurance matters. This form of self-regulation would increase and
facilitate the dissemination of insurance information throughout the country.
51 Section 3, Illiterates Protection Law (former Eastern Region)
Cap.64.
52 Especially terminologies, such as "covered," "comprehensive cover",
"all risk insurance" in fire, household and motor policies. See for
example in England, The Insurance Ombudsman Bureau, Annual Report
1984 pp.27-33
53 See supra, Chapter Eight of this work on the Settlement Process, pp.
444-465.
53
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In consequence, public awareness of the availability of advice providing
services and disputes settlement procedures might bridge the gap between the
'insurance man' and the lay man.
We have earlier stated
54
 that the primary motive, and indeed the most
important consideration for the present study, is a proposal for a uniform
motor vehicle insurance code. In this respect we would consider in the
foregoing discussion, in what form such reform and unification of the laws
ought to proceed. The question then is, are the courts the best institution
to make reforms in the law which are of such cardinal importance? Or should
the legislators take the initiative? 	 This question can be answered simply
and easily by the age-old adage that courts do not make laws. However, one
cannot overlook the usefulness of the courts as an instrument of law reform.
In both common and civil law 55 countries through the use of rules of
interpretation, courts have been known and found to develop the law. For
Ainstance, we observed 56
 that the Cour de cessation in Arret Jand'heur in
1930
57
 made a formidable interpretation of article 1384 of the Civil Code.
The French Civil Code is now so old that the courts have been compelled, in
the absence of legislative amendment, to give some of the articles an
interpretation that could never have been predicted by anyone who had
recourse only to the text of the articles.
54 See supra, at p.482 and the Abstract to this study at p.(v).
55 For the importance placed on jurisprudence as a source of law in
France see, Otto Kahn - Freund, Claudine tAvy and Bernard Rudden, A
Source-book on French Law: System- Methods : Outlines of Contract 
1979 2nd ed., Oxford Clarendon Press esp. pp. 116-166.
56 See, supra, Chapter Three of this work on the Reason for and Scope
of Compulsory Insurance, pp.153-155.
57 Ch. reunies, 13 February 1930, 0.1930. 1.57.
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In the case of Cameroon, the question of the courts being an
alternative agency or instrument for reform is debatable. On the other hand,
it may be observed that the courts may provide the forum for illuminating and
identifying the problem areas of the law and place them in the proper
perspective for future discussion. 	 It is significant to point out the
limitations which the courts in Cameroon may face. It has been constantly
made clear that Cameroon has a pluralist legal system - French law, English
law and customary law
58
. In view of this decentralised nature of Cameroonian
courts, it is questionable whether the courts can effectively carry out the
task of unifying the laws. There has been a gradual whittling down of the
influence of the judiciary, while on the other hand, the pervasiveness of the
executive has been intensified - most enactments from the legislature are
designed to apply to the entire country, thus ensuring and enhancing
uniformity. Indeed, this negative attitude towards the judiciary is reflected
in the constitution of the personnel of the courts. 	 Most of the judges
before reunification were learned in one of the two existing legal systems.
With this limitation, they have not generally proven themselves to be equal
to the task of properly analysing the issues involved. As already observed
59
in the introductory chapter, even highly qualified judges have not generally
delivered satisfactory judgments in connection with or when issues of
conflict of laws arise. They rather resort to the law they are acquainted
58 See the introduction to this study, supra, pp.1-37.
59 Supra, pp.28-30.
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with and hence integration has not taken the course it ought to have taken.
The expectation is that a change may be realised in the future in the
constitution of the courts as the school of magistracy is designed to
incorporate into the mainstream of the judiciary lawyers and advocates of
both English and French law.
Allied to the weaknesses of the judicial officers is a further
limitation arising from the structure of the courts. In Cameroon there are
ten courts of appeal in the ten provinces, eight in the French-speaking
Cameroon operating on purely the civil law received from France and two
courts of appeal in the English-speaking Cameroon applying principally
English common law. The total absence of any proper system of law reporting
in these provinces and in the entire country as a whole, coupled with the
fact that there is no strict adherence to precedent in Cameroon as conceived
in England makes it difficult, to say the least, to determine exactly what
the courts will decide in any given case and further, renders any comprehen-
sive review of the decisions of the courts an uphill and an arduous task. It
has been remarked
60
 that the only unifying body in the judicial system is the
Supreme Court of the Republic of Cameroon. Nevertheless even at that level
uniformity is only a paradox, as within the Supreme Court there are two
divisions - one hearing appeals from the courts of appeal of the English-
speaking provinces and the other attending to appeals from the courts of
appeal of the French-speaking provinces.
This leads to a third major criticism of the courts in the process of
reforming and unifying the law. This concerns the assessibility of legal
materials. The courts are not well-equipped and do not have the sources of
60 Supra, at p.23 note 35.
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information to be involved in more far reaching research for the considerable
legal analysis that needs to be carried out.	 In view of what has been said
about the Cameroonian judiciary above, they clearly lack any fact gathering
facilities or machinery and therefore lack the expertise to analyse facts and
legal issues adequately. Even in the common law countries where judges make
valuable pronouncements in their judgments which may be offered as 'food for
thought' in the process of reform, it takes years of litigation and learned
commentary to produce a set of acceptable working rules for general
application.
Another factor that imposes severe constraints on the courts is the
handling of litigation - case load, time, expense and the frustration of
repeated law suits. Probably more important is the fact that the courts in
any particular case cannot deal with the various factual situations that are
involved in a legal rule.
	
Because the courts proceed on a case by case
approach their effectiveness is stifled. They tend to deal with specific
instances rather than with general patterns thus having little diversionary
capacity.	 In Cameroon, in particular, in view of the fact that only a small
number of cases involving disputes on rules and principles of law reaches the
courts, the influence of the courts is bound to be negligible.
It is for these reasons that one can assert that the courts in Cameroon
are manifestly ill-suited as a starting forum for the determination of legal
reform.	 Undoubtedly, the courts would exercise their judicial freedom in
interpreting the laws and filling in the gaps where necessary. 	 Nevertheless
it seems that codification by the legislators is the orda hopeful solution.
While it is conceded that a comprehensive and satisfactory code can
hardly be hoped for, as it would resemble an encyclopedia in its size, nature
and cost, it would be a timid approach to conceive that the task is too big
and completely unattainable and that events should be allowed to take their
course.	 Cameroon is developing rapidly - economically, industrially,
socially and otherwise and the pace of reform may be too 'hot' for a laisser 
faire approach in the legal field. There is already codification in other
areas of law such as the criminal procedure code, the penal code and labour
code, and a tendency towards codification of civil law since 1964. In like
manner, the same spirit ought to be carried through towards rationalisation
and harmonisation of motor vehicle insurance law to adjust it to the changing
mores and conditions before the time is ripe, with the consequent danger that
a premature amalgam may lose much that is good for Cameroon and retain
ingredients from English and French law that would be better left out.
The study, recording of data, the organisation of confereaces ead
seminars all have their part to play for the eventual codification of the
law. Law reporting of judicial decisions ought to be encouraged by the
government who should create a directorate of the Ministry of Justice in
charge of law reporting.
The integration of members of the two sectors of Cameroon is developing
and in the present state of Cameroonian society ample room should be left for
it to continue to do so. 	 As this develops, it may with advantage be
encouraged to absorb as much of English and French principles and practices
as is appropriate, with a view, primarily, to securing uniformity so far as
is practicable. The goal seems to be something like this: as much of
English law as is sound and suited to local circumstances, together with as
much of French law as is worthy of preservation.
If a conscious effort is made to guide development in the right
direction, then those engaged in the task ought to possess a sound knowledge,
not only of English law but of French law, as well as other Anglo-French
jurisdictions. This reiterates our fourth consideration of comparative
lessons and experience from other countries as a source of the content of our
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uniform laws. The Commission, set up for embarking on codification should
make use of the joint effort and collaboration of specialists in related
disciplines -	 academics,	 sociologists,	 anthropologists,	 politicians,
historians, advocates, judges and civil servants of the Ministries of
Justice, Education and Finance.
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